Individualism in the Christology of Helmut Thielicke's sermons: analysis and response by Rueger, Matthew
Durham E-Theses
Individualism in the Christology of Helmut
Thielicke’s sermons: analysis and response
Rueger, Matthew
How to cite:
Rueger, Matthew (2003) Individualism in the Christology of Helmut Thielicke’s sermons: analysis and
response, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3713/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
Matthew Rueger 
Individualism in the Christology of Helm ut Thielicke's Sermons: 
Analysis and Response 
Doctor of Philosophy 
2003 
Abstract 
The overall purpose ofthis thesis is to explore the difficulty of an individualised 
christology in the postmodern world and to offer possible avenues for the Church in 
addressing it. Throughout the thesis we use the example ofHelmut Thielicke to 
demonstrate the nature of an individualistic christology. His sermons are 
particularly singled out because they serve as the main vehicle through which his 
christology reached the people. 
Thielicke is important to our goals for several reasons. For one, he represents a 
christological approach that is highly individualistic. Secondly, Thielicke is 
representative of a shift in the christological paradigm within Lutheranism. 
Discovering whether that shift is helpful or harmful directly affects how 
Lutheranism relates in the postmodern world. 
The thesis will progress through three stages to accomplish our goals. The first 
three chapters form the first stage. Their purpose is to establish concrete examples 
of the way Thielicke's individualised christology affects specific key doctrines in 
classic Lutheranism, as well as how it impacts the more general areas of Lutheran 
ecclesiology and sacramental theology. 
The second stage involves chapters four and five. The purpose here is to search 
for additional roots ofThielicke's individualism. Chapter four looks to the 
influences of both philosophy and secular social thought on Thielicke's christology. 
Chapter five seeks to find Thielicke's place within the overall development of the 
individual. 
Chapters six and seven form the final stage and represent our response to the 
kind of individualised christology Thielicke represents. We begin in chapter six by 
proposing a Theology of Presence as part ofthe solution to individualism. We 
conclude in chapter seven offering practical ways this theology can be applied in 
the postmodern context. Our conclusions will lead us toward the importance of 
establishing a new metanarrative based on a more corporate form of christology. 
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Preface 
God ... does not allow us to find him in our thoughts. lfwe could 
do this, we would not need God; but because we need him, he has 
designated a place and a person -showing us where and in what 
way he ought to be found. 
[Martin Luther, (WA 40111:338)] 
The basic assumption of classic Lutheranism is that Christ binds himself to 
physical elements so that we, as limited and fallen creatures, can grasp him. 
Helmut Thielicke, who was an especially popular Lutheran preacher in Germany 
following World War Two, did not approach christology with this basic 
assumption. Instead, he presented a christology that was more subjective in nature, 
concerned to a greater extent with a spiritual encounter of Christ, and focused more 
obviously on the individual. The intent of this thesis is to explore the direction of 
Thielicke's christology and evaluate its applicability in the postmodem world 
where we live. 
Thielicke's sermons offer an especially important focus for our research because 
it is there in the spoken word where the Church most obviously communicates her 
christology to the laity. In order to ensure the accuracy ofThielicke's thoughts I 
have cited the German text whenever his sermons are quoted. Following each 
German citation I have given the published English translations unless otherwise 
noted. I have offered my own translation on several occasions because the given 
published translation was found lacking. 
Because Thielicke presents himself as a Lutheran theologian, and because I am 
myself a Lutheran pastor, exactly how his ideas relate to the broader tradition of 
Lutheranism is especially important. Throughout this thesis Thielicke's 
IV 
conclusions are measured back against the standard of classic Lutheranism and 
Luther himself. References to the American Edition of Luther's Works [55 
volumes. Vols. 1-30, St. Louis: ConcordiaPublishingHouse, 1967; Vols. 31-55, 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967] will be abbreviated as "LW." References to the 
standard German collection ofLuther's Works, known as the Weimar Ausgabe 
[127 volumes, 1883] will be shown as "WA." While a great deal of discussion is 
devoted to Thielicke's relation to Lutheranism, my hope is that the conclusions 
here reached have application within the broader Christian context. 
Being a Christian pastor I am especially concemed for the effectiveness of the 
christological presentation in the current postmodem world. Thielicke's genius 
was being able to connect with the common man or woman on the street. His focus 
was toward the soteriological impact of his christology. This pastoral drive in 
Thielicke is vital in my own evaluation of his christology. What is of paramount 
importance is how christology today is going to touch the real daily lives of people 
caught in the peculiar individualised world views of postmodemism. 
I am not so bold as to assert that this thesis represents a conclusion to the 
problem of negative individualism as it is expressed today. What I do hope is that 
this thesis provides a healthy starting point for the Churches' ongoing struggle to 
proclaim Christ effectively in a world that seems bent in on itself. 
V 
Introduction 
The following study ofHelmut Thielicke's christology seeks to examine the unique 
contributions of Thielicke to the field of christology with special reference to his 
sermons. Thielicke is an especially important subject for christological study 
because of the impact he has had on Lutheran preaching. While Thielicke has not 
enjoyed the lasting public recognition of other theologians of his era like Barth, 
Althaus, or Bonhoeffer, he was a prolific writer and enjoyed great acclaim as a 
preacher. Churches were filled to overflowing when he preached. This success 
was evident very early in Thielicke's career, when between 1942 and 1944 he 
began an experiment with "didactic sermons" aimed at teaching the faith to those 
unfamiliar with the Church. Immediately at his first Thursday evening didactic 
sermon in St. Mark's Church in Stuttgart an overflow crowd attended, forcing a 
change of venue to the nearby cathedral where an estimated three thousand people 
came to hear him. 1 A little over a decade later in Hamburg the large crowds forced 
Thielicke to move from the Church of St. James to the more spacious church of St. 
Michael, where he again regularly filled the three thousand available seats.2 
His success as a preacher begs the question "why?" What was unique about his 
preaching which brought such crowds and what can the Church in the present day 
glean from him? There seems no reason to disagree with the conclusions of others 
that his preaching success was largely due to a combination of style and relevancy. 
1 Helmut Thielicke, Notes from a Wayfarer, trans. David R. Law (New York: 
Paragon House, 1995), pp.151-152. In German: Zu Gast auf einem schoenen 
Stem, (Hoffman und Campe Verlag, 1984) 
2 Ibid., pp. 285-286. 
1 
Thielicke addressed the real life issues facing the modem German people in a very 
engaging way. An article in Der Spiegel [December 1955] described Thielicke's 
preaching as follows: 
Er spricht vor Leuten, die ihre Zeitung gelesen haben, iiber das, was 
sie in der Zeitung gelesen haben. Er erHiutert die Bibelstelle, die an 
der Reihe ist, mit den Ereignissen, die an der Reihe waren - in der 
Politik, in der Wirtschaft. Er kennt die Wochenschau, er kennt das 
Alltagsdeutsch, er kennt den Biindesburger. Er weiB in dieser Welt 
Bescheid, und er nuzt diese Kenntnis, urn sich mit seiner 
Zuhorerschaft auch iiber die andere Welt zu unterhalten? 
[My translation: He speaks to people who have read their 
newspapers about what they have read in those newspapers. He 
explains the Bible passage for the day in light of current events in 
politics and in the economy. He knows the newsreels, he knows the 
daily German language, he knows the West Germans. He knows the 
information in this world, and he uses this knowledge to talk to his 
audience about the other world.] 
Thielicke's ability to speak to the heart of current issues is reinforced by John 
W. Doberstein's introduction to Thielicke's The Waiting Father; where Dr. 
Wilhelm Pauck is quoted as saying, "There's a man who takes you by the scruff of 
the neck!'.4 Not only was Thielicke successful in engaging the minds and hearts of 
the German people but his sermons enjoyed success in other countries as well. This 
leads to the conclusion that he had his fmger on what was vital to humanity 
throughout the Western world. The fact that no other German Lutheran preacher of 
Thielicke's era enjoyed the same kind of success is evidence that there was 
something unique in the content ofThielicke's sermons. 
3 
"Wohin mit dem Evangeluim?" Der Spiegel, 21 Dezember 1955 p. 34. 
4 Helmut Thielicke, The Waiting Father, trans. John W. Doberstein. (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 8. 
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What then was unique in the content of his sermons? Immediately one notices 
his stylistic sharpness; his imagery is fresh and he maintains one's interest. 
Beneath the style there is also great depth of thought that wrestled with some of the 
most important questions facing humanity. Current in the thought of his generation 
was the issue of individuality. lbis was all the more heightened in light ofthe 
various utopian views of the time and their corresponding communal philosophies. 
People were searching to understand who they were as individuals and what that 
meant for them in relation to God, their fellow human beings, and their 
government. lbis ultimately is what drove much of the christology in Thielicke's 
sermons. 
It was also an issue that put Thielicke at odds with the Lutheran Church to which 
he belonged. By bringing christology more onto the plane of individualism 
lbielicke moved away from the traditional ecclesiological form of christology as 
espoused by classical Lutheranism. What this form of christology emphasised was 
Christ working through the Church via his Word and sacraments. 5 The Church is 
both distributor of Christ's salvific work and is itself an expression of Christ's 
presence.6 lbielicke, however, presents a christology that is not ecclesiological in 
nature but seeks application directly at the level of the individual. 
5 W A 1 0 I, 1: 140 "Whoever seeks Christ must first fmd the Church" 
6 Ian D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther's Doctrine of Christ (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970), p. 106. "Only Christ, with His word, baptism, and supper, 
must be all. (These external ordinances are our means of clinging to Christ alone, 
because in the hands of the Holy Spirit, Who directs only to Christ, they are what 
we actually have of the man Christ in the Church. To deny them is to deny Him, 
for they are His.)" 
3 
These initial observations have led to several different foci within this thesis. Its 
main interest is to examine the specifics of how Thielicke moved toward the 
individual in his christological presentation and then to explore ways this informs 
the christological presentation in the postmodern world. We employ the term 
"postmodern" according to its common usage as a desigation for the unique 
character of present day Western culture. Some of the main features of this culture 
are its bent toward individualism, its embrace of subjectivism, and the atomisation 
of community. A more complete analysis of"Postmodernism" is offered in section 
5.2. 
The role ofThielicke's christological method in postmodernism is important 
because of the way it treats the individual. Obviously what he was saying about the 
individual captured the interest of the people. What was that, and is it still 
applicable in the present postmodern context? A secondary interest is the impact 
this had on classic Lutheranism. The kind of christology that Thielicke pursued has 
in fact been taken up by many Lutheran pastors without critical examination of its 
origin or the impact it has on the Church. This thesis will ask questions about how 
the classic understanding of Lutheran theology is affected by Thielicke's 
christology and whether or not this is good in light of current cultural concerns. 
That being said, it is important for us to define what we mean when we speak of 
classic Lutheranism. Historically Lutheranism has defined itself by the Confessions 
found in the Book of Concord. The first of these is the Augsburg Confession as 
delivered to Emperor Charles V at Augsburg on June 25, 1530. Later variations to 
this confession in the years following 1530 made by its primary author Phillip 
4 
Melanchthon caused no little controversy among Lutherans. To distinguish its 
original confession from the later variations, later Lutheranism began to refer to the 
original text as the "Unaltered Augsburg Confession," and it is this version that is 
considered authoritative. Other defining Confessions of Lutheranism contained in 
the Book of Concord include the Apology of the Augsburg Confession (1531), the 
Smalca/d Articles (1537), The Treastise of the Power and Primacy of the Pope 
(1537), Luther's Small Catechism (1529), Luther's Large Catechism (1529), and 
the Formula of Concord (1577). Classic Lutheranism, as defined here, is that form 
of Lutheranism that maintains its subscription to these Confessions.7 
Use of the term "classic Lutheranism" is not here meant to distinguish a specific 
"golden era" of Lutheran theology. Instead the term as we use it is meant to speak 
of that kind of Lutheran doctrine that remains true to its confessional basis. More 
than simply being at agreement with the letter of the Lutheran Confessions this kind 
of Lutheranism takes on a definite "incarnational" quality. It flows from the 
understanding that Christ has bound himself to certain places for the sake of 
distributing forgiveness; the Word and dominical sacraments bear Christ's 
presence, the Eucharist contains the flesh and blood of Christ, and his salvific 
operation is the primary function of each. We readly admit that within historic 
Lutheranism this christological binding is emphasised to greater and lesser degrees 
by various reformers. We will quote Luther throughout this thesis as one who drew 
constant attention to the salvific action of the christological presence. Yet we also 
note that the primary author of the Augsburg Confession and the Apology to the 
7 Here too there are two forms of confessional subscription in Lutheranism: 
Quantanus (adherence to the Confessions in as much as they agree with Scripture) 
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Augsburg Confession, Phillip Melanchthon, does not use the same incarnational 
language. Melanchthon does not disagree with Luther's incarnational direction; he 
simply does not adopt the same language. 
Use of the term "classic Lutheranism" also does not mean to suggest that there 
was ever a time of complete unity among all Lutherans. After the death of Luther 
(1546) Lutheranism faced both war (The Smalcald War led by Emperor Charles V 
on behalf of Pope Paul Ill) and internal theological division.8 The Formula of 
Concord, authored most notably by Martin Chemnitz and James Andreae, helped 
unite the majority of Lutherans behind a common confession and helped settle the 
worst of the internal doctrinal controversies. 
As we use the term "classic Lutheranism" then, we are identifying a way of 
thinking that includes consistency with the doctrines of the Lutheran Confessions 
and is rooted in the broader incarnational christology of the early reformers. Added 
to what has already been identified as central in this christology one could mention 
the further importance ofLuther's teaching on the forensic sense of Justification 
and the Lutheran distinction between law and Gospel.9 
and Quia (adherence because the Confessions agree with Scripture). The Church 
body in which I am a member requires a "Quia" subscription of its pastors. 
8 For a brief summary of these conflicts see: Eugene Klug, Getting into the 
Formula of Concord (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1977), pp. 9-15. The 
controversies of this period include disagreements over: Adiaphora, Synergism, 
Antinomianism, Crypto-Calvinism, Christ's Descent into Hell and Predestination. 
9 We defme classic Lutheranism in these terms while recognising the maturation 
of Luther' s own thought and possible changes in emphasis present in his writings 
and the writings of the other Reformers. 
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In that Thielicke identified himself as Lutheran, it is relevant to ask how he 
relates to historic Lutheranism. Inasmuch as history can have a cyclical character, 
where issues that are irrelevant in one age may return to relevance several 
generations later, it is important to evaluate both Thielicke and Postmodernism in 
light of earlier "classical" views. As an example, the way classic Lutheranism 
promoted the christological community was not seen as particularly relevant to 
Thielicke in his era. Thielicke's greater concern was leading the individual to a 
personal encounter with Christ. Yet now in the postmodem context where 
individualism has bred extreme subjectivism and has led to fragmentation of moral 
and spiritual standards, reconsideration of earlier more corporate models of 
christology gains greater urgency. 
Thielicke's approach to christology must then be examined both as to his 
treatment of the Lutheran tradition of which he was a part and in light of current 
world conditions. Since values and the social consciousness have changed from 
Thielicke's day, it follows that his christological presentation will require 
adjustment for the postmodem context. Beside the scholarly interest in dissecting 
Thielicke's method there is also a pastoral interest throughout this thesis in finding 
more effective ways to present christology for the good of the overall Church at 
present. 
This thesis will progress through seven chapters to achieve these goals. In the 
first chapter we will show specific examples of how Thielicke draws attention to 
the individual through the christology of his sermons. It is necessary at the outset to 
show the variety of expressions for his individual christology so that we can 
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establish the centrality of individualism to his overall method. The second chapter 
will show how his individualistic christology impacts his ecclesiology. Since our 
concluding response to Thielicke's method directly involves the role of the 
christological community the impact of individualism on ecclesiology is of central 
importance. Chapter three will explore the type of sacramental theology that 
formed around Thielicke's individualised christology. We maintain that 
sacramental theology holds important value in presenting christology to a 
postmodem culture. 
Our concern in chapter four is the variety of influences that pressed Thielicke 
toward his unique christological approach. To evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of his christology for Postmodernism it is necessary to understand what 
elements in his more modernistic German culture were important in shaping his 
thought. Next we will examine how Thielicke's individualism fits into the broader 
context of the developing individual. That form of individualism shaping 
Thielicke's christology in the years around World War Two was part of a long 
evolution of thought about the individual. Knowing how the individual has 
progressed will help us formulate a response. In chapter six we begin moving 
toward solutions to the problem of an individualistic christology in a culture that 
takes individualism to extremes. We will offer our own solution to the problem 
under the title of a "Theology of Presence." This solution will attempt to bring 
postmodem christology more in line with the corporate elements of classic 
Lutheranism that Thielicke ignored and will lay the foundation for a greater 
appreciation of the corporate element in biblical christology. In the final chapter we 
8 
will take up the strengths of Thielicke and attempt to show how the Church can 
better meet his goals as she relates to postmodem people. 
9 
Clhlaptew 1 
1'1hlie~iclke 9 s individuali§ti(C Clhnristoiogy~ 
Appeal and Limitations 
Thielicke's christological presentation saw some changes in emphasis over his 
years as a preacher. Early sermons in war-tom Germany10 obviously would identify 
different problems in the hearers' lives and therefore different applications of the 
Gospel than later sermons in the peaceful surroundings of St. Michael's in 
Hamburg11 • Yet despite the differences in emphasis one can still find a consistent 
thread running throughout his career tying earlier expressions of christology to later 
expressions. That thread is the relationship between believer and Saviour as a 
matter of a personal individual encounter. 
The goal of this chapter is to show ways that individualism shaped Thielicke's 
application of christology in some of the more central doctrines of Lutheranism. 
Five main sections will explore different themes showing movement toward the 
individual. Both difficulties and positive influences inherent in Thielicke's 
christological approach will be discussed. 
10 As an example: the sermons found in Our Heavenly Father [German title: Das 
Gebet das die Welt umspannt (Stuttgart: Quell Verlag, 1964)] were preached in 
1944 at the close of WW II. 
11 An example of these sermons is found in How to Believe Again [German 
title: Und Wenn Gott Ware: Reden uber die Frage nach Gott (Stuttgart: Quell 
Verlag, 1970)] 
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1.1 Key Concept§ Reintell'pll'eted 
As Thielicke brings his personal focus into his overall theological system, one finds 
that individualism redefmes a number of important doctrinal suppositions of classic 
Lutheranism. 
l.la Guilt Rather Than Sin 
Christology can be seen as the resolution of the most profound ofhuman problems. 
What problems the preacher identifies will directly shape the christological 
presentation. Thielicke's sermons contain a heavy emphasis on "guilt" ("Schuld") 
as one of the underlying human problems. 
Evidence seems to suggest that Thielicke 's use of "Schuld" represents a 
conscious decision to avoid the term "Siinde." An especially important discussion 
of this is found in Thielicke's Trouble with the Church where he singles out the 
word "sin" as an example oftheologicaljargon that has lost its effective meaning: 
Have we not gone through times like the period of Rationalism, 
times of ethical reinterpretation of Christianity, which have 
produced a complete moralization of the concept of sin 
[Siindenbegriffs]? Where is the average person today who, when he 
hears the word 'sin,' [Siinde] really hears what the New Testament 
meant by that word? For whom today does this word still say that 
here man is being addressed at the point of his resistance and 
opposition to God, that this means man in his will to assert his 
autonomy [Selbstherrlichkeit], his insistence that everything centers 
in man, his incredible passion for security, his lostness in 
preoccupation with the moment and that which is tangible and 
immediately at hand? And yet all this must be heard when we hear 
th d ' . ' 12 e wor sm, ... 
12 Helmut Thielicke, The Trouble with the Church, trans. John W. Doberstein 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 36. 
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As the above quotation demonstrates Thielicke's avoidance of the term "Siinde" 
is linked directly to what he perceives as the word's loss of meaning with regard to 
personal accountability. The above words were first published in 1965 but this 
tendency to avoid the term "sin" (Siinde) and instead focus on "guilt" ("Schuld") is 
evidenced in sermons written much earlier in his career. 
Part of the difficulty in discussing "sin" vs. "guilt" in the sermons of Thielicke is 
the fact that "Schuld" can be translated as "sin" or "guilt." and often is translated 
"sin" by Thielicke's premier translator David Doberstein. The following example 
shows the difficulty: 
Unser aller Schuld bildet gleichsam - so darf man die biblische 
Schau der Dinge wohl ausdri.icken - ein gewaltiges Kraftfeld. Alles, 
was in dieses Kraftfeld tritt, wird in den groBen Storungs -
ZersetzungsprozeB einbezogen, und die schrecklich Krampfe, die 
heute unsere gepeinigte Erde schiitteln, ddi.ngen sich auch dem, der 
nicht die ganze Tiefe biblischer Erkenntnis besitzt, in ihrem 
Zusammenhang mit der Schuld auf - sehr oft nicht mit einer 
bestimmten, faBbaren und protokollierbaren Schuld, sondern eben 
mit jener Schuld im letzten Hintergrund, mit jener Schuld, von der 
alle Menschen immer schon herkommen. 13 
[translation: (Doberstein) The guilt that we all share constitutes, as it 
were, a tremendous magnetic field and everything that enters into 
this field is drawn into this massive process of disorder and decay. 
And the connection between sin and the terrible convulsions that 
shake our tormented earth today forces itself even upon the minds of 
those who do not possess the full depth of biblical insight. And very 
often the connection is not with a definite, tangible, registrable sin, 
but precisely with this sin in the ultimate background, the sin that 
lies behind every man ever born on this earth.14] 
13 Das Gebet, p. 22. 
14 Helmut Thielicke, Our Heavenly Father, trans. John Doberstein (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 26. 
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Doberstein seems aware of the difficulty translating "Schuld" with a comment 
he makes as a note at the beginning of his translation ofThielicke's sermon, 
"Forgive us our Debts ... " in Our Heavenly Father. Doberstein writes "Here the 
word Schuld, which can be translated as "debt," "guilt," "sin," "trespass," etc., 
necessitates a choice that fits the context."15 Using the above sermon as an 
example, "Schuld" is translated as "guilt" twenty-five times; as "debt" (mostly in 
the formula "Vergib uns unsere Schuld") eight times; as "sin" three times; "misery" 
once, "offense" once, and "fault" twice. The variety of possible translations and 
contextual considerations for each case makes defining "Schuld" in specific terms 
impossible. 
It may well be that "Schuld" was a safer word to use as Thielicke sought to 
reach those unfamiliar with the Church and her "faith language." "Stinde" becomes 
a "Church word" that may lead those of a more secular persuasion to dismiss the 
term without serious concern. "Schuld" with its variety of definitions presents 
more readily acceptable idea of the human problem for those of a more secular 
orientation. Additionally Thielicke's free use of"Schuld" and limited use of 
"Stinde" involves his attempt at personalising mankind's shortcomings. 
A general observation ofThielicke's sermons shows an approach to the whole 
topic ofhuman sin that describes the particular sin at issue (envy, doubt, worry, 
squandering blessings, false piety, lust, thirst for power, etc.) while avoiding the 
term "Stinde". This practice seems compatible with his concerns over 
personalising sin. A comment Thielicke makes in Und wenn Gott ware reinforces 
15 Ibid., p. 102. 
13 
this idea: "Wenn man einmal verstanden hat, was in unserem Leben nicht in 
Ordnung ist, dann stehen wir vor Gott allein - ganz allein. Denn Schuld isoliert 
immer."16 [My translation: "When once we understand what is not in order in our 
lives, then we stand before God alone - all alone. Because guilt always isolates."] 
Thielicke's desire in his general treatment of sin is to isolate the individual in his or 
her particular problem. This isolation serves to force the individual to take 
responsibility for his or her own failings, and it is there at the level of one's 
realisation of self that the Christ encounter takes place. 
J.Jb The Cosmogonic Premise of Guilt 
Thielicke frames his discussion of the human problem in terms of the "cosmogonic 
premise" of guilt. The term "cosmogonic" is derived from the idea of the divine 
formation of cosmological material. Thielicke explains: 
This cosmogonic premise consists in the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihi/o, the creation of the universe from nothing. The point of this 
doctrine lies in the affirmation that God the Creator did not make 
use of already existing, curse-encumbered matter which he then 
formed into a cosmos. . . if creation is thus understood to mean 
creatio ex nihilo, then man caught in the toils of guilt can no longer 
claim that he is the victim of a flaw in the material of which the 
creation is made. He is deprived of the pathos that attaches to the 
tragic victim .... Thus creatio ex nihi/o says in mythical cipher-
language that man must say "I" to himself as a whole and undivided 
being and that he is fixed to himself. 17 
Guilt then becomes a matter of self-realisation. It is the personalising of sin. 
Thus the cosmogonic premise is concerned first of all with removing the blame for 
mankind's fallen condition from God and placing it firmly on the shoulders of the 
16 Und wenn Gott ware, p. 36. 
17 Helmut Thielicke, The Freedom of the Christian Man, trans. John W. 
Doberstein (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), pp. 20-21. 
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individual. A second concern in this premise has to do with God's creation of 
"self' and one's inability to be one's self. This too is related to the issue of 
personal responsibility but goes beyond it to self-determination. As one tries to 
exercise "selfhood" he or she is removed from God. Thielicke draws attention to 
this as he explains his cosmogonic premise of justification. 
The cosmogonic premise of the doctrine of justification may 
therefore be formulated as follows: I have received my self from the 
hands of God, and what is more, received it exclusively from God, 
without any co-operation of the elements of the world; therefore I 
must give my self back to him in the same state in which I received 
it. The discovery that I cannot do this, that I am incapable of 
"reporting back" in the original state in which I received my self, 
fixes and binds me down to the same state of being which we found 
to be the starting point of the doctrine of justification, namely, that I 
have lost the freedom to be my self; there is a rift in the original 
relationship between man and God, a loss of 'peace' which I do not 
have the freedom to restore. The liberation to a new 'ability to be' 
must come from outside my self, from the other side. What is 
needed is the freedom of grace and thus to peace which the world 
cannot give. 18 
As Thielicke discusses the cosmogonic premise of guilt his main concern seems 
to be personal responsibility. He wants individuals to recognise that the original 
creation was good, mankind is now bad, and God cannot be blamed for using poor 
materials. However, where justification is concerned, the cosmogonic premise 
seems to go to the issue of loss of self. God created the self to be good, mankind's 
exercise of self is corrupt, the only hope of restoring the lost self is through alien 
freedom. 
This cosmogonic premise of guilt is a recurring theme in Thielicke's sermons. It 
is not the main theme relating to the human problem, but it does occur in a number 
18 Ibid., p. 21. 
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of his sermons. The most common example of this misguided human autonomy is 
found in the recurring example of the prodigal son. 
Die Freunde und die lieben Mitmenschen denken, wenn sie ihn so 
sehen: ein imponierender, freier Mann, unabhangig von seinem sonst 
so einfluBreichen alten Herrn! Er fragt nicht nach Grundsatzen und 
nicht nach Erziehung, er ist der Typ des souveranen 
Herrenmenschen, das Urbild der Autonomie. 
Aber er, der verlorene Sohn, der seinen Zustand von innen sieht, 
weiB es anders. Die AuBenwelt sieht nur die Fassade und das, was 
in den Schaufenstem dieses verpfuschten Lebens ausgelegt ist. Er 
aber hort das Klirren der unsichtbaren Ketten, in denen er geht, unter 
denen er zu stohnen beginnt. ... 
"lch wollte frei werden", so spricht der verlorene Sohn nun zu sich 
selber- vielleicht schreit er es auch heraus -, "ich wollte ich selbst 
werden; und das alles meinte ich zu gewinnen, indem ich mich vom 
Vater und von meinem Ursprung loste, ich Narr! Nur Ketten habe 
ich gefunden."19 
[translation: (Doberstein) His friends and others when they look at 
him think: "What an imposing, free man, so independent of his 
otherwise very influential old man! He pays no attention to 
principles or education; he's the very type of the sovereign 
'superman,' the prototype of autonomy," 
But he, the prodigal son, who sees his condition from the inside, 
knows differently. The world outside sees only the fa~ade and what 
is put in the show window of this botched-up life. But he hears the 
rattle of the invisible chains in which he walks and they are 
beginning to make him groan .... 
"I wanted to be free," says the prodigal son to himself- perhaps he 
cries it aloud, "I wanted to become myself; and I thought I would get 
all this by cutting myself off from my father and my roots, fool that I 
am! I have found nothing but chains."2'1 
19 Helmut Thielicke, Das Bilderbuch Gottes: Reden iiber die Gleichnisse Jesu 
(Stuttgart: Quell-Verlag, 1957), pp. 25-26. 
20 The Waiting Father, pp. 25-26. 
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Thielicke references the parable of the prodigal son in nearly all his books. 
When he does it is often related to misguided autonomy. In other volumes 
Thielicke connects this specifically to Nazi Germany. He confronts the German 
people who either sympathised with or were part of the Nazi party and accuses 
them of having participated in this godless autonomy. One fmds Thielicke using 
expressions like: "one's own self-seeking and megalomania" (seiner Eigensucht, 
seines Gr6Benwahns21 ). The observation of godless autonomy remained with 
Thielicke as part of his understanding of guilt in his later sermons as well.22 
I. le Original Sin Personalised 
Within classic Lutheranism the doctrine of original sin features prominently. 
Original sin (Erbsiinde) is treated under the second article of the Augsburg 
Confession and in the Apology to the Augsburg Confession; it is discussed as the 
first article under the third part of the Smalcald Articles, as the first article in the 
Epitome of the Formula ofConcord, and the first article in the Solid Declaration. 
"Erbsiinde" is central to the classic Lutheran understanding of the human condition. 
Original sin is by its nature collective sin and while it infects the individual, it is 
used more to explain the general corruption of all people. It is significant for this 
discussion ofThielicke's tendencies toward individualism that the doctrine of 
original sin finds little expression in his sermons. There are several references but 
they account for very little of his overall teaching on sin; where they do occur 
21 Das Gebet, p. 57. 
22 Cf. Helmut Thielicke, I Believe: The Christian Creed (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1968), p. 5. "I must also despairingly take charge of my own life; I must be 
my own creator, a self-creator. In place of an eternal authority and immutable 
commandments, I have: a program which I myself devise; human, all too human 
ideologies; and, finally, the dogma of the superman." 
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Thielicke's hesitancy to use the term "Siinde" is again apparent. In Das Gebet Das 
Die Welt Umspannt Thielicke makes reference to "Urschuld"23 ("original guilt"), 
"Zeichen der Unordnung und des Risses, der mitten durch die Schopfung geht"24 
("A sign of the disorder and fracture that runs through the midst of creation"), 
"Unser aller Schuld bildet gleichsarn"25 ("the formation of all our guilt so to 
speak"), " ... jener Schuld im letzten Hintergrund"26 ("that offence in the final 
background"), "jener Schuld, von der alle Menschen immer schon herkommen"27 
("the guilt of every person always drawing near"), and "der ganzen Welt Schuld"28 
("the guilt of the whole world"). When these citations are viewed in the context of 
his overall proclamation of sin, one can see that they play only a minor role. The 
shift in terminology serves to demonstrate by silence that Thielicke's focus moves 
away from collective concepts of sin and toward more personal models for sin. 
J.ld Justification Given a More Personal Emphasis 
Thielicke's focus on the self as the seat of guilt leads naturally to a soteriological 
focus beginning at the self. To demonstrate Thielicke's unique approach to 
christology it is necessary to offer comparisons with classic Lutheranism and its 
confession of justification. Admittedly the issue of autonomy and individualism 
23 Das Gebet, p. 25, and is spoken of in terms ofthe "world's sin" pp. 26, 91, 
104. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 93. 
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were not major issues of debate in theology until the enlightenment, but this is not 
to say that classic Lutheranism did not address the individual in its treatment of 
justification. The point of departure in Thielicke is not merely that he addresses 
individualism in his "cosmogonic premise of justification" and classic Lutheranism 
does not, but rather how Thielicke shapes the article of justification around the 
individual as its core. 
The classic Lutheran formula for the doctrine of justification is found in 
Augsburg Confession Article N, and reads as follows: 
Weiter wird gelehrt, da13 wir Vergebung der Siinden und 
Gerechtigkeit vor Gott nicht erlangen mogen durch unser Verdienst, 
Werke und Genugtun, sondem da13 wir Vergebung der Siinden 
bekommen und vor Gott gerecht werden aus Gnaden, urn Christus' 
willen, durch den Glauben, so wir glauben, da13 Christus fUr uns 
gelitten hat, und da13 uns urn seinetwillen die Silnden vergeben, 
Gerechtigkeit und ewiges Leben geschenkt wird. Denn diesen 
Glauben will Gott fUr Gerechtigkeit vor ihm halten und zurechnen, 
wie St. Paulus sagt zu den Romem am 3 und 4?9 
[My translation: Furthermore it is taught that we may not acquire 
forgiveness of sins and righteousness before God through our 
service, work and sufficient deeds, but that we receive forgiveness of 
sins and become righteous before God out of grace for Christ's sake, 
through faith; so we believe that Christ has suffered for us and that 
for his sake, forgiveness of sins, righteousness and everlasting life, 
are given to us. Then God will hold and count this faith for 
righteousness before him, as St. Paul said to the Romans in chapters 
3 and 4.] 
29 Concordia Triglotta: The Svmbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church (St. Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing House, 1921 ), p. 44. 
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One could argue that the references to faith within this article of the Augsburg 
Confession imply a personal concept of justification.30 But influencing the 
Lutheran Confession's discussion of faith is the broader view of justification under 
which faith is subsumed. Within confessional Lutheranism the objective nature of 
justification is stressed as the foundation for a more subjective justification by 
personal faith. In classic Lutheranism objective justification means that Christ died 
to forgive the sins of the world, not just of the elect, and because of that universal 
sacrifice which did cover the sins of all people subjective faith becomes possible. 
Though the sins of the world are considered forgiven, classic Lutheranism does not 
understand this objective justification to convey a universalistic salvation; personal 
faith is still seen as paramount. But this personal faith was not the foundation of 
Christ's justifying work. Thus mixed with references to the necessity of personal 
faith, the Lutheran Confessions consistently point to Christ's work as collective or 
objective in nature: 
The Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. IV 
... but the promise of the remission of sins and of justification has 
been given us for Christ's sake, who was given for us in order that 
He might make satisfaction for the sins of the world ... 31 
Solid Declaration Art. XI 
Therefore if we wish to consider our eternal election to salvation 
with profit, we must in every way hold sturdily and firmly to this, 
that, as the preaching of repentance, so also the promise of the 
Gospel is universa/is (universal), that is, it pertains to all men, Luke 
24,47; For this reason Christ has commanded that repentance and 
remission of sins should be preached in His name among all nations. 
For God love the world and gave His Son, John 3,16. Christ bore 
the sins of the world, John 1,29, gave His flesh for the life of the 
30 The personal nature of faith in justification is especially clear in Article IV of 
the Apology ofthe Augsburg Confession. Cf. Tappert, p. 117ff. "We Obtain the 
Forgiveness of Sins Only by Faith in Christ." 
31 Ibid., p. 131. 
20 
world, John 6,51; His blood is the propitiation for the sins of the 
whole world, 1 John 1,7; 2,2.32 
§mancand Articles Part 2, Art. JI, para. 1-3 
The first and chief article is this, That Jesus Christ, our God and 
Lord, died for our sins, and was raised again for our justification, 
Rom. 4,25. And He alone is the Lamb of God which takes away the 
sins of the world, (Welt Sunde) John 1,29; and God has laid upon 
Him the iniquities of us all, (unser aller Sunde) Is. 53,6. Likewise: 
All have sinned (Sie sind allzumal Sunder) and are justified without 
merit [freely, and without their own works or merits] by His grace, 
through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, in His blood.33 
Other scholars have suggested that this collective or "objective" emphasis of 
justification forms the basis for any individual or subjective applications.34 As an 
example from my own Church body of how the justification of the individual flows 
from the justification of the collective consider the following: 
When God in Christ reconciled the world unto Himself, He absolved 
us with the world from sin, justified us, before we came into being. 
As ideal persons, as it were, existing solely in God's thoughts, we 
were justified. Then the single individual, looking at it in concreto, 
conceived and born in sin, becomes actu a child of God in that hour 
when he believes the Gospel. 35 
Personal justification is possible only inasmuch as the world has itself been 
justified according to classic Lutheranism. Thielicke turns the classic Lutheran 
32 Ibid., p. 1071. (Tappert, p. 620 para. 28) 
33 Ibid., p. 461. 
34 An argument made by Ken Schurb in Does the Lutheran Confessions' 
Emphasis on Subjective Justification Mitigate Their Teaching of Objective 
Justification? (Fort Wayne, IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press) p. 15ff. 
Cf. the many references to objective justification as sited in Robert Preus, 
Justification as Taught by Post-Reformation Lutheran Theologians (Fort Wayne, 
IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press). 
35 Theodore Engelder, Objective Justification: A series of three articles by Dr. 
Theodore Engelder from "Concordia Theological Monthly" July. August, 
September 1933 (Ft. Wayne, IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press, 1981), pp. 
516-517. In the above quotation he is citing George Stoeckhardt, another Lutheran 
theologian of the same era. 
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sense of justification around when he begins at the level of the individual and only 
then moves to more collective applications. He does this both when speaking of the 
human problem and when speaking ofthe justifying solution. 
And, 
Darum muB ich bei all em, was iiber die W eltschuld zu sagen ist, bei 
mir personlich und bei meiner eigenen Schuld beginnen .... und bei 
dem die Sanierung der Welt zu beginnen hat. 36 
[translation: (Doberstein) I must therefore begin with myself and my 
own guilt whenever there is anything to be said about the world's 
guilt ... the sanitation of the world must begin with me. 37] 
... daB er das Weltenheil und das Weltgericht an die ganz 
personliche Geschichtet bindet, die du und ich mit ihm eingehen 
sollen .... daB "ich" and daB "mein Herz" der Ort sein sollen, wo 
das Neue, das ganz Neue, wo das "Weltenheil" beginnen soll. 
[translation: (Doberstein) ... he binds up the salvation and the 
judgment of the world with the utterly personal relationship which 
you and I should have with him .... 'I' and 'my heart' should be the 
place where the new world begins. 38] 
In addition to the objective beginning point for justification in classic 
Lutheranism is a distinctively "forensic" sense to justification. God declares people 
righteousness by judicial action. Robert Preus explains: 
... the Law pronounces the sentence of condemnation upon him, a 
sentence written with the finger of God. Now God does not justify 
the ungodly through some error, like a judge who passes a verdict 
when he has not examined or acquainted himself sufficiently with a 
case ... No, God cannot take back His decision of condemnation 
which is revealed in the Law unless He has been given satisfaction 
(Matt. 5: 18) If God is to justify, justice and satisfaction are required. 
Luther correctly said, God remits no sin unless satisfaction has been 
rendered for it to the Law ... and yet the righteousness of the Law 
must be fulfilled in the one to be justified (Rom.8:4) - it is necessary 
36 Das Gebet, p. 110. 
37 Our Heavenly Father, p. 105. 
38 Ibid., p. 109. 
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that a foreign righteousness intervene ... And by virtue of this 
righteousness and its being imputed to him he is justified, that is 
absolved from the sweeping sentence of condemnation, and he 
receives the decree oflife etemal.39 
The judicial and "declaratory" aspects of justification again suggest a more 
corporate nature to justification. The sinner is declared righteous through the Word 
and absolution spoken by the pastor40 and through the sacraments received in the 
Church.41 The divine declaration requires a vehicle, which in turn most properly 
involves one or more additional people. This is not to say that Thielicke 
completely ignored the role of the other in forensic justification.42 Rather, he 
allows what was primary in classic Lutheranism to become secondary in his system. 
Replacing the classic Lutheran emphasis on both the forensic nature of justification 
and its objective basis Thielicke brings the focus to bear on the personal spiritual 
meeting of Christ and miscreant. This spiritualising of justification implies a lesser 
role for the community of faith. The individual "sees" Christ or "comes to know" 
him through personal struggle and by that meeting on the level of self finds 
renewal. 
39 Robert Preus, Justification as Taught by Post-Reformation Lutheran 
Theologians (Ft. Wayne, IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press) quoting 
Martin Chemnitz, Loci Theologica, 11. 251). Cf. "The Apology ofthe Augsburg 
Confession," Tappert, p. 188, para. 48. 
4° Cf. "The Apology of the Augsburg Confession," Art. XII, Penitence, Tappert, 
pp. 197ff. "Confession and Satisfaction." 
41 Cf. "Luther's Small Catechism," Tappert, p. 351; "The Sacrament ofthe 
Altar," para. 7 & 8. 
42 An example of Thielicke mentioning this aspect of Justification is found inj 
Believe: The Christian Creed, p. 53 "He speaks a word of efficacious power, which 
in the very speaking becomes a deed. 'Your sins are forgiven!"' 
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As stated above Thielicke directs his hearers toward a primarily "spiritual" or 
"inner/personal" encounter with Christ. He does this by avoiding language that 
might locate Christ at any tangible place. The christological encounter is explained 
through metaphor and left to one's own private experience. The following two 
examples from Thielicke's sermons serve to demonstrate this. While numerous 
examples could be cited, these were chosen to represent typical elements in his 
method. 
In this first example Thielicke applies justification to those caught in the 
prodigal son's guilt. 
lhr habt recht, wenn ihr euch verloren gebt. Aber seht: Nun ist etwas 
geschehen, was nichts mit diesem eurem Herzen zu tun hat, was 
euch einfach bereitet ist. Nun ist das Reich Gottes mitten unter 
euch, nun ist das Vaterhaus weit geoffnet. Und ich- ich bin die TUr, 
ich bin der Weg, ich bin das Le ben, ich bin die Hand des V aters. 
Wer mich sieht, der sieht den Vater. Und was seht ihr denn, wenn 
ihr mich seht? lhr seht jemanden, der zu euch in die Tiefe 
gekommen ist, wo ihr nicht in die Hohe konntet. lhr seht, daB Gott 
.>also< die Welt geliebt hat, daB er mich, seinen Sohn, in diese Tiefe 
hineingab, daB er sich's etwas kosten lieB, euch zu helfen, daB es 
durch Schmerzen Gottes ging, daB Gott etwas gegen sich selbst 
untemehmen muBte, urn mit eurer Schuld fertig zu werden, urn den 
Abgrund zwischen euch und sich Emst zu nehmen und ihn doch zu 
iiberbrUcken. Das alles seht ihr, wenn ihr mich anschaut! 
... Geht er nicht den Verlorenen nach? Ist er nicht bie uns, wenn 
wir sterben miissen und die anderen alle zurUckbleiben? Ist er nicht 
das Licht, das in der Finstemis scheint? Ist er nicht die Herzstimme 
des Vaters, die uns mitten in der Fremde iiberfallt, iiberfallt mitjener 
frohlichen Nachricht: Du darfst heimkommen?43 
[translation: (Doberstein) You are right when you give yourself up 
as lost. But look, now something has happened that has nothing to 
43 Das Bilderbuch Gottes, pp. 29-30 
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do with your heart, that is simply given to you. Now the kingdom of 
God is among you, now the father's house is wide open. { 1 } And I - I 
am the door, I am the way, I am the life, I am the hand of the Father. 
{2} Whoever sees me sees the Father. And then what do you see 
when you see me? You see someone who is coming to you in the 
depths because you could not go to the heights. You see that God 
'so' loved the world that he gave me, his Son, into these depths, that 
it cost him something to help you, that it went through the suffering 
of God, that God had to attempt something contrary to himself in 
order to put an end to your guilt, to earnestly seize upon the gulf 
between you and himself and then bridge it over. All this you see 
when you look at me! {3} 
... does he not go after the lost ones? Is he not by us when we must 
die and leave all others behind? Is he not the light that shines in the 
darkness? Is he not the voice of the Father's heart that overtakes us 
in the midst of the foreign land, overtakes us with such happy news, 
"You can come home.!" { 4} 44 
[numbers in brackets added for reference] 
Thielicke' s use of language is as important for what it does not say as for what it 
actually does say. He does not locate the christological meeting within any 
ecclesiological vehicles. There are references to an unspecified presence of Christ's 
kingdom and to the Father's house being open { 1} but how the miscreant is placed 
within them is not told. There is also no further explanation as to how Christ's 
kingdom is among us; it just is. 
Thielicke's language is full of examples of biblical metaphors, thus {2} "I am 
the door, I am the way, etc." These metaphors are often left without explanation as 
a means of forcing the individual to draw his or her own application. His use of 
metaphor will become important when we formulate our response to individualism 
at the conclusion of this thesis. For now, our concern is that Thielicke's intent is to 
44 The Waiting Father, pp. 28-29. 
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use undefined and "open-ended" metaphors as a device to engage individuals in 
their subjective understanding of the Christ encounter. 
In { 3} Thielicke speaks of "seeing" Christ as a way of grasping the incarnation 
as an act of brotherly love and solidarity. This seeing involves understanding the 
cross and divine suffering (traditional Lutheran themes). But again Thielicke 
avoids locating this "vision" of Christ in anything tangible within the Church. The 
seeing he has in mind is spiritual in nature, subjective, personal, and by all 
indications can be accomplished without mention of the Church. His concern is 
that "seeing" impacts one at the depth of one's own experience and is only 
understood from that individual life experience, not from a more collective 
experience of grace. 
At { 4} Thielicke again demonstrates the use of open metaphor. Christ is the 
"voice of the Father" and the "light that shines in the darkness." The images are 
consistent with biblical imagery but do not necessarily help direct the hearer to any 
location where he or she can receive christological justification. The language used 
lays the emphasis on a private emotional engagement with God's heart. 
The second example is as follows: 
Der Schwerpunkt in dieser seiner Quallag ganz woanders: Das, was 
die Menschen ihm Bases taten, war doppelt schrecklich fiir ihn, weil 
er alles messen muBte an dem, wozu sie eigentlich bestimmt waren .. 
Sie durften Kinder im Hause seines Vaters sein und trieben sich 
doch in der Fremde herum; sie waren lieber Knechte bei fremden 
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Herren. Ihnen war das groBe gut der Freiheit zugedacht, und sie 
verstrickten sich start dessen in finsteren Leidenschaften.45 
Hier aber ist einer, der dies alles von mir weiB und der trotzdem 
nicht irre an mir wird, sondem der mir sagt: Gerade fiir solche Leute 
bin ich da. Ich leide mit dir, wenn du an dir selber leidest.46 
Jesus von Nazareth mit dem Herzen finden, das heiBt aber, dieses 
Herz selber schlagen horen und sich davon anrUhren lassen, daB es 
ihm ganz allein urn mich geht, daB es ihm so sehr urn mich geht, als 
ob es nur mich allein auf der ganzen Welt gabe, und daB er sich an 
mir zu Tode liebt. Dann plotzlich, wenn mich dies anrUhrt, wird das 
Inkognito geliiftet, und ich stehe der Majestat des Gottessohnes 
gegeniiber. Dann sind meine Ketten zerbrochen, dann weiB ich 
iiberhaupt erst, in welchen Fesseln ich lag, dann erfahre ich, was das 
Leben zu sein vermag und was es heiBt, der Lasten ledig zu sein und 
eine Freiheit zu gewinnen, die mich schwindeln macht.47 
[My translation: The focal point of his (Jesus') agony lies 
completely elsewhere- namely, that what evil things people did to 
him were doubly frightening because he must measure it all against 
that for which they were really meant to be ... 
They might have been children in their Father's house but they 
roamed about in a foreign country. They would rather be slaves 
under foreign masters. The great goodness of freedom was intended 
for them, and instead they ensnared themselves in dark passions. 
But here is One who knows all this about me and in spite of it is not 
angry with me. Rather he says to me, "I am there for just such 
people. I sorrow with you when you sorrow over yourself." 
To find Jesus ofNazareth with the heart means to hear that very 
heart beating and to allow myself to be touched by the fact that it 
beats for me all alone - that it beats so much for me, it is as if I were 
the only one on earth, and that he loves me to death. Then suddenly, 
when this touches me, the incognito is lifted and I stand face to face 
before the majesty of the Son of God. Then my chains are broken 
and for the first time I know completely in what fetters I have lain. 
45 Helmut Thielicke, Woran Ich glaube: Der Grund christlicher Gewissheit 
(Stuttgart: Quell Verlag, 1965), p. 140. 
46 Ibid., p. 141. 
47 1bid., p. 144. 
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Then I learn what life can be like and what it means to be rid of the 
burden and to win a freedom that to me has been dwindling away.48] 
The first paragraph of this example demonstrates the link to cosmogonic guilt. 
The human problem is loss of self- inability to be "what people were really meant 
to be." The second paragraph shows the beginning ofThielicke's resolution of the 
human problem. Christ knows what mankind really is and still comes to be with 
such people. His presence "with us" is spiritual, and as the final paragraph of this 
example demonstrates, it is personal and individual as well -- ~'it is as if I were the 
only one on earth." Within the final paragraph one finds the use of metaphor as the 
main christological proclamation: "to find Jesus ... means to hear that very heart 
beating ... to allow myself to be touched." It seems clear that Thielicke intends 
this spiritual "touching" and "hearing" to convey the truth of Christ's redemptive 
love, but once more the application is spiritualised. The "hearing" and "feeling the 
touch" are inner events within each individual heart and no mention is made of 
coming to them through the Church. 
It should be noted that within this sermon Thielicke makes two references to 
"objective" justification- that is, Christ was "damit seine Schultem unter die Last 
der Weltschuld zu stemmen'.49 ["lifting the weight of the world's guilt upon his 
shoulders"] and appears as "der Hieland der Welt im Inkognito" ["Saviour of the 
world incognito."]50 Both mentions ofthis more traditional theme are brief and 
48 Anderson's translation is found in I Believe The Christian's Creed, pp. 103-
104, 105, 107. I've used my own translation because oflack of precision especially 
in the final paragraph. 
49 Ibid., p. 142. 
50 Ibid., p. 143. 
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certainly cannot be said to play a significant role in the primary christological focus 
of the sermon. 
In the above examples the question of how Christ meets the individual to 
reconcile his or her misguided autonomy is left hidden by the language of 
metaphor. Any mention ofthe Church as the place where one fmds the 
christological solution is avoided. There are a variety of images used to convey the 
idea of a reconciling christological encounter on a spiritual level, but the question 
of "how" is not clarified by Thielicke as it is by classic Lutheranism. As we have 
mentioned previously, the very forensic nature of justification in classic 
Lutheranism answers the "how." Justification is tied to the act of declaration--
thus the "Word" is the how and the Word is corporate. Christ is not heard in an 
inner voice but heard by the ears of those who listen to the preacher. Thielicke 
takes the external declaration of the Word common to classic Lutheranism and 
turns it inward, so that instead of justification being worked through the ear via 
declaration it is worked directly in the heart via spiritual encounter or realisation. 
The language explaining this encounter is deliberately vague so that each may make 
unique applications as his or her personal situation necessitates. Thielicke, in 
speaking of the christological encounter says: "The man who has experienced 
Christ knows that it happens today and every day exactly as it did to those who saw 
Him face to face."51 Again it is a meeting on a personal spiritual level that becomes 
the primary form of Christ encounter. 
51 The Waiting Father, p. 53. 
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1.3 Solidarity Used to Reinforce Individualism 
As Thielicke develops his presentation of the encounter with the spiritual Christ, 
one of the main themes to which he returns is solidarity. "Solidarity" involves a 
spiritual bond of understanding and sympathy. It is also a concept that lends itself 
well to an individualised christology. Christ is in solidarity with each person at his 
or her own unique level and each can experience this christological solidarity in his 
or her own way. 
As Thielicke develops this idea one can see it expressed in a variety of ways; 
Thielicke speaks of"brotherhood," "comradery," Christ "in the depths," and Christ 
"with us." Often these expressions occur together without differentiation, 
suggesting that for Thielicke there is no substantial difference between them. One 
can also see how broad the impact of christological solidarity is on his overall 
theology. In the subsections that follow this penchant for using solidarity to 
express a number of different individualistic notions will be explored. Those 
volumes that best demonstrate variants in the solidarity theme will be examined in 
chronological order. 
1.3a Solidarity with Suffering as a Personal Experience 
The first published volume ofThielicke's sermons was Das Gebet das die Welt 
umspannt, published in 1953 (In English as Our Heavenly Father in 1960). The 
date of these sermons falls during the declining years of World War Two. 
Naturally one will notice solidarity themes directed toward the special suffering of a 
war-tom people. Christ "in the depths" is a Christ who is one with the most severe 
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human suffering. One can see the principle of solidarity related to both physical and 
psychological pain. 
Ihr, meine Menschenbriider, lebt in einer Welt der Wunden, der 
Krankheiten und Kriege, und ich hore, wie ihr hadert mit eurem 
Vater und meinem Vater ... 
Aber nun seht, wie das alles, was euch qualt und in eurem Munde 
zur Anklage wird, meinem Vater und eurem Vater nahegeht. Eure 
Schmerzen sind seine Schmerzen; stii.nde ich sonst unter euch? Er 
schickt michja mitten in eure Schmerzen: 
Jede Wunde, auf die ich meine heilende Hand lege, hat erst 
tausendmal in mir selbst gebrannt, jeder Damon, den ich austreibe, 
hat mich selber angegrinst, und jedesmal bin ich den T od, den ich 
austreibe, selber gestorben und habe meinen eigenen Leib zerreiBen 
und in die Erde betten lassen. Wer unter euch leidet denn, und ich 
hatte nicht mitgelitten? Wer von euch muB sterben, und ich ware 
nicht mitgestorben? Ich binder Kamerad und Bruder aller eurer 
Schmerzen und Schicksale. 52 
[translation: (Doberstein) You, my human brothers, live in a world 
of wounds and sickness and war, and I hear you complaining and 
quarreling with your Father and my Father. ... 
But look, don't you see that everything that torments you and makes 
you complain grieves my Father and your Father? Your sorrows are 
his sorrows; otherwise would I be standing here among you? He has 
sent me into the midst of your sorrows .... 
Every wound I lay my healing hand upon has ached a thousand times 
in me; every demon I cast out has leered at me; I died the death that I 
myself defeated; I let my own body be tom and buried in the earth. 
Who among you suffers and I do not suffer with you? Who among 
you dies and I do not die with you ? I am your comrade and brother 
in every pain, whatever your lot may be. 53] 
Here themes of "brotherhood" and "with you" ("mitgelitten," and 
"mitgestorben") are presented side by side with Christ as our "comrade". This 
solidarity represents a spiritual encounter between Christ and the individual 
52 Das Gebet, pp. 19-20. 
53 Our Heavenly Father, p. 23. 
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wherein Christ is with the individual at the level of his or her own negative 
experiences. The point of location or vehicle for this solidarity is not defined; it is 
assumed simply to happen within the psyche and personal experience of the 
individual. 
Though it is not a major element in his proclamation, there are a few examples 
where Thielicke does locate the christological encounter outside the individual 
psyche. Within this same volume Thielicke connects Christ to the Word in such a 
way as to make it clear that the Word is a christological meeting ground. 
Weil also das Wort zu jeder personlichen und lebendigen 
Gemeinschaft hinzugehort, steht auch das W ort im Mittelpunkt der 
Heilsgeschichte unseres Gottes. Darum wird Jesus geradezu das 
"fleischgewordene Wort" genannt: denn in allem, was er sagt und 
tut, wie er lebt und stirbt, spricht Gott ein Wort in mein Leben 
hinein, das Wort nfunlich: Du solst mein Kind sein, und mein ganzes 
Herz steht dir offen! 54 
[translation: (Doberstein) Because words and speech are an integral 
part of every vital, personal relationship, the Word is also central in 
the history of salvation. This is why Jesus is actually called "the 
Word made flesh"; for in everything that Jesus says and does and 
how he lives and dies God is speaking his Word into my life. And 
what he is saying is: You shall be my child; my whole heart is open 
to you. 55] 
This in a way provides a tangible place of meeting between Christ and believer, 
but in another sense it remains a Word without location. What exactly does it mean 
that "God is speaking his Word into my life"? Where does this speaking happen 
and under what circumstances do I hear him? Questions such as these remain 
unanswered. Again, though the Word is identified as the location of the encounter 
54 D as Gebet, p. 36. 
55 Our Heavenly Father, p. 38. 
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the Word itself is never located. The result is that the Christ encounter remains 
predominantly spiritual in nature. Saying that the encounter with Christ is spiritual 
does not mean to suggest that Thielicke equated this encounter with mere "feeling" 
or subjective "religiosity."56 There is a substantial element to the encounter that 
requires it to be grounded in the actual Christ ofhistory, but the mechanics of how 
this happens remains largely undefined in his sermons. 
While the question of "how" this Christ encounter takes place is left largely un-
addressed in his sermons, the themes of brotherhood, Christ "with us," and Christ 
"in the depths," remain strong throughout the sermons. The unique application of 
these ideas for this volume is that they are almost always linked with the troubles 
people face as a result of the war. 57 Thielicke demonstrates empathy and a pastoral 
heart for the war-tom people of Germany by bringing Christ into their special 
sufferings. 
Und doch verrate ich einem Christenmenschen kein Geheimnis, 
wenn ich bekenne, daB wir im Donner der Bombennachte und in den 
Schreckenskammem unserer Keller und unterirdischen Stollen mehr 
vom Reich Gottes gelemt und wohl auch erfahren haben, als es jene 
ruhigen und fast utopischen Zeiten des Behagens nahelegen 
mochten.58 
[translation: (Doberstein) And yet I am not telling Christians 
anything new when I say that we have learned more, and probably 
also experienced more, about the kingdom of God in the crash of air 
56 Ibid. 
57 From Our Heavenly Father, 
On brotherhood cf. pp. 41, 42 46, 72, 81, 82, 107, 111, 112, 129, 144, 153. 
On "with us" cf. pp. 48, 111, 125-127, 129, 153. 
On Christ "in the depths" cf. pp. 60-65,74-75,81, 82,86-87,97,98, 106, 108, 
144, 151. 
58 Das Gebet, pp. 62-63. 
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raids and the terrors of our cellars and underground shelters than 
those peaceful and almost utopian times of comfort and well-being 
could ever suggest. 59] 
The solidarity theme is reflected in the often-repeated idea of God "with us." 
This idea carries strong personal/individual overtones as shown in the following 
quotation: 
Der Seufzer eines Sterbenden zu Gott ist mehr als eine ganze 
religiose Weltanschauung; denn bei jenem seufzenden und 
stammelnden Aufblick ist der Sterbende allein mit Gott - - und 
darauf kommt schlieBlich alles an; aber in der religiosen 
Weltanschauung sind die Menschen unter sich. 60 
[translation (Doberstein): The sigh of a dying man to God is more 
than a whole philosophy of religion; for in that sighing, stammering 
appeal the dying man is alone with God- and ultimately that's all 
that matters, whereas in a philosophy of religion, people are only 
with themselves.61 ] 
Here something ofThielicke's anthropology comes through. A later chapter will 
be devoted to Thielicke's concept ofpersonhood, which will explore this element at 
greater length, but for our purposes here it is worth noting how the human condition 
is grounded in aloneness- either aloneness with God or with self. Further, where 
aloneness with God is concerned, solidarity is the means to that aloneness. By 
framing solidarity within the discussion of aloneness or isolation of the individual, 
Thielicke entrenches solidarity all the more in the concept of a personalistic 
spiritualised christology.62 
59 Our Heavenly Father, p. 63. 
60 Das Gebet, p. 38. 
61 Our Heavenly Father, p. 40. 
62 Cf. the statement in Das Gebet, p. 100, "Er sieht nicht nur die verworrene 
Weltlage im groBen, er begnugt sichja nicht mit der gottlichen Perspektive eines 
Gesamtiiberblicks. Er kommt ja wie in den Stunden, da er uber die Erde ging, zu 
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Later volumes of sermons show that solidarity remains an important element in 
the treatment of all human suffering, even that which has nothing to do with the 
war. Das Bilderbuch gottes: Reden uber die Gleichnisse Jesu was published in 
1957 and contains sermons that began in St. Mark's Church in Stuttgart and later 
continued at St. James's and St. Michael's in Hamburg. This dates these sermons 
roughly from 1953-55. One fmds the solidarity theme again applied to human 
suffering, as in the following example: 
... obwohl in Kammem und an StraBenecken, in Schlossem und in 
Slums, die nur der Gottessohn sieht, gelitten un gesiindigt wird -
obwohl also dieses unermeBliche Schlachtfeld des Elends nach dem 
Arzte schreit, hat er Zeit und Gelassenheit genug, bei dem einzelnen 
stehenzubleiben. Er geht in die Zollnerstuben und zu den einsamen 
Witwen und verachteten Prostituierten, geht zu den AuBenseitem der 
Gesellschaft und ringt urn die See le der einzelnen. 63 
[translation: (Doberstein) ... though suffering and sinning were 
going on in chamber, street corner, castle, and slums, seen only by 
the Son of God - though this immeasurable misery and 
wretchedness cried aloud for a physician, he has time to stop and 
talk to the individual. He associates with publicans, lonely widows, 
and despised prostitutes; he moves among the outcasts of society, 
wrestling for the soul of the individuals.64] 
Not only is it clear that Thielicke continues to preach christological solidarity as 
an answer to human suffering, it is also manifest that this solidarity remains 
intimately joined to an individualising of the Christ encounter. 
dem einzelnen, dem Namenlosen, der in irgendeinem Hinterhause verlassen lebt." 
[translation: (Doberstein) "He does not merely see this whole confused world 
situation in the large; he is not content with the divine perspective of a total view. 
No, he comes, as he did in the days when he walked the earth, to the individual, to 
the nameless one who lives forsaken in some back alley." Our Heavenly Father, p. 
97.] 
63 Das Bilderbuch gottes, p. 121. 
64 The Waiting Father, p. 88. 
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1.3b Personalising Solidall'idy for the Sake of the Unbelievell' 
The volume Die Lebensangst und ihre Oberwindung, published in 1954, contains 
sermons extending from the war years through the postwar reconstruction period. 
Within this volume one finds a hint as to Thielicke's motivation for giving 
solidarity such a central role in his christological presentation. By using the 
example of the Canaanite woman Thielicke speaks from the perspective of his 
audience: 
Gliicklich - denkt er vielleicht bei sich selbst -, wem ein solcher 
Glaube gegeben ist, der das alles bestehen kann! Aber mir ist es 
nicht gegeben, ich gehore nicht dazu. 65 
[translation: (G.W. Bromiley) I can perhaps agree that those to 
whom faith is given, who can accept all this, are fortunate. But faith 
is not given to me. I do not belong.66] 
The identification of his intended audience (those who don't belong but wish 
they did) goes directly to his reason for featuring solidarity so prominently. In the 
preface of How to Believe Again, "A Word to the Reader," Thielicke states," ... 
indeed most of those present were not church-going people. They were seeking, 
straying, but also troubled. My work has been principally intended for them."67 
This choice of intended audience seems to have developed from his experience in 
the parish very early in his career. 
As early as my time in Ravensburg (1940-1942) it had become 
apparent to me what disastrous results the Nazis' ban on religious 
education in the schools had effected. The makeshift institutions 
65 Helmut Thielicke, Die Lebensangst und ihre Oberwindung, (Giitersloh: C. 
Bertelsmann Verlag, 1954), p. 64. 
66 The Silence of God, p. 16 
67 How to Believe Again, p. 19. 
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with which the church sought to compensate for this deficit could 
not fail but to be inadequate. Very soon the up-and-coming 
generation was ignorant ofthe most simple knowledge of the Bible 
and of the tenets of the Christian faith in general. I thus became 
increasingly convinced that there was a need for the development of 
a sort of dogmatics for adults, lessons aimed at combining 
information and interpretation. 68 
His initial success in the public sphere came while seeking to catechising those 
outside the Church, and it was this desire for outreach that directed his 
christological presentation toward the theme of solidarity. 69 This also helps 
explain his conscious evading of a location for the christological encounter. An 
audience comprised mostly of those outside the Church would be more difficult to 
convince about traditional ecclesiological doctrines about the Church as the 
location of christological presence. What this suggests is that the desire to move 
christology toward the individual is not wholly driven by philosophical necessity, 
but also by a pastor's heart wanting to reach lost sheep. 
It is likely that Thielicke was influenced by Schleiermacher in using solidarity as 
a point of contact with those outside the Church. In Modem Faith and Thought 
(published in 1983 as Glauben und Denken in der Neuzeit) Thielicke cites 
Schleiermacher's On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers and explains 
Schleiermacher's choice of audience as those who "think ofthemselves as mature 
and autonomous people"70; by which he means the sceptics of Christianity. 
68 Notes from a Wayfarer, p. 149. 
69 Cf. How to Believe Again, pp. 10, 13, 16 19. 
70 Helmut Thielicke, Modem Faith and Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1990), p. 190. 
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Thielicke's choice of audience was the same as Schleiermacher's. 71 It is 
significant that Thielicke notes how Schleiermacher used solidarity as part of his 
approach: 
Regarding the second point, i.e., confession of solidarity, 
Schleiermacher seeks to win a hearing, not by addressing the 
cultured authoritatively from outside, but by assuring them that he is 
one of them and will argue on their own ground. 72 
Thielicke's style seems to put a christological slant on Schleiermacher's 
approach. Whereas Schleiermacher himself sought common ground with the 
cultured despisers by attempting to portray himself as one with them, Thielicke 
attempts to win the cultured despisers by presenting Christ as the One who finds 
common ground with them. Schleiermacher's solidarity was personal on a human 
level, Thielicke's is personal on a christologicallevel, but in both cases solidarity is 
the stated approach for dealing with those outside the church. 
1.3c Recognition of a Minor Corporate Element to Solidarity 
Christological solidarity does have application beyond the personal Christ 
encounter to one's experience with others. In Die Lebensangst und ihre 
Uberwindung, one can find Christ's solidarity with us used to encourage our help 
and companionship with others. 
"Wunden mtissen Wunden heilen." Die eigentlichen Heifer ihrer 
Menschenbriider sind deshalb auch immer nur die groBen 
Verwundeten gewesen, die Leute, die selbst unter den groBten 
Schmerzen zu leiden hatten. Nur darum konnte Jesus der Seelsorger 
werden oder der Hohepriester, wie ihn der Hebraerbrief nennt, weil 
er selber den Machten der Schuld, des Leides und des Todes 
71 Doberstein makes the same point in The Waiting Father, p. 8. 
72 Modern Faith and Thought, p. 190. 
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standhalten muBte und darum Mitleiden haben konnte mit denen, die 
im Schatten dieser Machte sitzen. 73 
[translation: (G.W. Bromiley) "Wounds must heal wounds." True 
helpers of their fellow men have always been those who were greatly 
hurt, who had to suffer great sorrows. Jesus could be our Pastor, our 
great high Priest, as the book of Hebrews calls Him, only because 
He Himself had to stand against the forces of guilt and suffering and 
death and thus He could have sympathy with those who sit in the 
shadows of these powers. 74] 
Thus one cannot say that solidarity is wholly individualistic. There is clearly an 
underlying element that seeks the other when solidarity is applied to sanctification. 
Where justification is concerned however, solidarity is firmly set on an 
individualistic plane. As an example, within a letter from this same volume 
Thielicke places death in the realm of personal isolation and the salvific resolution 
to it in the context of solidarity: "For the truth is that one dies alone even though 
there is comradeship ("Kameradschaft") to give support until the final hour."75 
Aloneness in death is resolved with the comfort of solidarity; "Not my quality of 
soul nor my supposed disposition for immortality will see me through, but this 
Pilgrim who marches at my side as my Lord and Brother."76 
1.3d Solidarity Moving Toward isolation of the "1" 
In Das Leben kann noch einmal beginnen. Ein Gang durch die Bergpredigt, first 
73 Die Lebensangst, p. 40. 
74 Helmut Thielicke, Out ofthe Depths (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1962), p. 
18. 
75 Ibid., p. 25. 
76 Ibid., p. 29. 
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published in 1956,77 Thielicke features solidarity in a more varied and pronounced 
way than in any of the other volumes studied. Along with ample use of the usual 
expressions of solidarity, such as Christ as "brother,"78 "with us,"79 as our 
"Comrade (einer Kameradschaft mit uns),"80 "in the depths,"81 and as our 
"Companion" ("Geselle" and "Gefahrte"), 82 one also finds references to being in 
fellowship with Christ, 83 being members of his body,84 and to his solidarity with 
our sin.85 The word "solidarity" (Die Solidaritat) is used on at least two 
occasions. 86 
77 Thielicke fixes the date for the original writing of these sermons between 
1946-1948 with the remark that they were delivered during "the worst of the post-
war years." 
78 Life Can Begin Again. pp. 9, 14, 48, 70, 71, 88, 90, 94, 144, 145, 164, & 172. 
79 Ibid., pp. 131, 138, 172, also in our midst and one of us pp. 2, 8, 9, 33, 
80 Ibid., p. 6. [Helmut Thielicke, Das Leben kann noch einmal beginning, 
(Stuttgart: Quell Verlag, 1956), p. 17.] 
81 Ibid., pp. 15, 16, 48, 83, 106-107, 135, 140-141 
82 Ibid., pp. 91, 144, 172. (Das Leben ... pp. 106, 169, 200.) 
83 Ibid., pp. 13, 137. 
84 Ibid., p. 91. 
85 Ibid., p. 141. 
86 Ibid., pp. 152, 157. (Das Leben ... pp. 178, 184.) 
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The importance of this volume however lays in the fact that here Thielicke 
presents his most thorough sermonic discussion of individualism which again is 
joined with ideas of solidarity.87 
Da sind die Leute mit ihren Krankheiten, mit dem Aussatz, mit ihrer 
Blindheit, ihrer seelischen Verfinsterung and der Zerrilttung ihres 
Geistes. Mit dem allem stehen sie ganz allein vor Jesu. (Wie 
entsetzlich isoliert und einsam ist gerade ein Geistes kranker!) 
Unser Packchen tragen wir ja alle allein in einer letzten Einsamkeit, 
selbst wenn Tausende dasselbe Schicksal tragen, wenn Tausende mit 
mir heimatlos und vertrieben, verwaist und entwurzelt sind. Denn 
jeder erlebt und tragt und leidet dies alles ja wieder auf seine Weise 
und also ganz anders und also allein. Darum sind wir einsam in 
unseren Leiden. Jedes Leid macht insam. Und darum treten diese 
alle auch immer aus der Menge heraus, ganz allein vor den Heiland 
hin, and dieser Heiland gehort ihnen nun auch seinerseits ganz 
allein.88 
[translation: (Doberstein) And there are the people with their illness, 
their leprosy, their blindness, their darkened minds and shattered 
souls. And with all this they stand quite alone before Jesus. (How 
terribly isolated and lonely is the mentally ill person!) All of us 
carry our pack alone in ultimate loneliness, even though thousands 
of others bear the same lot, even though thousands like me are 
homeless, exiled, orphaned, and uprooted. For every single person 
experiences and bears and suffers these things in his own way and 
therefore in a totally different way -- and therefore -- alone. So we 
are alone in our suffering. Every suffering makes a person lonely. 
And consequently, each one steps out of the crowd and makes his 
way alone to the Savior, and then too this Savior belongs to him 
alone.89] 
Solidarity in suffering places a heavy emphasis on the "aloneness" ("einsam," 
"ganz allein," and "isoliert") ofthe Christ encounter. What will be explored in 
more depth later, but which is yet worth mentioning here, is that Thielicke 
87 Other ideas found in this section will be discussed in more detail under the 
section on Thielicke's ecclesiology. 
88 Das Leben, p. 210. 
89 Life Can Begin Again, p. 181. 
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emphasised the solitary relationship between Christ and the sufferer while 
discussing the Church! He writes, "From the beginning the Church was the 
community of solitaries, the community of those who were 'called out,' of those 
who first stood in ultimate loneliness before his eyes. "90 At the very point where a 
community emphasis would be expected, Thielicke instead emphasised an 
individual Christ encounter. 
He continues to isolate the sufferer with Christ two pages later. 
Als der GichtbrUchige von seinen Freunden vor Jesus hingelegt 
wird, vor ihn, der da eingekeilt in der Volksmenge steht, da sind die 
beiden, der Kranke und der giJttliche Arzt, auf einmal ganz allein, 
obwohl die Menge und auch die nHchsten Freunde dicht dabei 
stehen. Jesus ist auf einmal nur fiir diesen einen da, also ob es nicht 
noch Millionen andere auf dieser Welt gabe. Aber dieser eine, 
dieser verirrte und gequalte Menschenbruder ist ihm wert genug, daB 
er sich seiner erbarmt, daf3 er ihm ganz allein gehiJrt. Und sieh, 
durch diese Zweisamkeit mit Jesus muBt auch du hindurch. In 
diesem ganz schmalen Tor, wo er dir begegnet, wo er ganz allein vor 
dir steht und kein Mensch und kein Ding dich begleitet, da muBt 
auch du stehen und mit ihm reden.91 
[translation: (Doberstein) When the paralytic was brought by his 
friends and set down before Jesus, wedged in as he was in a crowd 
of people, at that moment those two, the sick man and the divine 
physician, were suddenly completely alone, even though the crowd 
and his closest friends were standing close by. Suddenly Jesus was 
there for this one man alone, as if there were not millions of others 
in this world. But this one man, this one erring and tormented 
human being was worth enough to him to command his compassion, 
to give himself wholly to him alone. And you too must go through 
this lonely, personal encounter with Jesus. You too must stand and 
talk with him in this narrow, constricted gate where he meets you, 
90 Life can Begin Again, pp.l80-181. 
91 b Das Le en, p. 212. 
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standing there before you alone, where no man and no thing can 
accompany you.92] 
To make this "aloneness" of the Christ encounter all the more clear, Thielicke 
sets it against all the other millions of people in the world and the vast crowd 
surrounding Jesus and the paralytic. Later chapters will explore reasons why 
Thielicke feels so compelled to drive his christology toward the individual. For 
now the need is simply to establish that he does. 
Thielicke must have sensed that his focus here was overtly individualistic 
because at one point he tries to block potential objections to his individualism by 
saymg, 
"Du brauchst nicht zu denken und zu fiirchten, daB ich dir da einen 
religiosen Individualismus predige. Mit einem Ismus und anderen 
torichten Begriffen aus der Hexenkuche der Gottlosigkeit hat das 
nichts zu tun. "93 
[translation: (Doberstein) You need not think or fear that I am 
preaching a religious individualism. This has nothing to do with an 
"ism" or any other silly notions that come out ofthe witches' 
cauldron of godlessness.94] 
Part ofThielicke's defensiveness stems from his aversion to being trapped in 
any single ideology. Thielicke regularly stated that ideologies may contain kernels 
of truth but their narrow focus prevents them from offering an honest system. 
Thielicke's scope will not be so limited. Yet his very objection to a perceived 
92 Life can Begin Again, p. 183. 
93 Das Leben, p. 214. 
94 Life Can Begin Again, p. 185. 
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charge of individualism shows an internal tension in his mind about the direction of 
his argument. 
In Thielicke's defence, his denial ofbeing guilty of individualism is honest in 
his own estimation. For Thielicke individualism is an established philosophical 
system that isolates the "I" from the transcendent "other." Thus in his analysis of 
the philosophies of Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, Thielicke 
complains about a thread of "!-isolation" which runs throughout their systems, and 
it is this to which he objects.95 At the same time Thielicke continues to recognise 
the "otherness" of God and divine transcendence; thus according to his definition 
his approach avoids the traps oftrue individualism. Yet Thielicke's objections are 
not wholly convincing. As this sermon bears out, he does separate the "I" from 
other "I"s and makes the individual the fmal and only meaningful meeting ground 
with the "transcendent other." 
J.Je The Influence of Calvinism on Solidarity as Seen in Christ's Decent into 
Hell 
In a sermon preached between 1961 and 196396 (found in Ich Glaube. Das 
Bekenntnis der Christen), Thielicke connects solidarity with Calvinist thought. In 
speaking of the doctrine of Christ's decent into hell Thielicke says: 
Die einen wollten damit sagen- es waren vor allem die Calvinisten -
, daB Jesus auch diese auBerste Emiedrigung auf sich genommen, 
daB er sich bis zur Solidaritat mit den Verlorenen herabgeneigt und 
auch ihr Bruder geworden sei. Hatte er nicht am Kreuze gerufen: 
"Mein Gott, mein Gott, warum hast du mich verlassen?" Hatte er 
95 Helm ut Thielicke, The Hidden Question of God, trans. by Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), p.68. 
96 I Believe the Christian's Creed, p. v. 
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nicht schon hier, in seiner letzten Lebensstunde, die auBerste 
Finsternis der Gottverlassenheit auf sich genommen? Hatte er sich 
nicht der V erzweiflung des Nichts ausgesetzt, so daB er auch auf der 
untersten Sohle aller Seelenqualen bei uns sein und unsere Hand 
halten kann? Die Hollenfahrt von Golgatha- wir ahnen, was das 
heiJ3t und welche Liebe, welches selbstvergessene Opfer daraus 
spricht. So antwortet der Heidelberger Katechismus auf die Frage, 
warum Christus zur Holle herabgestiegen sei: " ... daB ich in 
meinen hochsten Anfechtungen versichert sei, mein Herr Christus 
habe mich durch seine unaussprechliche Angst, Schmerzen und 
Schrecken, die er auch an seiner Seele zuvor am Kreuz erlitten, von 
der hollischen Angst und Pain erloset."97 
[translation: (H. George Anderson) Some, especially Calvinists, 
intended to say in this way that Jesus even took upon himself the 
extreme humiliation of stooping to solidarity with the lost and 
becoming their brother, too. Didn't he cry out from the cross, 'My 
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' Here, in the last hour of 
his life, hadn't he already taken upon himself the uttermost darkness 
of the godforsaken? Didn't he expose himselfto the despair of 
nothingness so that even on the bottom most level of soul torment he 
could be with us to hold us by the hand? We sense what it means to 
journey from Golgotha to hell, and we sense what love and self-
forgetting sacrifice it bespeaks. The Heidelberg Catechism answers 
the question about why Christ went down to hell in this way: "That 
in my severest tribulations I may be assured that Christ my Lord has 
redeemed me from hellish anxieties and torment by the unspeakable 
anguish, pains, and terrors which he suffered in his soul both on the 
cross and before."98] 
This quotation shows expressions of"brotherhood," Christ "in the depths" of 
our suffering, and Christ "with us" all occurring together without differentiation, 
reinforcing an earlier point that these expressions convey the same idea. The 
connection of these thoughts to Calvinism is significant because it goes to the issue 
of christological movement. Thielicke has imported an idea from Calvinism into 
Lutheran proclamation and made it foundational for his christological approach. As 
a demonstration that this is no mere passing thought on Thielicke's part, he makes 
97 Woran lch glaube, p.171. 
98 I Believe, pp. 130-131 
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the same argument connecting solidarity to Calvinism when he discusses Christ's 
descent into hell in volume two of his dogmatics texts.99 Admittedly his discussion 
on this specifically addresses Christ's descent into hell but the connection between 
Calvinism and solidarity as a principle of comfort is obvious. 
In contrast, Luther seems to have favoured a view that emphasised Christ's 
descent as an article of victory. Thus Luther says: 
I believe that for me and all his believers Christ descended into hell 
to subdue the devil [1 Pet. 3: 18-20] and take him captive along with 
all his power, cunning, and malice so that the devil can no longer 
harm me ... 100 
Yet it must also be said that the exact nature of Christ's descent into hell 
remained largely a mystery for Luther and on more than one occasion he simply 
acknowledges that he does know what it means (especially with reference to 1 Peter 
3: 18-20). 101 He does however qualify his professed confusion by raising questions 
about the sense that Calvin seems to take wherein Christ descended to endure 
hellish suffering. 102 After Luther's death the Formula of Concord addressed the 
disagreements that arose over the nature of Christ's descent into hell (including the 
99 Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1977), p. 420. 
100 LW 43:27. 
101 Cf. LW 2:86, 10:115, 30:113. 
102 LW 10:115 "I firmly believe that Christ did not feel the punishments and 
griefs of the damned ... but that Christ always hoped." Cf. John Calvin, Institutes 
of The Christian Religion, trans. by Henry Beveridge, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans, 1979), pp. 443-446. "But after explaining what Christ endured in the 
sight of man, the Creed appropriately adds the invisible and incomprehensible 
judgment which he endured before God, to teach us that not only was the body of 
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matter of whether it rightly belonged to his passion or glory). The conclusion of the 
Formula of Concord is that the important element in this doctrine is simply that 
through his descent Christ destroyed the power of hell for all believers and saved 
them from the devil. The exact nature of how Christ did this must remain in the 
realm of mystery. 103 
By connecting this article to solidarity with our suffering Thielicke is then going 
further than classic Lutheranism was willing to go. In his own mind his position is 
shared with that Calvin from whom he draws not only the matter of suffering in 
hell, but being in solidarity with us through that suffering. 
J.JfThielicke's use ofSpiY'itual Presence as a Deparlurefrom Classic LutheY'an 
Localisation 
Thielicke's borrowing from Calvin is not limited to a few isolated doctrines like 
Christ's descent into hell. The very spiritualised nature ofhis christology can be 
seen to have affinity with Calvinism. When Thielicke speaks of Christ "with us" in 
the depths he means that a spiritual encounter takes place in the heart of the 
individual. Whereas the classic Lutheran treatment of Christ in the depths is tied 
most obviously to Luther's theology of the cross, which in turn tends to seek a more 
localised christological resolution. Thus Christ is constantly joining himself to ''the 
Christ given up as the price of redemption, but the there was a greater and more 
excellent price - that he bore in his soul the tortures of condemned and ruined 
man." (p. 443); " ... from it (Christ's descent)we may infer how dire and dreadful 
were the tortures which he endured when he felt himself standing at the bar of God 
as a criminal in our stead" (p. 446). 
103 The Formula of Concord, Epitome, IX, Triglotm, p. 827. 
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depths of humanity" by confining his saving presence to the Word and dominical 
sacraments. Calvinism cannot accept the idea of Christ joined to physical means 
because of its reliance onfinitum non est capax infiniti as a governing principle. 
With Calvinism, and it would seem also with Thielicke, the mystical/spiritual 
Christ encounter is Christ's primary modus operandi. An example of how 
Thielicke emphasises solidarity as a Christ encounter on a spiritual level and not 
through objective means is as follows: 
Wenn ich ihn mit meinen Augen suchen will, dann darf ich nicht in 
die Stratosphare blicken. . . . Sondern nun mufi ich ihn in der Tiefe 
suchen: im kiimmerlichen Stall und bei den Tieren, in der Wuste mit 
ihrem Durst und ihrer satanischen Versuchung, am Galgen in seiner 
Preisgegebenheit, in seiner Gottverlassenheit und seiner Todesangst 
- vielleicht aber auch in der heiteren Runde der Hochzeit zu Kana, 
wo es ziemlich hoch und auf jeden Fall sehr menschlich hergeht. 
Er ist an allen Stationen meines Lebens, wo ich lachen oder auch 
heulen oder verstummen mufi. Denn ihm ist nichts Menschliches 
fremd, under will mich dart abholen, wo ich nun einmal bin. 104 
[translation: (Anderson) If I want to locate him with my eyes, I 
should not look up to the stratosphere ... No, I must seek him in the 
depths, in a shabby stable with the animals, in the wilderness with its 
thirst and its satanic temptation, in the abandonment of the cross 
with its godforsakenness and its fear of death -- maybe even in the 
gaiety of the wedding party at Cana, where everything was so human 
and turned out so well. 
He is there at every point of my life, whether I laugh or cry or sit in 
silence. For nothing human is foreign to him, and he wants to come 
to me right here where I am now. 105] 
After asking the question of where one looks to find Christ, Thielicke concludes 
that one must find him "in the depths" of his humble life- thus through one's 
104 Woran Ich Glaube, p. 203. 
105 I Believe, p. 155. 
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recollection of these narratives. He concludes that Christ wants to come to us 
"right here where I am now." Classic Lutheranism would have "jumped on" that 
statement as a springboard for Christ meeting us in the means of Word and 
sacrament. Thielicke on the other hand does not suggest such means, but simply 
leaves the question of "how" open-ended. The fact that he repeats this approach at 
nearly every mention of solidarity supports the premise that the Christ encounter is 
primarily (if not exclusively) spiritual and purposely turned away from the 
incamational models of classic Lutheranism. A major tenet of classic Lutheran 
christology is thus replaced with a spiritual Christ-encounter akin to that found in 
more Calvinistic models. 
Further insight into the perceived deficiency with the classic Lutheran treatment 
of Christ in the depths is found in Thielicke's dogmatics. Thielicke addresses the 
issue of solidarity at length while discussing Christ's threefold office, particularly 
his priestly office. 106 The threefold office of Christ is primarily a Calvinistic 
model. The fact that Thielicke locates the concept of solidarity within this model 
shows once more that Calvinism offers more fertile soil for Thielicke's ideas of 
solidarity. This becomes all the more important for our discussion ofThielicke's 
individualism when, during Thielicke's expansion of solidarity under the subject of 
Christ's priestly office, he defines it over and against the view of classic 
Lutheranism. Thielicke speaks of what he calls the "principle of homeopathy," 
which is the connection between Christ and people caused when Christ suffers like 
we do. This principle contains strong individualistic overtones as Thielicke himself 
points out: 
106 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, pp. 366ff .. 
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They (the sufferings of Christ) include the anguish of the 
schizophrenic. They include the suffering of the oppressed and of 
the old and lonely. All these find their own suffering in what is 
suffered on Golgotha. Hence we are not to rob them of their comfort 
by constantly shattering the analogy with a 'Yes, but .... ' If we do, 
if we allow only that Christ bore vicariously the wrathful judgment 
of God, that a collective world judgment was focused on him, and 
that he bore the great burden of the world's weight (Paul Gerhardt), 
the very exclusiveness of this dogmatic standpoint opens the door 
again to Docetism .... Concentration on the human and 
psychological aspect is certainly less to be feared than a cold and 
uninvolved docetic dogmatism. This was what finally caused 
Lessing and Schleiermacher to attack the orthodoxy of their day. 
The stiffness of its doctrines of suffering and atonement was 
offensive to them, not so much for its content as for the fact that it 
ignored the human dimension of Jesus' existence or dismissed it 
prematurely. 107 
Thielicke's statements here support our previous claims that he objects to the 
classic Lutheran doctrine of "objective justification."108 More importantly, by 
relying on a "principle of homeopathy" Thielicke is purposely connecting the 
emotions and feelings of Christ to those of his hearers. This is consistent with his 
idea of the overall spiritual Christ encounter. He is not concerned with the 
objective fact of Christ's presence in Word and Sacrament, as classic Lutheranism 
is, but with the subjective impact of Christ's spiritual presence on the emotions and 
psyche of his hearers. Whether it is true or not that Calvin supported such an 
emotional connection to Christ more than Luther did is beside the point. What 
matters for our discussion here is that Thielicke saw Calvin's three-fold office (and 
107 Ibid., p. 386. 
108 Cf. with the rather stark condemnation of these classic Lutheran concepts in 
the sermon "Crucified, Dead, and Buried" I Believe, p. 108 "Why then do we 
obscure it by talk of an 'atoning death' and a 'vicarious sacrifice'? Why can't we 
leave that life in the simple framework where it is so obvious and overwhelming in 
its humanity? ... A mythological and poetic concept (objective justification) 
threatens to stifle what was so human and close to us." Cf. Woran Ich glaube, p. 
146. 
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spiritual presence) as the logical place where his homeopathic principles could be 
best expressed. 
1.3g Thielicke's Variation of Luther's "Blessed Exchange" 
We have shown several ways that Thielicke has departed from classic Lutheran 
ideas in the preceding sections. His concept spiritualises the Christ encounter and 
competes with views of christologicallocalisation. In addition to this it should be 
noted that Thielicke's use of solidarity generally stands in contradiction to the way 
solidarity was used as an idea in Luther's christology. The Luther scholar Marc 
Lienhard shows how Luther developed his own ideas of solidarity: 
" ... he (Luther) also envisages an exchange between God and 
human beings, or more precisely between the divine righteousness 
on the one hand and human sin on the other ... In this passage109 we 
again find the idea which has also been developed in the 
Operationes in Psalmos and which associates the incarnation 
directly with the solidarity of Christ with sinful human beings. The 
humanity of Christ is not described only in general anthropological 
categories. It consists of solidarity with the sin of human beings, 'as 
if they [the sins] were truly his and he had sinned.' And he bears the 
consequences: 'he suffers, he dies, he descends into hell.' It is 
however this solidarity which makes Jesus Christ, the just man, the 
true human being, the new Adam, to whom we are conformed, .. 
,!10 
"Luther was not content to speak of his body or soul, i.e., of 
general, but static, anthropological conditions. For Christ to be 
human means equally to enter into our human condition, to be 
subject to the law, and to take the consequences of sin, which are the 
109 
"Now it is he who by virtue ofthe marriage of faith takes his part of the sin, 
death, and hell, which belong to the bride. What do I say? He makes them entirely 
his own as if they were truly his and he had sinned. He suffers, he dies, he 
descends into hell: but it is in order to surmount all. For neither sin, nor death, nor 
hell could swallow him up. And it is he who in a prodigious combat was to 
annihilate them." Quoted by Lienhard from WA 7, 55, 7ff. 
110 Marc Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, trans. by Edwin H. 
Robertson, (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1982), pp. 132~133. Cf. 
pp. 140,141, 168,282,286,297,364,383*. 
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wrath of God, the assaults of Satan and death. Of course, Luther is 
perfectly clear in saying that Christ did not himself sin. At the same 
time, however, he emphasizes his solidarity with sinful human 
beings. From the beginning the humanity of Christ is thus described 
with the aid of active, even moral categories. This humanity, which 
is voluntary submission to the law, is suffering and solidarity with 
other human beings."111 
As Lienhard explores the concept of solidarity in Luther he speaks of two main 
thrusts of christological solidarity: solidarity with sin and solidarity under the law. 
Both quotations above demonstrate Lienhard's insistence that Luther did not speak 
of solidarity in the sense of solidarity with "general anthropological conditions" as 
Thielicke does. By directing solidarity to Christ's oneness with mankind under sin 
and the law, Luther was directing solidarity toward the article of justification. That 
is, by taking human sin upon himself and taking his place under the law, 112 Christ 
was performing a saving act. He was exchanging places with us under the Father's 
demand for obedience and under his judgement, 113 and at the same time was giving 
mankind his righteousness. The exchange was sin for righteousness and the law for 
the Gospel. 
Thielicke's development of solidarity does not show the same concern for 
solidarity with our sin. His concern is directed much more toward solidarity with 
human suffering and with human problems (not necessarily associated with sin). 
Solidarity with sin is mentioned only rarely. One such example is as follows: 
Ill Ibid., p. 377. 
112 Ibid., pp. 168, 282. 
113 This is also the classic Lutheran doctrine of vicarious atonement that 
Thielicke above calls "a mythological and poetic concept!" 
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Genau dies geschieht auf Golgatha. In Jesus Christus, dem 
Leidenden und Gekreuzigten, tritt Gott selbst an unsere Seite. Alle 
V ersuchung und Gefahrdung unseres Herzens halt er selber aus. 
Leiden und Angst, Ensamkeit und Todesfurcht, alles Menschliche in 
seiner Fragwiirdigkeit und Hinfalligkeit nimmt er auf sich, ... 
Dort, wo das Gericht mich treffen milBte, da steht Gott selbst oder 
besser, da hangt Jesus Christus. Verstehe das, wer kann; ich 
verstehe es nicht. Aber die Lobgesange alter Martyrer steigen 
darUber zum Himmel empor, und alle, die Vergebung ihrer Schuld 
erfahren haben und darUber neue Menschen geworden sind, wissen, 
daB es wahr ist ... 114 
[translation: (Anderson) This is precisely what happens on Golgotha. 
In the suffering, crucified Jesus Christ, God himself steps up beside 
us. He himself bears all the perils and temptations of our hearts. He 
takes every thing human upon himself in all its doubtfulness and 
infirmity-- suffering and anxiety, loneliness and the fear of death ... 
God stands (or, better, Jesus Christ hangs) at the point where 
judgment must fall upon me. Let him who can understand this; I 
don't. But all the martyr's songs in praise of it rise to the skies, and 
all who have experienced the forgiveness of their sins and through it 
have become new men know that it is true. 115] 
This quotation indicates that Thielicke recognises the need for solidarity under 
the law when he speaks of Christ's being with us at the point where judgement falls 
upon us. Yet the variation of the "blessed exchange" that Thielicke uses most often 
is not an exchange of Christ's perfect obedience under the law for our disobedience 
(as in Luther), but of his suffering for ours. This represents a shift from classic 
Lutheranism on several fronts: The first is a shift in emphasis where use of 
"solidarity" as a christological theme is only a minor presentation of the Gospel in 
classic Lutheranism; in Thielicke it is a major theme. The second is a shift in 
direction where Thielicke's major emphasis for solidarity is on mental and physical 
suffering and the human condition in general (which Lienhard specifically says 
114 Woran Ich glaube, p. 155. 
115 I Believe, pp. 116-117. 
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Luther did not do) and not primarily on solidarity under sin and the law. Thielicke 
goes so far as to blame orthodoxy's aversion to the human side of Christ's suffering 
as impetus for an overcompensation of anthropology into christology. 116 In the 
same place he accuses orthodox Lutheranism of a kind of docetism for failing to 
reckon with the human side to Christ's anguish (thus robbing Christ of his true 
humanity). By redirecting solidarity away from Luther's own model Thielicke 
hopes to make Christ's incarnation more "real" and more accessible to more 
people. Yet it can also be argued that by focusing solidarity on the human mental 
and physical suffering Thielicke is himself robbing solidarity of its deeper salvific 
action as described in Luther's "blessed exchange." 
1.3h A Change in Thielicke's Later Years 
The last major volume of sermonic meditations Thielicke published was Faith the 
Great Adventure (Published in German as Glauben als Abenteuer, 1980). Strictly 
speaking it is questionable whether this volume should be included in a study of 
Thielicke's sermonic works. In the Foreword Thielicke describes the works therein 
as "meditations." Each chapter represents a devotional development on a specific 
text. The chapters are slightly shorter than a typical Thielicke sermon, but the 
material contained in them carries the flavour of a Thielicke sermon - the intent is 
clearly sermonic - "By meditating on a text I mean that we should open ourselves 
to it in such a way that it permeates our whole being. This is possible only when a 
text not only touches our person and heart but strikes home at our situation."117 
116 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, p. 386. 
117 Helmut Thielicke, Faith the Great Adventure, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1985) p. vi. 
54 
Within this volume one finds a striking divergence in style and direction from 
the sermons of his earlier years. Perhaps the most obvious change concerns the 
theme of solidarity. The theme, which arguably is his most prominent 
christological theme throughout the first thirty years of his preaching career, is 
rarely developed in this volume. One can find only a handful of clear references to 
solidarity. 118 The longest treatment of solidarity amounts to only one paragraph. 119 
What is different about the majority of these references is how the idea of 
solidarity is so often applied to human relationships. For example, "A sound 
theology demands the severity of thinking and childlike faith that can unite a genius 
with one who is mentally handicapped in a common discipleship."120 " ••• many 
officeholders in the church no longer want to be shepherds but 'top sheep,' 
members of the flock with which they are in solidarity, and with whom they do not 
come into conflict."121 
As the above quotations demonstrate Thielicke's concern is still with the 
christological message, but now the application of that christology has shifted to a 
more human-to-human emphasis in solidarity- that is, toward sanctification. 
Earlier in his career the purpose behind much of his christological solidarity 
involved a stronger thrust toward a form of justification. He wanted people to 
118 Ibid., pp. 65, 134, 136. 
119 Ibid., pp. 152-153. 
120 Ibid., p. 139. 
121 Ibid., p. 103. 
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know that Christ was with them spiritually in their suffering. Evidently the spiritual 
laxity he saw in society during his final years led him to speak more forcefully to 
the need for expressing Christ's presence through outward action. One might even 
say that he moves from a more obvious Gospel proclaimation to a more forceful 
proclamation of law. 
The change may simply reflect Thielicke's recognition of changes in the world. 
When the need was hope in the midst of human suffering, be it physical pain, 
emotional stress, loneliness, or feelings of insignificance, then christological 
solidarity was his logical choice. Solidarity provides an intimacy and an individual 
focus that is particularly suited for offering comfort to those enduring such things. 
However, when the issue involves the increeping of worldly philosophies, a spirit 
oflaxness or the rise of secularity, then Thielicke's focus on Christ's personal 
solidarity with us gives way to our solidarity in the name of Christ with others in 
need. 
1.3i Application of Schleiermacher's Divinatory Method 
We have already identified how Schleiermacher's influence on Thielicke makes 
solidarity the theme of choice when reaching the cultured despisers. But it should 
also be noted that Thielicke's indebtedness to Schleiermacher extends further. 
Thielicke finds support for his use of solidarity in Schleiermacher's divinatory 
method of understanding. Schleiermacher explains the nature of his divinatory 
method in the following terms: 
The divinatory method is the one in which one, so to speak, 
transforms oneself into the other person and tries to understand the 
individual element directly. The comparative method first of all 
posits the person to be understood as something universal and then 
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finds the individual aspect by comparison with other things included 
under the same universal. ... Both refer back to each other, for the 
first initially depends on the fact that every person, besides being an 
individual themselves, has a receptivity for all other people. But this 
itself seems only to rest on the fact that everyone carries a minimum 
of everyone else within themselves, and divination is consequently 
excited by comparison with onself. 122 
The divinatory method is further explained as the "interpreter putting himself 
'inside' the author,"123 and as a kind of"conjecture" to be employed with a text 
h d 'd fi . . uffi . 124 w en ocumentary ev1 ence or meanmg 1s not s tctent. 
This method has application to the type of solidarity Thielicke espoused. 
Beginning with comments in Modern Faith and Thought, one fmds Thielicke 
expanding and developing Schleiermacher' s approach to the Christ encounter: 
According to Schleiermacher's famous definition, the divinatory act 
consists of changing oneself into the other, of seeing the other from 
within. In modern terms, it means adopting the self-understanding 
of the other and judging him by his own criteria. Only thus, thinks 
Schleiermacher, can we achieve a direct, intuitive, or congenial view 
of the other's individuality. 125 
Thielicke addresses the divinatory method under the section on "Historico-
Psychologically Determined Hermeneutics," which in and of itself suggests 
Thielicke sees Schleiermacher's approach as being rooted psychological 
122 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism: and other Writings, 
trans. by Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 92-
93. 
123 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, 
trans. by James Duke and Jack Forstman (Missuola, Montana: Scholars Press, 
1977) pp. 56 & 64. 
124 Hermeneutics and Criticism, p. 177. 
125 Modern Faith and Thought, p. 22. 
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apprehension. Thielicke's interest in this method lies in its value for general 
anthropological understanding. One truly understands the other by mentally 
walking in his or her shoes. Understanding requires empathy and emotional 
attachment. When Thielicke applies this to his christological method he hopes to 
establish a point of contact between Christ and all people, secular and religious 
alike, by showing how Christ identifies with our emotional and psychological 
situation. He avoids classic Lutheran solidarity with its focus on justification and 
atonement because it simply does not form an immediate psychological connection 
and therefore, in his estimation, does not strike at the heart of non-religious people. 
Thielicke identifies further developments to Schleiermacher's divinatory method 
by Droysen and Dilthey. Of the two Thielicke seems most indebted to Dilthey. In 
The Hidden Question of God Thielicke states: 
This distinction between scientific explanation and intellectual 
understanding has become a common one under the influence of 
Dilthey. What understanding means here in contrast to explanation 
is that insight into another personal life needs a certain existential 
pre-condition, namely, that I myself as a person represent the same 
structure of existence as that other personal life. Only because I 
have a relation to being and meaning can I understand the other in 
his corresponding relation. Only for this reason are his boredom and 
emptiness, his anxiety, his missing or achieving of being, familiar to 
me. Only for this reason do I understand that this other existence, 
like myself, is called upon to grasp his destiny, and that it runs the 
risk of failure. Solidarity with the other in the same type of 
existence makes understanding possible. 
In his work on hermeneutics, Dilthey described this psychologically 
as a kind of sympathy not unlike the divinatory understanding of 
Schleiermacher. 126 
126 The Hidden Question of God, p. 114. 
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Here again one can see the importance of the "same structure of existence" for 
Thielicke's christology. He describes this elsewhere as "immersing" one person in 
the other. The christological union with mankind becomes a deeply spiritual union 
with the individual formed in the inner recesses of the psyche. Thielicke's use of 
the divinatory method as a function of christology is important to this thesis at two 
levels. For one, this represents a departure not only from classic Lutheranism but 
even from classic Calvinism (which we've previously noted influenced Thielicke's 
presentation of solidarity) toward the Calvinism of Schleiermacher. Secondly, a 
christology that begins at this level shows its obvious individualistic bent. Granted, 
Schleiermacher' s combination of divinatory and comparative methods requires a 
certain communal bond in that one identifies in the other what is common to all, yet 
the question of which aspects of that other one identifies is wholly subjective. The 
very act of emotional empathy required by the divinatory method is also wholly 
subjective (everyone's feelings are different) and prone to misunderstanding (how 
can one really be sure of another's mentaVemotional state or intent?). Thielicke's 
intention is that christology begin at the inner recesses of the subjective mind not 
necessarily with the communal experience of grace. His goal is to bring Christ's 
salvation to all people beginning at the level where they are. 
In the concluding chapter we will take up Thielicke's goal of reaching people 
where they are at with the saving message of Christ. We will show then how one 
can accomplish his goal without relying so heavily on subjective individualistic 
methods. For now it is enough to establish the fact that an individualistic directive 
drove his christological method. 
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Another major theme in Thielicke's sermons is God's hidden presence. Thielicke 
uses this theme as a means of balancing solidarity. Where solidarity shows Christ 
with us in suffering, the deus absconditus is God's seeming absence in our 
suffering. Exploring the experiential tension between solidarity and the deus 
absconditus runs throughout many ofThielicke's sermons. Often he places the 
deus absconditus in direct juxtaposition to solidarity using the tension between the 
two for pastoral purposes- to comfort the hurting and explain God's actions to the 
confused: "Even when He was silent, God suffered with us."127 
Luther and classic Lutheranism use the idea of a hidden God to explain two 
main theological ideas. One relates to the deus absconditus in the strict theological 
sense, where God is unknown and unknowable in his majesty (deus absconditus in 
majestate). This is what Luther referred to as the "naked" God, or God in himself. 
In classic Lutheranism seeking to know God through the deus absconditus is 
understood as belonging to the theology of glory; it is an attempt to gain knowledge 
of God apart from objective means. Marc Leinhard describes it as the hiddenness 
"which attracts the speculation of unbelief, it is the consuming flre which bums the 
curious spirits who try to penetrate it."128 The other side of the deus absconditus 
relates more directly to christology; it is referred to as deus absconditus sub 
contrario129. This aspect of the deus absconditus may arguably be subsumed under 
127 The Silence of God, p. 14. 
128 Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, p. 262. 
129 Dietmar Lage, Martin Luther's Christology and Ethics (Lewiston, NY: The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), p. 63. 
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the deus revelatus. This side ofthe hiddenness of God belongs to the theology of 
the cross and its purpose is to reveal grace sub contrario. 
When one examines the ways the hiddenness of God is expressed in the 
confessional writings of classic Lutheranism one finds a number of uses. In Article 
XI of the Formula of Concord (the Solid Declaration) one finds God's hiddenness 
used in the "strict" sense of God's impenetrable nature, especially where divine 
foreknowledge and predestination are concerned. The reader is warned, "Neither 
should we permit ourselves to try to explore the secret and hidden abyss of divine 
forek:nowledge." 130 In Article VIII of the Solid Declaration on "The Person of 
Christ," Christ's divine majesty is portrayed. as hidden ("secreta") within his person 
while in the state ofhumiliation. 131 In Art. VII and VIII of the Apology of the 
Augsburg Confession, which deals with the Church, one finds some discussion 
about the Church as the hidden kingdom of Christ. 132 Here deus absconditus sub 
contrario seems intended. There are also references to the deus absconditus as a 
sign of judgement when people seek God through the law and not through the 
Gospel. 133 The sections on the sacraments, particularly those dealing with the 
Lord' Supper, use language that bespeaks God's hiddenness sub contrario. Christ 
130 Theodore G. Tappert ed., The Book of Concord: The Confessions ofthe 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), p. 620 para. 26. 
131 Ibid., p. 1024, para. 26. 
132 Cf. LW 39:xiii where Eric Gritsch sets Luther's discussion ofthe deus 
absconditus in the context of the Church. 
133 Tappert, p. 122, para. 106. 
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is spoken of as "under" the bread and wine, 134 and being bodily present "with those 
things that are seen."135 
In regard to the issue of purpose, a wide divergence between classic Lutheranism 
and Thielicke can be seen. As explained above, classic Lutheranism holds two 
main purposes in its use of the deus absconditus; either to describe the 
incomprehensible majesty of God or to show grace "sub contrario." Of the two, 
the deus absconditus sub contrario occupies the position of greatest importance for 
classic Lutheranism because ultimately it leads to the deus reve/atus of Word and 
sacrament and therefore ultimately to the Gospel. 
Thielicke's goals are much more existential, more deeply concerned with 
psychological discovery, and therefore more clearly impacting on the level of the 
individual. One does not see the same emphasis on the Gospel in the narrow sense 
in Thielicke's use of the deus absconditus (that is, the Gospel as a source of 
forgiveness and grace). 
Ultimately both Thielicke and classic Lutheranism seek explanations for the 
Christ encounter. Both wish to offer a sense of resolution and comfort for those 
experiencing the deus absconditus. Both contain elements ofthe deus absconditus 
which could be classified as "in majestate" and "sub contrario." The point of 
divergence is most pronounced when dealing in the realms of sub contrario with 
the vehicles through which Christ and his grace are hidden One quotation in 
134 Augsburg Confession, Art. X 
135 Tappert, "Apology to the Augsburg Confession," Art. X. p.180. 
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particular demonstrates Thielicke seeking to express the idea of hidden grace in 
places outside the traditional means of classic Lutheranism. 
So wickelt Gott seine Allmacht in die Freundlichkeiten des 
alltii.glichen Nebenbei ein. So kann mir, wenn ich einmal sehr 
schlimm dran und vielleicht verzweifelt bin, eine blilende Rose 
dasselbe dedeuten wie der Regenbogen, den er nach schweren 
Wettem ilber die Erde spannt und der mir verkilnden soil, da13 diese 
fragwilrdige und rebellische Welt unter seiner Gnade weiterleben 
soli, daB seine Hand diese Welt und uns alle weitertragen will und 
daB kein menschlicher W ahnwitz sie dieser bewahrenden Hand 
entreiBen und sie kaputtmachen darf- selbst nicht teuflische Spiele 
mit atomaren Feuem. 136 
[translation: (Anderson) Thus God wraps his omnipotence in the 
friendly, everyday, close-at-hand things. Ifl am very bad off, 
perhaps despairing, a blooming rose can mean as much to me as a 
rainbow arching over the earth after a storm. It should proclaim to 
me that this dubious and rebellious world will survive under God's 
grace; that his hand will support the world and every one of us; and 
that no human madness, not even our demonic playing with nuclear 
fire, can tear it out of his protecting hand and destroy it. 137] 
By consistently locating the solution to the deus absconditus outside of 
ecclesiological/sacramental models Thielicke once more shows his aversion to 
communal concepts of grace. In the above quotation he replaces the theology of 
objective means as grounded in ecclesiology, which is so central to Luther's 
theology of the cross, with a much more individualistic searching for God in one's 
own observations of nature. 
The following material will seek to highlight how the deus absconditus as used 
by Thielicke impacts the overall discussion ofthe individual in Thielicke's 
136 Woran ich glaube, p. 60. 
137 I Believe the Christian Creed. p. 36. 
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christology and how it demonstrates movements from the christological/theological 
structure of classic Lutheranism explained above. 
1.4a The Experiential Concern of the De us Absconditus 
It is necessary for Thielicke to discuss the de us absconditus in light of the daily 
experience of suffering endured by people. Thielicke confronts such issues as: 1) 
God's allowance of suffering without his interference. "How many meaningless 
blows of fate there seem to be! - life, suffering, injustice, death, massacres, 
destruction; and all under a silent heaven which apparently has nothing to say."138 
2) God's willingness to let evil prosper. '"This God' cried a ship's captain recently 
to one of my students who was earning some money, 'this God ought to come on 
board sometime. I'd throw him over the rail as a deck-hand, because he's always 
bungling things. He let my best friend go to the dogs, but the real deadbeats get to 
enjoy life. "'139 3) Our feelings of forsakenness and aloneness. "The Lord is absent, 
he has withdrawn out of sight and is barely believable. Meanwhile we feel forsaken 
and alone;"140 4) Our contrary observations of life. "We trust an invisible One. 
Can this invisible One, however, stand up in competition with what we 'see' in all 
its gruesomeness? Doesn't our observation, therefore, refute him?"141 5) Our 
feelings of impatience in needing to know Christ. "Even John the Baptist rebelled 
against this silence of Jesus. 'How long are you going to keep us in suspense? If 
138 The Silence of God, p. 14. Cf. The Waiting Father, p. 39, 85, 138; How to 
Believe Again, p. 82, 136, 178, 183; Faith the Great Adventure, p. 117, 134. 
139 How to Believe Again, p. 177. cf. p. 199. 
140 Ibid., p. 69. Cf. p. 78. 
141 Ibid., p. 207. 
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you are Christ, say so! Let a voice from heaven say that you are! Don't you notice 
that your silence upsets us?"' 142 
Thielicke addresses a whole range of possible human reactions and emotions to 
God's silence. But the definite purpose behind these probing forays is to explain 
the negative experience of the deus absconditus in a positive way. There is a 
purpose in God's silence and in his absence. 
W ahrhaftig: Gottes Schweigen ist anders als das Schweigen der 
Menschen .... Es gibt kein Schweigen der Gleichgiiltigkeit bei Gott, 
auch damals nicht bei Jesus, sondem nur die hoheren Gedanken-
niemals ein schweigendes Schicksal. 143 
[translation: (Bromiley) Truly the silence of God is different from 
that of men ... The silence of God and of Jesus is not of 
indifference. It is the silence of higher thoughts. 144] 
The implication of these "higher thoughts" is that God has a beneficent purpose 
in mind. The issue of purpose however may differ from individual to individual. 
Since Thielicke is always highly sensitive to the personal application of doctrine, 
this doctrine too is presented in such a way as to allow for a variety of individual 
applications. Methodologically Thielicke accomplishes this by leaving his 
conclusions "open-ended." Here he resolves the deus absconditus in the "higher 
thoughts" of God but then does not offer an exact definition of what God's "higher 
thoughts" are. This "open-ended" approach is similar here to what was noted 
previously about Thielicke's use of metaphor as a method for forcing his audience 
142 Ibid., p. 80. 
143 Die Lebensangst, p. 62. 
144 The Silence of God, p. 15. 
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to search for their own individual application. 145 How one experiences the 
hiddenness of God in suffering will determine what one concludes about its 
ultimate purpose. 
1.4b Seeking Resolution in the Deus Revelatus 
The deus absconditus is in a way a question in need of an answer for Thielicke. 
"Why does God hide himself?" Which leads to a second question "How does one 
find the God who is hidden?" 
The question of"why" has a two-fold answer in Thielicke's presentation. God 
hides himself in order to reveal either love or judgement. "A Father," says 
Thielicke, "always has for them (his children) the hidden thought oflove."146 The 
only necessary tangible location for God's love is found in the incarnation of 
Christ. But since that first incarnation is inaccessible to us now, we must rely on 
more subjective means to uncover the deus revelatus of Christ. 
So kam er aus Liebe in groBer Stille, und man kann ihn nur horen 
und sehen, wenn man sein eigenes Herz ganz still macht. Man muB 
seine guten Worte horen, die er zu den Armen und Stillen im Lande 
sprach. Aber man kann sie nicht so horen, wie man die lauten 
Stimmen der Welt hort, wie man das Radio hort und die 
145 Cf. Our Heavenly Father, pp. 65-66 where Thielicke uses metaphor to 
describe the deus absconditus, "May I tell you how I myself have come to feel and 
experience the reality of God's rule in these days of catastrophe, to feel it in all its 
mysterious hiddenness, and also in that hiddenness which is so oppressive that it 
almost reduces one to despair? ... It is like the building of a bridge that goes on 
beneath a covering of scaffolding, so that we cannot see the bridge itself, and we 
hear only the drumming of hammers. But one day the scaffolding and planking is 
removed and the bridge is revealed to our wondering eyes." (additionally pp. 86-87 
and 153) 
146 Out of the Depths. P. 64. 
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Schlagzeilen der Zeitung liest. Wenn man die Stille scheut, muB 
man ihn notwendig uberhoren. 147 
[translation: (Doberstein) So he came, because oflove, in great 
stillness, and you can hear and see him only if you hold your own 
heart completely still. You must hear the good words he spoke to 
the poor, the quiet people. But you cannot listen to them as you 
listen to the loud voices of the world, as you listen to the radio and 
read the headlines of a newspaper. If you are afraid of the stillness, 
then you must necessarily miss hearing them altogether. 148] 
The above quotation shows the difficulty of separating the issue of ''why" from 
the issue of"how." Christ came (he revealed himself) "because of love," but how 
one receives Christ and this love is only metaphorically described as "holding your 
own heart completely still." Christ is met in one's own experience of Christ's 
stillness. What this stillness is, remains undefined. A second example shows more 
clearly the goal of God's hiddenness as love and the revelation ofthat love as tied 
to an inner spiritual experience: 
Wir wollen mit diesem Herrn ringen, wie das kananasche Weib mit 
ihm gerungen hat, auch wenn er zu schweigen scheint. Wir wollen 
ihn nicht lassen, er segne uns denn. Wir wollen ihm unsere leeren 
und sehnsiichtigen Hande zeigen. Und er, der seinen Kindem Brot 
und keine Steine gibt, der einer armen Frau Gnade gab, obwohl sie 
keine Kirchenchristin war und von keinem Menschen beachtet 
wurde, dieser Herr wird auch denen Gnade geben, die nicht zu 
glauben wagen, daB sie Berufene und Erwahlte sind, und die doch 
stiindlich bitten: "Ja, Herr!" und "Erbarme dich unser!"149 
[translation: (Bromiley) We should wrestle with this Lord, as the 
woman of Canaan did, even when He seems to be silent. We should 
not let Him go until He blesses us. We should show Him our empty, 
longing hands. And He, who gives His children bread and not 
stones, who showed grace to a poor woman even though she was no 
churchwoman and enjoyed no high esteem, will also extend His 
grace to those who dare not believe that they are called and elected, 
147 Das Bilderbuch gottes, p. 63. 
148 The Waiting Father, p. 50. 
149 Die Lebensangst, p. 70-71. 
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but who yet pray every hour: "Truth Lord," and "Have mercy upon 
us.1so] 
Though Christ can seem to be silent (deus absconditus), his true loving 
intentions can be revealed by our individual wrestling. If there is an external 
element to this wrestling, Thielicke's words above would suggest it is prayer. 
Prayer here is private and heart-felt and not portrayed as a communal act. It is also 
a meeting point for divine grace. Classic Lutheranism has avoided making prayer a 
definite location for the revelation of christological grace. 151 Instead grace is 
conferred in classic Lutheranism through the more objective means of Word and 
sacrament, which in turn gives a definite communal flavour to the reception of 
grace. Understanding divine love behind masks of contrary appearance is a task 
that need not be relegated to the individual. The Church as a whole struggles to 
understand God's goodness in a world of suffering. By thrusting the individual on 
his or her personal struggles, even toward prayer as a personal wrestling, without 
encouraging the mutual support and admonition of the saints is to invite personal 
frustration. This matter of how one involves individuals in the mutual searchings 
of others will become central in our response to Thielicke's christology. Thielicke 
seems to ignore how shared experience leads to shared conclusions about God. Our 
contention is that this simple observation, avoided by Thielicke, holds important 
conclusions about the direction that Postmodem chistology should go. 
150 The Silence of God, p. 20-21. 
151 
"Grace" here is used in the sense of a justifying act or a bestowal of 
forgiveness. 
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A lesser element in Thielicke's answer to why God is hidden is found in his 
presentation of divine judgement. God's hiddenness reveals his conscious 
withdrawal from the individual. 
Es ist aber nun keineswegs so, daB etwa "nichts" geschahe, wenn 
Gott zu schweigen und passiv zu sein scheint. In seinem Schweigen 
und Passivsein kann sich gerade das Gericht vollziehen, ja es 
vermag sogar darin zu bestehen. In der Sprache des Glaubens 
bedeutet dies beides nfunlich, daB Gott seinen Arm abzieht und die 
Menschen sich selbst uberHillt, daB er sie an die Konsequenzen ihres 
Tuns hingibt, und sie damit dem Selbst gericht ausliefert. 152 
[translation: (Bromiley) Yet it is not true that God is doing nothing 
when He seems to be silent and passive. Judgment may then be 
exercised; indeed, it may consist in this very silence and passivity. 
In the language of faith this means two things. First, it means that 
God withdraws His arm and abandons men to themselves, thus 
giving them up to the results of their own actions and delivering 
them to self-judgment. 153] 
The issue for Thielicke is that the deus absconditus is not simply the absence of 
something, but a sign ofthe active presence of God's judgement. It is also a means 
to personalise judgment by making it a matter of "self-judgment." God withdraws 
because of personal unbelief to allow the individual freedom to pursue his or her 
own path to destruction. Thielicke references the example ofRomans 1:18ffas a 
biblical demonstration ofthis principle. 154 
Whether it be love or judgement that answers why God is hidden, the matter of 
how God reveals his will is consistently personal, spiritual, and subjective. Another 
152 Die Lebensangst, p. 212. 
153 Out of the Depths, p. 86. 
154 Ibid., p. 87. also I Believe the Christian Creed, p. 210. 
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example ofThielicke's "retreat" to metaphorical answers for how God reveals 
himself is as follows: 
Wir erkennen den Herrn nie an seinem AuBerer. Da ist er immer 
verhiillt (sei es, daB er durch Elend und Wunden entstellt ist, oder sei 
es, daB er wie am Ostermorgen in verklarter Gestalt vor uns tritt). 
Wir erkennen ihn immer nur an seiner Stimme ... " 155 
[translation: (Anderson) We never recognize the Lord by his 
outward appearance. Outwardly he is always hidden; he is either 
disfigured by rags and sores, or he is transfigured as he was on 
Easter morning when he comes to us. We recognize him only by his 
voice ... " 156] 
God is revealed for Thielicke in the hearer's mind and heart as he or she "hears 
his voice." Where that voice comes from is as uncertain as how one hears it. 
Thielicke's personal/spiritual explanations about the deus reve/atus stand in 
contradistinction to classic Lutheranism. Luther made the deus absconditus a 
central element in his theology of the cross. 157 But for Luther and Lutheranism 
there is a clearer principle of localisation that directs the individual to special places 
where God ultimately reveals himself and dispenses his grace. 
Thielicke rarely references his ideas of deus absconditus with "grace" in the 
technical Lutheran sense of God's justifying action. He does speak of God's 
positive working for us behind his hiddenness, but this "work" is usually undefmed 
155 Und wenn Gott ware, p. 83. 
156 How to Believe Again, p. 72. 
157 Cf. Martin Luther's Christology and Ethics, p. 63. "The God revealed in 
Scripture is a God who works contrary to human expectations. What is apparent in 
the life and death of Christ is weakness not strength, folly not wisdom, humiliation 
not victory. The power and glory of God are hidden 'in the humility and shame of 
the cross.' The underlying reality is not visible, and is in fact in contrast to, 
ordinary expectations." 
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or when it is defined it references emotional, psychological, or inner spiritual 
solutions, not the sub contrario of a sacramental/ecclesial presence. What follows 
is a typical example of the language Thielicke uses with reference to the de us 
absconditus: 
Er allein ist in seinem Leben und seinem Sterben der Garant dafiir, 
daB es einen Vater gibt, und daB Gott mitten in dieser so grausamen, 
harten und vaterlos scheinenden Welt dennoch am Werk ist und in 
der Heimlichkeit des Kreuzes sein Reich der Barmherzigkeit baut. 158 
[translation: (Doberstein) He alone (Jesus), in his life and his death, 
is the guarantor that there is a Father, that God is nevertheless at 
work in this cruel, hard, and fatherless world, building his kingdom 
of mercy in the secrecy of the Cross. 159] 
How and through what means God is building His kingdom is left unanswered. 
The hearer is merely assured that God is doing this somehow and is encouraged to 
trust in that fact. Again the resolution to God's hiddenness is highly individualised, 
because each person finds God "building his kingdom" in his or her own way. 
1.4c Using the Uncertainties of God to Confront the Self 
The use of the deus absconditus in Thielicke's individualised christological system 
serves the purpose of forcing a confrontation with the self. God purposely 
confounds the individual with the mystery of his Person and work to force the 
individual to come to terms with his or her own misconceptions about God . 
. . . wird er uns wieder und wieder zum R~itsel, damit wir auf ihn 
selbst horen, uns vielleicht an ihm argern, aber dann in diesem 
Horen und Argern immer tiefer in sein Geheimnis eindringen. Wir 
sollen keine Traumer bleiben, sondern Realisten werden, die den 
wirklichen Jesus finden. Denn nicht unsere Traume machen uns frei 
und neu, sondern nur dieser wirkliche Jesus. Darum brauchen wir 
immer das Erstaunen, haufig sogar das Erstarren vor dieser Gestalt, 
15s D 6 as Gebet, p. 2 . 
159 Our Heavenly Father, p. 29. 
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die so ganz anders ist als alles, was unser Traumen und Phantasieren 
uns vorstellen kann. Jedes Ratsel an seiner Gestalt, mit dem wir 
fertig werden, bringt uns deshalb ein StUck weiter von uns weg und 
ein StUck naher zu ihm hin. 160 
[translation: (Doberstein) ... he repeatedly becomes an enigma to 
us, in order that we may listen to what he himself says and perhaps 
be offended at him, but in this listening and in this offense penetrate 
more deeply into his mystery. We should not go on being dreamers 
but rather become realists who discover the real Jesus. For it is not 
our dreams that make us free and new but only this real Jesus. 
Therefore we need repeatedly to be astonished, oftentimes even 
chilled, by this Figure, who is so completely different from what we 
make him in our dreams and fantasies. Every enigma of his person 
that we manage to come to terms with thus brings us a bit farther 
away from ourselves and a bit closer to him. 161 ] 
An interesting dialectic presents itself: the self is the arena of encounter that 
Thielicke stresses; it is also that which one wants to leave. The location of this 
encounter with self is within the mind or spirit of the individual. The wrestling is 
personal. What exactly it means to move away from the self is not stated. The 
context suggests it has something to do with moving away from false 
interpretations of Christ that cling to the self. In that way one also moves closer to 
a proper understanding of Christ and therefore closer to Christ Himself. 
Closely related to the inner struggle against the self is the confrontation with 
decision that one experiences in the deus absconditus. Thielicke's best explanation 
of this is found in How to Believe Again: 
Warum gibt er sich nicht zu erkennen, warum verbirgt er sich in der 
Gestalt eines Ohnmachtigen, Gehangten und Verzweifelten? 
Kierkegaard hat uns auf dies sehr elementare Frage die tiefsinnige 
Antwort gegeben: Er war verhiillt in Elend und Niedrigkeit, damit 
nur der ihn finden kann, der ihn mit unendlicher Leidenschaft sucht. 
160 Das Bilderbuch gottes, p. 212. 
161 The Waiting Father, p. 149. (Das Bilerbuch gottes, p. 212.) 
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... Denn alles, was bombensicher ist, braucht uns nicht mehr 
aufzuregen. Kein Mensch gerat doch in Wallung, wenn er hort, daB 
zweimal zwei gleich vier ist .... Wenn ich aber vor der Frage stehe, 
ob in dieser einen Gestalt mein Schicksal beschlossen ist und ob 
alles, buchstablich alles in meinem Leben anders aussehen wilrde, 
falls es stimmen sollte, daB er mir meine Schuld wegnimmt, meinen 
Tod iiberwinden und mir Frieden schenken kann- wenn ich vor 
dieser Frage stehe, dann werde ich mich ganz anders einsetzen, urn 
in sein Geheimnis einzudringen. Und es wird mich urn so mehr 
aufregen und urntreiben, je ratselvoller und unkenntlicher er mir 
gegeniibertritt. Das ist der Grund dafiir, warum Jesus so im 
Inkognito bleiben will, warum er sein Messiasgeheimnis wahrt und 
warum er es verbietet, sein Geheimnis weiterzusagen, wenn einer 
einmal dahintergekommen ist. Jesus Christus will, daB unsere 
Entscheidung nicht erst damit beginnt, daB wir sagen: "Ich will dir 
nachfolgen," sondern schon damit, daB wir sagen lernen: "Du bist 
Christus, des lebendignen Gottes Sohn." ... Uberall, wo Gott sich 
verhiillt, will er die Leidenschaft der Frage in uns entbinden, will er 
unsere hochste Wachheit und unsere Entscheidung. 162 
[translation: (Anderson) Why doesn't he want to be recognized, why 
does he conceal himself in the form of a weakling, a desperate, 
doomed man? Kierkegaard has given us a profound answer to that 
very basic question: He was disguised in misery and lowliness so 
that only those could find him who searched with infinite passion ... 
. for we aren't excited by anything that is absolutely certain. 
Nobody flies into a passion when he hears that two times two equals 
four .... But when I face the question of whether this one figure 
holds the key to my destiny, of whether literally everything in my 
life would look different in case it was true that he took away my 
guilt, conquered my death, and could give me peace - when I face 
that question - then I will become involved in a totally different way 
in order to penetrate his mystery. And the more enigmatic and 
unrecognizable he is to me, the more it excites and intrigues me. 
That is why Jesus wished to remain incognito, why he guards his 
messianic secret and why he forbids those who once learn his secret 
to tell others. Jesus Christ does not want our first decision to be, "I 
will follow you"; he wants the prior decision to be our learning to 
say, 'You are the Christ, the Son ofthe living God.' ... Wherever 
God disguises himself, he does so with the goal of releasing 
passionate questioning in us, he wants our highest truth and our 
decision. 163] 
162 Und wenn Gott ware, pp. 208-209. 
163 How to Believe Again, pp. 164-165. Cf. I Believe the Christian Creed, p. 66. 
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As Thielicke explains, the deus absconditus is a guard against superficiality and 
an invitation for passionate inner searching leading to a decision. Kierkegaard is 
given credit for Thielicke's understanding of the passionate decision. The 
Kierkegaardian source certainly points toward existential motives. The Christ 
encounter is experiential, psychological, emotional, and spiritual. It penetrates the 
inner heart of each individual as he or she personally is forced to answer the 
question of "Who is Christ?" The language of personal "decision" further presses 
Thielicke's use of deus absconditus toward an individualistic conclusion. In short 
the basic thrust of the de us absconditus presented above is to focus on an 
appropriation of Christ that involves the total individual in a way consistent with 
the Schleiermachian divinatory method of understanding. 
1.5 "Transcendence" in Relation to the Self 
Transcendence usually has the force of pushing apart God and the individual; God's 
ways are not our ways, his workings are above our comprehension. Thielicke is 
more apt to use the idea of transcendence in a way that draws people to God rather 
than pushes them away. Transcendence is used in Thielicke's sermons to balance 
his prolific use of solidarity. Christ may be a brother with us, but he is more than a 
brother. He may be in our depths, but he is also above our depths. Without 
Christ's "othemess" solidarity becomes nothing more than fellowship; it lacks 
redemptive power. Thielicke explains: 
... we are loved to the deepest depth of solidarity and the one who 
loves thus is more and other than him whom he loves. For this 
reason the Redeemer has the power to be the Redeemer even in the 
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impotence of his love. He is not trapped in solidarity. Even in 
achieving it he is more than solidarity. 164 
"Othemess" allows Thielicke to broach issues normally covered by the more 
technical language of Christ's two natures without becoming "doctrinaire". 
Theological jargon is out of reach for most individuals and therefore lacks meaning. 
The language of "other" was more in line with the spirit of theological discussion of 
his day. The above quotation could be used to draw comparisons to the classic 
Lutheran discussion of Christ's divinity within the context of a vicarious 
atonement. There, as in Thielicke, the mere participation of Christ with humanity 
in active and passive obedience is not in itself sufficient. It must be joined to 
Christ's divinity so that his death is, in fact, the death of God in our stead. 
1.5a The Experience of Transcendence 
Thielicke did not want his individualised christology to be consumed by 
subjectivity. He recognised that crass subjectivity would lead to implicit denials of 
Christ's historicity. Each person would create Christ in his or her own image. The 
concept of transcendence is used to counter such subjectivity. As Thielicke 
analyses Schleiermacher's subjective consciousness, as taught in the Speeches, he 
notes: 
The dynamic element in Schleiermacher's view of subjectivity- this 
much we may say already- is that objective (or, better, 
transsubjective) historical facts correspond to it. For him the 
Christian religion is by no means an expression or projection of 
subjectivity. Jesus Christ is its central content- and he is an entity 
that transcends the subjective I and comes to it from history. 165 
164 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2 p. 382. Cf. p. 379. 
165 Modem Faith and Thought, p. 163. 
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Thielicke's view ofSchleiermacher explains his own approach. For Thielicke, 
as for Schleiermacher, a strong individualistic ("subjective") thrust is a necessary 
part of the foundation for all theological and christological reflection. Yet faith 
must be more than subjectivity, lest it be idolatry of self. There must be an 
objective core from which faith draws. That core is the transcendent "otherness" of 
Christ.l66 
Yet there is irony here, because as Thielicke explains in The Evangelical Faith, 
vol. II, the paradox between "otherness" and "likeness" (solidarity) is the heart of 
the personal experience of faith. "Otherness" for all its "trans-subjectivity" leads 
away from the individual only to fall back on the individual again in the form of a 
faith experience! Thielicke writes, 
This Christ, then, can be encountered only as a paradox, in faith. 
Faith embraces what is contradictory. It is an elemental personal 
experience preceding reflection and already possessing that on 
whose contradictions subsequent reflection founders .... What is 
paradoxical to later objective (i.e., historical) thought, what breaks 
up for this into God on the one side and individual man on the other, 
is held together in the act of faith and is in fact the ground of faith. 
In the very antithesis faith experiences the fact that Christ in his 
humanity is alongside us in solidarity and weakness and that Christ 
in his deity, as Lord of time and its creatures, is at the same time 
over us. 167 
"Otherness" would remain outside mankind were it not for the fact that God 
allows his transcendence to intersect our psyche and experience; a point Thielicke 
166 Cf. Thielicke's discussion in The Hidden Question of God, p. 149, on the 
tension between God's transcendence and what we can know through autonomous 
thinking. Personal faith is built on this tension between the tangible and the 
irreconcilable nature of God's transcendence. 
167 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, p. 280-281. 
76 
makes when discussing Christ's encounter with the disciples on the road to 
Emmaus: 
Even as wholly other the risen Lord did not stay outside the system 
of co-ordinates of our thinking, feeling, and willing. He entered into 
it. He did not just cut across the line of our expectation; he was also 
on this line. The point is that our schemata, being tied to 'normal' 
history and psychology, could not locate him on it and identify him 
with the help of it. We simply noted that our hearts burned. This 
was an indication that he entered our psyche with its hopes and 
fears. 168 
For Thielicke "othemess" would remain an obscure theological point were it not 
for the individual experience of it. With the individual's encounter with the 
transcendent, even though the individual cannot fully comprehend this 
transcendence and can only feel his heart burning, the personal faith of that 
individual finds someone in whom to hope and trust. The personal experience of 
paradox becomes an important part ofThielicke's definition of faith. Both 
christological elements (transcendence and immanence or solidarity) must be 
experienced together if the fullness of Christ is to be appreciated. 
Und doch haben alle, die von der Gestalt Jesu angeriihrt waren, 
gemerkt: Er ist bei aller Nahe zugleich ganz anders als wir .... 
Darum ist die Weihnachtsgeschichte, die zuriickhaltend und voller 
Scheu auf diesen Ursprung Jesu deutet, auch so ahnlich angelegt wie 
eine Notenpartitur, bei der man die obere und die untere Linie zu 
gleich lesen muB. Auf der unteren Notenreihe sind massive, irdische 
Vorgange: ... Darilber namlich, in der oberen Reihe, singen die 
Engel, darilber steht der Himmel ofTen. Und wer diese obere Zeile 
nicht mitliest, hat die ganze Partitur nicht verstanden. In ihr klingt 
eben beides zumsammen: daB Gott ganz menschlich and nahe in 
unser Leben kommt, daB ihm nichts Menschliches fremd ist und daB 
er gleichwohl aus ganz anderen Raumen in unser Leben bricht. 169 
168 Ibid., p. 450. 
169 Woran Ich glaube, pp. 119-120. 
77 
[translation: (Anderson) Yet everyone who has been touched by the 
figure of Jesus has noticed that in his nearness he is still "totally 
other" than we .... Thus the Christmas story, pointing to Jesus' 
origin in its reserved and modest way, is arranged somewhat like a 
musical score: its upper and lower lines must be read 
simultaneously. On the lower clef are concrete earthly events .... 
Above it, in the upper register, sing the angels, above it heaven is 
open. Whoever fails to read this upper clef has not understood the 
whole score, for both lines harmonize: God comes into our life 
completely human and near us; nothing human is foreign to him, but 
nevertheless he breaks in on our life from a totally different 
realm. 170] 
1.5b Constructing a Christology from Below 
Though Thielicke's christological system does recognise the importance of 
transcendence for christology, it is still clear that transcendence plays only a minor 
role. Without offering an exact numerical comparison, one could say that the 
occurrence of immanence (solidarity) roughly outnumbers "othemess" by nearly ten 
to one in his sermons. Thielicke does offer a possible explanation for the numerical 
difference in occurrence between solidarity and "othemess." 
So ist es immer zunachst etwas ganz Menschliches an Jesus, das den 
Menschen nahekommt und ihnen auffallt. Doch gerade dann, wenn 
sie sich so an das Nahe und Vertraute halten, wird ihnen plotzlich 
klar, daB noch ein Ratselvolles und "ganz Anderes" im Hintergrund 
machtig ist. Nie aber ist es so, daB Jesus sie mit seiner Gottheit 
"iiberfallt". Die Geschichte mit ihm beginnt stets mit dem Einfaltig-
Menschlichen, das wir verstehen konnen. 171 
[translation: (Anderson) So it is always something quite human 
about Jesus that strikes people at first. But precisely when they thus 
cling to the near and dear, they suddenly become aware that there is 
still something enigmatic and 'totally other' at work in the 
background. Jesus never imposes his divinity on them. With him 
the story always starts with the understandable, the simple, and the 
human. 172] 
170 I Believe, pp. 85-86. 
171 Woran Ich glaube, pp. 125-126. 
172 I Believe the Christian Creed. p. 91. Cf. similar thoughts on pp. 12-13 & 
183. 
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The prevalence of immanence over transcendence then is explained by the very 
nature of the incarnation. It was through his humanity that Christ established the 
Gospel. Thielicke notes this and uses the same approach of a "christology from 
below" - beginning with the humanity of Christ and eventually rising to issues of 
divinity or "othemess." In an indirect way this christological approach fits well 
with Thielicke's concern for the individual. Rather than beginning with doctrinal 
statements about the two natures he begins with the actual concrete situation of 
people who presumably have no knowledge of doctrinal formulations. He shapes 
his discussion of Christ around what is most graspable by individuals trying to 
understand Christ. His concern here as throughout his theology is not to maintain 
the ecclesiological status quo but to reach the real lives of real people. "Otherness" 
is a necessary albeit secondary component to that approach. 173 
J.Sc The Role of "Otherness" in Self Definition 
Thielicke uses "otherness" as part ofhis definition of the Christian self. Thielicke 
saw the Christian self as one whose true dignity was imparted from the outside. 
Thielicke stated: "Our dignity is strange or alien because it is grounded in what 
God (one who is other, i.e., alien) has done for us, what he has applied to us, and 
that by which he has bought us with a great price (1 Cor. 6:20; 7:23)."174 In the 
173 As one would expect the most common location for discussions about 
"othemess" are near discussions on the miracle stories where confrontation with 
divine elements in Christ is unavoidable. Cf. I Believe the Christian Creed, p. 169 
(the Emmaus story) & 200 (the stilling of the storm). 
174 Ibid., p. 21. 
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full paragraph from which the above phrase was taken, Thielicke attributed this 
idea to Luther and his concept of"strange dignity." 
A similar statement is found in The Hidden Question of God (a non-sermonic 
work) wherein self-identity is again seen as a relational issue between the self and 
the transcendent other. This time Thielicke gives credit to Kierkegaard as the 
source of his thoughts. 
We are not definable inasmuch as the world does not know us, since 
it does not know God (1 John 3:1). We exist as a relation to God. 
For this reason we are not more definable than God. Only God 
defines us .... The relation that defines us is not an immanent one, 
whether to nature above which we lift ourselves, or to society of 
which we are to be useful members, or to an idea which we burn 
ourselves up in realizing. All these relations make us a function, a 
means to some other end. They thus take away our unconditionality. 
This unconditionality is kept only when man is related to an 
unconditioned which transcends immanent relations even though 
present in them and sustaining them. Only in relation to the 
unconditioned which we call God does human existence take on 
what Kierkegaard calls infinite reality. 175 
The matter ofThielicke's definition ofpersonhood will be taken up in detail in a 
later chapter. At this point it is necessary only to note only how the idea of 
transcendence is important to his definition of"self." Mankind was created in the 
alien image of God and is recreated before God according to the alien righteousness 
of Christ. It is this relationship with the God who bears the seal of alien 
righteousness that defines the self. Certainly in steering the question of self-
definition toward othemess in these ways, Thielicke is moving toward an idea of 
christological justification. The consistent problem between Thielicke and classic 
Lutheranism over this doctrine is in part that the nature of this relationship, even if 
175 The Hidden Question of God, pp. 147-148. 
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it is ultimately justifying, lacks a vehicle through which it can be built. The 
implication is that an ecclesiological vehicle is not needed and each forms this 
relationship through his or her own unique spiritual encounter with Christ. Thus 
the definition of "selfhood," even if directed toward a doctrine of justification, 
remains tied to one's personal relationship with Christ which one discovers and 
defines for himself or herself. 
1.5d Pressing joY' Personal Struggle 
So sprechen die Menschen aller Jahrhunderte auf Jesus ein, und am 
SchluB fragen sie ihn: Sptirst du denn nicht, wie uns deshalb die 
Frage umtreibt, wer du bist und aus welcher Macht du das alles tust? 
Wer bist du, Jesus von Nazareth? 
Bist du eine Personlichkeit von ungeheurer suggestiver Kraft, daB 
du das fertigbrinst? Bist du ein Genie der Menschenbehandlung, 
daB du die Leute so an dich kettest und sie fiir dich leben und sterben 
Hillt? Bist du ein kluger Psychologe, ein geschickter Taktiker der 
Seele, daB du die religiosen Bedtirfnisse der Menschen ausntitzt und 
dich fiir Jahrtausende unentbehrilich machst? 
Oder - - oder - bist du Gottes Sohn, bist du der ganz Andere, bist 
du allein "von oben her", wahrend wir andern alle "von unten" sind? 
1st es Gottes eigenes Vaterherz, das in dem deinen schUigt, wenn du 
dich neiderbeugst zu den Armen und Kranken? Is es Gottes eigene 
Hand, wenn du die deine heilend auf die verwundeten Gewissen und 
kranken Korper legst? 
Bitte, sages uns, wer du bist: Woher hast du deine Macht? V on 
Gott oder den Menschen?176 
[translation: (Bromiley) Thus men in all ages speak with Jesus, and 
they finally ask Him: Do you not see how we are tormented by the 
question who you are and by what authority you do these things. 
Who are you, Jesus ofNazareth? 
Are you a personality of tremendous evocative power to be able to 
do all this? Are you a genius at handling men that you can bind 
them to you to live and die for you? Are you a clever psychologist, a 
skilled manipulator of souls, that you exploit the religious needs of 
men and make yourself indispensable to the generations? 
Or- are you the Son of God? Are you the Wholly Other? Are you 
alone from above, whereas we are all from below? Does God's 
176 Die Lebensangst, p. 106. 
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fatherly heart beat in you when you stoop to the sick and poor? 
Does God's hand act in yours when you lay it in healing on wounded 
consciences and diseased bodies? 
Please tell us, who are you? What is the source of your power? Is 
it from God or from men?177] 
It has been noted repeatedly how spiritual wrestling bespeaks that side of faith 
that is highly personal and private. For Thielicke, personal faith belongs less to the 
realm of certain knowing than it does to the realm of wrestling with the deeper, 
more profound questions about God and Christ. "Otherness" provides the perfect 
platform for wrestling with the most profound questions of all about the person of 
Christ - questions dealing with the relationship between divinity and humanity in 
Christ's person. Drawing attention to this inner conflict within the human heart is 
to focus on the side of faith that involves one's emotions and inner psyche. 
Thielicke is never content with outward superficiality in faith but directs his 
thoughts to the centre of one's being. This too is another sign of movement toward 
the individual. 
The idea of wrestling with the mysteries of God is not unknown in classic 
Lutheranism. Luther spoke of"Oratio, Meditatio, and Tentatio," 178 as that which 
makes a theologian. For Thielicke, personal wrestling leads to the personal 
decision which defined faith. Classic Lutheranism places faith into a more 
objective sphere by de-emphasising the personal wrestling/decision on the way to 
faith and emphasising faith as an objective gift of the Holy Spirit.179 Part of 
177 The Silence of God, pp. 25-26. 
178 Preface to the Wittenberg edition ofLuther's German Writings 1539, LW 
34:285. 
179 Cf. the meaning of the Third Article of the Creed in Luther's Small 
Catechism, Triglotta p. 545. "I believe that I cannot by my own reason or strength 
82 
Thielicke's move toward a more subjective personalistic model was a result of 
perceived inadequacies in the traditional sanctification I justification model of 
classic Lutheranism; this will be explored at greater length under the section 
dealing with Thielicke's sanctification emphasis. We wish to note here that 
"othemess" is used by Thielicke to press the christological concern toward the 
individual by way of a personal inner struggle. 
believe in Jesus Christ, my Lord or come to Him; but the Holy Ghost has called me 
by the Gospel, enlightened me with His gifts, sanctified and kept me in the true 
faith; even as He calls, gathers, enlightens, and sanctifies the whole Christian 
Church on earth, and keeps it with Jesus Christ in the one true faith; ... " 
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How Thielicke brings a christology that is highly individualised into his 
understanding of Church, which by its very nature is highly corporate, is of special 
interest. A goal of this thesis is to suggest a more corporate form of christology for 
use against the negative forms of individualism prevalent in our time. Naturally the 
relationship between ecclesiology and christology in Thielicke's work directly 
informs the topic of corporate christology versus private christology. Further, the 
relationship between christology and ecclesiology is vital. What Thielicke says 
about christology necessarily impacts his overall view of the Church and the 
relationship people have with the Church. In turn what he says about the Church 
affords important insights into the limits and directions ofhis christology. 
The previous chapter was concerned in large part with establishing elements of 
Thielicke's public proclamation that prove he did indeed direct his christology 
toward the individual. This chapter, while including sermonic material, seeks to 
expand that view by considering more ofThielicke's non-sermonic works. In 
addition to establishing the basic elements ofThielicke's ecclesiology, this chapter 
will attempt to show ways he continues to support and promote the individual and 
where his ecclesiology represents significant departures from classic Lutheranism. 
Additionally, the validity or invalidity of his conclusions will be explored. 
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2.1 The Calvinist Background 
To appreciate the nature ofThielicke's ecclesiology some words about his 
background are necessary. Thielicke's autobiography mentions his beginnings in 
the Reformed parish of Barmen-Gemarke. In that parish Thielicke experienced a 
"Calvinistic sobriety" and a theology that he describes as "a powerful biblical 
Pietism."1 Throughout his description of his boyhood church he writes with highly 
affectionate tones both for her pastors and her members. Later this area was to 
become famous for the Barmen Declaration of 1934 of which Thielicke again spoke 
favourably. 
During his years of young adulthood the Reformed theologian Karl Barth proved 
to be an influential force. Thielicke admired Barth for his passion and his 
profundity, yet he took issue with Barth's separation of theology from 
anthropology: "Barth did not concern himself with the concrete - either inward or 
outward- situation of the human being."2 
One of the lasting influences Reformed theology had on Thielicke was in the 
area of sacramental theology. More detail will be devoted to this in our next 
chapter. At this point it is necessary only to draw attention to Thielicke's affinity 
with Reformed sacramental theology. This is especially apparent in his exposition 
of the Lord's Supper. Thielicke leans toward Calvin's teaching on the Eucharist 
and he states his disdain for Luther's sacramental theology. In Thielicke's 
dogmatics he speaks of the Lutheran concept of Real Presence as a "crassly magical 
1 Notes from a Wayfarer, p. 37. 
2 Ibid., p. 66. 
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view,"3 insists the doctrine of the Real Presence needs correcting,4 and goes so far 
as to call the Real Presence a "sin. "5 When Thielicke describes Calvin' s view of 
the Lord's Supper he adds his agreement and portrays Calvin as a middle ground 
between Luther and Zwingli. Thielicke clearly favours Calvin's spiritual presence 
of Christ in the sacrament and rejects Luther's ontic presence.6 This directly 
influences his ecclesiology. 
Thielicke eventually moved to Erlangen where he studied under the Lutheran 
theologian Paul Althaus. He acknowledged having taken an "extremely polemical 
attitude" toward Althaus' theology, but also admitted admiring Althaus as a 
preacher. In Erlangen Thielicke was challenged by other Lutheran theologians like 
Wemer Elert. Elert served as dean at Erlangen and represented a kind of 
Lutheranism that Thielicke despised. Thielicke called Elert an "arch-Lutheran" and 
said that on one occasion Elert felt, "with some justification" that "I regarded his 
stubbornly Lutheran, polemical denominationalism as hackneyed, obsolete, and 
anachronistic."7 Thielicke's belief was that Elert took offence at his Calvinistic 
background, his support of the Confessing (Lutheran!Reformed union) Church, and 
his views on the Barmen Declaration. 8 
3 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 249. 
4 1bid., p. 257. 
5 Ibid., p. 297. 
6 Ibid., p. 298. 
7 Notes from a Wayfarer, p. 80. 
8 1bid. 
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Though Thielicke was Lutheran he held no allegiance to any specific 
denomination. His ecclesiology and the christology which was at its core were 
ecumenical and highly critical of those who were concerned with "an orthodox, 
chemically purified Lutheranism." The fact that Thielicke gives no account in his 
autobiography of his change in denominational allegiance to Lutheranism certainly 
suggests that it did not represent a major shift in his theological thinking. This 
ecclesiological middle ground between the Reformed tradition and the Lutheran 
tradition holds important christological implications for the whole ofThielicke's 
system. It would not be wrong to see his christology as the product of constant 
wrestling between Lutheranism and Calvinism. 
2.2 Perceived Ecclesiological Problems 
Thielicke was very open about the weakness he saw in the ecclesiological 
community of his day. At times his criticisms against the Church seem aimed at 
establishing common ground with his hearers (the cultured despisers). Other times 
his criticisms serve as pastoral warnings and at still other times his criticisms seem 
to serve no other purpose than to throw down the gauntlet before those with whom 
he disagrees. 
The form of ecclesiology Thielicke most severely criticised was that of 
orthodoxy. On several occasions he complains about a "chemisch reiner 
Orthodoxie"9 ("a chemically purified orthodoxy"). At other times he is critical of 
9 I Believe the Christian Creed, p. 187 (Woran Ich Glaube, p. 241); How to 
Believe Again, p. 73; Faith the Great Adventure, p. 139; The Waiting Father, p. 
129 " ... one can be an unjustified, case-hardened Pharisee and champion what may 
87 
orthodox dogmatism 10 and hyper-theological correctness. 11 These barbs seem 
directed primarily at orthodox Lutheran theologians. While he does not always 
defme them as Lutheran, in his autobiography he makes the same biting remarks in 
regard to the "chemically pure Lutheran" Wemer Elert, 12 the "super-Lutheran 
fanatic" J.A.O Preus; 13 only sparingly does he label any Calvinist theologians as 
"dogmatic" or "hyper-orthodox." But he does speak ofBarth's "ivory tower," and 
offers the example of Hermann Friedrich Kohlbrttgge, a Reformed pastor whom he 
sites as a negative example of Reformed conservatism. 14 
2.2a Appropriation Lacking a Personal Connection 
The greatest recurring complaint raised by Thielicke against orthodoxy is in regard 
to christological appropriation. This is developed in his dogmatics as he 
differentiates between Cartesian and non-Cartesian theologians. 15 Non-Cartesians, 
who have also been labelled "conservative" at times, are often thought to hold to "a 
reactionary form of thought which simply transmits traditions in an authoritarian, 
immature, and mechanical way with no effort to come to grips with them or to 
be a correct and legitimate doctrine of justification with an angry, arrogant 
fanaticism for orthodoxy." 
10 Out of the Depths, p. 51, 74; I Believe the Christian Creed, p. 93, 150, 183, 
187; Life can Begin Again, p. 3; How to Believe Again, p. 33, 75, 78, 79, 85, 103, 
128,219 (dogmatic pencil pushers! "die dogmatischen Federfuchser" ); The Silence 
of God, p. 17, 30, 39; Faith the Great Adventure, p. 16, 139; The Waiting Father, p. 
189. 
11 I Believe the Chistian Creed, p. 182, 
12 Notes from a Wayfarer, p. 81. 
13 Ibid., p. 366. 
14 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 1, p. 36. 
15 Ibid., pp. 30-65. 
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appropriate them."16 Dogmatism for Thielicke is tantamount to empty 
traditionalism. He complains: "Who knows how many dogmas have been thus 
carried down through the centuries without having the least effect on our lives? 
This simple rote-religion of the Christians must be an abomination to God; it must 
be agony for him."17 
The problem for Thielicke is that the mere acceptance of dogmatic formulas 
removes the "I" from the equation of faith. Thielicke felt that orthodox pastors in 
particular were turning the Church into a collection of "automata" where 
individuals were not required to subjectively appropriate the meaning of the 
dogmas through personal struggle. For Thielicke to focus on doctrine as objective 
truth, as orthodoxy did, is to make an "it" of doctrine and ignore the "I" of 
appropriation. Thielicke does not mean to suggest by this that all doctrine should 
be an entirely subjective affair. Christ himself is grounded in historical fact and is 
therefore an objective reality. Yet the objective character of Christ's existence is 
irrelevant for the life and faith of the individual unless there is an act of personal 
appropriation. The issue then is not one of "Is there truth in doctrine?" but "How 
does one appropriate that truth?" Thielicke's solution to the problem of orthodoxy 
is to build an ecclesiology that does not so much confess an objective body of 
doctrine as it does provide the most fertile ground for a subjective spiritualised 
Christ encounter- an ecclesiology that would seat the act of appropriation in the 
individual will. 
16 Ibid., p. 35. 
17 I Believe: The Christian Creed, p. 150. 
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One cannot deny the existence of those who demanded blind obedience over 
personal appropriation. There undoubtedly were elements within orthodoxy that 
cared little about a timely and relevant presentation of biblical truth and saw the 
Church more as a "storehouse" for doctrinal formulas. Yet Thielicke' s recurring 
complaints fail to recognise the possibility that many people with an orthodox spirit 
did face personal struggle as faith was appropriated and did not merely inherit a 
blind form of dogmatism. 18 Without question the tendency to accept doctrines 
without personal engagement was and is a problem, but if as it seems Thielicke' s 
concern is with mere formulaic acceptance of ideology without serious 
consideration, then it must be admitted that this is not a unique problem to 
orthodoxy. One can accept any ideology with the same blindness and lack of 
personal struggle. 
Nor is it fair to lump all the "orthodox" theologians together; classic 
Lutheranism, which is what Thielicke most often labelled "orthodoxy," shows great 
concern with individual appropriation. In speaking of the grace of Christ as 
acquired on the cross, Luther's Large Catechism states, "Whence do they know of 
it, or how can they apprehend and appropriate to themselves the forgiveness, except 
they lay hold of and believe the Scriptures and the Gospel?"19 In speaking about 
18 Cf. the way Thielicke separates orthodoxy from the struggle of faith in the 
sermon "What the word 'Faith' means" in How to Believe Again, p. 79: "For that 
faith ('great faith') does not consist in 'believing something is true' or in some sort 
of special antenna for religious questions. It consists in a struggle, a conversation 
with God." Thielicke divorces "believing something to be true" from "struggle" 
and "conversation with God." There seems to be an unfair characterization of 
orthodoxy in general by focusing on the single element of "dead orthodoxy." 
19 Triglotm, p. 759. 
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the grace given in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the Lutheran Confessions 
state," ... what is given in and with it the body cannot seize (fassen) and 
appropriate (zu sich bringen). But this is done by the faith of the heart, which 
discerns (erkennt) this treasure and desires (begehrt) it."20 In article XII ofthe 
Apology to the Augsburg Confession, the Reformers argued that forgiveness is not 
given ex opere operata because of contrition, but only "by that special faith by 
which an individual believes that sins are remitted to him."21 
Thielicke's observations about mechanical appropriation are correct and worthy 
criticisms for the Church to note, but laying such criticisms at the feet of 
"orthodoxy" is more the result ofThielicke's personal reaction against his critics 
than it is an accurate statement of fact. The importance of these criticisms for our 
research is that they once again reveal a passionate concern for the individual. 
Belonging to a church, going through the motions of worship, and confessing a 
given doctrine are inadequate expressions of faith for Thielicke.22 The individual 
20 Ibid., p. 761. 
21 Ibid., p. 267. Note that in classic Lutheranism "faith" even when spoken of 
here as residing in the individual, does not necessarily always involve an act of the 
individual will, but does always necessitate receiving Christ. Thus classic 
Lutheranism can speak of infants believing as well as the handicapped and mentally 
ill. 
22 Cf. Thielicke's comments in Life Can Begin Again, p. 184 "Perhaps it is the 
sight of this big congregation that is carrying you along, the rapt attention and the 
mighty, uplifting singing of the hymns. Perhaps you are hiding yourself among all 
these hundreds of people and letting yourself be carried along on a wave; and under 
the spell of this gathering it may seem to you that there really may be something to 
this Lord of the church, the Lord of this congregation, after all. Well, if that's what 
you think, you are still far from the kingdom of God; for then you are still on the 
broad way, which does not lead to peace." 
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heart must be engaged and the individual will must appropriate truth in a 
meaningful way for himself or herself. 
2.2b An Inadequate View of Faith 
The Lutheran Confessions provide a consistent witness to the need for individual 
appropriation of Christ via faith.23 The real issue between Thielicke and classic 
Lutheranism seems to involve conflicting definitions of "faith" more than issues of 
personal appropriation versus blind traditionalism. 
How one defines faith and the method one chooses for appropriation of the 
Gospel will determine a great deal about one's ecclesiology. For Thielicke both of 
these issues lean heavily on one's personal decision. To be sure, there are instances 
where Thielicke's description of faith is in full agreement with Luther and classic 
Lutheranism. Following a quotation from Luther, Thielicke states: " ... one might 
perhaps say that faith is ec-centric; it has its basis outside itself (extra se). For this 
reason it is not open to psychological self-observation."24 Again citing Luther 
Thielicke says, 
In particular the psychological act of faith, its character as a work, 
does not justify and save us (as though it could be a meritorious 
work). No, it does not justify on its own but only because it accepts 
the promised mercy. The decisive deliverance takes place from 
outside, on us and not through us. Not our spirit but the Pneuma 
does the work. 25 
23 Cf. The Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art IV "Justification" in the 
section "We Obtain the Forgiveness of Sin only by Faith in Christ," Tappert, pp. 
117f. Also Apology Art, XII "Penitence" para. 73-74. Tappert, p. 192, The Smalcald 
Articles, "How Man is Justified Before God, and His Good Works" Tappert, p. 315, 
The Formula ofConcord, Art. ill, "Righteousness" para. 40-41, Tappert, p. 546, 
24 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3 , p. 15. 
25 Ibid., p. 19. 
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This understanding of faith as reception and as being grounded outside oneself is 
repeated in Thielicke' s sermons: 
Man kann eben nicht einer "neuer Kerl" werden, indem man sich 
vomimmt: "Ich will einer werden," sondem nur so ist das moglich, 
daB wir uns in diesen LebensprozeB der Gemeinschaft mit Gott 
hineinschalten lassen. 26 
[translation: (Doberstein) A man cannot become a new person by 
deciding to become one. He can become a new person only when he 
allows himself to be incorporated into this living process of 
fellowship with God.27] 
The passive character of reception of faith so prominent in classic Lutheran 
ecclesiology does find expression in Thielicke's writings?8 
Yet other times Thielicke's definition of faith is more in line with "decision" 
theology which stands at odds with classic Lutheranism.29 Decision theology 
accepts the premise that regardless of human depravity or a sinful nature people can 
choose good or decide to follow Jesus. Lutheranism has historically rejected the 
ability ofthe unregenerate will to choose righteousness (see previous footnote). 
Thielicke's concern for the individual does not allow him to leave "faith as gift" 
26 Das Gebet, p. 52. 
27 Our Heavenly Father, p. 52-53. 
28 Cf. How to Believe Again, p. 145. "This love of his (God's) passes on to me, 
so that it literally puts me on, and thus a flow is established from the origin of all 
love and forgiveness, from that which God does for me and for us all, through me 
to my neighbor." 
29 Luther's Bondage of the Will is often considered the best example of the 
Lutheran understanding of the spiritual limitations of the will to decide in favour of 
God. See especially LW 33:249ff. 
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and faith as "ec-centric" language go without qualification. One finds statements 
like the following in Thielicke's sermons: 
Was heiBt das? Wenn Jesus hier den engen und breiten Weg 
einander gegenUberstellt, dann verlangt er zunachst einmal eine 
Entscheidung von uns. 30 
[translation: (Doberstein) Well, what does this mean? ("no one 
comes to the Father, but by me") It means, in the first place, that 
when Jesus here contrasts the narrow and the broad way he is 
demanding of us a decision. 31 ] 
Sie mUssen sich darUber klarwerden (und zwar ganz einfach 
"entscheiden"), ob sie in ihm den Herrn sehen wollen, dem alle 
Gewalt im Himmel und auf Erden gegeben ist, so daB er den 
Elementen gebietet und die Schicksals - und ZerstOrungsmachte 
brechen kann. Sie mUssen sich darUber klar sein (also wieder 
"entscheiden"), ob sie in ihm das Wetterleuchten des kommenden 
Reiches sehen wollen. 32 
[translation: (Anderson) Each one must clarify (or, quite simply, 
"decide") whether or not he will see in Jesus the Lord to whom all 
power in heaven and earth is given, so that he commands the 
elements and smashes the power of fate and destruction. Each has to 
clarify for himself (once again, "decide") if he will see in him the 
heat lightning of that coming kingdom ... 33] 
The fact that Thielicke makes statements like these in his sermons - that faith 
and appropriation lay in the decision of the individual - suggests that Thielicke sees 
this as the more practical (more authentic) definition of faith. The careful dogmatic 
distinctions found to be in agreement with classic Lutheranism are more apt to be 
found when writing to academics and pastors. 
30 Das Le ben, p. 207. 
31 Life can Begin Again, p. 178. Italics are Doberstein's. 
32 Woran Ich glaube, p. 95. 
33 I Believe: The Christian's Creed, p. 64-65. 
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It would seem that for Thielicke the sort of "institutional" appropriation that he 
disliked was linked to the strong emphasis in classic Lutheranism on sacramental 
theology. This becomes clear when one examines Thielicke's thoughts about infant 
baptism. He makes the following statement about faith as appropriated by the 
infant: 
It is obvious that the relation of Word, sacrament, and baptism is 
upheld here on the one condition that instead of the simultaneity of 
baptism and faith, as in the NT accounts, there is a temporal 
postponement of faith, which with the growth of consciousness 
"creeps" into baptism and ratifies the baptismal covenant. This act 
of ratification can be given ritual form in confirmation. 
This kind of anticipation of the baptism covenant, which is accepted 
and confirmed by faith, makes sense, however only if the baptized 
infant is from the very first placed in the relation of Word, 
sacrament, and faith even though the child itself is not the believer; 
but the faith of parents and godparents plays a kind of vicarious role 
in the establishment of the relation. 34 
As Thielicke explains, faith is not actually appropriated in baptism as a gift of 
grace but faith develops as consciousness develops. For Thielicke baptism seems 
to place the infant in a subliminal relationship to faith, wherein faith is present in 
others and available by example as the infant grows, but is only finally explicitly 
accepted after sufficient cognitive development. Thielicke plainly states that faith 
is "postponed" until the consciousness develops. He goes as far as to say that the 
baptised infant is "not the believer." Such statements clearly depart from classic 
Lutheran understandings of faith and its appropriation, which see faith as a gift 
given prior to any "growth of consciousness." In describing what is given in 
baptism, Luther in his Large Catechism states: 
Therefore every Christian has enough in Baptism to learn and to 
practise all his life; for he has always enough to do to believe firmly 
what it promises and brings: victory over death and the devil, 
34 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 275-276. 
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forgiveness of sins, the grace of God, the entire Christ, and the Holy 
Ghost with His gifts.35 
While defending the Lutheran view of baptism against the Anabaptists, the 
Lutheran Confessions explicitly mention the Lutheran conviction that infants can 
believe. 
Thus you see that the objection of the sectarians is vain. For (as we 
have said) even though infants did not believe, which, however, is 
not the case, yet their baptism as now shown would be valid. 36 
"Faith" in the Lutheran view is not relegated to the act of the will nor placed 
within the context of a personal decision. 37 It is rather a Pneumatological gift and 
simultaneously a receiving of the person of Christ. Thielicke' s counter to this 
seems to be that lack of cognitive ability blocks the christological/pneumatological 
action in infants and that personal decision is needed to unblock it later. One can 
see within this debate the clear conflict between the individualised christology of 
Thielicke and the more communal christological appropriation of classic 
Lutheranism. By linking the appropriation of individual faith with sacramental 
means historic Lutheranism has necessarily placed the act of personal appropriation 
35 Triglo!Y!, p. 743. 
36 Ibid., p. 745. 
37 In this regard note also the differences in the baptismal rubrics between 
Anglicanism and Lutheranism. In Common Worship (London: Church House 
Publishing, 2000), p. 353, there is a rubric called "The Decision." During this 
rubric the candidate speaks of his wilful act of faith, "I reject, I renounce, I repent, I 
turn, I submit, I come." This section corresponds to the one in the American book 
Lutheran Worship (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1982), pp. 201-202 
where the candidate or his or her parents are asked, "Do you renounce the devil .. 
. "at which point the devil is renounced. But then immediately following the 
renunciation of the devil the baptismal party speaks the creed in three separate 
sections in answer to questions about each person of the Trinity. There simply is 
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within the "institutional" Church. It has also drawn the focus away from the 
individual and his or her act of personal appropriation and emphasised instead the 
divine action of giving faith: 
Faith is that my whole heart takes to itself this treasure (the 
remission of sins and justification). It is not my doing, not my 
presenting or giving, not my work or preparation, but that a heart 
comforts itself, and is perfectly confident with respect to this, 
namely, that God makes a present and gift to us, and not we to Him, 
that He sheds upon us every treasure of grace in Christ. 38 
Thielicke is well aware of the classic Lutheran view of faith given in baptism 
and sharply disagrees with it. 39 What one notices in his disagreement is that his 
initial criticism against classic Lutheranism and "dogmatic" Christianity for failing 
to address the individual and demanding only blind acceptance of a formulaic faith 
is not really the issue here. Clearly classic Lutheranism does address the individual 
and his or her appropriation of grace. The real issue between Thielicke and classic 
Lutheranism does not lie in the "if' of appropriation but in the "how." Thielicke 
sees appropriation more as an act of the will, a decision, a psychological struggle, 
while classic Lutheranism sees appropriation as a gift, a Pneumatological work, and 
as a christological union which does (as in the case of infant baptism) precede 
conscious apprehension. For Thielicke the fact that faith does not necessitate the 
consciousness in classic Lutheranism creates separation between the "I" and God. 
It means the "I" is merely an "it" and places baptism back into the realm of ex opere 
operata. 
not a corresponding set of questions and answers that could be considered a 
"decision." 
38 Triglott~ p. 135. 
39 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 277. 
97 
However, as classic Lutheranism sees itself, this is certainly not the case. 
Instead, by viewing faith and appropriation as matters that do not depend on the 
conscious will, classic Lutheranism seeks to offer hope to the disenfranchised. 
Infants, the severely mentally handicapped, those suffering diseases that impair the 
mind like Alzheimer's, and the unconscious are all seen to have faith, if they have 
objectively received it through the Word and dominical sacraments. Admittedly 
Luther and the Lutheran Confessions do not speak a great deal about the mentally 
ill as having faith. It is likely that their views of mental illness were not clear in 
regard to the physical nature of the disease, and they looked upon it more as a 
spiritual malady. However one can find examples of early Lutheranism speaking 
about weak or imperfect faith as "saving faith." 
So in the midst of sins, death, and anxieties we, too, lay hold on 
Christ with a weak faith. Yet this faith, tiny though it may be, still 
preserves us and rules over death and treads the devil and everything 
under foot. 40 
The passive nature of faith in Lutheran theology is meant to offer hope to those 
whose conscious will has succumbed to weakness and opposition to God. 41 Only 
through an initial act of divine grace does the conscious will become regenerate and 
capable of apprehending the things of God. This also necessarily means that the 
giving of faith, which occurs prior to the act of the conscious mind (especially in 
40 LW 12:262. 
41 As an example: LW 25:418 "God saves no one but sinners, He instructs no 
one but the foolish and stupid, He enriches none but paupers, and He makes alive 
only the dead; not those who merely imagine themselves to be such but those who 
really are this kind of people and admit it. For it really was a fact that the Gentiles 
were not the people of God and were a foolish nation, so that, being saved without 
any merits or zeal of their own, they might acknowledge the grace of God." 
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infants), is placed in a social context, namely that of the Communi a Sanctorum. 42 
Thielicke shows an understanding of ecclesiology which de-emphasises the 
communal/social element to faith. Further details of the social context for faith's 
reception will be explored in more detail in a subsequent chapter. Certainly the 
individual will is involved in faith, but only in as much as the will is recreated by 
the indwelling of Christ, and only in as much as Christ was received through Word 
and sacrament via the Communio Sanctorum. 
A misguided communal element in popular ecclesiology was a cause for concern 
with Thielicke. In the section addressing infant baptism Thielicke states: 
Whereas in primitive Christianity and in missionary churches an 
awakening to faith is the normative motive for the reception of new 
members, in Christendom infant baptism sees to it that birth and 
tradition constitute the spiritual link between the generations. The 
question inevitably arises whether infant baptism is legitimate on 
this basis. But the question is really a rhetorical one. Scepticism as 
to the continued existence of Christendom gives it a sociological 
42 The term "Communio Sanctorum" is used here as a more precise definition of 
what is often termed "church." Luther complained about the ambiguity of the word 
"church" (Kirche) and the multiplicity of meanings it is often given in common 
conversation. [cf. LW 41, p. 143-144 where Luther speaks of"Kirche" as "this 
meaningless and obscure word." Also Luther's Large Catechism, Concordia 
Triglotta, p. 691 par. 48-50 where Luther discusses his use of the terms 
"communi a " and "Kirche ".] The term "Communio Sanctorum " is less ambiguous 
emphasizing the true spiritual community of believers in Christ. This community is 
the body of the redeemed wherever they are found around the world - those united 
not by outward bonds of denominational labels, or by the appearance of faithfulness 
and piety, but solely by grace and the salviftc act of Christ [Cf. LW 39, p. 65, and 
esp. LW 35, p. 50-51]. It is localized when true saints gather around the Word and 
Sacrament and receive Christ. A more detailed treatment ofLuther's Communio 
Sanctorum is found in Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 297ff. In 
Bonhoeffer's The Communion of Saints (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
1963) the term "Sanctorum Communio" is used incarnationally as an expression of 
Christ in the midst of His Church. He is present both to distribute grace and 
incorporate believers into Himself. His presence is both tangible and mystical. 
Bonhoeffer states "The church is the presence of Christ, as Christ is the presence of 
God." (page 1 01 ). The term "Communio Sanctorum" expresses the idea of the 
community of faith which is also the body of Christ. 
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twist. In our pluralistic and secularized society the claim of an 
institution that at the great points of life, especially birth and death, 
it can take over the patriarchally inserted function of giving meaning 
is more than doubtful.43 
Thielicke's concern is misplaced faith. People were trusting in a loose 
association to the Church on the basis of having been baptised, but were not 
genuine in the faith. When one considers the actual connection of the German 
people to the Church in Thielicke's day, one can see that his concerns are not 
without justification. The lack of regular Church attendance and a wide perception 
in German culture that life in the Church was not necessary to one's secular life no 
doubt are the basis for Thielicke's concerns. The fact was that people did view 
baptism as nothing more than an outward rite and were failing to understand it as a 
new life in Christ connected to the Communio Sanctorum. It seems reasonable to 
assume that there was also at that time a widespread mistrust of the institution of 
the Church. Its reputation had been tarnished over questions of its role during the 
war. Perhaps part ofThielicke's focus on individual cognitive apprehension was a 
capitulation to these legitimate social doubts. 
Unfortunately Thielicke's solution to the problem of people's perceptions was to 
question the whole traditional Lutheran understanding of appropriation. But this 
was not the root of the problem then and did not need to be abandoned. Where a 
false magical view of baptism persisted Thielicke could have more openly and 
strenuously objected to it and countered it with clear explanations of baptism. 
Where aversion to the Church was a result of failures of the institution then those 
failures should have been his focus. His desire for honest appropriation and 
43 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 274. 
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genuine faith were sincere and appropriate. His method for how to achieve this 
however could have been less individually directed. In the concluding chapter we 
will examine ways that appropriation can be better taught by tying it to the social 
being of the Church. 
2.2c The Institution as Self-serving 
As suggested above the institution of the Church had aroused the ire of many in 
Germany including Thielicke. He recognised that this side of the Church was an 
unavoidable reality that must be reckoned with, and that the "human" side of the 
institution often interjected a sinful selfishness.44 Thielicke says: 
If we take seriously the corporeality of the church, we must also take 
seriously the institutional problems posed by this corporeality. Not 
to regard the institutional element, i.e. matters of structure and 
constitution, as part of the church would lead to Platonic and docetic 
spiritualizings which would deny to the Word its incarnation and its 
assumption ofhistorical form.45 
Denying the human organisational element of the Church or glossing over it in 
favour of a strictly spiritual view of the Church is for Thielicke a crass spiritualising 
of Christ himselfwho was joined to humanity. The threat ofDocetism meant that 
the physicaVinstitutional element of the Church should be embraced and understood 
in all its apparent weakness. Whether Thielicke effectively does this is highly 
44 Cf. The Waiting Father, p. 72 "Even in the assemblies of bishops and synods 
that power mingles the seeds of ambition, the praise of men, and clericalism with 
this desire to be obedient to God and to act spiritually." See also p. 89, (Das 
Bilderbuch Gottes, p. 122 " ... und darum mussen die Pfarrer sich huten, zu 
religiosen Managem ohne Vollmacht und mit vertrockneter geistlicher Substanz zu 
werden.") 
45 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, p. 44. 
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debatable. Yet as he saw it, it was essential to do because those outside the Church 
tended to be very suspicious of what they saw as a human institution.46 
One problem that presented itself in Germany and possibly furthered the 
suspicion of the institutional mindset was the matter of the Church being supported 
by state taxes. Many saw these taxes as doing nothing more than paying Church 
authorities to maintain the institution. Quoting Hans Iwand, Thielicke complains, 
Die Entfremdung der Kirche vom wirklichen Leben nimmt immer 
mehr zu (V erstehen Sie? Er sagt nicht: die Kirchenfremdheit, der 
Sakularismus nimmt immer mehr zu; sondem er sagt: die 
Entfremdung der Kirche vom wirklichen Leben nimmt immer mehr 
zu!), ... Das Evangelium, das die Welt heute braucht, wird als 
bekannt und fertig vorausgesetzt. Man mochte damit alles mogliche 
in Gang bringen, wie mit einem Motor. Ich muB gestehen, dal3 ich 
oft bei diesem Treiben ganz versweifelt bin ... Was wir haben, ist 
der StaatszuschuB von einigen Millionen fiir die kirchlichen 
Behorden .... Und siehe: heir konnte das Wasser des Lebens an sie 
ausgegeben werden. Aber die Quellen sind offenbar verschUttet. 
Eine erstarrte Institution scheint nur brackiges Tfunpelwasser 
anbieten zu konnen, das viele als ungenieBbar wieder ausspeien oder 
urn das sie einen weiten Bogen machen.47 
[translation: (Anderson) The alienation ofthe church from real life is 
growing greater and greater. [You see how he doesn't say that 
secularism or alienation.from the church is increasing? He says the 
alienation ofthe church is increasing!] ... The gospel that the world 
needs today becomes overfamiliar and is taken for granted. People 
want to use it as a motor to get everything possible moving. I must 
confess that this tendency often dismays me completely .... What 
we have is a state subsidy of a few million for the church authorities . 
. . . The church could provide them with the water of life. But 
obviously the springs are blocked up. A moribund institution 
46 Comments made in a sermon on the prodigal son are revealing: "But yet I ask 
myself why it is that so many 'worldlings,' even the very respectable and definitely 
serious ones, are so difficult to get inside a church. Many of them have said to me, 
'Sure, when you speak in the university or in an auditorium I'm glad to come. But I 
have the same horror of a church that the devil has of a holy water font."' The 
Waiting Father, p. 36. 
47 Woran Ich glaube, pp. 297-298. 
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appears to offer only brackish pond water which many spit out as 
undrinkable or else shun completely48] 
Thielicke consistently warns against the Church losing her mission and 
becoming irrelevant in the world. Fifteen years after the above citation Thielicke 
published these words (speaking from the perspective of the cultured despisers): 
Die Institution Kirche ist unglaubwiirdig (schaut euch ihre 
Biirgerlichkeit, schaut euch die Zerrissenheit ihrer Botschaft, ihre 
Weltfremdheit order auch ihre Welthorigkeit an! Jedenfalls tut sie 
das nicht, wovon sie redet).49 
[translation: (Doberstein) The institutional church is untrustworthy. 
Just look at its conventionality. Look at the confusion of its 
message, its naivety, or at its slavery to the world! At any rate, it 
does not practice what it preaches. 50] 
The solution Thielicke offers the cultured despisers is both christological and 
individualistic. Thielicke reminds his hearers that it was precisely for the 
weaknesses and sins of people that Christ died. "For Christ did not rise up against 
all these (problems of sinful people in the church) but rather died and rose for all of 
them."51 He further points to Christ as embodying the very opposite spirit of the 
church that cares only for the institution. Christ lived to reach the individual, not to 
build the corporation. 52 The institution of the Church itself is not trustworthy but 
Christ who died for her is trustworthy. 
48 I Believe: The Christian's Creed, pp. 232-233. 
49 Glauben als Abenteuer, p. 56. 
5° Faith the Great Adventure, p. 27. 
51 Ibid., p. 32. 
52 Cf. Our Heavenly Father, p. 143. 
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Such a frank confrontation with the institutional failings of the church shows 
respect to the valid observations of those outside the Church. At the same time his 
christological solution refocuses concern away from fallen humanity toward the 
soteriological work of Christ. Both these elements are helpful in the present 
context of the world where such suspicions remain. Yet within Thielicke's 
criticisms of the institution can be seen a subtle attack on the corporate heart of the 
Church. There is an implication that: "the established institutionalised Church is 
untrustworthy, therefore seek Christ on a personal level without the dangers of 
institutional abuses.53" lfThielicke's criticisms ofthe institution were balanced 
with a renewed sense of what was good and right with the corporate Church, then it 
would be less likely that people would choose to resolve their suspicions by 
avoiding the Church. Unfortunately Thielicke's criticisms of the institution 
encourage a view of Church that upholds the individual faith of the member while 
not exploring one's the broader relationship to the community of faith. 
V on Anfang an war die Kirche die Gemeinschaft der einzelnen, der 
Herausgerufenen, die Gemeinschaft derjenigen, die zuerst einmal in 
letzter Einsamkeit unter seinen Augen standen. 54 
[translation: (Doberstein) From the beginning the church was the 
community of solitaries, the community of those who were "called 
53 Examples of this kind of logic can be found in a sermon where Thielicke even 
speaks of the collapse of the German institutional Kirche in WWII as a blessing 
(Our Heavenly Father, p. 141). This was because the lack of institutional trappings 
made the people free to live by the more basic elements of"Scripture and 
Confession." In Theological Ethics, vol. 1, p. 625 Thielicke goes so far as to claim 
that Nazis persecuted the church not because the message was offensive to them, 
but because the Nazis were disgusted at the "pliant and unconvincing character" of 
the ecclesiastical institution. 
54 Das Leben kann noch einmal beginnen, pp. 209-210. 
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out," of those who first stood in ultimate loneliness before his 
eyes. 55] 
2.2d Liturgical E5capism 
The liturgical voice of the congregation could itself become a problem for 
Thielicke. In particular he complains about people coming to Church for the holy 
sounds and smells, for the "cozy feeling" of familiar liturgical acts, and the purpose 
of finding "a pious refuge to which we might withdraw from the evil world."56 The 
very sacredness of the surroundings in the Church could be seen as isolating people 
from the world instead of preparing them to live in it. Thielicke saw this attitude 
especially in the liturgical "revival" during World War Two. Though Ich glaube 
das Bekenntnis der Christen was published in 1965, almost two decades after 
World War Two, the frustration with the wartime liturgical movement is still clear. 
Als im Dritten Reich die Verfolgung uber die Gemeinde Jesu 
hereinbrach, gab es Leute, die liturgische Bewegungen inszenierten 
mit gregorianischen Gesangen und kultischen Gewandem. Das mag 
fiir manche von ihnen (sicher nicht fiir alle und vielleicht nicht 
einmal fiir die meisten) so etwas wie ein Druckposten gewesen sein 
in einer Situation, die das offene Bekenntnis und nicht das heilige 
"Glasperlenspiel" verlangt htltte. Wo namlich die Kirche im 
Angesicht des Anitchristen predigte und ihre harte, unverkfuzte 
W ahrheit hinausschleuderte, da begannen die Puppen zu tanzen, da 
wurden die Uimmer Gottes sehr bald von den Wolfen umzingelt und 
die ganze Hitlerei reagierte sauer, weil sie sich getroffen fiihlte. 
Aber wo man nur fromme Kulte zelebrierte, konnte man 
ungeschoren bleiben; diese Kreise wollte niemand storen. Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer aber entlud uber diesen frommen Betrieb sein 
Zomeswort: "Nur wer offentlich fiir die Juden betet, darf auch 
gregorianisch singen. "57 
[translation: (Anderson) When the persecutions under the Third 
Reich broke over the church, there were people who staged liturgical 
movements with Gregorian chants and elaborate vestments. For 
55 Life Can Begin Again, pp. 180-181. 
56 I Believe the Christian's Creed, p. 234. 
57 Woran Ich glaube, pp. 300-301. 
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many of them (certainly not for all and perhaps not even for most of 
them) that activity may have been something of a cozy corner in a 
situation that would have demanded of them an open confession 
instead of that holy charade. For the fur began to fly wherever the 
church preached her hard, unvarnished truth in the face of the anti-
Christians. Then the lambs of God were very quickly encircled by 
the wolves. All the Hitlerites reacted negatively because they felt 
they were being criticized. Where merely pious ritual was 
celebrated, however, people could remain undisturbed; nobody 
wanted to shear those sheep. Dietrich Bonhoeffer vented his scorn 
on this pious business by saying, "Only those who pray publicly for 
the Jews may sing Gregorian. 58] 
Thielicke had nothing against the liturgy in itself. He preferred liturgical forms 
and preached in traditional vestments. What he did object to was religious form 
that became an end unto itself and which consequently did not effectively 
communicate the living Christ. 59 Thielicke praises the Russian Orthodox Church 
that was very high in its liturgical form for bringing a genuine new life to her 
people.60 
Certainly part of the difference between Thielicke's criticism of high liturgy 
among the German Lutherans61 of World War Two and his praise of the high 
liturgy of the Orthodox has to do with the context of each. The liturgical renewal in 
58 I Believe the Christian's Creed, p. 235. 
59 Cf. Ibid., p. 217 " ... Christianity can become so exciting, so fiery and stormy, 
that it can catapult people out of the previous course of their life. For in our case 
(honestly, now) the situation often seems to be exactly the reverse. The words we 
hear from the pulpit or the old liturgies seem to be venerable, of course, but they are 
often dead as well." 
60 Thielicke repeats this praise of the Russian Orthodox Church in The Trouble 
with the Church, p. 103. Specifically he mentions their making the liturgy 
understandable to "both friend and foe" as a positive step. 
61 Germany and America are identified as the main areas for this liturgical 
legalism in The Trouble with the Church, p. 85. 
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Germany during the war was for Thielicke an artificial repristination. It was a 
legalistic insistence on the liturgical form, not a liturgical practice that flowed from 
the necessity of the Gospel. Thielicke seems to say that such liturgical legalism 
also represented the wrong focus for the times. Instead of worship directing the 
people toward the cross and sacrificial love, the liturgical renewal placed the focus 
of Christian life on the correctness of the act ofworship.62 
Thielicke gives an extended discussion about the role of the liturgy in his 
dogmatics. 63 There one sees how he seeks balance in the liturgy between 
traditional forms and modern expressions. Both sides to the liturgical debate can 
lead to harmful ends. Escape into the liturgy for the sake of liturgy can ignore the 
immediacy of genuine human problems and issues. By the same token, escape 
away from the liturgy for purposes of innovation, if there is not christological 
necessity to do so, is also highly dangerous. Thielicke writes: 
Should we not replace Gregorian chants and similar music with 
modern idioms (jazz, rock, etc.)? Should we not use trumpets, 
saxophones, and the like instead of organs? Certainly such a break 
with traditional worship is not permissible if a secular group is used 
merely for the sake of being modern and of tickling the ears of 
(young) people. Psycho-strategy is the worst enemy of the spiritual 
and self-evident Word, quite apart from the fact that the aim is 
noticed and is missed for this very reason. 64 
A properly balanced liturgical expression is important for Thielicke. Here he 
shows sensitivity to the communal nature of worship. His individualised 
62 Ibid., pp. 83-85. 
63 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, pp. 245-247. 
64 Ibid., p. 247. 
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christology does not give free license to subjectively rework liturgical expressions. 
The needs of the community of faith must be paramount in changing the liturgy in 
any direction. 65 
"For it is precisely as the abiding element that the liturgy should pass 
over into the flesh and blood of the actual, present church. But it 
can do this only on two conditions, first that it be understood, and 
second, that it be constantly repeated, from childhood to old age, that 
it become as familiar as the voice of one's mother. And this is 
exactly why I think it is so disastrous that the liturgiologists keep 
changing the existing liturgies and allow the familiar things to die, 
that even the hymnals are subjected to radical- and actually very 
dubious - operation. "66 
The community of faith for which Thielicke is here concerned is more than just 
the local congregation but the Church as she exists "trans-temporally." Thielicke 
recognises the liturgy as a cohesive element important in transmitting the 
christological message consistently over time. So while the liturgy was prone to 
abuse by individuals, a balanced liturgical practice was salutary for the many. Two 
elements ofThielicke's thought find expression here: he is concerned that the 
liturgy function as a consistent voice for the corporate Church, but his criticisms of 
abusive liturgical practice also reflect his passion for the individual. An underlying 
problem of liturgical innovation or repristination is that it does not deal seriously 
with the concrete situation in which individuals live. It glosses over the actual 
substance of individual lives and focuses instead on the form the corporate voice of 
worship will take. 
65 Note Thielicke's recognition of the liturgy as an expression of the community. 
Cf. The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 245. 
66 The Trouble with the Church, p. 100 
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2.3 Benefits of the Ecclesiological Commemity 
It is true that the numerical balance between negative statements and positive 
statements reveals a deep-seated scepticism toward the Church; Thielicke' s 
criticisms far outnumber his positive statements. Nonetheless he does provide 
balance to the criticisms previously noted by pointing out certain benefits to be had 
in the Church. 
2.3a The Church as the Bearer of Christ 
The Church for Thielicke was especially important as a bearer of Christ. Despite its 
weaknesses the active presence of Christ was at work within the Church especially 
in the Word proclaimed there. The Church was a sort of relay race toward the 
eschaton wherein the message of Christ was handed like a baton from one 
generation to the next. 67 The glory of the Church was not outward, but found in the 
holiness given her through the Word.68 In that Word God himself is present to his 
people. 69 There is a decidedly corporate character to this christological presence 
that Thielicke notes: 
Nein, ich glaube diese Kirche aus einem ganz anderen Grunde: weil 
mich namlich das Wort des Herrn ergriffen und weil es mich an die 
Quellen des Lebens gefiihrt hat und weil mir nun mit einem Schlage 
zweierlei klar wird; einma/, daB ich dieses schopferische und 
verwandelnde Wort nur hier gehort habe und auch weiterhin nur hier 
horen kann, daB dieses W ort nur in der Gemeinschaft von Christen 
zu horen ist, also nur dort, wo zwei oder drei in seinem N amen 
versammelt sind. Und noch ein Zweites wird mir klar: Wo dieses 
67 I Believe: The Christian's Creed, p. 167. 
68 Ibid., p. 241. 
69 Ibid., p. 236. 
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Wort ausgerichtet wird, da findet es auch seine Leute, da wird der 
Herr "mitten unter ihnen sein", da wird sich das Wunder der Kirche 
ereignen. 70 
[translation: (Anderson) No, I believe the church for a far different 
reason. It is because the word of the Lord grips me there and leads 
me to the source of life, and because at a stroke two things now 
become clear to me. The first is that I have heard this creative and 
transforming word only there, and only there can I hear that this 
word may be heard only in the fellowship of Christians, that is, 
where two or three are gathered in his name. And a second thing 
also becomes clear: his people are found wherever this word is 
spoken. There the Lord will be "in the midst of them"; there the 
miracle of the church will take place.71 ] 
The remarkable aspect about this quotation is that Thielicke makes the Church 
the sole source for christological proclamation and the location of the divine 
presence. Christ's presence is tied to the Word, but uncharacteristically Thielicke 
claims that the Church is the only context wherein the Word can be properly heard. 
This stands in contrast to previously noted statements wherein Christ's presence 
was said to be found outside the traditional means of Word and Sacrament. 
Unfortunately the persistence of his individual/spiritual Christ encounter 
overwhelms this reference to Christ's corporate presence and he never develops the 
idea further. 
As he draws attention to Christ's activity within the Church,72 Thielicke defends 
the local church, which although human and unimpressive is still the bearer of the 
70 Woran Ich glaube, p. 302. 
71 I Believe: The Christian's Creed, p. 236. 
72 In I Believe the Christian's Creed compare two statements: Christ knocking 
on the doors to our heart within the Church, p. 239. Christ as being in the midst of 
his people in the Church, 
p. 241. 
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Gospel. 73 The context of this sermon is the Third Article with its "I believe in the 
holy Christian Church." The topic forces a more involved discussion of the Church 
than is typical in other sermons. The criticisms directed toward the corporate 
Church that one finds in other sermons are also found here, 74 but Thielicke does 
draw attention to more of the positive blessings of the Church. He mentions the 
warmth of fellowship one can have with other Christians even in transcultural 
situations 75 and the christological action of grace that one finds active in the 
Church. 76 There is ample evidence in this sermon that Thielicke was well aware of 
the potential of ecclesiology to offer a necessary foundation for the "I" in reference 
to the Other of God and other people. The Church is the bearer of Christ for 
Thielicke, but his persistent concern for Christians as individuals is much more 
powerful than his concern for Christians as a community. Therefore the Church as 
bearer of Christ corporately yields to individual hearts as bearers of Christ 
personally in his overall theology. 
2.3b The Church As Vicarious 
One of the community models in Thielicke's ecclesiology which holds great 
potential is that where the Church carries out a vicarious function. This is seen 
with particular clarity in prayer: 
Vielleicht ist dies das letzte, was uns bleibt, wenn die dunklen 
Wogen ubermachtig werden wollen: daB es eine Gemeinde gibt, die 
73 Ibid., p. 240. 
74 Ibid., pp. 231' 232. 
75 Ibid., p. 231. 
76 Ibid., p. 233. 
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lobt und dankt und die stellvertretend fiir mich ihre Hande erhebt, 
wahrend ich selbst keinen Ton mehr herausbringe oder auf einem 
Krankenlager oder als Sterbender meiner Gedanken und Worte nicht 
mehr mHchtig bin. 
Urn mich herum lebt Jesus Christus in seinen Zeugen. Ihr Lobpreis 
darf nie verstummen, auch wenn das eigene Herz tot und der Mund 
versiegelt ist. Zwischen mir und jeder Finstemis steht Jesus 
Christus, und es gibt kein Dunkel, mit dem jenes Licht nicht fertig 
wtlrde, dessen Anbruch der Lobgesang des Zacharias bezeugt. 77 
[translation: Perhaps this is the last thing with which we are left, 
when the dark waves overwhelm us, that there is a congregation that 
cares, who praises and thanks God and who vicariously raises its 
hands for me, while I myself can not bring forth a sound or when I 
am on my sickbed or dying and can no longer control my thoughts 
and words. 
Jesus Christ lives all around me in his witness. Their praise may 
never be silenced, even when one's own heart is dead and one's 
mouth is silenced. Between me and every darkness stands Jesus 
Christ, and there is no darkness which that light cannot brin~ to an 
end. Zachariah' s song of praise bears witness to that dawn. 8] 
The vicarious action of the Communio Sanctorum was especially important for 
Thielicke during wartime. In The Silence of God Thielicke devotes an entire letter 
to the subject of"vicarious intercession."79 Within that letter he expands on the 
concept by explaining that his view is not one that would remove responsibility 
from the individual. 80 Just the opposite, the nature of the vicarious act requires a 
binding of one to another. (The comparison he cites is that of sponsors at infant 
baptism, who in the act of speaking on behalf of the infant who cannot yet speak, 
77 Und wenn Gott wHre, p. 228. 
78 Here, because of accuracy, I prefer my translation to Anderson's in How to 
Believe Again, p. 181. 
79 The Silence of God, pp. 43-49. 
80 Ibid., p. 4 7, "Naturally, we cannot speak of it responsibly without mentioning 
the danger. To quote an expression ofKHhler, I might say that the dangers lie 
especially in 'exclusive substitution.' By this I mean the vicarious representation 
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bind themselves to that child and obligate themselves to guide and nurture the child 
in the faith.) The soldier in the field who because ofthe horrors of war does not 
know what or how to pray as he ought can at least take comfort in the knowledge 
that there are those who have bound themselves to him in love and obligated 
themselves to him before God. He is drawn into this community of faith as a 
subject before God with them and not merely as an object of prayer. The 
christological overtones are clear. Thielicke's basis for such vicarious 
representation is Christ who prayed "Our Father ... " with fallen humanity. He 
finds other examples of vicarious representation in Scripture including Abraham's 
prayer for Sodom and Gomorrah and God shortening the days of judgement for the 
sake of the elect in Mark 13. As the Church bears the image of Christ she, like him, 
lives for the sake of the other. 
There is a great deal of potential for further elaboration on the vicarious nature 
of the Church. One could explore further biblical examples of this vicarious action 
and show present-day applications. One could expand on how the solitary "I" tied 
to the Communio Sanctorum by faith is never really solitary but enjoys a mystical 
bond of love grounded in the vicarious nature of Christ himself. Yet despite the 
possibilities for meaningful expansion of thought, Thielicke chooses to mention 
vicarious intercession only in passing. He does not develop it or return to it as a 
regular emphasis. 81 
which absolves others from personal decision because I illegitimately take it upon 
myself." 
81 Another example of this is found in: Helm ut Thielicke, The Silence of God, 
trans. G.W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), p. 46. 
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The building blocks for a strong ecclesiology are clearly present with Thielicke's 
system. It seems that what may be holding Thielicke back from developing the 
communal elements of his ecclesiology is more ideological than doctrinal. His 
method of thought simply favours subjectivism and demonstrates a strong aversion 
to objective/ontic thought forms. The subjective emphasis necessarily leads toward 
individualism and away from community models. Certainly in post-World War 
Two Germany where there was a reaction against Nazi mass fervour, models 
stressing the collective nature of the Church would have been more difficult to 
promote. In today's world however, as individualism leads toward social 
atomisation and hedonism, Thielicke's approach is problematic. 
2.4 Two Sources for Personalisation: Spener and Schleiermacher 
Thielicke's movement away from the classic Lutheran ecclesiology with its 
corporate/objective emphasis toward a more personal, spiritual, inner, concept of 
appropriation is part of a movement that started much earlier. Thielicke gives 
credit for this movement to Philip Spener, the father of German Pietism. He writes 
that Spener was the first German theologian who tried to do justice to emphasising 
subjectivity and individuality in faith appropriation. 82 Pietism was a significant 
influence on Thielicke's spiritual growth. We have noted that Thielicke was raised 
in a pietistic church. He did not accept all for which Pietism stood, but several 
tendencies characteristic of Pietism can also be seen in Thielicke's 
christology/ecclesiology. A psychological or experiential emphasis on 
appropriation is shared between the two, a theology that shuns the dogmatism of 
82 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 1, p. 41. 
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orthodoxy is also shared as is the movement away from the sacramental theology of 
classic Lutheranism. 
The other ecclesiological influence on Thielicke that he cites is Schleiermacher. 
In his dogmatics texts Thielicke explains how Schleiermacher attempted to show 
that a general secular consciousness included a "religious structure. "83 Even those 
separated from the Church can appropriate Christ because in a way they had already 
done so as conscious beings. All that remained for the theologian was to provide 
the appropriate encouragement for the people to become conscious of this through 
"contemplation and feeling of the 'universum'. "84 The nature of this consciousness 
is a feeling of"absolute dependence." Schleiermacher hoped that by directing the 
"I" into the self to discover the feeling of dependency that the "I" would then also 
find the source of the feeling which was God. 
One sees this line of reasoning in Schleiermacher's Speeches; he states, "True 
religion is sense and taste for the Infmite."85 He then expands on this by saying: 
What can man accomplish that is worth speaking of, either in life or in 
art, that doesn't arise in his own self from the influence of this sense 
for the Infinite? ... What is all science, if not the existence of things 
in you, in your reason? What is all art and culture if not your 
existence in things to which you give measure, form and order? And 
how can both come to life in you except in so far as there lives 
83 Ibid., p. 43. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, 
trans. John Oman (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958) p. 39. 
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immediately in you the eternal unity of Reason and Nature, the 
universal existence of all ftnite things in the lnfinite?86 
For Schleiermacher, in that humanity posses an "immediate" sense of the 
Infinite, so also does humanity inherently posses a sense of true religion. There is 
certainly a sense in which we can agree that humanity posses an inherent sense of 
the divine.87 The fact that some form of religion exists in virtually all of world's 
cultures testifies to humanity's sense of a divine being. Yet the question must be 
asked whether this is where Christianity should start its engagement with the world. 
Did the Apostles begin their mission activity with the Gentiles by ftnding common 
ground with some sense of "godness" manifest within the mind and intellect of the 
hearers? Perhaps one could cite Paul on Mars Hill as an attempt to connect with a 
sense of the divine in the unbelieving world. 88 Yet even in this example Paul is not 
building on the god within the mind and intellect, but rather on the sense of the true 
God as unknown to the people. The question is a thorny one, because in one sense 
the Church can build on secular mankind's inner belief in a god and show from that 
how there is a true God revealed in Christ, but in another sense the Church must be 
wary of Schleiermacher's approach because it begins within mankind and directs 
the hearer to himself or herself for evidence of God. The very nature of the Gospel 
as something external to humanity located in the person of Christ stand at odds to 
an attempt to find evidence of the true God by looking within. Which elements 
within in the psyche of secular humanity can be drawn on to provide paths to 
86 Ibid. 
87 Calvin agrees to this in his Institutes, Book 1, chapter 3: "The knowledge of 
God naturally implanted in the human mind." 
88 Acts 17:23ff. 
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Church are vital for our response to individualism. As we explore these later we 
will fmd that there are such internal elements which do not encourage looking for 
God within, but draw people out to where they can receive word of the God outside 
of us. 
Thielicke identifies this weakness in Schleiermacher's approach as a merging of 
anthropology with theology, because the beginning point for appropriation in 
Schleiermacher's system is a general analysis of consciousness. Thielicke is aware 
of the difficulties this poses for Christian faith. He asks: 
... are not the doctrines changed in content to fit the consciousness, 
to make them digestible? Do they not undergo reduction when 
presented as the expression of a modification of the consciousness? 
Are they not starved and impoverished?89 
Thielicke did not embrace Schleiermacher's anthropological starting point for 
appropriation, but Thielicke did take with him a need to emphasise the 
psychological act in the process of appropriation. By presenting faith as something 
dependent on the rational mind and the emotional consciousness rather than on an 
objective ecclesiological act, Thielicke leans toward an anthropological origin for 
faith - not by denying the doctrine of faith as a Pneumatological gift, but by making 
its genuineness depend on a human ability to grasp it. 
2.5 The Divorce of SanctifiCation from Ecclesiology 
The subject of sanctification is discussed here under the general section on 
ecclesiology due to Thielicke's treatment of the subject. It is while discussing the 
89 Ibid., p. 45. 
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Church that Thielicke often levels his criticisms of poor sanctification in the people. 
Sanctification also serves the Church for Thielicke in several important ways; these 
will be discussed in the first section below. We will make observations about the 
nature ofThielicke's presentation of sanctification and its consequences for the 
Church under point "2.5b" below, and the final section will address the social 
implications of sanctification on ecclesiology. 
2.5a The Separation of Christian Life from the Church by Her Members 
For Thielicke there was an obvious failing in the relationship of people with the 
Church. He identifies two main problems: people who had no regular meaningful 
life with the Church, and those who came regularly to services but who failed to 
live out the faith they confessed. With the latter group Thielicke more often than 
not lays the problem at the feet of orthodoxy. For him dogmatism represented 
knowledge without action and doctrine without self-denying service. A revealing 
quotation is found in The Waiting Father: 
Ein saftiger Heide ist Gott hundertmallieber und auch vor den 
Menschen ungleich sympathischer als ein Schriftgelehrter, der seine 
Bibel kennt, der religiOs erheblich zu diskutieren weill, der 
sonntiiglich in die Kirche rennt, und in dem nichts zur BuBe und zur 
Tat und vor allem nichts zum Sterben wird. Der reichert sich nur 
mit Verwesung an, und sein kenntnisreiches Christentum und seine 
religiose Geftlhligkeit sind nur phosphoreszierende Faulnis, die bloB 
ein armer Laie fiir gottliches Licht halten kann. Dber den tatlosen 
Vielwissern- auch uber den Nur- Theologen - liegt ein 
schrecklicher Fluch.90 
[translation: (Doberstein) A salty pagan, full of the juices oflife, is a 
hundred times dearer to God, and also far more attractive to me, than 
a scribe who knows his Bible, who can discuss religion gravely, who 
runs to church every Sunday, but in whom none of this results in 
repentance, action, and above all, death of the self. He is simply 
accumulating corruption and his knowledgeable Christianity and his 
90 Das Bilderbuch gottes, p. 73. 
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religious sentiment are nothing but phosphorescent putrefaction, 
which only a poor layman could consider to be divine light. A 
terrible curse hangs over the know-it-all who does nothing - and also 
over the theologian who is only a theologian.91 ] 
Thielicke's criticisms are aimed at both laymen and clergy whose faith was 
lacking genuineness (most often the "orthodox"92). For Thielicke it seems logical 
to assume that those whose appropriation of Christ is founded on the engaged will 
and intellect will be more inclined to action than those whose appropriation does 
not begin with the will. Yet an unbiased examination would find a lack of 
sanctification also among more liberal thinkers (especially in the form of 
antinomianism), as well as examples of self-sacrifice among those who were 
concerned with dogmatic correctness. So while it can be granted that there were 
examples of dead orthodoxy that deserved condemnation, it must also be 
acknowledged that Thielicke does show bias in his criticisms by directing the 
majority of his complaints against orthodoxy. 
This does not mean that he completely fails to recognise the broader scope of the 
problem. There are examples ofThielicke's criticisms being spread generally over 
91 The Waiting Father, p. 57. 
92 Cf. Life can Begin Again, p. 170. " ... for there can be no relationship with 
the Father that does not also include a relationship with our neighbor .... And a 
service of worship which is not at the same time a service to my brethren is not 
service of God, but merely opium and pious titillation. Then God has no desire to 
hear the solemn phrases of such prayers, the droning sound of even the great 
Reformation hymns, and the recitation of even the most correct sermons." Cf. also 
the quotation from The Silence of God, p. 30-31, (found on page 195). 
119 
those who attended Church but saw no need to express the joy of the Gospel they 
received there: 
Die sauertopfisch-muffigen Gesichter vieler Christen, die oft genug 
aussehen, als ob sie Gallensteine hatten (alle, die wirklich welche 
haben, mogen mir verzeihen!), sind schlechte KUnder jener 
hochzeitlichen Freude. Sie geben eher AnlaB zu der Vermutung, daB 
sie statt vom Freudenmahl des Vaters vom Gerichtsvollzieher 
kamen, der ihrer SUnde MaienblUte meistbietend und zu ihrem 
groBen Kummer versteigert hat, so daB sie nicht mehr heran konnen. 
Nietzsche hat schon richtig beobachtet, wenn er sagt: "Sie mUBten 
erloster aussehen, wenn ich an ihren Erl5ser glauben sollte."93 
[translation: (Doberstein) The glum, sour face of many Christians, 
who frequently enough look as if they had gallstones (all those who 
really have them will excuse me!) are poor proclaimers of that 
wedding joy. They rather give the impression that, instead of 
coming from the Father's joyful banquet, they have just come from 
the sheriff who has auctioned off their sins and now are sorry they 
can't get them back again. Nietzsche made a true observation when 
he said, 'You will have to look more redeemed if I am to believe in 
your Redeemer.94] 
Thielicke is equally harsh in his statements to those who saw no need for regular 
contact with the Church: 
Es gibt zum Beispiel Christen, die meinen: Einmal im Leben muB 
man sich bekehren oder in die Kirche eintreten, sich am Altar trauen 
lassen oder sich entschlieBen, die Kirchensteuem zu bezahlen. Dann 
ist alles fertig. Solche Leute kommen mir vor wie eine Frau, die 
einmal am Altar oder vor dem Standesamt das Jawort ihres Mannes 
erhalten hat und die nun meint: "Der is mir jetzt sicher ... kann ich 
mich gehen lassen, mich vemachlassigen und eine Schlampe 
werden." 
... Die erstorbenen Ehen und die erloschenen Lampen der Liebe, 
deren RuB nur auf traurige W eise anzeigt, daB hi er einmal etwas 
gebrannt hat, sind viel schlimmer.95 
[translation: (Doberstein) There are some Christians, for example, 
who think that once in one's life one must be converted or join the 
93 Das Bilderbuch gottes, p. 312. 
94 The Waiting Father, p. 187. 
95 Das Bilderbuch gottes, p. 300. 
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church, be married at the altar, or decide to pay the church dues. 
Then everything is finished. Such people strike me as being like a 
woman who, once she has heard her husband say, "I do," at the altar 
or in the registry office, says to her self, "Now I've got him .... I can 
let myself go, neglect myself, and be a frump." ... The dead 
marriages and the extinguished lamps of love, whose dismal soot is 
only a sad evidence that once a light had burned here, these are far 
worse.
96] 
The sanctification that should be produced through one's ecclesiological 
connection was vital to Thielicke's christology on several levels. It was a guard 
against taking individualism to extremes by living only for self; sanctification 
necessitates love for the other. The sanctified life was also the first point of contact 
that the cultured despisers would have of Christianity. Thus sanctification was vital 
for outreach. 97 
It seems likely that Thielicke's Reformed background also contributed to his 
views on the regenerate or sanctified life. One does find a more central role for the 
regenerate life in Calvin's theology than one fmds in Luther. For Calvin the third 
96 The Waiting Father, p. 178-179. 
97 Consider the following quotation where Thielicke speaks of a lack of 
sanctification as being responsible for people not wanting contact with the 
church (specifically the pastor). "Wie viele Abschiede von der Kirche haben 
sich nict so vollzogen, daB man feststellen muBte: Der Pastor ist 
unglaubwiirdig ( schaut sein Privatleben, schaut seine menschliche 
Interesselosigkeit gegenUber Eltern rnit ihren Erziehungsnoten, gegenUber 
Kranken und Alten an!" (Glauben als Abenteuer, p. 56). [translation: "How 
many of those who have left the Church have not come to the conclusion 
that a person must see the pastor is untrustworthy? Look at his private life. 
Look at his human weakness, his loss of interest in regard to parents with 
their needs in raising their children and his weakness in regard to the sick 
and the old!" (Doberstein's translation in Faith the Great Adventure, p. 27 
was not used here because it lacked exactness.)] 
121 
use of the law is held up as its principal use;98 in Luther the second use of the law is 
given primacy.99 In Luther the article of Justification dominates, in Calvin's 
Institutes the nature of good works is explored before the article on Justification 
because, "it seemed of more consequence first to explain that the faith by which 
alone, through the mercy of God, we obtain free justification, is not destitute of 
good works."100 Thielicke's great concern for a prominent place for sanctification 
in the lives of believers then seems consistent with his Calvinist background. 
Turning to the issue of sanctification preventing over-individualisation one fmds 
Thielicke taking the following argument from a sermon: 
Wenn dieser Mann recht haben so/lte - so sprach die innere Stimme 
-, dann konnte man nicht so bleiben, sie man war. Dann durfte man 
nicht mehr nur der saturierte Gottesgelehrte sein, der im W orte 
Gottes forschte, den aber das Elend der Armen nicht weiter umtrieb. 
Dann konnte man nicht mehr der hochmutige Intellektuelle sein, der 
seinem Individualismus lebte und den die Plebs, die Masse, den die 
langweiligen Dummkopfe mit ihren tausend uninteressanten 
Tagesnoten und Courths-Mahler-Sentimen-talitliten nichts angingen. 
Dann konnte man auch nicht mehr der "reiche Jiingling" bleiben, der 
seiner personlichen Kultur, seinen gepflegten Wohnraumen lebte 
und der dariiber vergaB, daB draufien, zweihundert Meter von seiner 
Villa, Nissenhutten standen, die schmutzig und ubervolkert 
waren. 101 
[translation: (Doberstein) If this man (Jesus) should be right, said the 
inner voice, then a man could not remain as he was. Then he could 
not go on being merely the blase theologian, who searched the 
Scriptures but was no longer moved by the misery of the poor. Then 
98 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. 1, trans. by Henry 
Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1979), p. 309. [Book 2, 
chap. 7, section 12] 
99 Cf. LW 9:290, 22:143, 35:172, 39:188, 44:63, 
100 Institutes, Book 3, Chapter 11, section 1. 
101 Das Bilderbuch gottes, p. 242. 
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he could no longer be the proud intellectual, who practiced his 
individualism and had no time for the plebs, the masses, the boring 
bonehead with their thousand and one uninteresting daily needs and 
silly sentimentalities. Nor could he go on being the 'rich young 
ruler,' who lived his cultured, sheltered life and forgot that not two 
hundred yards from his villa there were dirty, overcrowded huts and 
102] tenements ... 
Here Thielicke speaks of sanctification as a divesting of oneself. Individualism 
is overcome as one gives up oneself for the other. It is also through sanctified acts 
toward the other that Thielicke sees the individual as drawing closer to God. 
Die letzten qualenden Lebensfragen konnten dann nur dort zur Ruhe 
kommen, wo man sich selbst und seinen Terminkalender vergillt -
wie das der barmherzige Samariter ja tatsachlich tut - und wo man 
fiir diesen seinen Mitmenschen da ist, in dem Gott selber uns 
begegnen will. 103 
[translation: (Anderson) The ultimate tormenting problems of life 
can only be laid to rest at the point where we forget ourselves and 
our appointment books, as the good Samaritan actually did. God 
himselfwill meet us where we are present to our fellow man. 104] 
Throughout these discussions on sanctification, some of which are linked to 
expectations on one's life with the Church and others of which are made issues of 
personal responsibility, it does become clear that sanctification is highly personal. 
It is directed toward the other and in that sense has a scope beyond the individual, 
but how one gains the sanctified life is not joined to a communal experience in the 
Church. Even when the Church is mentioned as the place where one should expect 
to gain sanctification there is no exploration of the corporate nature of receiving it. 
When the discussion is obviously about the Church then the individual seems to 
102 The Waiting Father, p. 159-160. Cf. Und wenn Gott ware, p. 252. (How to 
Believe Again, p. 201-202.) 
103 Und wenn Gott ware, p. 158. 
104 How to Believe Again, p. 120. 
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grow in sanctification (or not grow) from his or her personal contact with the Word 
found there. The "otherness" of sanctification is then a personal encounter with the 
other not a model for the corporate reception of a sanctified heart in the Church. 
2.5b Reaching for Community through Social Ethics 
Yet for Thielicke this personal ethical responsibility toward the other stamps the 
Church with a social concern and therefore with a limited sense of community. 
One cannot be sanctified unto oneself but only in relation to others. As Thielicke 
defines his concept of Church, it becomes clear that this sociological concern is 
behind much of his ecclesiology. Ecclesiology that is defmed by sociological ethics 
is found in its most blatant form in the theology of Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher 
writes: 
Now the general concept of 'Church,' if there really is to be such a 
concept, must be derived principally from Ethics, since in every case 
the 'Church' is a society which originates only through free human 
action and which can only through such continue to exist. 105 
Thielicke does not support such a sociological definition of the Church106 but it 
is worth noting that ethics, which formed the sociological building blocks of 
ecclesiology for Schleiermacher, play a very important role in Thielicke's 
theological thought as well. 107 Schleiermacher defmed the Church via ethics. 
Thielicke merely borrows the idea that ethics should be included heavily in the idea 
105 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1956), p. 3. 
106 Cf. The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 203 where he calls ecclesiology that 
begins with sociology as "aberrant." 
107 In The Trouble with the Church, p. 78 Thielicke points out that he wrote the 
Ethics volumes as a way of doing the theological groundwork for preaching. 
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of the Church. Indeed as one examines Thielicke's works one finds that he spends 
comparatively little time discussing a doctrine of ecclesiology proper while 
devoting several volumes to ethics. In the quotation below one can see 
sociological/ethical considerations as part ofThielicke's ecclesiological definitions. 
The church may be defined, then, only in terms of a relation that 
arises when the faith and prayer of those addressed by the 
efficacious and creative Word of God respond to it. This 
fundamental relation constitutes the church - the relation between 
the transcendent Word and the empirical historical reality in which 
faith in this Word arises and living people respond audibly and 
visibly to it. The two elements in a definition of the nature of the 
church are origin in the Word on the one side and historical being on 
the other. 108 
Unlike Schleiermacher Thielicke places a great deal of importance on the Word 
in his definition of the Church because, as the next chapter will endeavour to show, 
the Word for Thielicke is the main christological meeting ground (spiritually). 
Unlike classic Lutheranism the issue of the Churches' "historical being" or its 
anthropological/relational existence becomes the second element of his definition 
of "Church." Classic Lutheranism found the marks of the Church in the Word and 
sacraments; Thielicke finds them in the Word and corresponding human response. 
By joining the ethical response of the people to the Word in his definition of 
Church Thielicke is allowing the element of sanctification to define the Church. 
The definition of Church given in Augsburg Confession Article VII resists allowing 
sanctification to be part of its definition. The Church in classic Lutheranism is 
defined primarily by its christology and therefore also by the article of justification. 
108 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 204-205. 
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Thielicke's need to bring human action into his definition of Church follows an 
internal consistency in his theological system of elevating individual responsibility 
over communal receptivity. Ethics provides the necessary "mechanism" for pursing 
subjective/individualistic issues of relationship. Thielicke states, " ... faith is 
always actualized - wholly actualized - within the concrete relationships of the 
world."109 Such a view of faith as a matter of personal ethical "actualisation" in 
concrete relationships demands a high degree of subjectivity since the application 
of ethics must take into account situational concems. 110 Nonetheless, there is 
implicit within the ethical consideration a need for community. The need stems 
more from a necessary arena wherein ethics can be practiced than from a corporate 
body wherein the ethical imperative is received. 
2.5c The Nature and Consequences ofThielicke's Presentation 
Thielicke may have borrowed ecclesiological notions from Schleiermacher but by 
and large his presentation of sanctification attempts to walk a line between classic 
Lutheranism and a more pietistic Reformed theology. At times he stands in 
complete agreement with the classic Lutheran view of sanctification proceeding 
from justification, 111 at other times, like that quoted earlier, he makes unguarded 
109 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1966), p. 471. 
110 Ibid. cf. "The Conflict Situation as Typical of Man's Ethical Relation to the 
World," pp. 482-493. 
111 Cf. The Waiting Father, p. 70 "We can do this (distinguish between true 
growth and false) only as we grow into him, as his Word is formed in us, as we 
allow everything we are and think and do to be permeated by him, as we wake with 
him in the morning and let him be our first thought, as we see in our fellow men 
and fellow workers the men for whom he died, as we allow our work to be 
hallowed by him, as we give thanks to him for the joys and fulfillments of our life 
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statements about the human act preceding God's action. In all probability many 
such conflicting thoughts are simply the result of difference in context while 
preaching. In preaching one is more likely to make provocative statements without 
the kind of dogmatic precision characteristic of academic writings. Yet it also 
seems clear when one looks at the complete picture ofThielicke's theology that 
there is a genuine tension between competing theologies. Our previous point is 
reinforced; his Reformed upbringing (which as he says was pietistic in nature) in 
combination with his Lutheran self-identification leads Thielicke to the creation of 
a theology that borrows from both but claims allegiance to neither. 
Outside of his sermons his discussion of sanctification is more clearly in 
agreement with classic Lutheranism. 112 In his Theological Ethics he specifically 
mentions Augsburg Confession article VI that deals with "The New Obedience" 
and registers his agreement with it. Thielicke is adamant that any view of ethics 
(sanctification in the narrow sense of good works) that does not proceed from 
justification is ultimately blasphemous, even more, ultimately blasphemes by 
and accept the pains and disciplines as from his hand, and finally when death 
comes, as we 'let him put his hand beneath our head to lift us up and hold us' 
(Matthias Claudius)." Cf. p. 112 & 118 "Not until we know him who has taken us 
into his service, not until we know his heart, his wisdom, and his compassion does 
it become a happy service to be employed by him." Cf. also p. 185. Out of the 
Depths p. 67, "Jesus Christ is known only in discipleship, or He is not known at 
all." 
112 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics: Foundations, ed. William H. Lazareth, 
vol. 1. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 51. "The ethical act, then, is simply 
an expression of the prior fact of justification; it is, as it were, a 'subsequent' 
demonstration ofthe given justification." A footnote explains "subsequent" as not 
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making the self its own god. 113 
Yet despite the strength ofThielicke's agreement with classic Lutheran 
formulations on sanctification in his academic writings, his sermonic statements 
cannot be ignored. There are numerous places where Thielicke separates 
sanctification from justification by speaking of sanctified acts as occurring prior to 
justification, or he speaks of sanctified acts as being the motivation for God's 
activity instead of the immediate product of God's activity. 
Ich will morgen aufstehen und mit meinen Pfunden dann so fiir dich 
wuchem und meinem Nachsten so dienen, als ob es dich giibe. 
Dann wirst du die groBe Stille urn dich zerbrechen und wirst 
plotzlich bei mir sein. Dann wirst du sagen: "Ei, du frommer und 
getreuer Knecht, gehe ein zu deines Herm Freude!" So ist das also 
mit Gott. "Wenn wir horchen, redet Gott; wenn wir gehorchen, 
handelt Gott. " 114 
[translation: (Doberstein) Tomorrow I shall rise and trade with my 
pound for thee and serve my neighbor as if thou didst exist. Then 
shalt thou break the silence and suddenly be near to me. Then shalt 
thou say: "Well done, good and faithful servant; enter into the joy of 
your Lord!" That's the way it is with God. "When we listen, God 
speaks; when we obey, God acts."115] 
The context of the above statement is in reference to those who doubt God. 
They are asked to simply act "as if God did exist" and then on the basis of their act 
meaning "temporally" but logically subsequent. Cf. p. 54 "good works arise, as it 
were, 'automatically' out of the event of justification without human co-operation." 
113 Ibid., p. 61 "For wherever ethics does not understand works with a backward 
reference as the expression of justification, but instead refers them forward to the 
ethical goal and understands them as a means to actualize that goal, it is bound to 
subscribe to the blasphemous idea of a 'self-creation of the ego' according to which 
works will create the good, the pious, the well-pleasing ego." 
114 Das Bilderbuch gottes, pp. 206-207. 
115 The Waiting Father, p. 146. 
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God will come to them, and on the basis of their obedience God will act. 
Sanctification is thus separated from the justifying action of God and actually 
precedes it. 116 Thielicke's approach may be borrowing from ideas noted in 
Schleiermacher earlier, where unregenerate humanity carries within it an instinctive 
knowledge of God. Thielicke wishes to arouse these suppressed instincts by 
encouraging performance of the acts of faith the regenerate would do. A similar 
presentation is seen in a sermon from The Silence of God, but here sanctified acts 
are demanded of those who claim orthodoxy but in reality are dead in their faith. 
To reclaim a living faith they are instructed to act first and expect God to follow 
their actions. 
Du wirst nicht fertig mit der Frage: wie ich bin? Du zergrUbelst dir 
den Kopf i.iber die Dogmen, i.iber meine Gottmenschheit, i.iber 
Jungfrauengeburt und Ahnliches? Versuch statt dessen einmal 
etwas in meinem Namen zu tun, meinetwegen, "als ob" ich schon in 
deinem Leben ware. Versuch einmal, dein Leben mir zuzuordnen, 
reiche einem Durstigen in meinem Namen einen Becher Wasser, 
vergib einem andem, weil ich dir auch vergab. Obergib mir eine 
Leidenschaft, an der du hangst; wage, mir dein innerstes Herz 
bloBzustellen und vor mir ein SUnder zu werden. Wage es, dein 
Herz vor mir eine Mordergrube sein zu lassen, auch wenn es wehe 
tut. Sei gewiB, daB du dann auf einmal ganz anders i.iber dich 
denken, eine ganz andere Stellung zu mir finden wirst, als du es je 
vermuten und ertraumen konntest, da du mit theoretischen Gedanken 
nach mir suchtest. ll7 
[translation: (Bromiley) Can you not answer the question of who am 
I? Are you immersing yourself in the dogmas of my divine 
humanity, Virgin Birth and the like? Instead, do something in my 
name and for my sake as though I were already in your life. Try to 
order your life by me. Give a cup of water to the thirsty in my name. 
Forgive another because I have forgiven you. Surrender to me 
something to which you cling. Dare to lay bare your soul and 
become a sinner before me. Dare to let your heart be a den of thieves 
116 Within this same volume of sermons note the identical instruction to act "as 
if there was something to Jesus" and then based on that action getting a response 
from God. p. 192. 
117 Die Lebensangst, p. 113. 
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before me, however hard it is. Be sure that you will then suddenly 
think differently of me, and find a very different attitude to me, than 
you could ever suspect or imagine when you sought me 
theoretically. 118] 
In classic Lutheranism one does not attain to right faith through one's acts. 
Justification is not the reward for sanctified acts, but the soteriological force that 
instantaneously begins the sanctified movement in the believer. 119 In Thielicke's 
statement quoted above and in other statements made throughout his sermonic 
works sanctified acts are occasionally seen as preceding faith and thus as preceding 
justification. There seems little reason to doubt that he knew this put him at odds 
with Lutheranism. But his desire for a pragmatic method of moving those outside 
the Church toward an encounter with Christ seems to have superseded his concern 
for dogmatic correctness. His approach is consistent with his premise that 
appropriation is founded on the human psyche which is able to arouse a hidden 
118 The Silence of God, p. 30-31. 
119 The term "logically" is set against "temporally." In classic Lutheranism 
sanctification occurs in justification. It is given simultaneously with grace and does 
not develop after one has been justified. Cf. David P. Scaer, "Sanctification in 
Lutheran Theology," Concordia Theological Quarterly, April-July, 1985, p. 187. 
"Luther' s concept of si mu/ justus et peccator is fundamental for a Lutheran 
understanding not only of justification but also of sanctification. Before God the 
person is totally justified and the same person is in himself and sees himself as a 
sinner. What is important in this understanding is the Latin word simu/, at the same 
time, and not in a sequential sense as if one followed the other in point of time. 
Historically this distinction was lost in Lutheranism, as in the case of Pietism, 
where man is frrst justified and rescued from sin and then the work of sanctification 
begins. The end result is perfectionism or at least a mild form of it. The matter is 
viewed in this way: After a person is justified by faith, the new life of obedience 
sets in and progresses. Justification is seen as a past event in the Christian life and 
sanctification as a temporal result, separate and distinct from justification as the 
cause. Whenever justification and sanctification are separated from each other with 
this kind of temporal understanding, Lutheran theology is brought to ruin." 
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consciousness of Christ120 and is a function that belongs to the realm of personal 
d . . 121 ectston. 
As this applies to our discussions here, it is important to note the impact this has 
on ecclesiology. Thielicke's stress on one's personal regenerate acts as a means of 
"finding" Christ drives a wedge between ecclesiology and the Christian faith and 
life. If even those outside the Church can produce sanctified works through their 
individual efforts and be assured of a divine comfort in the face of judgement then 
the need for being part of the ecclesial body of Christ is weakened in the overall 
scheme of soteriology. The centrality of justification in classic Lutheranism presses 
the need for the Church to the forefront. By maintaining the necessity for 
justification to logically precede sanctification, one is maintaining a need for 
contact with the "vehicles" of justification, and since those "vehicles" are bound up 
with Church, the Church itself becomes joined to one's daily sanctified life. 
12° Cf. Glauben als Abenteuer, pp. 40-41. [Faith the Great Adventure, p. 17.] 
121 Cf. Thielicke's statements in the sermon "How to Love Again" found in the 
volume How to Believe Again: "If I want to know what faith is - and how I long to 
have that experience!- then I am not to ask about the dogmas that this faith must 
energize; I am to keep a lookout to see what discoveries this faith makes, what new, 
breathtaking image of my fellow man is granted to it and what power of love are 
released in it." p. 128. Here again faith is sought not in any objective christological 
encounter but within the works produced by the individual. His aversion to 
dogmatic orthodoxy is here also evident. 
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The previous chapter has already shown significant differences between Thielicke' s 
sacramental theology and that of classic Lutheranism. This chapter will explore 
those differences further and examine how Thielicke's sacramental theology relates 
to his individualistic christology. We will also in this chapter begin to move more 
toward an evaluation of the effectiveness ofThielicke's christological focus in a 
postmodern context. 
3.1 The Treatment of the Sacraments in Thielicke's Sennons 
The sacraments have always been vital for classic Lutheranism in establishing both 
the vertical christological relationship and the horizontal relationship within the 
Communio Sanctorum. They are important as vehicles of christological 
embodiment, giving an immediacy and ontological reality to the present Christ. 
Consequently they feature prominently in Lutheran preaching. If one is to point to 
any sort of tangible embodiment principle in Thielicke's thought it would be found 
in Thielicke's doctrine of the Word which will be explored throughout this chapter. 
What will be shown is that the value of the sacraments for Thielicke lies in the 
proclaimed Word surrounding the sacramental rite, not in the means themselves. 
Of course in classic Lutheranism the empty means without the Word are also of no 
value. 1 Yet once the Word of promise is joined with the means then classic 
1 Cf. Triglotta, "The Large Catechism," p. 755. "The Word must make a 
Sacrament of the element, else it remains a mere element." Cf. LW 51:184 "Take 
the Word away and it is the same water with which the maid waters the cow; but 
with the Word, it is a living, holy, divine water." 
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Lutheranism is very willing to speak of the sacraments as being bearers of a unique 
divine presence. 2 Thielicke does not understand the joining of Word with 
sacrament in the same way as classic Lutheranism. The objective means do not 
hold an objective/ontological christological presence at any point for Thielicke. 
The Word alone holds the unique ability to bear the christological presence.3 That 
Word may or may not be a thing joined to the Church.4 
What is immediately noticeable when one reads the volumes ofThielicke's 
sermons is the decided lack of allusions to the sacraments. There are ample 
references to the presence of Christ and the Christ encounter, but it is clear that the 
location for this christological presence does not lie in the objective means of the 
sacraments. One also notices when the sacraments are mentioned that negative 
statements about them dramatically outnumber positive statements. Thielicke is 
greatly concerned that false sacramental views lie at the heart of much spiritual 
laxity. The solution in his sermons is to steer the people away from sacramental 
2 LW 51 :318-319 "Hence, not only are sins forgiven in baptism, but we are 
also made sure and certain that God is so well pleased with it that he, together with 
Christ and his Holy Spirit, proposes to be present when it is administered and he 
himself will be the baptizer .... Therefore wherever anybody is being baptized 
according to Christ's command we should be confidently convinced that God the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is present there ... " 
3 Cf. Life Can Begin Again, p. 209, "But the Word of the Lord- and Jesus 
Christ himself is this Word - is relevant at every station of life." This quote simply 
shows the understanding of Christ as being linked to the Word 
4 For an example of Thielicke speaking of the Church as the bearer of the Word 
cf. I Believe the Christian's Creed, p. 238. "Then (when Christianity is rejected by 
society) the miracle of the Church (Kirche) will confront us, because only then will 
it become clear that she lives from the word of her Lord, only from that word and 
from nothing else." Here Thielicke has in mind the Church catholic. For an 
example of the use of the Word outside the context of Church see Life can Begin 
Again, p. 212. Also The Waiting Father, p. 69 which speaks of the Word as the 
apostolic medium for conversion and deliverance. 
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spirituality by avoiding the topic of the sacraments as much as possible and 
focusing the people more on their personal inner faith experience. 
3.1 a Baptism Viewed in Pragmatic Terms 
We have already noted a number of disagreements Thielicke has with infant 
baptism. These were shown from statements made in his dogmatics texts. These 
same concerns have also been repeated in less detailed ways in his sermons. 
Wir sind von Jugend auf in fast gefahrlicher Selbstverstandlichkeit 
dessen versichert und gewiB, daB Gott bereit ist, uns alles zu 
vergeben, und daB das Siegel unserer Taufe unter diesen 
Gnadenbrief gedrlickt ist. Wir haben schwarz auf weiB ein 
Dokument in der Tasche. Es lag schon in unserer Wiege, und jetzt 
konnen wir es also privilegierte Taufscheinbesitzer und 
Kirchensteuerzahler jederzeit auf Anhieb aus der Schublade ziehen. 
Petrus muB uns schon durchlassen, wenn wir unseren HimmelspaB 
aus der Tasche ziehen. Und einen Stehplatz irn Hirnmel wird er 
schon noch fUr uns haben. 5 
[translation: (Doberstein) From our youth up we have been taught to 
take it almost for granted that God is prepared to forgive everything 
and that the seal of our baptism has been stamped upon this full 
pardon. We have in our pocket a document in black and white to 
prove it. Why, it was there in our cradle and now, as licensed 
possessors of a baptismal certificate and contributors to the church, 
we can produce it any time we please. Even Peter will have to let us 
in when we pull our "pass to heaven" out of our pocket. And 
certainly there will be at least standing room for us in heaven.6] 
This quotation is representative of several similar statements made by Thielicke. 
For him the abuse of baptism was yet another manifestation of cheap grace.7 The 
5 Das Leben kann noch einmal beginnin, p. 60. Cf. Our Heavenly Father, p. 
140, The Waiting Father, p. 178, Faith the Great Adventure, p. 92, How to Believe 
Again, p. 58. 
6 Life Can Begin Again, p. 44. 
7 Cf. comments in Das Bilderbuch gottes, p. 308. With an eye toward the idea 
of "familiarity breeds contempt" Thielicke numbers baptism among those things 
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problem with Thielicke's criticisms against baptism is a problem of balance. In his 
sermons he criticises but does not provide instruction on the correctives offered 
within the classic Lutheran doctrine. Instead he seems to "throw the baby out with 
the bath water," leaving in question the validity of baptism itself. His dogmatics 
texts reinforce his questioning of the validity of infant baptism for the modern era, 8 
and they show his belief that the continued ritual practice of it fosters indifference 
in faith. 9 It also becomes apparent that his concerns are not merely concerns of 
dogmatic correctness but primarily of pastoral care. The concrete situation of 
individuals is the starting point for Thielicke's consideration of different models of 
baptism. In this regard he is a pragmatist; what works in practice to remove the 
abuse justifies the departure in doctrine. Whereas classic Lutheranism answers the 
question of validity from the standpoint of dogmatics (doctrine), Thielicke seeks an 
answer from the present life and circumstances of individuals. 10 The way Thielicke 
that simply get taken for granted by Christians who have been around the 
sacrament for many years. Thielicke writes:" ... urn dieses Staunen betrligt, dal3 
namlich das Unerhorte uns zur Banalitiit, dal3 das Wunder uns zur 
Selbsverstandlichkeit und daB das Obernatiirliche uns zur zweiten Natur geworden 
ist. Wir sind beinahe mit Gnaden, die uns im Getriebe der bOrgerlichchristlichen 
Existenz auf dem Wege Uber Taufe und Konfirmation zustromen, ein bi.Bchen zu 
sehr verwohnt. Darum konnen wir die Seligkeit jener Einladung kaum noch 
empfinden. Christliche Stattheit ist aber schlimmer als hungriges Heidentum." 
[Translation:" ... We are cheated from this awe when the unheard of things 
become banal to us, the Wonder becomes matter of fact, and the supernatural 
becomes second nature to us. We are almost spoiled with a little too much with 
grace, which is poured into us by the way of baptism and confirmation in the bustle 
of our middle-class Christian existence. Therefore we can hardly feel the bliss of 
each invitation. Christian fullness is worse than hungry heathenism." Doberstein' s 
translation is found in The Waiting Father p. 184.] 
8 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 274-275. 
9 Ibid., p. 276, 278. 
1° Consider the following quotation, "The main question is not whether infant 
baptism is possible in principle but whether in circumstances such as these it is 
practicable, whether it is a possibility that can be recommended with a good 
conscience." Ibid., p. 276. 
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shapes his thoughts about the sacrament of baptism once more betrays the 
importance of the individual as a foundational element in his thought. What works 
must not simply be a matter of what is biblically correct but rather how it will be 
received and understood in concrete situations by individuals who may not have 
sound theological understanding. In contrast to this classic Lutheranism does not 
bring proper reception into questions of validity, 11 but does allow it to enter into 
questions ofbenefit. 12 Luther actually sees the problem of abuse as confirming the 
ontological validity of baptism: "The saying goes, 'Abusus non to/lit, sed corifirmat 
substantiam, 'that is, 'Misuse does not destroy the substance, but confirms its 
existence. "'13 
3.Jb Different Paths to the Corporate Dimension of Baptism 
Thielicke makes it clear that baptism is important for the Church as a community. 
The validity of baptism may be based on how it is received by individuals, but 
baptism itself is not an individualistic act nor does it bespeak a crassly 
individualistic christology for Thielicke. However, the path Thielicke takes to get 
to the corporate character of baptism is consistent with his spiritualising of the 
Christ encounter and does show serious departures from classic Lutheranism. 
11 
"Luther's Large Catechism," Tappert, p. 443: "Further, we are not primarily 
concerned whether the baptized person believes or not, for in the latter case 
Baptism does not become invalid. Everything depends upon the Word and 
commandment of God .... Baptism is valid, even though faith be lacking." 
12 Ibid., p. 441: "Just by allowing the water to be poured over you, you do not 
receive Baptism in such a manner that it does you any good. But it becomes 
beneficial to you if you accept it as God's command and ordinance, so that, 
baptized in the name of God, you may receive in the water the promised salvation. 
This the hand cannot do, nor the body, but the heart must believe it." 
13 Ibid., p. 444. 
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Perhaps the strongest of his sermonic statements about the corporate dimension of 
baptism is made late in his career. In his last volume of"sermonic meditations" 
published in 1980 Thielicke observes: 
So beantwortet denn auch Petrus die Frage: 'Was sollen wir tun?' 
sehr schlicht: 'LaBt euch taufen, laBt euch die Verge bung eurer 
Stinden zuteil werden, laBt euch von eurer Vergangenheit 
lossprechen und gebt dem Geist Gottes Raum!' ... Hier geht es urn 
einen gleichsam automatischen ProzeB. Wer den ersten Knopf 
seiner Weste ins falsche Loch knopft, bei dem wird alles schief. Ich 
zeige euch das richtige Knopfloch. LaBt euch durch die Taufe zur 
Gemeinde des Herm 'hinzutun' (2,41), werdet Glieder am Leib des 
Herrn, vertraut auf die V erheiBungen, mit denen diese Gemeinschaft 
beschenkt und gesegnet ist, freut euch der tragenden Kraft dieser 
Verbindung mit Briidern und Schwestern, dann werdet ihr den Atem 
des neuen Lebens erfahren ... 14 
[translation: So then Peter also answers the question 'What shall we 
do' very simply: 'be baptised, receive forgiveness for your sins, be 
absolved from your past and give the Spirit of God room!' ... It is, 
as it were, an automatic process. He who buttons the first button of 
his vest in the wrong hole will make all the rest wrong. I will 
demonstrate the right way to button for you. Be brought through 
baptism to the congregation of the Lord. Become members of the 
body of the Lord, trust in the promises that this community is given 
and with which it is blessed. Rejoice in the supporting power of this 
union with brothers and sisters, then you will discover the breath of 
the new life ... 15] 
On the surface this statement seems in agreement with the traditional views of 
classic Lutheranism, namely, that through baptism one is united with Christ by 
faith and given fellowship with the Communio Sanctorum. However, referring 
back to the discussion on infant baptism in the previous chapter, it must be noted 
again that Thielicke does not believe faith is actually given in baptism, but that 
14 Helmut Thielicke, Glauben als Abenteuer, (Stuttgart: Quell Verlag, 1980), p. 
118-119. Thielicke makes similar statements about baptism as making one a 
member of the Christian community in The Silence of God, p. 49. 
15 Scheidt's translation in Faith the Great Adventure, p. 60 was not used due to 
the absence of the third and fourth sentences in my translation above. 
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baptism is a sign of faith that will mature as the intellect grows. That in mind, his 
statement about being "brought through baptism to the congregation" assumes a 
different character from classic Lutheranism. 
Three possibilities seem to present themselves. One, he is speaking about a 
mature cognitive faith that has grown after baptism, and when speaking about 
baptism as an entrance rite is simply referring to what will eventually come of it. 
Two, he has changed his views on infant baptism; or three, fellowship with the 
Church is based on something other than faith. The second option is unlikely since 
his views about faith not being conferred in infant baptism seem fairly well 
entrenched. As an example: "as he (Luther) sees it, infancy is no barrier to faith, 
only to its confession .... but the fact that this faith is silent and unconscious forces 
Luther to describe it in ontological categories which he elsewhere rejects ... " 16 
The objective/ontological nature of classic Lutheran sacramental theology is simply 
untenable for Thielicke. 17 The third option is also less desirable since faith as an 
act of the personal will is held up as important throughout his sermons. Although a 
case can (and will) be made that Thielicke's understanding of faith as a member of 
the Communio Sanctorum is still a very personalised affair, and the Church is seen 
16 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 277. On this same page Thielicke accuses 
Luther's ontological schema of being an example of"nominalist scholasticism 
which seriously disrupts his understanding of grace, faith, and original sin." 
17 Yet again one must acknowledge that Thielicke at times uses more traditional 
Lutheran language when discussing baptism. Consider the following, "Baptism is 
not just teaching about integration into Christ. It does not just illustrate 
justification. It accomplishes these things." The Evangelical Faith, vol 3, p. 271. 
Also in agreement with Luther Theilicke says, (Our Heavenly Father, p. 85) "By 
nature it (baptismal water) is the same water the maid uses to cook with; in modern 
terms, it is H20. But when 'God's Word is comprehended in the water' it suddenly 
acquires a dignity and becomes the bearer of the sacrament, and then it is 
something quite different from H20." 
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from the perspective of an atomised community not a close knit body united in one 
faith and doctrine. The more likely answer is the first. Infant baptism is an 
entrance rite to the Church in as much as it joins one to the Church by way of a sign 
(albeit a powerful sign which one might also call a future hope) of that which will 
develop and flourish through cognitive apprehension of Christ. 18 
It seems clear that Thielicke approaches baptism from more of a Calvinist 
perspective than a Lutheran one. 19 Thielicke seems to agree with Calvin when he 
speaks of baptism as a sign of grafting into Chrisf0 and of union with the 
Communio Sanctorum. 21 Calvin does not believe that the sacrament itself 
ontologically binds the presence of Christ or gives faith, but that it is a sign of 
grace, faith, and the blessings ofChrist.22 This concept of the baptismal sign 
18 Cf. Ibid., p. 275. 
19 One finds more in common with Thielicke's language and the language of 
Calvin whom he quotes, than with his quotations ofLuther. Cf. The Evangelical 
Faith, vol. 3, p. 268. "Along the same lines Calvin appealed to baptism as the given 
sign and seal of the 'initiation by which we are received into the society of the 
church, in order that, engrafted in Christ, we may be reckoned among God's 
children."' 
20 Institutes, vol. 2, p. 514 "The last advantage which our faith receives from 
baptism is its assuring us not only that we are ingrafted into the death and life of 
Christ, but so united to Christ himself as to be partakers of all his blessings. For he 
consecrated and sanctified baptism in his own body, that he might have it in 
common with us as the firmest bond of union and fellowship which he deigned to 
form with us." 
21 Ibid., p. 513 "Baptism is the initiatory sign by which we are admitted to the 
fellowship of the Church, that being ingrafted into Christ we may be accounted 
children of God. p. 520 "Baptism serves as our confession before men, inasmuch 
as it is a mark by which we openly declare that we wish to be ranked among the 
people of God, by which we testify that we concur with all Christians in the 
worship of one God and in one religion." 
22 Ibid., p. 520 " ... not that such graces are included and bound in the 
sacrament, so as to be conferred by its efficacy, but only that by this badge the Lord 
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becomes very important for Thielicke. It allows him to speak of the Communio 
Sanctorum being one with the baptised and of parents and the members of the 
Church sharing in responsibility for nurturing the faith of the baptised. This 
corporate character to the sacrament leads Thielicke to conclude that the rite of 
baptism should not be divorced from the Church but practised within the 
community of saints wherein this faith would develop.23 
The problem with Thielicke's chosen path to the Church is that Thielicke is a 
Lutheran and as such has subscribed to the Lutheran Confessions. Yet here he 
challenges some of the most basic theological suppositions of the Lutheran 
confession. The three-way corporate connection between Christ, the individual, 
and the Communio Sanctorum is built on "ontological" thought structures in classic 
Lutheranism. The candidate in classic Lutheranism receives Christ and justifying 
grace in baptism24 and as previously noted is given faith objectively through the 
water and words of baptism even if his or her mind cannot cognitively grasp it. 
While it is true such an ontological model can be and is misunderstood, it is also 
declares to us that he is pleased to bestow all these things upon us." This is not to 
say that Calvin rejected the idea of a christological presence in baptism. Cf. The 
Evangelical Faith, vol 3, p. 267. 
23 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3 p. 281. 
24 This view is not confined to Luther but held by later Lutheranism as well. 
One example is, Martin Chemnitz, Ministry, Word, and Sacraments: An 
Enchiridion, trans. by Luther Poellot (St. Louis: Concordia Seminary Press, 1974), 
pp. 137-138. Chemnitz [often called the "second Martin" ofthe Lutheran 
Reformation and principle author of the Formula of Concord] speaks not only of a 
christological presence but of an ontological presence of the entire Trinity: " ... in 
it [baptism] the entire holy Trinity is present and deals with the poor sinner through 
that outward ministry, so that He cleanses him from sins, delivers [him] from death, 
Satan, and eternal damnation, and instead gives [him] righteousness and eternal 
salvation." p. 138 para. 231. Chemnitz is careful to distinguish between this unique 
sacramental presence and God's attribute of omnipresence. 
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true that classic Lutheranism contains internal correctives for such 
misunderstandings. For instance, nowhere does classic Lutheranism teach a 
separation between baptism, the baptismal faith, and the consequent Christian life 
following baptism; just the opposite, it teaches a close connection between them?5 
The path Thielicke takes to corporate relationships in the Church allows for a 
more spiritualised and subjective bond of communion. A view of baptism that sees 
the sacrament as an actual conferral of faith by Christ places one immediately into 
the very essence of the Communio Sanctorum. The "I" is joined to the body of faith 
as a fellow believer. Thielicke's ideas seem to create a second level of Christians 
within the Communio Sanctorum. One level of Christian exists only by way of sign 
and promise as it were. Faith is not really present but is in a way vicariously 
present in the parents and sponsors who bring the child to baptism. At the second 
level are those who really have faith and believe cognitively utilising the active 
will. The first level exists in the manner of a seed full of potential, the second level 
is the plant that has sprung from it. 
This distinction is so important to Thielicke's thought that he actively entertains 
the idea of postponing baptism until later in life when cognitive abilities are more 
fully developed.26 In this way he believes the Church can avoid promoting the 
false "magical" view of infant baptism. There is an obvious logic to his thoughts. 
If people are baptising their babies with the belief that they have completed their 
25 Cf. Luther's Large Catechism, Tappert pp. 439-446. 
26 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, pp. 280-281. 
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responsibilities as parents by completing the rite, then remove the rite and insist 
parents raise their children in the faith and teach them prior to receiving the rite. 
In place of baptism at the stage of infancy Thielicke suggests a rite of dedication 
or blessing similar to that used by the Reformed Church of Geneva. 27 That such a 
view be seriously entertained reinforces the observation that Thielicke does not 
believe faith or grace is actually given in baptism. If it were, as in classic 
Lutheranism, infant baptism would be necessary to join one to Christ and the body 
of faith united in him. 
Thielicke's willingness to consider such a drastic measure as postponement of 
baptism comes out of a genuine pastoral intent. He undoubtedly is concerned with 
helping the "I" recognise his or her responsibility to the living faith as a part of real 
daily life. However, one must ask if by joining baptism to an age of cognitive 
acceptance he is not adding an element of anthropocentrism that contradicts the 
very nature of baptism itself? Does not the balance then tip in the direction of the 
subjective by making the efficacy depend on the right thoughts of the individual? 
Thielicke's intent is to make baptism meaningful for the real lives of people, but 
the result of his approach is to make baptism into a matter of individual intellectual 
acceptance. What then started out as an impetus toward the corporate becomes 
ultimately situated once more in the individual. In the context of postmodernism 
where subjective truth claims and negative individualism are rampant, placing 
baptism in a context where the individual will determines the rite does little to 
27 1bid., p. 280. Thielicke cites as his source Robert Leuenberger, Taufe in der 
Krise; Feststellungen, Fragen, Konseguenzen, Modelle (Stuttgart: Quell Verlag, 
1973), p. 81. 
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emphasise the fullness of what being joined to the corporate Church means. The 
beauty of the classic Lutheran view is that fellowship with God and with other 
Christians is given objectively apart from the individual's force of will. The 
individual does not set the terms for the relationship. Personal abilities give way in 
importance to an act of communion external to the self. The divine Other exposes 
what is lacking in the "I" and gives what the individual cannot gain through mental 
efforts, namely remission of sins, the indwelling person of Christ, and union with 
his body. 
3.1c The Lord's Supper as an Emphasis for Sanctification 
The same trends one sees in Thielicke's treatment ofbaptism can be seen in his 
sermons when he discusses the Lord's Supper. There are not many references to 
the Lord's Supper in Thielicke's sermons, but those references there are provide a 
glimpse of what Thielicke saw as important for his hearers. 
Of major importance in Thielicke's treatment ofthe Lord's Supper is his 
emphasis on sanctification. In Glauben als Abenteuer Thielicke speaks of the 
Lord's Supper as a meal offering strength for sending out the people of God into 
the world. 
Ebenso wie das Ursprungsfest des Passahmahles, mit dem das 
Abendmahl ja in Verbindung steht, sollte die Gemeinschaft am 
Tisch des Herm eine Aufbruchfeier sein: sei es, daB wir, von diesem 
Mahl gestarkt, an unser FlieBband, in unseren Haushalt, an unseren 
Schreibtisch entlassen oder aber wie Schafe mitten unter die Wolfe 
geschickt werden. 28 
[My translation: Likewise, as the original celebration of the 
Passover meal, with which the last supper is associated, the 
fellowship at the table of the Lord should be a festival of departure -
28 Glauben als Abenteur, p. 75. 
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that we be strengthened from this meal and dismissed to our place 
on the assembly line, to our homes, or at our desk. - or that we be 
sent out as sheep amid the wolves?9] 
Similar thoughts can be found in a sermon on the Holy Christian Church in his 
volume I Believe the Christian's Creed.3° Calling the sacrament a "festival of 
departure" is more than grammatical innovation. It effectively moves the emphasis 
of the sacrament from the christological act in the meal itself to the Christian's 
sanctified life following the sacrament. Classic Lutheranism would certainly not 
argue that the Lord's Supper provides one with help for sanctified living,31 however 
sanctification remains the consequence of Christ's act of justification in the 
sacrament, not the main intent of the sacrament. Luther and classic Lutheranism 
placed the main benefit of the sacrament on the reception of forgiveness32 which in 
turn was tied directly to the body and blood of Christ that were understood as 
objectively present. 
29 The above translation is my own. Scheidt's translation is found on p. 40 of 
Faith the Great Adventure. 
30 I Believe the Christian's Creed, p. 234. Cf. Woran Ich Glaube, p. 299. 
31 Triglotta, The Large Catechism, pp. 757-759. "On this account it (the Lord's 
Supper) is indeed called a food of souls, which nourishes and strengthens the new 
man ... Therefore it is given for a daily pasture and sustenance, that faith may 
refresh and strengthen itself so as not to fall back in such a battle, but become ever 
stronger and stronger. For the new life must be so regulated that it continually 
increase and progress." 
32 Ibid., The Small Catechism, p. 557. "What is the benefit of such eating and 
drinking? Answer. That is shown us in these words: 'Given and shed for you for 
the remission of sins;' namely, that in the Sacrament forgiveness of sins, life, and 
salvation are given us through these words. For where there is forgiveness of sins, 
there is also life and salvation." 
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It seems safe to conclude that it was never Thielicke's intention to rob the 
sacrament of its christological focus. 33 His intentions here seem consistent with 
intentions noted in previous pages, namely to face the individual with his or her 
personal responsibilities and thus make faith part of one's actual life. However his 
shift in focus toward sanctification does represent a major shift from the 
sacramental theology of the church body to which he belonged. The issue of what 
was given in the sacrament diminished in importance and how one was affected in 
daily life gained prominence; the movement from an objective focus to a more 
subjective focus asserts itself again. 
3.1d A Different Relationship Between Word and Sacrament 
We have noted already the embrace of spiritual presence as the christological mode 
in the Eucharist. This is expanded to a minor degree in his sermons. In I Believe 
the Christian's Creed he states that the Lord's Supper "is the assurance that the 
Lord remains with us when the worship comes to an end. "34 Here the sacrament 
serves as a reminder of an ongoing divine presence. No unique christological mode 
of presence is recognised in the sacrament. Rather the sacrament points beyond 
itself to the spiritual presence of Christ with all believers. The other reference to a 
presence surrounding the sacrament is found in the same volume in a sermon on 
"The Resurrection of the Body ... ". There Thielicke says: 
Diese Klammer ist ja in dem Einen, der jetzt mitten unter uns ist, wo 
wir in seinem Namen versammelt sind, in dem Einen, der zu mir 
33 He does for instance speak of the Lord's Supper as a sign of communion with 
Christ in Helmut Thielicke, Between God and Satan, trans. C.C. Barber (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), p. 62. 
34 I Believe the Christian's Creed, p.234. The German reads "die trostende 
Vergewisserung, daB der Herr bei uns bleibt, wenn der Kultus zu Ende ist ... " 
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spricht: "Fiirchte dich nicht, glaube nur," in dem Einen, der mir an 
den Altiiren in Brot und Wein begegnet und der als Kindlein in 
Mariens SchoB liegt, obwohl aller Weltkreis ihn nicht umschloB. 
Seine Arme sind die Klammer, die Zeit und Ewigkeit, die diese und 
die zukUnftige Welt umfangen. 35 
[My translation: These clasps are in the One who is still with us 
where we are gathered in his name; in the One who says to me "Fear 
not, just believe;" in the One who meets me at the altar in bread and 
wine and who lays as a little baby in Mary's bosom although the 
whole universe cannot contain him. His arms are the clasps that 
encircle time and eternity this world and the next. 36] 
Christ's presence here is multifaceted. He does indeed meet us at the sacrament 
but his presence there is not in accordance to the Lutheran view of "real presence." 
It is spoken of in the same terms as any of the other Christ-encounters thus far 
exemplified in Thielicke's sermons. 
There are simply too few references in Thielicke's sermons to establish any 
definite doctrine of a unique sacramental presence in the Lord's Supper. What he 
does not say becomes more important than what he does say. His lack of 
sacramental christology, which is at the heart of classic Lutheranism, certainly 
suggests doubts in Thielicke's mind about the validity ofthis doctrine. His 
unwillingness to build in any significant way on the concept of grace given in the 
sacrament likewise suggests doubts as to whether the Lord's Supper itself actually 
offers justifying grace. Where Thielicke allows for grace, forgiveness, and Christ's 
presence in the Lord's Supper is in the Word of promise surrounding the 
sacrament. Here his views mirror those discusses under the Word surrounding 
baptism. Thielicke writes: 
35 Woran Ich Glaube, p. 321. 
36 Anderson's translation can be found in I Believe the Christian's Creed, p. 252. 
It was not used because of difficulties in clarity. 
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Er spricht ein W ort von vollziehender Gewalt, das im 
Gesprochenwerden schon Tat ist: "Dir sind deine Siinden 
vergeben!" Er sagt es so, wie es heute noch im Abendmahl zum 
Ausdruck kommt: daB hi er wirklich die Vergebung auf mich 
zukommt, daB ich sie mit diesen meinen HW\den fassen darf. Wenn 
Jesus auf einen Menschen zukommt, dann handelt er, dann 
verwandelt er ihn und fiihrt ihn auf eine ganz neue Ebene des 
Lebens.37 
[Translation: (Anderson) He speaks a Word of efficacious power, 
which in the very speaking becomes a deed. "Your sins are 
forgiven!" He says it in the same way it is still expressed today in 
Holy Communion, where forgiveness comes to me so assuredly that 
I can actually take it up in my own hands. When Jesus comes to a 
man, Jesus acts; he transforms him and leads him onto an entirely 
new level oflife.38] 
Further investigation of Thielicke' s sacramental belief reinforces the case that 
the christological act of forgiveness revealed at the sacrament is in reality a 
christological act mediated through the kerygma. 39 The sacrament becomes 
important for the sake of the Word proclaimed there. Interestingly Thielicke 
criticises both Zwingli and the theology of Erlangen for this very thing. 
The second extreme is the approach represented especially by 
Zwingli. Here the elements do not have inherently any special 
quality but have purely symbolical rank as illustrations .... This line 
of thought, too, extends by way of the Enlightenment, which found 
it most congenial, to our own day. A. von Harnack carried it so far 
as to recommend, in the name ofthe sole normativity of the Word, 
that it might be best to drop the sacrament from divine service. 
Only God's Word and prayer really have a place in worship (What is 
Christianity?, p. 291). Everything apart from the Word and faith is 
a matter of indifference (p. 313). The classical theologians of 
37 Woran ich Glaube, pp. 80-81. 
38 I Believe the Christian's Creed, p. 53. 
39 It is worth referring back to an earlier quotation cited from I Believe the 
Christian's Creed, "Then the miracle of the church will confront us, because only 
then will it become clear that she lives from the word of her Lord, only from that 
word and from nothing else." p. 238. (italics Thielicke's) 
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Erlangen Lutheranism reduced the sacrament to simply another form 
of the Word. 40 
What sets Thielicke's view apart from those he criticises is perhaps a 
willingness to allow for the spiritual kind of divine presence surrounding the 
sacraments. Avoiding the "symbol only" thinking of Zwingli and the "est" 
thinking of Luther, Thielicke seems to lean toward Calvin in granting a mystical 
spiritual encounter with Christ in the Lord's Supper. From his perspective this 
avoids the "word only" mentality ofErlangen and Zwingli. 
3.2 Thielicke 's Challenge of ClOlSsic Lutheran !Views Outside His Sermons 
To get a more complete picture ofThielicke's sacramental christology it is 
necessary to look outside his sermons. 
3.2a ClCJSsic Lutheran Ontological !Presence Openly Challenged 
Thielicke's clearest dogmatic exposition of the Lord's Supper is found in The 
Evangelical Faith, vol. 3. As Thielicke's views on the Lord's Supper are examined 
there it can be stated in general terms that he is by his own admission closer to 
Calvin than to Luther. He calls Luther's view a "crassly magical view."41 Later in 
this same volume he cites Calvin's observations that a bodily presence of Christ in 
40 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 250. Cf. p. 256 where Thielicke gives four 
points supporting his premise that the sacraments are merely forms of the word: 1. 
"The enumeration of acts of worship indicates the primacy of the Word over the 
sacrament." 2. "Luther deals with the sacraments in such a way as to put all the 
stress on the word." 3. "Where there is no gospel there is no church." 4. "The 
efficacy that is given to the Word is greater in the testament than in the sacrament. . 
. . For the sacrament cannot exist without the Word, but the Word can without the 
sacrament." Thielicke concludes the four points by saying, "The priority of the 
Word over the sacrament shows that the sacrament is a Word-event, an actual 
Word." 
41 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 249. 
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the sacrament opens the door for docetism, 42 and that the doctrine of a physical 
presence in the Lord's Supper sins against the Holy Spirit.43 In all ofThielicke's 
comments, the main bone of contention is the idea of an ontic presence of Christ. 
Thielicke rightly observes that the Lutheran view ofthe Lord's Supper depends 
on the real presence of Christ in the sacrament. Christ's presence defines the 
sacrament and gives the sacrament its power. As in baptism the role of the 
individual at the Supper is as one who receives with a certain passiveness. The 
rubric of pastor placing the wafer into the hand has ancient roots intending to 
convey these elements and thereby proclaim the undeserved and unearned grace of 
Christ.44 The essence of the Supper itself does not depend on the state of the heart 
that received it. The ontic presence is there the same for believer and unbeliever 
alike in the teaching of classic Lutheranism. 
42 Ibid., p.297. The charge of docetism is somewhat ironic since Luther's 
ontological presence insists on Christ's actual flesh and blood in the sacrament. 
Docetism of course denies the physical reality of Christ and sees Christ only as a 
spirit being. Thielicke here bases his charge of docetism on Calvin's statement that 
an omnipresent physical body is a "monstrous" thing. Luther explains how this is 
possible through the doctrine of the communication of attributes but this too is a 
point of contention for Thielicke. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Cf. comments made by Cyril of Jerusalem in his Catechetical Lectures "In 
approaching [the altar] therefore, come not with thy wrists extended, or thy fingers 
spread; but make thy left hand a throne for the right, as for that which is to receive 
a King. And having hollowed thy palm receive the Body of Christ, saying over it, 
'Amen.' ... Then after thou hast partaken of the Body of Christ, draw near also to 
the Cup of His Blood; not stretching forth thine hands, but bending, and saying 
with an air of worship and reverence, 'Amen,' hallow thyself also by partaking of 
the Blood of Christ." Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, eds., Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers (Second Series), vol. 7 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Pub., 1994) pp. 156-
157. 
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In maintaining an ontic view of the Lord's Supper classic Lutheranism did not 
refuse to acknowledge the individual as a unique person or belittle the importance 
of the individual, quite the opposite. Proper reception of the sacrament depended 
on the individual approaching with right faith. Each recipient was expected to 
confess the faith of the Communio Sanctorum and to have received proper pastoral 
care, especially in regard to confession and absolution. High expectations were 
placed on the individual to be sincere in his or her piety and confession so that as 
he or she received the body of Christ he or she would be spiritually united to that 
body through faith. Both corporate and individual concerns were implicit in the 
whole ontic schema of the sacrament. 
In sharp contrast to this view, Thielicke maintains that one should not insist on 
any specific confessional understanding of the sacrament as a prerequisite for 
reception. 45 For Thielicke the final explanation of the sacramental meal is best left 
in the realm of one's personal interpretation. A much "looser" concept of the 
corporate body of Christ is exemplified in Thielicke' s sacramental thought. 
3.2b The Question of Ecumenism in the Eucharist: Elert and Sasse at Odds 
with Thielicke 
The strong ecumenical tone in Thielicke's sacramental teaching further exposes his 
distaste for the ontological models of classic Lutheranism and his preference for 
spirituaV personal understandings of the sacraments. There are several points at 
which Thielicke tries to "demythologise" Luther and make his insistence on the 
45 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 299. 
150 
"est" of the sacrament palatable to non-Lutheran tastes. At one point Thielicke 
tries to build a bridge to Luther by citing a passage from the Babylonian Captivity 
where Luther states "we have one sacrament and three sacramental signs."46 When 
Luther writes of one sacrament he is referring to Christ who is called a 
"sacramentum" ("mystery") in the Vulgate.47 Thielicke seizes on the term 
"mystery" and the christological foundation of the term and states his own distaste 
for the term "sacrament." The term "mystery" he feels holds less polemical 
baggage and may be a term to which all sides of the sacramental debate can agree. 
Luther's intent was just the opposite; instead of looking for agreement he was 
looking for a fight. He spoke of one sacrament to bait the Roman Catholic scholars 
who numbered the sacraments at seven. 48 
Thielicke also tries to redefme Luther's disagreement with the Reformedfinitum 
non est capax infiniti principle and make it more palatable to the Reformed. He 
writes: 
What Luther wanted to say with his principle that the finite can 
grasp the infinite is that we should take seriously the full and 
unconditional entry of the eternal Word into our limited humanity.49 
Thielicke's ecumenical objectives here lead him into a corner. He pits what he 
feels Luther really wanted to say against what he actually did say. The body of 
Luther's writings would support a very different conclusion from Thielicke's about 
46 Ibid. p. 259. 
47 Luther has in mind the Vulgate rendering of 1 Timothy 3:16. LW 36:18. 
48 Cf. LW 36:94-95. 
49 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 298. 
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what Luther meant. What Luther actually said was the very thing Thielicke spends 
so much time contradicting, namely that the finite elements of the Supper contain 
the infinite God/man Christ according to his ontic presence in the form of body and 
blood. Thielicke seems to stretch the facts in his attempt to reconcile Luther with 
his own thought, yet his intent is obvious. He hopes that by finding common 
threads of meaning in both approaches he can build ecumenical roads between 
Lutherans and the Reformed. In a way this demonstrates a concern for the Church 
as community. His desire is to find theological ground on which different 
theological points of view can co-exist harmoniously. In another sense, which we 
will explore in more detail below, the kind of community Thielicke would build 
with his ecumenism is something akin to postmodem views of an individualised 
community. 
The same desire for common ground between Reformed and Lutheran views is 
seen even more dramatically when Thielicke finally addresses the issue of the mode 
of christological presence. He states: 
Now that we have pierced through the time-bound concepts of the 
traditional eucharistic doctrines and reached their theological core, 
we are in a position to sift out the nonnegotiable element in our 
statements about the Lord's Supper. Reduced to a single formula, 
this may be described as the real personal presence of Christ in 
feeding through Word, bread, and wine. Since the real presence is 
not meant as presence 'in itself but as presence 'for us,' one might 
also use for this non-negotiable element in the eucharist an 
adaptation ofMelanchthon's famous saying: 'To know the Lord's 
Supper is to know its benefits. ' 50 
Thielicke here is only partially correct. It is true that the concept of the real 
presence is intended to point to grace "for us" but this does not negate the necessity 
50 Ibid., p.299. 
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of the ontic presence of Christ in the sacrament. He seems to be trying to tone 
down the "real (on tic) presence" by speaking of a "real personal presence." This of 
course raises the question of exactly what kind of presence it is if it is not ontic? It 
seems clear that Thielicke's "theological core" of the Lord's Supper, which he 
terms "real personal presence," is in fact a spiritual presence. His harsh 
renunciation of on tic modes of presence leaves little room for anything but spiritual 
modes of presence. So once more Thielicke moves toward the spiritual/personal 
Christ encounter at the very point where classic Lutheranism moves toward a 
substantive/objective Christ encounter. In seizing upon the Lutheran insistence on 
"for us" in the sacrament Thielicke seeks to redirect focus away from his lack of an 
ontological sacramental presence. 
Thielicke's closing statements in his discourse on the sacraments show he is 
aware of possible dangers in his ecumenical approach. He writes: 
This might be regarded as a tolerance which is related to 
indifference and which would then be a new way of despising the 
Lord's Supper. But this charge cannot stand so long as it is the 
community that receives the guest at the Lord's table and does not 
leave him to his subjective and perhaps erroneous ideas but sets him 
under its accompanying Word, under proclamation, teaching, and 
pastoral care.51 
He seems willing to acknowledge that his approach encourages subjectivity but 
he hopes to overcome that danger by setting the "I" in the context of the Church 
and her work. The individual with erroneous views is still permitted at the table, 
but with the understanding that the Church will teach the truth to that individual 
over time. Thielicke's view of community here fits well with postmodem views 
wherein community is a fairly loose association of individuals. The Eucharistic 
51 Ibid., p. 300. 
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community of classic Lutheranism necessitates closer bonds under a common 
confession of faith. Thielicke's intent is of course noble in that he wishes to 
expand the Church and make it more inclusive. But by loosening the bonds of 
community historically understood under the sacrament, Thielicke's approach may 
help justify the atomising tendency of individualism instead of combating it. 
Thielicke's approach to ecumenism (where the sacraments are concerned) is to 
examine the different theological understandings of the sacraments, be critical of 
each, find elements of common ground between the views, then focus on the 
common ground and simply dismiss the differences as not relevant to the issue of 
fellowship. Under such an approach the Lord's Supper becomes a gathering point 
for a multiplicity of doctrinal positions. It is used as a tool to unite people of 
differing confessions. Thielicke trusts that the spiritual presence of Christ in the 
sacrament will foster brotherhood and solidarity among people. This will then 
empower them to be more sanctified in their actions toward one another and thus 
further the actual bond of fellowship that was symbolised in the sacramental 
gathering. 52 
Classic Lutheranism saw the Eucharist in very different terms where ecumenism 
is concerned. Article VII of the Augsburg Confession shows both the classic 
Lutheran definition of "Church" and its approach to ecumenism. 
52 Hermann Sasse sees a distinctive characteristic of Reformed theology here 
that is not shared by Lutherans or Catholic churches of the East and West. He 
states that the Lord's Supper is the "goal of unification" in Lutheran and Catholic 
circles while it is the "means of unification" in the Reformed tradition. Hermann 
Sasse, We Confess the Sacraments, trans. Norman Nagel (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1985), p. 11. 
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Also they (our churches) teach that one holy Church is to continue 
forever. The Church is the congregation of saints, in which the 
Gospel is rightly taught and the Sacraments are rightly administered. 
And to the true unity of the church it is enough to agree concerning 
the doctrine of the Gospel and the administration of the Sacraments. 
Nor is it necessary that human traditions, that is, rites or ceremonies, 
instituted by men, should be everywhere alike. As Paul says: One 
faith, one Baptism, one God and Father of all, etc. Eph. 4, 5.6.53 
The basis of all ecumenical efforts in classic Lutheranism is simply to find 
agreement on the "doctrine of the Gospel" and the sacraments. Of course it must 
also be understood that when the Lutheran Confessions speak of the "doctrine of 
the gospel" it was not a reductionist view of gospel to which they referred, but a 
broad application of the gospel through the whole teaching of the Church. The 
union of the doctrine of the gospel with the sacraments shows how the sacraments 
themselves were understood. The sacraments were visible tangible gospel. They 
could not be separated from the Word of the gospel. Christ was in them for salvific 
action and therefore they were as necessary to the Church as the Word. 
The sacraments were not intermediate means to the ends of fellowship but the 
very basis of fellowship with the doctrine of the gospel. Where sacramental 
divergence existed, it was understood that divergence in the doctrine of the gospel 
also existed. Ecumenical efforts then had to include agreement at both points 
(Word or doctrine of the gospel and sacraments) before divergent parties could 
gather under the sacrament. The Lord's Supper was not a sign pointing people with 
different confessions to the hope of future agreement, but the fullest expression that 
the body of Christ was intact. 
53 Triglo~ p. 47. Augsburg Confession VII "of the Church." 
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Thielicke's views may well be spurred on as a reaction against the views of 
Werner Elert, his "archenemy" at Erlangen. Elert argued that there was a marriage 
between the sacraments and the confessional unity ofthe people. By analysing the 
Apostles' Creed Elert shows how the earliest creedal understandings linked the 
sacraments with the general confession of what the apostolic faith was. Elert 
claims this creed originated in the East and moved to the West. 54 In the East 
",;wv a{trov Km vrovl.a" was understood as "holy things" or more specifically as 
the elements of the Lord's Supper. As the phrase moved west and was translated to 
Latin the meaning of "holy things" became lost in the more uncertain Latin 
expression sanctorum communio. Elert identifies the difference between a 
"genitive of persons" and a "genitive of things" ('rffiv a{trov as the genitive of 
-r~ ayta and therefore sanctorum as the genitive of sancta). He argues that when 
Km vrovl.a is meant as a reference to persons, it is far more common to see it used 
with prepositions such as Athanasius' reference to Km vrovl.a /l~'t~ ,;wv mcr-rffiv. 55 
Elert admits: 
The connection of koinonia with things is also expressed with 
prepositions. Here, however, the bare genitive is no exception, and 
innumerable phrases using it are employed alongside the 
prepositional construction .... Even though the meaning of such 
genitives may have to be explained from case to case, there can be 
no denying that -rffiv a{trov Kmvrovl.a fits most naturally in this long 
list of "holy things" as another genitive of things. 56 
54 Wemer Elert, Eucharist and Church Fellowship in the First Four Centuries, 
trans. Norman Nagel (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1966), p. 11 and 
214. 
55 Ibid., p. 220. 
56 Ibid. 
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Herman Sasse, the onetime secretary of the Bekennende Kirche and professor of 
Church and Dogmatic History at Erlangen, supported Elert's findings and added his 
own observations. Sasse claimed that the phrase "sanctorum communionem" is the 
last addition to the creed and even in its original Latin meaning would not have 
been understood as a further explanation of "sanctam ecclesiam catholicam, "but 
as an entirely new idea because the Roman Creed bears none of the more clearly 
Eastern characteristics of explanatory repetitions ("God of God, Light of Light, 
very God of very God"). 57 The point of these conclusions is to emphasis that the 
sacraments were essential marks of the early Christian Church and were understood 
to be part and parcel of their overall unity of faith and confession. They were not 
merely rites that stood in hope of future doctrinal unity but at the heart of true unity 
under a common confession. 
In his Theological Ethics Thielicke says he favours the understanding of 
sanctorum as a genitive denoting fellowship in holy things. 58 With that he further 
speaks positively about the Church as being greater than the sum of the individuals 
who make it up. But where his contemporaries Elert and Sasse conclude that 
communion in holy things means also that the sacraments are an expression of 
close communion under one doctrine, Thielicke sees the sacraments as expressions 
of hoped-for unity. 
57 We Confess the Sacraments, pp. 141-142. 
58 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics: Politics, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1969), p. 621. 
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The sum of these arguments supports the idea that in the early Church the 
marriage between ecclesiology and sacramental theology was undeniable. 
Ecclesiological fellowship was defined by fellowship in the objective means of the 
Lord's Supper. The Eastern liturgical expression "'t~ ayta 'tote; a{totc;"59 shows 
the marriage between the Saints and the supper. Fellowship in 
christological/sacramental things was the supreme mark of fellowship between 
people. 
Thielicke's sensitivity toward doctrinal divergence is laudable. He clearly 
wants to mend fences and bring to Christ those who live in ignorance of him. 
However several questions must be asked: Is his approach honest to the historic 
faith and practice of Christendom? And will his ideas prove healthy for the Church 
in a postmodern context? 
Elert and Sasse admit that the early church was not unfamiliar with confessional 
divisions. But as they point out the Lord's Supper was not a "Christians' supper" 
where multiplicity of doctrinal understanding was welcome (as Thielicke's view 
holds), rather it was understood as "Christ's Supper" where unity of faith and 
confession was the only acceptable expression of the Body of Christ. 60 Letters of 
59 Eucharist and Church Fellowship in the First Four Centuries, p. 222. 
60 This view even came to the fore as a point of agreement between the Lutheran 
Church of Finland and the Russian Orthodox Church in their ecumenical dialogues 
held from 1970 to 1986. One report ofthis meeting states that both sides agreed 
"that in principle the eucharist should not be made a means of achieving unity, but 
that eucharistic fellowship expresses the already existing unity ofthe Church." 
Hannu T. Kamppuri, editor, Dialogue Between Neigbours: The Theological 
Conversations between the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Finland and the 
Russian Orthodox Church, 1970-1986, Publication ofLuther-Agricola Society, 
Band 1 7 (Helsinki: V ammalan, 1986), p. 17. 
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Fellowship exchanged between churches and bishops in regard to specific 
individuals provided the practical means for determining doctrinal unity. 61 It was 
necessary to establish doctrinal unity prior to receiving the Lord's Supper.62 
The contrast between Thielicke's "sacramental ecumenism" and the practice of 
the early Church in establishing doctrinal unity prior to communing becomes 
sharper against the background of Postmodemism. The overtones of isolationism 
in postmodem individualism press more and more toward doctrinal and 
sacramental disunity. A "don't ask don't tell" policy at the Eucharist serves only to 
legitimise this atomistic mentality. If the postmodem individual is to learn the 
importance of "communion" with God and others, then the sacrament provides an 
opportunity to teach submission of self to what is greater. The "greater" aspect of 
the sacrament goes to the mystery of the real presence on the one hand and to the 
body of doctrine that embraces this presence on the other. 
As Thielicke views sacramental fellowship he espouses what might be termed 
"sacramental reductionism" (as long as individuals can agree on general shared 
threads of meaning they need not agree on the specific nature and character of the 
sacrament). Elert shows numerous examples of how from the earliest stages the 
Church has sought to take seriously the biblical call for being of"the same mind."63 
61 Eucharist and Church Fellowship in the First Four Centuries, pp. 151-154. 
62 Ibid, p. 121. Elert quotes John of Damascus "We must maintain with all 
strength that the Eucharist is to be neither received from nor given to heretics." He 
further cites the Apostolic Constitutions confirmed by the Council of Carthage 
(345-48) which states that "no person, clerical or lay, may commune in another 
congregation 'without a letter from his bishop."' p. 132. 
63 I Corinthians 1 : 1 0 
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A practice in the postmodem Church that seeks affinity with the ancient practice 
promises a powerful impetus away from individualism. The individual may not 
understand all the elements of that doctrine but he or she is in a position of 
submission to them as one who has yielded self to the greater corporate 
confession64. This is not an excuse for ignorance or disengaged faith as Thielicke 
might see it, but it is recognition ofhuman weakness. Human subjectivity is thus 
placed in service to a divine objectivity, tied to Word and sacrament, and veiling 
the person of Christ. 
Such a view raises certain concerns if qualifications are not made. For instance 
under the guise of objective doctrinal truth, fundamentalism has gained a 
stronghold in many American denominations. Thielicke was wary of 
fundamentalist approaches to Scripture. 65 He was also wary of the objectivication 
of truth in general. In his Ethics Thielicke argues: 
Truth is not linked merely to the agreement between a certain 
judgment and the objective and verifiable facts, as positivism 
maintains. For positivism, the criterion of truth consists in the 
correspondence between what is said and the on tic data. 66 
For Thielicke truth can only be known when an objective fact is linked to the 
"more inclusive system or framework within which, and with reference to which, 
64 The argument for taking seriously the unifying power in one's historic 
confession and faith (or "noncontemporaneous religion") is taken up by Johann 
Baptist Metz, in "Productive Noncontemporaneity," in Observations on "The 
Spiritual Situation of the Age," ed. Jiirgen Habermas, trans. by Andrew Buchwalter 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), pp. 169-177. 
65 Cf. How to Believe Again, p. 160. 
66 Theological Ethics, vol. 1, p. 522. 
160 
this fact arises."67 Truth depends on "the relation to things, forms, and events to 
their divine 'foundation.'"68 Fundamentalism can be avoided provided the ontic 
character of doctrine is built on the right divine foundation. Fundamentalism builds 
on the foundation of law with its "thus saith the Lord" criteria for objective 
doctrine. Luther and classic Lutheranism sought their "divine foundation" for 
objective truth in christology. Luther scholars have pointed out the main principle 
operating within Luther's system of doctrine was not sola Scriptura as is often 
claimed (and as fundamentalism claims for itself) but so/us Christus.69 The 
christological principle establishes the objective reliability of the body of doctrine. 
Thielicke is also concerned that hermeneutics be governed by the christological 
principle. Yet there is a marked difference between Luther's christological 
principle and Thielicke's. For Luther the christological principle was established 
on ontic thought forms and the belief in an objective Christ encounter. Such an 
objective presence of Christ meant also the existence of an objective body of 
identifiable doctrine. A christological hermeneutic that yields to one's subjective 
Christ encounter will necessarily lead toward the rejection of an objective body of 
doctrine. That rejection necessarily colours one's views on the sacrament. The 
sacrament then becomes a hope for what does not and cannot exist in this life, 
namely a unity under a given body of doctrine. In the context ofPostmodernism, 
which has seen the near total rejection of absolute truth claims, granting admission 
to the sacrament without concern for unity in doctrine is not only a denial of the 
67 Ibid., p. 529. 
68 Ibid., p. 528. 
69 Cf. Lienhard pp. 39-42 and Siggins, p. 17. 
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early Christian understanding of the deeper meaning of the sacrament, but a 
capitulation to a new paradigm of knowing that stands counter to an absolute 
objective Christ. 
3.3 The Genus Majestaticum as a Point of Departure 
Behind Thielicke's resistance to an ontological presence of Christ in the sacrament 
is his objection to Luther's doctrine of the communication of attributes. Thielicke 
calls Luther's teaching on the communication of attributes a "fateful course,"70 "a 
mental walking on eggs,"71 and "sheer absurdity."72 He seems willing to accept 
Luther's ideas of God becoming man in Christ but says Luther's thought loses its 
clarity "when he takes the next and apparently logical step of reversing things so 
that not only does God become man but the humanity of Christ becomes God."73 
At issue then is the Lutheran teaching on the genus majestaticum or the belief in the 
communication of the properties of the divine nature to the human nature. Thus 
where the Lord's Supper is concerned, the divine property of ubiquity is 
communicated to the human flesh and blood of Christ making it possible to be 
present in more than one place at a time. This topic has been introduced previously 
but here must be taken up again in view of the communication of attributes. 
Thielicke echoes Zwingli's criticisms by stating, "What can be meant by an 
omnipresent body when the body is ontologically characterized by limitation in 
70 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, p. 326. 
71 Ibid., p. 266. 
72 Ibid., p. 268. 
73 Ibid., p. 326. 
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space?"74 The Lutheran Confessions offer a more systematic defence of the genus 
majestaticum in Article VIII of the Formula of Concord. There Zwingli's 
objection is answered with the following: 
As the two natures are united personally, i.e., in one person, we 
believe, teach, and confess that this union is not such a copulation 
and connection that neither nature has anything in common with the 
other personally, i.e., because of the personal union, as when two 
boards are glued together, where neither gives anything to the other 
or takes anything from the other. But here is the highest 
communion, which God truly has with the [assumed] man, from 
which personal union, and the highest and ineffable communion 
resulting therefrom, there flows everything human that is said and 
believed concerning God, and everything divine that is said and 
believed concerning the man Christ; as the ancient teachers of the 
Church explained this union and communion of the natures by the 
illustration of iron glowing with fire ... "75 
Thielicke does not seem to object to the more general genus idiomaticum which 
speaks of communication of properties from the divine nature to the person of 
Christ, 76 but the thought that the humanity of Christ was so involved with the 
divine nature as to give it divine characteristics was more than Thielicke was 
willing to accept. Luther scholar Marc Leinhard points out that Luther himself did 
not use the term genus majestaticum to refer to this communication of attributes but 
did nonetheless teach the concept clearly.77 For Luther the doctrine ofthe genus 
majestaticum was much more than a metaphysical concept defining the substance 
of the Lord's Supper; it could also be applied in principle to whole salvific action 
of Christ. As humanity is joined to Christ by faith, a process of communication 
74 Ibid., pp. 327-328. 
75 Triglotta, The Formula ofConcord, Art. VIII, p. 819. 
76 A view which is held also by Calvin. Cf. Institutes, vol. 1, chapter XIV, pp. 
415-416. 
77 Leinhard, p. 339. 
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with Christ begins wherein Christ's divine properties are given to sinful humanity 
and mankind's sinful nature is taken into Christ in a "blessed exchange." Luther 
at times spoke of the salvific action as a kind of theosis wherein deity becomes 
"humanified" so that humanity can become deified ("gantz und gar vergottet," 
"Godded through"). 78 The doctrine of the os is which has found ready acceptance in 
the Eastern Church has unfortunately caused confusion among modem Lutherans. 
Thielicke's agreement with Zwingli's criticism does not mean Thielicke's 
overall view of the sacrament is any closer to Zwingli's than Luther's. Thielicke is 
just as harsh in his criticisms ofZwingli's alloiosis as he is ofLuther's 
communication of attributes, 79 and as we have repeatedly said seems to align 
himself with Calvin. 80 
What Thielicke does seem willing to recognise in Luther's doctrine of the 
communication of attributes is that this doctrine served the proclamation of Christ's 
salvific work. Thielicke knows that this was not a metaphysical or academic point 
for Luther and this at least is something he appreciates. When the communication 
of attributes is viewed from this perspective, Thielicke finds more agreement 
78 Quoted from a sermon ofLuther's in 1526 by Kurt E. Marquart, "Luther and 
Theosis," Concordia Theological Quarterly vol. 64 (July 2000), p. 185. 
79 Cf. The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, p. 329. (by "alloiosis" Thielicke means a 
"figure of speech" or a "metaphorical statement." For Zwingli this was a 
christological principle. Thielicke speaks of Zwingli's view as ultimately teaching 
Christ is not God but merely represents God, just as Christ is not really in the 
Eucharist but the sacrament only represents him.) 
80 The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3, p. 297. Thielicke's discussion ofCalvin's view 
is important because he defines "spiritual presence" as that which does not belong 
only to the intellect or conscious mind but more belongs more to the realm of 
God's "real acts toward us." The spiritual presence belongs to faith not mind. 
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between Luther and Calvin than between Luther and Zwingli. Thielicke then sides 
with Luther in seeing a salvific importance to the idea of the humanity of Christ 
being joined to divinity, but remains opposed to this as an ontological doctrine. 
Yet Thielicke may be ignoring the value in Luther' s communication of 
attributes for an individualised society. The communication of attributes offers the 
postmodem Church an effective angle in combating an autonomous view of self. 
Christ's flesh sharing divine attributes so as to be present in reality both in this 
world and in glory means in a roundabout way that the individual is caught up in a 
mystery of the highest order. The "I" touches the divine in the flesh and in so 
doing (with faith) is caught up in the blessed exchange of Christ's righteousness for 
mankind's corruption. The "I" is shown that Christian existence must be an 
existence of dependence and reception because that to which the "I" is attaining is 
so far above the "I" as to be unattainable without a constant connection to the 
Person giving it. The very mystery of Christ's sacramental presence presents a 
view of reality that begs the "I" to recognise the limitation of the self and embrace 
that which cannot be fully understood by the rational mind. The more such 
sacramental piety can exert itself in the postmodem context the greater chance that 
individuals will recognise the impossibility of existence as monads. Unfortunately 
Thielicke's overall direction toward individual subjectivity, which has shown itself 
again in his sacramental christology, does little to redress the problem of 
individualism. 
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Chapter 4 
Forces Pressing Toward the Individual 
Throughout the previous three chapters we have offered various theological 
explanations for Thielicke's individualistic approach to christology and we have 
shown how his focus impacts other major areas of his theology. Thus far we have 
been hesitant to suggest that Thielicke's system is built on a philosophy of 
individualism. As we will explain in this chapter, the term "individualisation" is a 
better description for what we have found in Thielicke's system. Though we have 
searched for answers in theology that might help explain why Thielicke moves so 
strongly in the direction of the individual we have not yet addressed the major 
philosophical or social forces that pressed Thielicke's view in this direction. This 
chapter will focus on the pressure Nihilism placed on Thielicke's overall thought 
and will discuss the social pressures this created for him in Nazi Germany. 
We take these matters up here because they will offer us a clearer picture of the 
direction that must be taken for christology in the postmodem context. By 
examining the social and philosophical influences driving Thielicke we will find 
similarities and differences in the present. Discovering such similarities and 
differences will help us determine what elements ofThielicke's approach remain 
vital today and what elements need redirecting. 
By looking at the philosophical and social pressures in Thielicke's mind we 
hope also to find a root cause or major guiding principle that forced him in an 
individualistic direction. Thielicke does not himself define a single principle of 
individualisation in his theology/christology; one may assume the presence of such 
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a principle is either thought to be so obvious it does not merit definition, or of such 
a secondary nature that he was largely unconscious of being driven by it. This 
thesis assumes the latter. When it is claimed that Thielicke is largely unconscious 
of having his christological system driven by some broader principle of 
individualisation, certain qualifications must again be made. Thielicke is conscious 
of wanting to highlight the individual in his system. The following quotation is one 
of many where Thielicke reminds the reader of this very point: 
One point at least is clear: Jesus Christ wills that the mass be 
disentangled. He does not view man as merely one member of an ant 
colony, as merely a particular specimen of his genus or species. He 
views man rather as a child of God of infinite worth. He views him as 
one who must die alone, who bears his sins all by himself, and who 
can only receive forgiveness individually and personally. Each must 
come to God in a radical solitariness .... It is for this reason that on a 
Christian, and especially a Lutheran view, even the orders of the 
world, e.g., state, family, or society, do not have the character of a 
suprapersonal institution in which the individual is done away. On 
the contrary, the orders are conditioned and sustained by personal 
love. It is not a case ofpersonhood being overcome but of the person 
really coming to his own. God does not deal with the mass. He 
knows only the individual with his eternal destiny .... Pre-eminence 
is thereby attached to ''the individual" he is radically singled out from 
the mass. 1 
Like so many other references to an individualised focus Thielicke does not 
explain in detail why he must do so. Statements like "God does not deal with the 
mass" and "Pre-eminence is attached to the individual" are left largely unguarded. 
Thielicke does not see a need to balance such statements with what he would see to 
be a proper view of spiritual community. In other places one finds statements 
reflecting appreciation for the ecclesiological community, but he does not develop 
these at length or refer to them with any consistency in his sermons. This leads to 
the conclusion that for Thielicke the individual is so central to the basic principles 
1 Theological Ethics, vol. 1, p. 514. 
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of christology, philosophy, and the nature of God that it is simply a given that the 
individual is the pre-eminent consideration. 
What the above quotation does demonstrate is his concern about the genuine 
daily needs and issues of people in actual life settings. Beginning at the individual 
existential level Thielicke then extends his view to theologicaVchristological 
conclusions. Rather than adopting the more deductive approach of those 
"orthodox" theologians he disliked by making blanket dogmatic statements which 
do not take into consideration the special needs of individuals, Thielicke opted for a 
more inductive method.2 The language of"inductive" vs. "deductive" does not 
seem to be part ofThielicke's evaluation of his own work, yet the distinction 
between the two approaches is obvious especially in comparison to the 
aforementioned orthodox dogmaticians. 
Secondly the quotation cited above from Thielicke's Ethics shows a pastoral 
drive in Thielicke's method that could be called "disentanglement." The mass must 
be separated into its singular parts so that God can affect His work at the "atomic" 
level so to speak. Since the "Sitz im Leben" of each individual is unique God's 
action to deliver the individual must also be unique. Disentanglement becomes the 
passion of the pastor. Each individual must be separated from all things and people 
that stand in the way of the divine encounter for simple reasons of pastoral care. 
Thielicke approaches his entire theological system with this pastoral concern 
because God "does not deal with the mass. He knows only the individual ... " 
2 The observation is also made in the following work: Frank Stanaland 
Christian Jr., "The Gospel and Modem Man: A Study of the Theological Method of 
Helm ut Thielicke in the Context of Modem Secularization" (Doctoral Thesis, The 
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1977), pp. 163-167. 
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This inner pastoral drive toward the individual and his or her unique "concrete 
situation" is evident very early on in Thielicke's career. The above quotation from 
Thielicke' s Ethics came in 1951. Thielicke would not publish his first dogmatics 
text until 1968. The order suggests a greater concern for the concrete ethical 
situation of people over a concern for systematic doctrine. Further evidence of this 
is apparent already in Thielicke's two doctoral theses. His philosophical 
dissertation was entitled Das Verhaltnis zwischen dem Ethischen und dem 
Asthetischen and was published in 1932. His doctoral thesis in theology was 
published in 1934 under the title Das Wesen der "Konkreten Situation"3. In his 
analysis of Das Verhaltnis zwischen dem Ethischen und dem Asthetischen, Frank 
Stanaland Christian Jr. concludes: 
... the relationship between the ethical and the aesthetic senses is a 
highly abstract problem. Thielicke concretises the subject when he 
approaches it from the standpoint of the "superindividual 1." Das 
uberindividuelle Ich is the focal point of reality in his dissertation, as 
it forms the unifying center for the various subjects of experience. 
This "multidimensional I" (mehrdimensionale Ich) represents the 
concrete existence of man with which Thielicke's theological and 
ethical thought repeatedly begins. The concrete existence of the 
individual is the "anthropological starting point" of his methodical 
procedure.4 
Stanaland's observations prove that Thielicke's process of"individualisation" 
does not gradually develop during his career but is present in a mature way from 
his earliest works. It is an axiom or unassailable truth for Thielicke that requires no 
further explanation. Yet the source of this axiom remains unapparent. As we will 
3 Later this was published under the title Geschichte und Existenz: 
Grundlegung Einer Evangelischen Geschichtstheologie (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann 
Verlag. 1935). 
4 Frank Stanaland Christian Jr., pp. 71-72. 
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demonstrate in the pages following, this undeniable truth of the existential 
individual as the ground of being lies, in large part, in the questions posed by 
philosophy. 
4.1 The Line between Individualism and Individualisation 
Having stated in our opening paragraph that Thielicke' s approach is a matter of 
"individualisation" rather than "individualism," it is necessary for us to explain the 
difference. Thielicke does not consider his isolation of the "I" as individualism. 
Individualism is an ideology unto itself- an ideology that Thielicke claims is 
invalid. Thielicke's "I" isolation is tied rather to his definition of personhood as 
one who is isolated from the mass in order to have a relationship with God.5 
Thielicke is quick to distance his idea of isolation of the "I" from "individualism:" 
This notion ofbeing singularly alone, which is not without 
connections to Kierkegaard, has of course nothing to do with 
individualism .... In order to make the antithesis to individualism 
graphic, we can say that the singularly alone one is not the 
individualistic subject of a world event; he is, in the midst of the 
world events that pass through him and sustain him, the object of the 
divine address. One dare not get the two mixed up. Individualism is 
one particular perceptible form of historical existence that occurs 
among men. To be singularly alone signifies being isolated before 
God, which is another dimension entirely. 6 
According to Thielicke's definition "individualism" places the "I" as the only 
relevant subject in the world (self-deification). In contrast he wishes only to strip 
5 Consider Thielicke's discussion ofpersonhood in Death and Life, trans. 
Edward H. Schroeder (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), p. 119. "The biblical 
message teaches everywhere that I am separable from all the powers that surround 
me and support me, that in this ultimate dimension of my personhood I have to 
become singularly alone." Cf. p. 115. This book is a translation ofTod und Leben: 
Studien zur christlichen Anthropologie (Zweite Auflage: Tubingen: Verlag von 
J.C.B. Mohor [Paul Siebeck], 1946). 
6 1bid., p. 121. 
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the "I" from "everything we have sought to hide behind."7 In Thielicke's approach 
the "I" is not the subject of existence as a self-enclosed monad or entelechy, but a 
unique object before God. The principle of disentanglement seeks to wrest the 
individual from such self-deifying individualism and restore union with God. On 
the basis ofThielicke's own definition of"individualism" it is not honest to say 
Thielicke is guilty of espousing it. Yet the fact remains that his approach 
consistently points to the individual as the basis for an encounter with the Divine. 
To differentiate Thielicke's approach from the ideology of individualism it is 
perhaps best to refer to his approach as individualisation. 
The question must be posed as to whether the lines of demarcation between 
Thielicke's "individualisation" and the ideology of"individualism" are as simple to 
draw as Thielicke would like. By isolating the individual so consistently 
throughout his theological/christological system Thielicke does turn the idea of 
being "singularly alone" into something more than a pastoral concern. In the 
quotation above Thielicke claims that "Individualism is one particular perceptible 
form of historical existence that occurs among men." Yet as Thielicke defines the 
concrete basis of mankind and the starting point for his system, he presents the 
individual precisely as the one particular form of historical existence that matters 
most. The individual is clearly the hub around which the spokes of his 
theology/christology radiate. He may not intend this to reflect the sole form of 
existence among men, but it is the foundational point of existence for Thielicke 
before God. He is correct that his approach is not "individualism" in the 
humanistic sense, but it is individualistic. In the fmal analysis Thielicke's 
7 Ibid., p. 120. 
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individualisation may prove just as difficult for postmodem christology as 
individualism. 
4.2 The Pressure of Thielicke's Theology of Meaning 
Because the concrete situation of mankind in his actual personal realm of being was 
of such eminent importance to Thielicke, it is natural that he would focus on those 
issues that were particularly pressing on the majority of individuals of his day. 
One of the strongest cultural pressures facing the Germans ofThielicke's day was a 
feeling of meaninglessness. As Thielicke treats the issue it becomes clear that this 
meaninglessness is a reflection of a deeper spiritual emptiness touching the very 
heart of what it means to be an individual before God. 
One fmds Thielicke returning to this theme time and again in his sermons. On 
the lips of the rich young man of Matthew 19 who asks Christ "what must I do that 
I may have eternal life?" Thielicke puts the following paraphrase: 
Sage mir etwas von dem Sinn meines Lebens, denn ich bin an ihm 
irre geworden: und dann lege mir auf, was du willst! Ich will jede 
Last tragen, auch ein elftes oder zwolftes Gebot :fiir die Elite (noblesse 
oblige!), wenn ich nur das GefUhl habe, daB ich im Einklang mit mir 
selbst und mit meiner Bestimmung bin. Ich ertrage das Leben nicht 
mehr, wenn ich kein Thema habe, :fiir das ich lebe. Ich ersticke an der 
Sinnlosigkeit.8 
[My translation: Tell me something about the meaning of my life, 
because I am in error about it, and then lay on me whatever you want. 
I will bear any burden, even an eleventh or twelfth commandment for 
the elite (noblesse oblige!), ifl only have the feeling that I am in 
harmony with myself and my destiny. I can't bear living any more if 
I have no theme to my life. I am suffocated by meaninglessness.9] 
8 Und wenn Gott ware, p. 140. 
9 I prefer my own translation here to Anderson's in How to Believe Again, (p. 
1 05) due to a lack of accuracy in Anderson' s translation. 
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This example is typical of the way Thielicke uses biblical texts to address the 
issue of meaning. The sheer number of times Thielicke addresses this issue 
testifies to the importance of it in his mind. 10 In his book Nihilism Thielicke 
writes: 
Meaning' is the most stirring of all spiritual impulses, just as 
'meaninglessness' is an absolutely effectual bacillus for producing 
paralysis. 11 
Thielicke' s sermons show his pastoral desire to heal the pain at the root of the 
German psyche - a pain that came from this "most stirring of all spiritual 
impulses." Left untreated meaninglessness would fester and produce other 
negative results in the German psyche, one of which is a painful sense of aloneness 
and separation from God. 
Quoting Jean Paul Richter, whose novel Siebenkas pictures Christ in a painful 
realisation of meaninglessness, Thielicke gives voice to the aloneness born in 
meaninglessness pressing on the German psyche: 
Und erschiittert bekennt dieser enttiiuschte Christus, dieser 
>>Christus a.D.<< sozusagen, das Fazit seines vergeblichen 
Streifzuges durch den Kosmos: Starres, stummes Nichts, kalte, 
ewige Notwendigkeit, wahnsinniger Zufall! ... Wie ist jeder so 
allein in der weiten Leichengruft des Alls ... 0 Vater! 0 Vater! 
Wo ist deine unendliche Brust, daB ich an ihr ruhe?- Ach, wenn 
jedes Ich sein eigener Vater und Schopfer ist, warum kann es nicht 
auch sein eigener Wiirgengel sein?12 
1° Cf. from the same volume pp. 60, 78f, 120, 136f, 165, 173 186, 208,211, 
213, 216f. 
11 Helmut Thielicke, Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature with a Christian Answer, 
trans. John W. Doberstein (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 31. 
12 Woran Ich glaube, pp. 22-23. 
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[My translation: Shaken, this disillusioned Christ, this "Christ A.D." 
so to speak, summarizes his vain expedition through the cosmos: 
"Stiff, dumb nothingness! Cold eternal necessity! Insane chance! . 
. . How is it that everyone is so alone in this wide universal burial 
vault? 0 Father! Father! Where is your boundless breast that I may 
rest on it? Oh! If every individual is his own father and creator, why 
shall he not also be his own angel of death?" 13] 
Meaninglessness brought to the German psyche the kind of aloneness that seizes 
one in separation from God. For Thielicke this is more than a psychological 
phenomena; it represents a deep-seated spiritual rift in the German soul, a rift that 
he hopes to bridge by addressing the individual in his or her isolation. Thielicke 
takes pains to show the quest for meaning must take seriously the issue of 
aloneness; it must even embrace the idea of aloneness, but it must redirect that 
aloneness away from the notion of total isolation toward an isolation that places 
one before God. 
There is certainly value in Thielicke's christological direction for postmodem 
society. The atomisation of society born of rampant pluralism fosters a kind of 
aloneness that must be recognised and addressed. Yet the postmodem form of 
aloneness is even more pronounced than that which Thielicke faced. Today 
individualism carries a stronger isolation ofthe "I" in individual judgments and 
evaluations. Despite the separation inherent in the nihilism ofThielicke's day, it did 
create a sort of community of people exploring their shared aloneness. And 
regardless of differences in ideology the overall sense of social community was 
stronger in Thielicke's day than it is now. Today, in light of individualism and 
pluralism, that sense ofbelonging and community enjoyed by previous generations 
has become more superficial and more difficult to maintain. 
13 Again Anderson's translation isn't used because oflack of accuracy Cl 
Believe, p. 5) 
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In one. sense Thielicke's approach offers an effective witness to postmodern 
individuals. By turning cultural fragmentation and atomisation toward a 
recognition of how the individual is being isolated, perhaps the Church can build as 
Thielicke did on this sense of aloneness. Further this awareness of aloneness can 
be redirected from total isolation toward an aloneness before God. 
But in another sense Thielicke's approach must be surpassed by taking the next 
step from isolation to a sense of christological belonging. The shortcoming of 
Thielicke's isolation of the individual before God is that it seems to stop there, 
leaving the individual as a solitary "I" before God. If Christianity is going to 
impact the selfish individualism of postmodernism then the "I" must be shown a 
solution to aloneness in the larger picture of belonging to the christological 
communion and community. Had Thielicke' s ontology carried a greater sense of 
ecclesial being then his method could prove more directly beneficial for 
postmodem culture. As it stands Thielicke's search for meaning in the notion of 
the "I" before God is still workable with the addition of a stronger sense of the 
"we" before God (this will be discussed at length in chapter seven). 
4.3 The Force of Nihilism 
For Thielicke in the era surrounding World War Two, meaninglessness was all the 
more dangerous because of the proliferation ofNihilism. Nihilism represents a 
philosophy of life wherein all traditional dogmatic ways of knowing are 
challenged. Gone are claims to objective truth or "retreats" into the divine will. 
Nihilism seeks to throw the individual back on himself or herself as a self-defining 
monad. It presents a curious mix of subjectivism wherein self-deification is 
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fostered and cold objectification where the individual is a mere member of a 
species and of no special worth. 14 Traditional Christian views of an historical telos 
or of a divine purpose for mankind are dismissed. Mankind is confronted with a 
purposeless existence and forced to build what many nihilists considered an 
"intellectually honest" ontology. 
Thielicke' s perception of the role this philosophy of meaninglessness played 
within the German psyche of his day can be seen in his book Nihilism: 
We may be permitted to begin with the rather banal statement that 
the word "nihilism" is derived from nihil, "nothing," and the even 
more obvious statement that the word ends with "ism." It is evident 
that these two facts account for the dubious reputation this word has 
of being really modem and realistic, so that it is considered to be the 
representation of the whole spirit of our age. 15 
For Thielicke nihilism is the foundation for the German Weltanschauung. It is 
the force defining the concrete situation of German individuals.16 Because ofthat 
Thielicke returns to the subject of meaninglessness over and over again in his 
sermons; there is no "ism" cited more often in his sermons than nihilism17 and no 
14 Nihilism, "Schizophrenia (Thielicke uses this mental condition to describe 
the nihilistic mind) is characterized by the fact that it sets in destructively at the ego-
center itself, that it breaks down 'self activity, self-feeling, and self-consciousness' 
and leaves behind a vacuum. pp. 42-43. " ... one must necessarily lose the feeling of 
being a self and simply think of oneself as an object, an effect, a product. This 
understanding of the self, this evaluation of the self- this is nihilism ... " p. 46. 
15 Nihilism, p. 17. 
16 Thielicke can even be found giving a backhanded compliment to the "God is 
dead" theologians "whose serious intentions are nonetheless not to be scorned. They 
concern themselves almost fanatically with the so-called situation of modem men .. 
. " I Believe the Christian's Creed, p. viii. 
17 Examples of how often this subject occurs in Thielicke's sermons can be seen 
in the following citations: Faith the Great Adventure, pp. 20, 69, 81, 93, 95, 111. 
The Silence of God, pp. 3-4, 15, 40. Out ofthe Depths, pp. 26, 42, 88. Our Heavenly 
Father, pp. 45, 73, 86, 115. I Believe the Christian's Creed, pp. viii, 5, 8, 98. 112, 
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philosopher referred to more often than Nietzsche. Thielicke quotes novelists, 
scientists, playwrights, newspaper articles and politicians in such a way to show 
that the issue of meaninglessness pervaded every corner of cultural thought. 
The link between Nihilism and meaninglessness was obvious to Thielicke. He 
wrote, "Nihilism literally has only one truth to declare, namely, the truth that 
ultimately Nothingness prevails and the world is meaningless."18 The true offence 
ofthis meaninglessness was its assault on Thielicke's concept ofpersonhood. 
Instead ofpersonhood being defmed as the isolated individual before God, 19 
nihilism made it the isolated individual without God. God was himself the basis for 
personhood for Thielicke20 and nihilism did away with God from the German 
world view. 
What made Nihilism unique among philosophies was the fact that to Thielicke it 
was more than a philosophy. 
The "ism" always proposes to be a physician; it always has at hand a 
program to cure and reconstruct the world. Nihilism, however, 
recognizes that one is a patient, that one has been infected by a 
consumptive bacillus. The "isms" look upon man as the subject, that 
122, 186,233. How to Believe Again, pp. 62-63, 109,211-212, 217. Christ and the 
Meaning of Life, pp. 14, 27, 37, 70, 117, 129, 131, 133. Life Can Begin Again, pp. 
17-18,29,61,77, 85,102,112,129,137,169,170,214. The Waiting Father, pp.12, 
31,37-38,42,69,79-80,132-133,144,174,177,183,187,189. Thisdoesnot 
include the many "back handed" references to "nothingness" that reappear 
throughout his sermons or the nihilistic struggles ofGoethe's Faust which also are 
referenced numerous times. 
18 Ibid. p. 27. 
19 Cf. also Theological Ethics vol. 2, p. 393 " ... for the Christian, personhood 
depends not on one's standing before men but on one's standing before God, on an 
'alien dignity') p. 277 " ... God, who is the basis of all personhood." cf. Theological 
Ethics vol. 1, pp. 151,170. 
20 Theological Ethics, vol. 2, p. 277. 
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is, the creator and achiever of a program; they think of man as the 
Demiurge, whom they place at the center of glowing eschatologies. 
Nihilism, on the other hand, sees man as an object. He cannot escape 
the creeping process of self-disintegration, which is all too 
euphemistically called the history of the human mind . . . the whole 
history of the human mind is nothing but a journey through a field of 
corpses ... it consists only of graves garlanded with ideologies, but 
that beneath this camouflage is nothing but dung and dead bones, and 
that therefore we are gazing at nothing but Nothingness. Therefore 
we declare that nihilism is not a program but rather a value 
judgment?' 
Despite his warnings Thielicke did reserve a certain admiration for the honesty 
of Nihilism. Nihilists were to be treated with a kind of respect because true 
nihilists showed more integrity than lukewarm Christians; they, unlike lukewarm 
Christians who live in a state of denial, at least had the courage to admit their 
hopeless condition.22 
This admiration for the philosophical discipline of nihilism is implicit in 
Thielicke's many references to Goethe's Faust. In the character ofFaust, Thielicke 
sees an example of the struggling German spirit in search of ultimate truth.23 Yet 
this spirit of struggling, as noble as it might be for its effort, has an inherent fatal 
flaw- it is goal-less.24 Faustian seekers have courage to seek, but they seek 
without the intention of fmding an object. Their search then is doomed to failure 
before it starts. 
21 Nihilism, p. 29. 
22 Cf. The Waiting Father, p. 144 and Faith the Great Adventure, pp. 69, 95. 
23 Cf. Christ and the Meaning of Life, p. 129. Life and Begin Again, pp. 11, 
200. Out of the Depths, p. 60. The Silence of God, p. 7. How to Believe Agl;!!n, p. 
31. 
24 Cf. I Believe the Christian's Creed, pp. 204-205. How to Believe Again, pp. 
63, 108. Life Can Begin Again, pp.118, 199. Christ and the Meaning of Life, p. 182. 
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As this applies to current circumstances few social/political leaders today openly 
claim to be disciples of a nihilistic outlook but this is not to say that nihilism has 
disappeared. While the philosophy called "Nihilism" has fallen out of favour the 
characteristics of that philosophy, especially those that Thielicke critically 
identified, have simply become part of the conglomeration of Western thought. 
Postmodemism has taken certain traits, which in Thielicke's day were more 
defined as belonging to the school of nihilistic thought, and made them matters of 
individual freedom. "Pluralism" is now the more common term for nihilistic 
subjectivism. Such pluralism is no less a bold attempt at truth seeking and 
rejection of traditional norms than was the more organized intellectual seeking of 
nihilism in Thielicke' s day. 
What may have changed somewhat since Thielicke's day is the replacement of 
pessimism with a more superficial optimism. Thielicke praises the nihilists of his 
day for the painful admission of purposelessness and lack of trust in anything 
beyond death. Today, especially in America, it sometimes seems that each 
individual Christian carries the understanding that his or her self-made beliefs carry 
a divine imprimatur, and that their salvation is secure no matter what they believe. 25 
Hopelessness and despair about life remain but they seem to be buried deeper 
within the subconscious. Likewise in America one can see an increase in the 
openness of a more deistic/universalistic belief in God since the terrorist attacks of 
2001. This revitalised deism acts as a veneer over hopelessness and 
meaninglessness in many American people. 
25 I make this observation as a parish pastor who has dealt with hundreds of 
parishioners and their sometimes bizarre theological ideas. 
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It may have actually been easier for Thielicke to present a christological form of 
meaning in his day to those openly admitting their hopelessness than it is in present 
times when prevailing moods are less likely to admit such despair. In the context 
of hidden hopelessness and pluralistic self-justification it becomes all the more 
important for individuals to look past the self and have an anchor in something 
meaningful that is both objective and changeless. The growth of Islam may well 
reflect the inner desire for something objective and changeless. In the case of Islam 
the objective changeless elements are rooted firmly in law, the Koran, and in the 
community surrounding both. The Christian hope certainly has the necessary 
objective changeless elements that can harness the cultural longing for meaning. 
Instead of law the Christian hope has the timeless truth of the Gospel. Instead of a 
fundamentalist devotion to a book Christianity has the Word both written, spoken, 
and Incarnate. And perhaps most significant of all, Christianity has an objective 
form of divine presence ( christological presence) in its midst that promises 
hopeless individuals the presence of God's person to give hope that cannot be 
found in either the law or the self. 
4.3a Nihilism and Politics 
The value judgment of nihilism was manifest for Thielicke in all totalitarian 
governments. Thielicke would include Marxists, Communists, Fascists, and 
National Socialists under the umbrella of totalitarian governments. Common to all 
these systems and to nihilism was the tendency toward depersonalisation. 
Thielicke complained about the use of propaganda and sloganeering in these 
systems as indicative of depersonalisation; first because the one issuing the 
propaganda sees the other only as an object to be won, and secondly because such 
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forms of communication do not "strike man at his personal center ... but only at 
the extremities of his nervous system. "26 Further the impetus toward mass society 
inherent in these systems leads to the personal identity of individuals being "largely 
submerged in a muffling collective ... "27 
It should be noted that in contrast to earlier statements from Thielicke about the 
ultimate meaninglessness of nihilism, those totalitarian systems he condemns as 
nihilistic do claim to offer meaning in life. Whether it be the creation of a race of 
Obermenschen or some other utopian society the goal of all such totalitarianism is a 
meaningful existence. However as Thielicke rightly notes in his observations about 
the depersonalising nature of these systems the cost of totalitarian meaning is the 
loss of the individual in service to the system. 
Additional problems posed by totalitarian political systems involve a kind of 
deification of the state. Such systems declare themselves the saviour of mankind in 
the place of the divine Saviour,28 claim their material base of history is the divine 
base,29 and defme humanity as merely an object.30 All these elements present in 
totalitarian systems are for Thielicke built on basic nihilistic principles. 
26 Theological Ethics, vol. 2, p. 49. 
27 Ibid., p. 262. cf. p. 153. This charge oflosing the individual in the mass is 
made on page 47 in reference to Communism. 
28 Ibid., pp. 22, 26. 
29 Ibid., p. 51. 
30 Ibid., pp.22, 38, 49. 
181 
This distaste for the depersonalisation of totalitarian systems was present 
throughout Thielicke's career. In his earliest writings the issue of totalitarian 
depersonalisation is evident.31 In several ofhis sermons from the early 1950's one 
sees Marxism particularly singled out as a system that demeans personhood by 
diminishing religion,32 and in one of his later works, Living with Death (originally 
published as Leben mit dem Tod in 1980), Thielicke strongly criticises Marx for an 
ideological "bait-and-switch" where he promises better concern and care for 
individual workers only to make the individual an object of production for the 
state.33 
Both nihilism and totalitarianism reduce the individual to an object. In 
Thielicke's Nihilism he decries nihilism for reducing humanity to a "relative thing, 
a function."34 Nihilism's "death of God" forces the individual into a recognition of 
himself or herself as a mere member of a species with no higher purpose than to 
live and die in service to the survival of the mass. Totalitarianism makes an object 
of the individual in the same way. Concern for the individual is replaced with 
concern for the ideological mass. This was especially noticeable in Germany under 
31 In Notes from a Wayfarer Thielicke says that his Theological Doctorate 
"Geschichte und Existenz," was "diametrically opposed to the Nazi understanding of 
life and history, it was later one of the reasons for my dismissal in 1940." p. 77. 
32 The Waiting Father, pp. 84, 171, 182. I Believe the Christian's Creed, pp. 
224,244. 
33 Helmut Thielicke, Living with Death, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1983), pp. 90-95. 
34 Ibid., p. 105. 
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Hitler's fascism, but was seen also in the Weltanschauung of Germany under 
Bismark.35 
We will explore further in the next chapter how Thielicke's experience with 
such totalitarian ideology was a major influence for his emphasis of the individual 
over and against the collective. The need to always begin at the concrete situation 
of humanity necessitated serious consideration for these sociaVpolitical conditions. 
Since the people were negatively affected by the politics and ideology of 
35 Pierre Ayyoberry, The Social History ofthe Third Reich 1933-1945, trans. 
Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 1999) p. 66. Cf. the general public longing 
for unity prior to Hitler described on p. 66 with the way National Socialism steered 
that longing toward its own desires, pp. 71-78. The masses faced a barrage of subtle 
propaganda in cultural art, music, radio and on the printed page along with Hitler's 
own speeches. According to Ayyoberry the National Socialists pursued a program 
where "seduction was to replace indoctrination" (p.75). What the people were 
seduced to believe was that by setting aside personal concerns or objections and 
following the National Socialist "program" Germany itself would become strong and 
a "People's Community" could be formed. Personal value and personhood itself 
became inconsequential compared to the quest for national unity. 
In the following book, Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 
1890-1990 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), the 
author shows convincingly that Nietzsche was elevated to near mythic proportions 
within a decade after his death (pp. 18, 32, and 44 as a few examples). By the time 
of the 3rd Reich Nietzscheanism had been incorporated into the basic foundation and 
tenets of National Socialism (pp.232ff.). In regards to how this impacted the view of 
personhood Aschheim states, "Ernst Homeffer insisted that Nietzsche, far from 
preaching individualism, was interested in setting up a new society based on new 
bonds and new collective values. The Obermensch was 'not a singular concept but a 
racial and species one [Art- und Gattungsbegrijj] ... the fruit of an immense, 
uninterrupted human breeding project.' The fact, wrote Hildebrandt, that Nietzsche 
had attacked the Hegelian deification of the state did not make him an antinational 
individualist. 'He wanted to oppose the cold instrumental state and soulless 
organization not with the disconnected individual but with authentic 
Volksgemeinschaft."' p. 249. 
Thielicke exemplifies the Nazi depersonalisation for the sake of the mass by 
referring to a funeral sermon he preached while in Ravensburg. At the graveside he 
referred to a Nazi pamphlet that described the death of an individual as a leaf falling 
from the tree of the nation. The living trunk constantly brings forth new leaves and a 
process of renewal. Notes from a Wayfarer, p. 140. The inference is clear that the 
individual doesn't matter as long as the nation continues. 
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totalitarianism in their daily lives, he had to offer them an alternative that would 
counter the depersonalising influences of the state. Thielicke was persistent in 
reminding the people of their individual responsibilities and their individual worth 
before God. Thielicke's embrace of the individual then was a bold statement 
against the prevailing language of fascist culture. Much to Thielicke's displeasure 
he found himself surrounded by theologians who had taken up both the politics and 
language of the Third Reich. 36 
Robert Ericksen in his book Theologians under Hitler documents the way 
political depersonalisation wormed its way into the language and writings of 
prominent theologians. Kittel, Althaus, and Hirsch used depersonalisation both to 
justify Nazi abuses of the Jews and to give a divine imprimatur to the extreme 
nationalism of the Third Reich.37 Thielicke even found himself having to write a 
character reference after the War on behalf of his old doctoral father, Paul Althaus, 
36 In Notes from a Wayfarer Thielicke describes his strained relationship with 
Emanuel Hirsch at Gottingen. p. 93. Upon entering Gottingen he knew well of 
Hirsch's reputation as a "notoriously fanatical National Socialist." At one point 
Hirsch wrote a letter of criticism against Thielicke to the German Christian bishops 
that nearly cost Thielicke his life. Despite this Thielicke says that "In spite of 
everything, I always pitied rather than hated this eminent man" [p. 95]. In 
Heidelberg Thielicke again ran into difficulties with his superiors who supported the 
Nazis. He was dismissed from the faculty in 1940 by the deceitful dealings of the 
dean of the theological faculty Theodor Odenwald. Odenwald was an open Nazi 
supporter whose protest to the local Head of Lecturers caused Thielicke to be 
relieved of duties at Heidelberg on the grounds that Thielicke's lectures were not in 
agreement with the Nazi line, p.113. OfOdenwald Thielicke says, "I was overcome 
with pity for a failed human being." p. 114. 
37 Robert P. Ericksen, Theologians under Hitler (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985). Ericksen documents the writing and speeches of Gerhard Kittel over 
the Judenfrage wherein Kittel justifies abuses to the Jews on the express basis of 
ignoring their individuality and concentrating on the Jews in a collective sense. 
Quoting Kittel, "It is not a question of whether individual Jews are respectable or 
disrespectable; also not whether individual Jews are unjustly ruined, or whether that 
occurs justly to individuals. The Jewish question is absolutely not a question of 
individual Jews but a question of Jewry, the Jewish Volk." p. 55. 
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who was accused of being a Nazi collaborator. In that letter Thielicke tries to put 
the best construction on Althaus' pro-Nazi language by dismissing his actions as a 
case of passionate nationalism. 38 
4.3b Nihilism and Deification 
Nihilistic assaults against personhood also implied attacks against the first 
commandment for Thielicke. Thielicke identifies two paths that nihilism takes 
away from the first commandment. As shown above when the nihilistic impulse 
objectifies the individual, personhood is diminished to the point of irrelevancy. In 
such cases the state or larger community is deified. However the nihilistic impulse 
can work in the opposite direction by deifying the individual making him or her the 
sole ground of truth, creator, destroyer, and thus the subject ofbeing.39 This 
deifying character of nihilism carries important implications for Thielicke with 
regard to the relationship between the individual and the community. Thielicke 
writes: 
... when the individual is deified and philosophy proclaims nothing 
but the so-called "right of personality" to develop in accord with its 
38 Ibid. p. 111. The letter from Thielicke that Ericksen references is part of a 
collection ofletters known as the Paul Althaus Papers held by Gerhard Althaus, son 
of Paul Althaus. 
39 One can note here Thielicke's citation ofNietzsche in Life Can Begin Again 
when he quotes the philosopher as saying, "I would like to be the master of all men, 
but most of all God." p. 85. Again similar thoughts are found in Christ and the 
Meaning of Life, p. 3 7 where Nietzsche is quoted as saying, "If there were gods, how 
could I bear not to be one?" and p. 131 when Thielicke mentions Nietzsche's 
Twilight of the gods as an example of attempted deification of the creature. In I 
Believe: The Christian's Creed, p. 5 it is in the nihilism of Jean Paul Richter where 
Thielicke sees the need to be one's own creator. The self-deification tendency in 
nihilism is not limited to creative activity but also becomes apparent in the 
destruction of life. Nietzsche especially sees the self-destruction of suicide as a 
moral imperative, cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols: or How to 
Philosophise with the Hammer, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (Edinburgh: The 
Edinburgh Press, 1927), pp. 88-89. 
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own nature, then the community is very likely to feel that it is being 
left out of account and begins to protest against "individualism." On 
the other hand, when the community is deified and there arises a 
philosophy of collectivism, which subordinates the individual to the 
whole in a way that extinguishes the personality, then the individual 
personality feels that it is being ignored and tyrannized over and 
proceeds to rebel again in favor of a new individualism. If all the 
signs are not deceiving, we are now in a new phase of development 
of this latter kind.40 
One must admit that while this nihilistic deification of either individual or 
community may have been fairly obvious during the interwar years when Thielicke 
wrote, the matter may be more complicated in the present era. Not all those who 
profess a nihilistic outlook would speak about themselves in terms of self-creator or 
self-destroyer. Nor in light of recent movements toward greater freedom in 
communist countries can one accuse all totalitarian states of embracing the same 
philosophy of state deification that they may once have embraced. 
Further, the signs to which Thielicke refers are tied to the cultural situation of 
the early 1960's in which he was writing. In the quotation above Thielicke has in 
mind the student rebellions and changing Weltanschauung of that era. In 
retrospect one must ask about the accuracy ofThielicke's observations. A case 
can be made that the nihilistic deification of the "I" did not make community "feel 
left out" in Germany. On the contrary the history of the Third Reich seems to 
suggest that the "I" deification of a nihilistic outlook led into a deification of the 
community. The Third Reich, influenced heavily by Nietzschian nihilism, was 
4° Christ and the Meaning of Life, pp. 129-130. The identical thought is found 
in Helmut Thielicke, Man in God's World, trans. John W. Doberstein (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1963), p. 49. 
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intent on creating a new Volk of Obermenschen. The elevation of the community 
then did not proceed as a counter movement to nihilism but as a consequence of it. 
Of course there is also truth in Thielicke' s observations. In view of the enforced 
conformity under the Third Reich it seems logical to assume the German student 
rebellion was an example of individualism rising up against collectivism. Thielicke 
does not seem to take into account however that the student rebellion was mirrored 
in democratic states where there was no forced conformity akin to that of the Third 
Reich. Nor were such student rebellions sweeping through communist countries 
with the same fervour as in democratic states though doctrines of collectivism ruled 
there with much more stringency.41 
Thielicke's statement that deification of the "I" leads to a rebellion of the 
collective and vice-versa does not remain credible when viewed against the 
dynamics of world politics, but his observation does show a glimpse into his train 
of thought. What it shows is that collectivism and individualism are at odds with 
each other for him. As he presents these two doctrines the "I" is either a cog in the 
machine or in isolated solitude. Nihilism seems to have forced Thielicke into 
seeing humanity as either individualistic or collectivistic. Consequently one does 
not fmd Thielicke presenting a doctrine of personhood that treats at length the need 
to view mankind in both individual and social terms. 
41 One could also argue that the student rebellions which claimed individual 
freedom and non-conformity were in reality simply forming new collectives with 
different standards of conformity. Thus "counter-culture" establishes a different 
"culture" with different norms to which individuals are to conform. Freedom then 
becomes a relative concept. 
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4.3c Nihilism and Chrisdology 
Nihilism is the most extreme consequence of secularization, and 
precisely because of its tie with secularization it is nihilism post 
Christum. By virtue of his contact with Christianity the autonomous 
man of the Western world has in hand a most ultimate standard by 
means of which he can measure the interior truth about himself to a 
terrifying degree. Perhaps it is a curse imposed by Christ on those 
who desert him, that they have come to knowledge because of him 
without yet having the comfort that sustains them in this 
knowledge. 42 
For Thielicke the nihilistic individual does not simply exist without Christ but 
stands against him. It is not just that nihilism has no christology, it is more a matter 
that christology in the nihilistic system stands as judge against it. Nihilism is not 
then a matter of blind unbelief or ignorance of Christ, rather it is a matter of 
entering into isolation from God with one's eyes wide open,43 that for Thielicke is 
the most frightening side to nihilism. 
This outright rejection of Christ and the Gospel immediately reverses the normal 
Christian progression of thought for an honest evaluation of the "I" in relation to 
life and death. The nihilist interprets death by life because life is the ultimate 
ground ofbeing and from life comes all value and existence. The Christian 
interprets life by death because Christians know physical life is not the ultimate 
ground of being and that in Christ a transcendent truth exists that supersedes this 
life.44 Before one even discusses the variety of christological views, the mere 
existence of christology turns the evaluation of ontology toward this death-to-life 
42 Death and Life, pp.57-58. 
43 The stated anti-Christian nature of nihilism is obvious throughout the works 
ofNietzsche who sadly grew up in a faithful Lutheran household. 
44 Death and Life, p. 60. 
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direction. Christology introduces transcendence and love into all formative 
questions of ontology. Nihilism flatly rejects the importance of both and thus 
condemns itself to a hopeless ontology before it begins. 
4.4 Summary 
Identifying a single root for Thielicke's focus does not seem possible. The mixture 
of social, cultural, political and theological forces that contributed together to push 
Thielicke in the direction of the individual create a structure of different roots 
feeding his individualisation of christology. In some cases these roots remain a 
concern in the postmodern context. In other places they are dated and should no 
longer influence christology. Which elements ofThielicke's context should remain 
a concern for today will continue to guide our discussions throughout the remainder 
of this thesis. 
The fact that Thielicke was as sensitive as he was to directions in cultural 
thought is of great importance. The Church in the postmodern world must likewise 
understand the cultural forces shaping the minds and concerns of the people. One 
may argue that Thielicke went too far in not only being sensitive to the mind of 
culture, but in allowing his theology to be shaped by that mind to where important 
elements of his Lutheran confession were lost. When we suggest that the 
postmodem Church must be sensitive to trends in current thought we are not 
suggesting that the Church has to change her theology, only that she must know 
what issues her theology needs to address and what problems she must redress. 
How to respect the individual without becoming individualistic must be addressed. 
Negative directions in individualism must be redressed. In the final two chapters 
we will search for practical methods to deal with both. 
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It is self-evident that Thielicke's "individualistic imperative" was not something 
unique to him. Thielicke's genius was his ability to probe the deep issues of the 
cultural Zeitgeist. We have shown how deep questions about the individual were 
lurking under the social currents of his day. Those questions were the product of 
centuries of development. The times in which Thielicke lived were witness to a kind 
of individualism in flux - modernist but moving quickly toward postmodernism. 
This chapter will attempt to locate Thielicke's place within the general historical 
movement of individualism and will discuss at further length how his views fit with 
postmodern individualism. 
5.1 Roots of lndividUJJalism 
It is impossible to fix an exact date or even an exact era as the time when 
individualism was born. One can however note movements in certain key areas of 
history where the idea of the individual gained importance and thus contributed to 
later advancements of individualism. 
5.1a The Individual in the Old Testament 
Especially for Western Christians, immersed as they are in a culture centred on the 
individual, the Old Testament presents immediate barriers to understanding. The 
witness of the Old Testament shows a strong sense of the corporate that seems alien 
to those of more individualistic minds. One finds examples of this especially in 
divine pronouncements of punishment where the many bear the weight for the sins of 
the one or the few. The consequence for the sin of Adam and Eve passed to all 
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mankind (the doctrine of original sin). Noah's punishment of Ham for seeing his 
nakedness extended to Ham's descendants. 1 Achan's individual act of covetousness 
resulted in God's wrath shown to all Israel and the remarkable statement "Israel has 
sinned, and they have also transgressed my covenant which I commanded them."2 
Achan's punishment was equally corporate with his whole family including livestock 
being put to death. When God sought to punish the whole assembly for the sins of 
Korah and his sons Moses pleaded with God, "shall one man sin, and you be angry 
with all the congregation?"3 It becomes apparent that this corporate character in 
God's judgement presented some difficulty for the Israelites; in Jeremiah 31:29 one 
sees what must have been an often repeated complaint, "The fathers have eaten sour 
grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." 
Similarly, there are corporate overtones in the giving of birthrights. The birthright 
blessing was not merely intended for the son but for his progeny. Jacob's blessing 
from Isaac was intended for Jacob's line.4 As Jacob blessed his sons in Genesis 49 it 
is obvious Jacob was speaking to the generations of each son. Even circumcision 
seems to have a corporate view at work. The mark of circumcision was borne in the 
very organ of procreation, signifying not only the faithfulness of the one who bore it 
but his pledge that all those who follow from his line would be raised under the same 
covenant. 
1 Genesis 9:22-27. 
2 Joshua 7:11 (New King James Version) 
3 Numbers 16:22 (New King James Version). 
4 Genesis 27:27-28 and 28:4. 
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Some might posit the argrunent that these Old Testament corporate views 
represent the more primitive tribal mentalities of the earliest authors. As culture 
developed the tribal corporate views were amended to include a clearer consideration 
for the individual. A cultural corrective then exerts itself on the text, and while 
maintaining a high degree of appreciation for the community, notions of individual 
worth begin to find expression. Such a view obviously sees the Old Testament text 
as evidence for a gradually developing sense of the individual. 
Others, who take a more holistic view of the Old Testament, see the strong 
corporate character of God's relationship with humanity coupled with a recognition 
for the individual as part of God's divine providence, wherein he establishes checks 
and balances to ensure that neither community nor the individual are lost. Those who 
adopt this view would be less inclined to see the Old Testament text in terms of a 
layering of authorship where later generations added their unique perspective of 
individuality. 
Regardless of one's view, it cannot be denied that the Old Testament presents the 
reader with a strong sense of corporate punishment and blessing and yet recognises 
the importance of the individual. In the example of Achan and Ham, it was the 
failure of the individual that carried consequences for a great many people. In the 
case of certain Old Testament birthrights, there seems to be a clear assumption that 
the faithfulness of the paterfamilias will translate into the continued faithfulness of 
his family. In both instances the whole depends on the faithfulness of the one. 
Recognition for the individual surfaces again when one examines God's answer to 
the saying of the Israelites about the children's teeth being set on edge for their 
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father's sins: "every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man who eats the sour 
grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge."5 In 1 Samuel2:25 one fmds the statement, "If 
one man sins against another, God will judge him," and Proverbs 24:12 states, "will 
He not render to each man according to his deeds?" Both views of textual 
development discussed above can agree that the importance of the individual rose 
over time. The latter holistic view however would insist that this does not 
necessarily imply that in earlier, more tribal understandings the individual was 
nonexistent. 
As Christianity lives in highly individualistic cultures it has a very difficult task. 
It has embraced the Old Testament and called it sacred; which in turn means that it 
has embraced the principles of faith and life revealed in the Old Testament. An 
undeniable principle at work in the divine revelation of the Old Testament is one that 
holds corporate being in high regard even as it recognises the individual. The Church 
can debate the degree of corporate being appropriate for today but she cannot ignore 
the importance of such being in the Old Testament. 
5.1 b. Early Christianity and the Individual 
By the time of Christ, consideration for the individual does seem to have matured. It 
is not that any specific corporate principle from the Old Testament had been denied 
or dismissed, only that one does see a heightened concern for faith weighted more 
toward an individual application. Undoubtedly the shift reflects an overall 
movement within the cultural paradigm. Thielicke notes that Greek tragedy bears a 
uniquely individualistic stamp by concerning itself with such things as a person's 
5 Jeremiah 31:30 (New King James Version). 
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emotions and inner mental anguish. One need only walk through a museum display 
of sculptures from later Greece and early Rome to see a new concern in art for 
capturing the exact likeness of individuals. So Christianity in this new context where 
the individual was being recognised in more pronounced ways seems also to speak 
more to the importance of the individual. 6 
These observations must however be tempered with the recognition that even with 
these shifts in emphasis "individualism" as such was nonexistent. Scholars have 
pointed out that Greek culture began its worldview from the standpoint of the ''polis" 
which to them was the natural unit of society.7 Further, Jewish culture, which 
formed the initial body of early Christendom, continued to have a strong view of 
community and one's place within that community. Even now the sense of 
community in Judaism is stronger than most Christians realise. One author, who is 
probably representative of many Jews, voices his understanding of the place of the 
individual within the Jewish community: 
My participation in the people Israel, in the eyes of the tradition, is 
not simply a voluntary act, which I can retract at will. It is rather part 
of my very being, which no act on my part can change. Even if I 
convert to another religion, I continue to bear the obligations of being 
a Jew. That is why Hillel's comment, "Ifl am here, then everyone is 
here," is not just metaphorical (or egotistical!): We are all part ofthe 
same ontological entity, the Jewish people, and that entity is present 
in every one of us. 8 
6 eg. Matthew 18:12, Luke 15:7, Rom. 2:5ff., 2 Cor. 5:10; Gal. 6:4-5. 
7 Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual: 1050-1200 (Toronto: University 
ofToronto Press, 1972), p. 2 .. Also Lenn E. Goodman, "The Individual and the 
Community." in Autonomy and Judaism. ed. Daniel H. Frank (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1992), p. 81. Goodman writes, "Aristotle argues that 
a person who would live alone is either above or below the level of humanity- a 
beast or a god; for man himself is by nature a creature ofthe polis (zoon politikon)." 
8 Elleot N. Dorff, "Individual and Communal Forgiveness" in Autonomy and 
Judaism, p. 203. 
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No doubt some among the Jewish community might argue with his statement 
about remaining a Jew even if he converted to another religion. Yet his comment 
does demonstrate a widely held understanding of community which is so strong that 
the overall sense of corporate being supersedes a common faith. 
The New Testament draws attention to this very thing at several points. The 
conflicting theologies ofPharisees and Sadducees existing together at the Jewish 
council as described in Acts 23: 1 ff is an example of the coexistence of such 
conflicting theological views. One can also point to the toleration (official toleration) 
of Christian teaching in the temple and the synagogues which ultimately allowed 
converts to be drawn from Judaism.9 Of course the witness of Acts also testifies to 
widespread opposition and occasional ''unofficial" violence because of this teaching, 
but the willingness of the Jewish officials to allow the Christian message in its 
synagogues is significant in establishing the strength of the Jewish view of 
community. 
Early Christianity found itself at odds with this broad concept of ecclesial being. 
It could not define itself in terms of an ''umbrella community" wherein divergent 
theological doctrines could peacefully coexist. Paul offers particularly clear 
examples of this conflict. In the Corinthian Church Paul confronted competing 
theologies with the question "Is Christ divided?"10 He urged the Corinthians, "Now I 
9 Cf. Acts 13:14ff, 14:1ff, 17:1ff"Then Paul, as his custom was, went in to them 
(in the synagogue), and for three Sabbaths reasoned with them from the Scriptures, 
17:10, 17, 18:4, 18:19,24-26, 19:8. 
10 I Corinthians 1:11-13 (New King James Version), 
195 
plead with you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the 
same thing, and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be perfectly 
joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment."11 And to Timothy Paul 
said, "As I urged you when I went into Macedonia; remain in Ephesus that you may 
charge some that they teach no other doctrine ... " 12 
In a sense Christianity operated under a stricter sense of community, in that a 
person's relation to the community of faith depended on oneness of mind and 
doctrine. Yet in this tighter doctrine of community can also be seen an intense 
concern for the individual. A loose association with the community of faith was not 
adequate. An actual engagement with Christ and a personal grasp of Gospel was 
needed if one was to be part of the body of faith. 
Luke 3 records John the Baptist chastising the Jews coming out to be baptised 
saying, "do not begin to say to yourselves, 'We have Abraham as our father.' For I 
say to you that God is able to raise up children to Abraham from these stones." John 
is combating the inclination of the people to invest their spiritual hope in a superficial 
understanding of the Abrahamic covenant - an understanding that united them to an 
outward "covenant community" but, as John objected, did not necessitate right faith. 
That this issue continued to be problematical for Christians is evidenced by Paul's 
instruction regarding the practice of circumcision. Circumcision had become ossified 
11 I Corinthians 1:10 (New King James Version). Note similar statements in 
Philippians 3:16, Romans 16:17, Ephesians 4:1-6. 
12 I Timothy 1:3 (New King James Version) 
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as an outward sign of one's place in the Abrahamic community; it had lost its 
character of personal engagement with the Messianic hope. In Romans 2:29 Paul 
states, "He is a Jew who is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the 
Spirit, not in the letter." More to the point of conflict between Jewish views of 
community and Christian views is Paul's statement later in Romans: 
For they are not all Israel who are oflsrael, nor are they all children 
because they are the seed of Abraham; but, 'In Isaac your seed shall 
be called.' That is, those who are the children of the flesh, these are 
not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted as 
the seed. 13 
The Christian need for personal engagement of one's faith in the Messiah 
challenged the salvific significance of an outward association with the community of 
Abraham. That same spirit of concern for the faith of each individual in Christ is 
self-evident throughout the New Testament. 
Early Christianity then sets itself apart from prevailing views both with regard to 
the individual and with regard to the nature of the spiritual community. The 
community becomes more tightly bound under a common faith, and the individual is 
more clearly singled out as to his or her sincerity in believing the Christian message. 
5.1 c Early Medieval Expressions of Individualism 
Between the first century and the period of the Reformation there are marked 
movements toward a further awakening of an individual identity. Prior to the 
medieval period Augustine (A.D. 354-430) provides what may be the first extended 
example of personal self-reflection in the writing ofhis Confessions. There he 
rehearses the events of his youth and the progression of his spiritual and 
13 Romans 9:6-8 (New King James Version). 
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psychological state of mind. Not until later in the medieval period does one see more 
widespread attempts to personalize one's spiritual experience through 
autobiography. 14 
In the book The Discovery ofthe Individual1050-1200, author Colin Morris 
builds a strong case for an awakening recognition of the importance of the individual 
in society and in the Church during the years from 1050-1200. Within the Church 
Morris notes a growing willingness during this time to think critically, particularly 
with reference to the early Church Fathers. There was a conscious effort during this 
period to reconcile apparent difficulties among the Fathers rather than simply accept 
contradictions in the faith. 15 One can also notice a new self-awareness in the 
preaching of the time as sermons spoke more openly of the personal experiences of 
the preacher. Morris cites the example of Guibert ofNogent as one who promoted 
the use of self-analysis as a tool for proclamation. 16 The common use of the 
expression "know yourself' led to new more personal expressions of piety. There 
was an increase in penitential hymns written in the first person, 17 a growing concern 
for self-examination and confession, 18 and the rise of kneeling during prayer as a sign 
of personal devotion. 19 The combination of this more personal form of piety and a 
greater concern for self-introspection led even to a change in the common depiction 
14 The Discovery of the lndividual1050-1200, pp. 79-80. 
15 Ibid., pp. 60-63. 
16 Ibid., p. 67. 
17 Ibid., p. 71. 
18 Ibid., p. 73-74. 
19 Ibid., p. 142. 
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ofthe crucifix. During the period of 1050 to 1200 Christ was more often portrayed 
in realistic death poses, thus encouraging a more emotional personal form of self-
introspection in one's devotionallife?0 
Though one sees these early hints at a more open recognition of the individual, 
medieval thought was still dominated by a worldview that discouraged expressions 
of individualism. There was a marked unequal treatment under the law between 
people of various estates21 and an understanding that once one occupied a specific 
estate one was bound to it for life, as well as to one's place within society because of 
that estate?2 The relationship of Regent to subject and the theological understanding 
of rule by divine right led to a society of subjects and rulers (as opposed to citizens 
and governors). Even the art forms of early medieval culture showed little concern 
for the individual identity or personal characteristics of the one portrayed (unlike 
earlier Greek sculpture!) and more attention to the trappings of the office that a 
person occupied.23 
Yet despite the forces working toward the restriction ofthe individual, there was 
at least the beginning of a new understanding of the individual in society. From 1964 
20 Ibid., p. 140. 
21 Waiter Ullmann, The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages (Baltimore, 
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 15. 
22 Ibid., 40. Ullmann states "Society was pictured as a large organism in which 
each member had been allotted a special function which he pursued for the common 
good ... there was the stratification of medieval society into its estates. The 
significance of this stratification within the present context is that it was precisely the 
hallmark of a member of the particular estate that he could not move out of his own 
estate and that whatever status he enjoyed, he was rigidly controlled by the norms 
applicable to his estate." 
23 Ibid., p. 44. 
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to 1965 W alter Ullmann presented a series of lectures on the Individual and Society 
in the Middle Ages at Johns Hopkins University. During these lectures he noted 
unique occurrences, particularly in the 13th century, which helped individuals gain a 
more important place in society. There was the signing of the Magna Carta, which 
placed the king (John) under a rule oflaw by his own consent and held out the rights 
of individuals to a trial by their peers. Article 39 of the Magna Carta states: 
No freeman shall be captured and imprisoned, or disseized, or 
outlawed, or exiled, or in any way harmed, except by a lawful tribunal 
of his peers and by the law of the land.Z4 
Of particular interest to Ullmann was the concept of the "law of the land" which 
he also termed "common law." It was a form of law born at the grass roots level and 
not dictated "from the top down." This common law evolved and changed the 
relationship between subjects and kings eventually moving the feudal system in the 
direction of contractual agreements between the feudal lord, barons and vassals.25 
Regents were forced into dual roles, occupying the right of rule by divine right, while 
yielding to the pragmatic operation of contractual agreements and common law. 
Gradually then individuals gained recognition under common law as possessing 
certain rights. And it was this right of the individual under the common law that 
eventually grew into philosophies that formulated the American Declaration of 
Independence. 26 
24 As quoted by Waiter Ullmann in The Individual and Society, p. 71. 
25 Ibid., p. 69-71. 
26 A conclusion reached by Ullmann, pp. 96, 150, 151. 
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Social awareness of the individual during the eleventh and twelfth centuries 
coincides with the growth of cities throughout Europe?7 Economic developments 
coupled with growth of markets, transportation improvements, and textile 
manufacture all helped fuel the growth of cities at this time?8 Distinctions between 
trades-people began to be exposed as cities grew and were divided up 
demographically according to guilds.29 Increased trade and industry led also to the 
development of a middle class during this period.30 This gradual evolution of class 
and trade would have served to draw clearer distinctions between people and 
therefore ultimately defme people according to their unique function or role. These 
distinctions often led to conflict and repression as unequal distribution of wealth 
distanced tradesmen from merchants and master craftsmen from assistants.31 Such 
tensions coupled with the more critical mind of the medieval period and the idea of 
personal rights under the law provided a fertile ground for an increased recognition 
of self as an individual. 
We must also point out that larger cities give rise to a less tangible or quantifiable 
psychological phenomenon as well, wherein people try to distinguish themselves 
from each other more dramatically than those who live in rural settings. Of course 
the present age cannot be a direct measure of medieval expressions; nonetheless 
27 David Nicholas, The Growth of the Medieval City (New York: Addison 
Wesley Longman Limited, 1997), pp. 90-91. 
28 Nicholas, pp.lOO, 105-106. 
29 Ibid., pp. 102-103 
30 Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925), pp.158-164. 
31 Paul M Hohenbert and Lynn Hollen Lees, The Making of Urban Europe 1000-
1994 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 44-46. 
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human nature being what it is, one can expect that even in the severely limited 
economic conditions of the medieval period, this human desire to be noticed would 
have added to the growing recognition of the individual in the context of larger cities. 
5.1d The Individual in T!he Reformation 
From the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries the once-rapid growth of cities had 
slowed.32 Yet during the same time specialization in trade increased.33 Different 
cities attracted different workers with unique skills. The implication for the 
individual is an even more pronounced recognition of personal uniqueness as 
compared to that of earlier medieval times. 
Beside social considerations there were ecclesiastical upheavals during this time 
that further serve to highlight a growing appreciation for the individual. Had the 
Reformers not been willing to stand alone as individuals against the community of 
ecclesiastical authority (even to the point of death), the Reformation would not have 
been possible. Ralph Ketcham in his book Individualism and Public Life states: 
Luther, declaring before the Diet of Worms, "Here I stand, I can do 
no other," defied all authority in the name of faith. Calvin insisted in 
Geneva on no law other than that which faith and intellect found in 
the Bible, and John Knox thundered against monarchs, lords, and 
bishops alike if they thwarted men living according to Christ's law 
reduced to seven words, "love God and thy neighbor as thyself." 
Each provided a graphic lesson in individual responsibility. 34 
32 Hohenberg and Hollen, pp. 106-1 09 . 
33 Ibid., p. 109. 
34 Ralph Ketcham, Individualism and Public Life: A Modern Dilemma (New 
York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1987), p. 46. 
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Ketcham's observations capture the distinctions between the kind of 
individualism upon which the Reformation was founded and that of postmodem 
culture. Reformation individualism, if one should even call it individualism, was not 
founded on the autonomous "I" as in the Enlightenment, but upon a perceived 
submission of the "I" to the higher authority of the Church and the Word. Instead of 
separating the individual from the Communio Sanctorum Luther understood his work 
as uniting present with past as the true holy catholic Church under the Gospel. In 
that regard Luther and other Reformers demonstrate typical medieval thought 
patterns. 
C.S. Lewis in The Discarded Image shows, via examples of literature, how 
medievals yielded to the authority of previous generations. Lewis states: 
When we speak of the Middle Ages as the age of authority we are 
usually thinking about the authority of the Church. But they were the 
age not only of her authority, but of authorities. If their culture is 
regarded as a response to environment, then the elements in that 
environment to which it responded most vigorously were 
manuscripts. Every writer, if he possibly can, bases himself on an 
earlier writer, follows an auctour: preferably a Latin one .... In our 
own society most knowledge depends, in the last resort, on 
observation. But the Middle Ages depended predominantly on books. 
Though literacy was of course far rarer then than now, reading was in 
one way a more important ingredient of the total culture. 35 
When the reformers stood against the authority of the Church, they were 
demonstrating submission to what was understood as a more enduring and therefore 
more certain authority. Their confessions of faith were in fact tied to their 
understanding of what came before, namely Scripture and the early Church Fathers 
(as demonstrated by the many quotations from the Scriptures and early Church 
35 C.S. Lewis, The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and 
Renaissance Literature (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p 
5. 
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Fathers in the Lutheran Confessions). Yet it is still apparent when we examine 
Luther in particular, that the Reformer was placing his own understanding of the 
Scripture and the early Church Fathers ahead of that ofthe given ecclesiastical 
authority. In that sense at least the Reformation demonstrates a more open assertion 
of the individual. 
5.Je Individualism in Classical Lutheran Theology 
Though the Lutheran Confessions are products of late Medieval or even early 
Renaissance culture and therefore carry within them the communal assumptions of 
the age, they do demonstrate a strong concern for the individual. Itself also a 
growing medieval trend, individual responsibility and personal faith hold an 
important place in the confessions of classic Lutheranism. Against Roman 
Catholicism the Lutheran Confessions explicitly reject the impersonal notion of grace 
given ex opere operata and insist on the necessity of personal faith. 
But as the adversaries expressly condemn our statement that men 
obtain the remission of sins by faith, we shall add a few proofs from 
which it will be understood that the remission of sins is obtained not 
ex opere operata because of contrition, but by that special faith by 
which an individual believes (den Glauben, da ein jeder fiir sich selbst 
glaubt) that sins are remitted to him. For this is the chief article 
concerning which we are contending with our adversaries and the 
knowledge of which we regard especially necessary to all 
Christians. 36 
Here the issue of personal faith is considered the chief article of contention with 
Roman Catholicism where the Lutheran confessors take the position that personal 
36 Triglotta, "Apology of the Augsburg Confession," Art. XII., para. 59. p. 267. 
Under this same topic would be the rejection ofLuther in the 95 theses of the 
treasury of merits. He traces this belief to the 13th century scholastic theologians. 
Instead of drawing from the excess merits of saints Luther redirected the idea of a 
treasury of merits to the merits of Christ as all-sufficient. Cf LW 31:20, 215, 224. 
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faith is necessary for all Christians. Individual faith as seen here should not be 
understood in the atomistic sense ofPostmodernism wherein personal faith is 
tantamount to free license, but as the voluntary submission to a shared body of 
doctrine and a shared understanding of the Gospel. When condemning the 
Anabaptists the Lutheran Confessions condemn doctrine that is "self-chosen." Under 
the section "Articles That Cannot be Tolerated in the Church" the Epitome of the 
Formula of Concord lists as its third point, 
That our righteousness before God consists not in the sole merit of 
Christ alone, but in renewal, and hence in our own godliness in which 
we walk. This is based in great part upon one's own special self-
chosen (and humanly devised] spirituality, and in fact is nothing else 
than a new sort ofmonkery.37 
So while stressing the importance of the individual in his or her relation to the 
Saviour, classic Lutheranism seems well aware of the dangers in making the 
individual autonomous where doctrine is concerned. 
In other places, while keeping a strong ecclesiology and an emphasis on the 
community of faith, Lutheran doctrine lays stress on the place of the individual under 
Christ. This can be seen in: a) private confession and absolution- the Lutheran 
confessions uphold the vital importance of private confession and absolution in the 
37 Ibid., "Epitome" XII para. 5, p. 839. It would be fair to add here that the 
Anabaptists were not the only group the roused the ire of the reformers for holding 
doctrines that separated them from the Catholic Church. The Lutheran reformers 
were equally appalled by the doctrinal individualism of those who were part of the 
radical reformation. 
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life of the individual/8 b) personal obligations under the law.39 c) Church 
discipline,40 d) in the experience of faith's ebb and flow,41 e) in the need to provide a 
reliable witness during times of controversy or persecution, 42 and f) at the point of 
election.43 
Whether spurred on by the Reformation or recognizing for itself a new cultural 
pressure toward the individual, the Roman Church too acknowledged more clearly 
the need for individual engagement with the faith. A thorough study of the Council 
of Trent and its recognition of the individual is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
however two clear examples from this Council present themselves. In the Decree on 
Reformation it is mandated that a catechism be produced for the teaching of the laity 
38 Ibid., "Solid Declaration" XI, para. 37, p. 1075 "but He seals it through the 
Sacraments which He attaches as seals of the promise, and thereby confirms it [the 
certainty of the promise of the Gospel] to every believer in particular. (einenjeden 
GUiubigen insonderheit)." 
39 Ibid., "The Large Catechism," para. 180, p. 631 "here now we go forth from 
our house among our neighbors to learn how we should live with one another, every 
one himself (einjeglicher fiir sich selbst) toward his neighbor." 
40 Ibid., para. 279, p. 661. Here the biblical imperative in Matt. 18 is under 
discussion where a person is guilty of sin and must be addressed. "So he whom it 
concerns is always to be treated personally (manje mit dem selbst handle)." 
41 Ibid., "Solid Declaration" 11, "OfFree Will" para. 68. p. 907 " ... each 
Christian ... experiences in himself that at one time he is joyful in spirit, and at 
another fearful and alarmed; at one time ardent in love, strong in faith and hope, and 
at another cold and weak." 
42 Ibid., "Solid Declaration" X, para 10, p. 1055 "at the time of confession, when 
the enemies of God's Word desire to suppress the pure doctrine ofthe holy Gospel, 
the entire congregation of God, yea, every Christian (jeder Christenmensch) , but 
especially the ministers of the Word, as the leaders of the congregation of God, are 
bound by God's Word to confess freely and openly ... " 
43 Ibid., "Solid Declaration" XI, para. 23, p. 1069 " ... God has prepared salvation 
not only in general, but has in grace considered and chosen to salvation each and 
every person (alle undjede Personen) of the elect who are to be saved through 
Christ." 
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and that priests and bishops explain the sacraments "in a manner suited to the 
capacity of those who receive them. ,,44 There is also an emphasis on personal 
worthiness for the Eucharist wherein people are encouraged to make use of private 
"sacramental" confession prior to the Eucharist, and in the case of those who might 
be guilty of mortal sin, sacramental confession is demanded prior to communing.45 
The need for personal piety is particularly visible in the sacramental theology of 
Trent. 
Our main concern here is with the understandings of classic Lutheranism. 
Certainly the worldview oflate medieval culture gave rise to a greater appreciation of 
the individual in all Western Christian circles, but again we must recognize that this 
in no way approaches the individualism of our day. Classic Lutheranism maintains a 
tension between corporate and individual christology, even as it expresses a tension 
between objective and subjective justification. The faith of the many as well as the 
faith of the one is necessary for a complete view of engagement with Christ. Of 
course the corporate nature of faith understood among the classic Lutheran fathers 
may reflect in some part a natural expression ofLuther's own spirituality as a monk; 
still the need for the Confessions to base both forms of christological engagement on 
scriptural grounds is evident. 
Part of the reason why this thesis seeks to draw classic Lutheranism into the 
discussion ofThielicke is because of this inherent tension between the individual and 
44 J. Waterworth trans., The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Ecumenical 
Council of Trent, (Chicago: The Christian Symbolic Publication Society, date?), pp. 
213-214. 
45 The Canons of Trent, Session XIII, On the Most Holy Sacrament of the 
Eucharist, CANON XI, p. 84. 
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the community of faith. Thielicke' s christology, which purports to be of a Lutheran 
character (since Thielicke was himself Lutheran), has resolved the tension in favour 
of the individual. It is the contention here that a restoration of this tension is 
desirable for postmodem christology. Not that a late medieval or early renaissance 
worldview is the answer for the postmodem context, but that an application of a 
dialectic which balances both communal and personal christology to the new 
contexts ofPostmodernism will allow for re-evaluation of a narrow individualistic 
worldview. 
5.lf The Enlightenment 
There is a temptation to lay the responsibility for the emergence of modem ideas of 
individualism at the feet of the Enlightenment. Certainly the Enlightenment was 
concerned with self-defmition and autonomy. Kant' s use of the term "autonomy" is 
a case in point, but for Kant "autonomy" represented ''the idea of a self-appropriated 
universal rational law. '46 "Autonomy" was placed in service to rational law, and 
instead of representing free license (as it often does in postmodem usage) 
"autonomy" represented a self-chosen obedience: 
Kant' s idea of autonomy is not absolute self-determination, but self-
determination according to the rational and moral being which is 
given to man and which contains in itself the rational and morallaw.47 
An autonomy in service to moral law (ethics) discourages pure selfism. Its 
purpose is harmony with others and peaceful coexistence through mutual obedience 
to moral law. Such autonomy represents the (self-imposed) restriction ofthe self 
46 John Macken, The Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics: Karl Barth and 
His Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 5. 
47 Ibid., p. 10. 
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under law and is the opposite of postmodem views of the individual which tend 
toward freedom from law rather than under it and therefore border more on 
antinomianism than autonomy. 
John Macken in his book The Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics 
compares the understanding of autonomy in Kant with that of Fichte and 
demonstrates a marked difference in Fichte's understanding of autonomy. Fichte 
operated under the principle of reflective self-consciousness. Macken explains it 
thus: "The reflection of the subject on itself constituted the Ich, the Ego. The Ego 
posits itself; it looks for no explanation or ground outside itself ... ,,48 
For Fichte the moral law under which autonomy was founded must be thought of 
as posited by the self. Autonomy was still a matter of the individual freely subjecting 
self in obedience to moral law, but the moral law was within the control ofthe 
individual rather than above him or her.49 An ethic posited from outside the 
individual constituted heteronomy and thus undermined the absolute self-
determination of true autonomy. 50 Yet even here the more severe individualism of 
Postmodernism is avoided. The pursuit of absolute self-determination is the pursuit 
48 Ibid., p. 12. 
49 Cf. the discussion on Fichte's self-positing moral law in Karl Ameriks, Kant 
and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 189. There, in discussing the 
practical character ofFitche's system, Ameriks states," ... Fichte always held onto 
the basic twofold Critical idea that, in signifying freedom and autonomy, 'the 
practical' implies an executive power to determine oneself absolutely, in absolute 
spontaneity as an uncaused cause of intentional acts, as well as a legislative capacity 
to do so morally in line with law of one's own general essence, that is, one's 
rationality." 
5° Cf Ibid., p. 14-15. 
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of the ethical community. It depends on others to raise the individual to the ideal of 
autonomy. Individuality is not the fmal reality for Fichte but "accidental" and 
Reason the true reality. Fitche is quoted by Macken as stating: 
Reason alone is eternal, in our view, while individuality must 
constantly decay. Anyone who does not first accommodate his will to 
this order of things will also never obtain a true understanding of the 
Science of Knowledge. 51 
The concern for self-understanding and self-defmition were at the heart of 
Enlightenment thinking. Descartes' famous "I think therefore I am" is an attempt to 
base existence and ontology on the self. Autonomy was an integral part of the 
definition of the self during the Enlightenment, but individualism as it is now 
understood cannot be redacted on the Enlightenment concept of the self. It is better 
to say that the Enlightenment merely gave voice to the cultural need of individuals at 
that time to define themselves against the backdrop of existence as an "I" in relation 
to God, the universe, and other people. The philosophical issues revolving around 
self-definition that came out of the Enlightenment proved to be a very important 
issue for Thielicke in all his works. Much of what Thielicke says about the "I" can 
be seen in the context of his ongoing dialogue with Enlightenment philosophies. 
Ironically, as concerned about self-definition as he was, Thielicke did not seem to 
perceive the dangers in the rising tide of individualism. 
5.1g Post-Enlightenment Developments in individualism 
By the 19th century the French observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, had noted dangerous 
trends in individualism that had evolved under the influence of democratic principles. 
51 Ibid., p. 16. 
210 
Offering his observations on American society in the late 1830's de Tocqueville 
wrote: 
"Individualism" is a word recently coined to express a new idea. Our 
fathers only knew about egoism. Egosim is a passionate and 
exaggerated love of self which leads a man to think of all things in 
terms of himself and to prefer himself to all. Individualism is a calm 
and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself 
from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family 
and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly 
leaves the greater society to look after itself. Egoism springs from a 
blind instinct; individualism is based on misguided judgement rather 
than depraved feeling. It is due more to inadequate understanding 
than to perversity of heart. Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every 
virtue; individualism at first only dams the spring of public virtues, 
but in the long run it attacks and destroys all the others too and finally 
merges in egoism. Egoism is a vice as old as the world. It is not 
peculiar to one form of society more than another. Individualism is of 
democratic origin and threatens to grow as conditions get more 
equal.s2 
De Tocqueville's "Egoism" could also be called selfishness. It is not new; as 
Tocqueville asserts, "it is a vice as old as the world." His observations clearly point 
to individualism not merely as a social consideration but as a spiritual issue. 
Tocqueville accurately foresees that individualism will grow as notions of equality 
grow. Indeed, history has shown that as egalitarian ideals have matured, 
individualism has matured with it. The irony is that while egalitarianism has sought 
to unite people by removing authoritarian barriers, further separation and atomisation 
has been the inevitable result. 
52 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence (New 
York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), p. 477. 
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De T ocqueville was not alone in his observations during the 19th century. Steven 
Lukes, author of Individualism: Key Concepts in the Social Sciences, reveals a 
unique French school of thought that saw individualism in largely negative terms. 53 
Lukes concludes: 
... the mainstream of French thought, above all in the nineteenth 
century, was expressed by 'individualisme'- what Durk:heim 
identified by the twin concepts of 'anomie' and 'egoism'- the social, 
moral and political isolation of individuals, their dissociation from 
social purposes and social regulation, the breakdown of social 
solidarity. 54 
The issue for many French observers, like de Tocqueville, was not that there was 
necessarily more selfishness in their day than in previous generations, but that the 
form of selfishness was so bound to the basic ideals and principles of Western culture 
that it carried the force of a Weltanschauung capable of atomising every element of 
society. Indeed, present social and theological circumstances bear out that many of 
their concerns were justified. 
Part ofThielicke's seeming blindness to the French warnings about individualism 
may be tied to Germany itself. Steven Lukes identifies a very different view of 
individualism among German thinkers of the same period. The difference, according 
to Lukes, lies in the influences of Romanticism that saw individuality as an 
expression of originality and uniqueness. 55 With time this positive view of self 
53 Steven Lukes, Individualism: Key Concepts in the Social Sciences (Bristol 
England: Western Printing Services Ltd., 1973), pp. 1-16. 
54 Ibid., p. 15. 
55 Ibid., pp. 18-19. One may cite in addition to this that part ofthe difference 
between German and French views may have something to do with the French 
Revolution at the end ofthe 18th century and their consequent wrestling with issues 
of autonomy at that time (Cf. the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789). 
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evolved into an idea of nationalistic community. Individuality was no longer 
ascribed only to persons but to "supra-personal" entities like the nation or state 
wherein persons could discover their personal individuality. Thus in Germany the 
idea of individualism was a liberating idea; it did not carry the historical baggage of 
revolution noted by French scholars. Growing up under these German attitudes 
toward the individual one would be more willing to focus on the individual with a 
certain naivete as to where it might lead. Thielicke's approach then seems more 
understandable in an atmosphere where individuality was accepted without a great 
deal of suspicion. 
Yet the tendency for German individualism to move toward the "supra-personal," 
as noted by Lukes, carried a darker side against which one would expect Thielicke to 
have reacted. We have commented on Thielicke's condemnation ofNazi communal 
philosophy. What we have not noted is that Thielicke recognised the Nazi problem 
as also involving a failure of the individual. Yes, he speaks on occasion of the 
breakdown of personal responsibility to act rightly under the Nazi regime, but he 
does not blame the underlying German understandings about the individual. The fact 
remains however that the German romanticised individual did not carry a sufficiently 
independent critical mind to stop the domination of the Nazi corporate model. 
Thielicke does not give up on the prowess of the individual; instead he refocuses his 
hopes on the liberating strength of individuals who have come to recognise their 
position of responsibility and solidarity with God. 
5.2 The Nature of Individualism Today 
Thielicke certainly saw some negative elements of individualism, but as a German 
scholar and one whose views of autonomy were shaped in large part on German 
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Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinking, he does not seem willing to part 
with his hopeful outlook for the individual. Despite his obvious grasp of the nuances 
of Enlightenment philosophy one must be critical of his failure to deal adequately 
with French observations about dangerous individualism. Those observations have 
expressed themselves in obvious ways in Postmodernism. 
Thielicke chided preachers to remain in touch with the culture in which they 
found themselves. 56 Thus to be true to Thielicke 's own intentions the Church must 
know what pressures exist in the current social climate. 
5.2a Individualism as a Negative Social Influence 
Social observers have tagged the postmodem idea of individualism as a potential 
source of difficulty for the common good throughout the world. In 1995 the United 
Nations held a conference on "Ethical and Spiritual Dimensions of Social Progress." 
The concern of the conference was to identify both problems and solutions to key 
issues involving poverty, employment, and social integration. The seminar began 
with the premise that many of the problems faced in these areas were spiritual in 
nature and were rife with misguided individualism. A number of issues facing 
"Western" culture were noted by the seminar: 
... [the] unprecedented material successes of Western civilization, 
have created some elements of a universal culture centred on the 
acquisition of goods and services which render daily life easier and 
56 Eg. " Thus as a preacher I am involved in an unending dialogue with those to 
whom I must deliver my message. Every conversation I engage in becomes at 
bottom a meditation, a preparation, a gathering of material for my preaching. I can 
no longer listen disinterestedly even to a play in a theater without relating it to my 
pulpit. ... Thus life in all its daily involvements becomes for me a thesaurus in 
which I keep rummaging, because it is full of relevant material for my message." 
The Trouble with the Church. p. 22 (and throughout this volume). Thielicke lists 
lack of relevancy with culture as being one of the downfalls of modern preaching. 
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more comfortable, as well as on the notions of free choice and instant 
satisfaction of needs. With many nuances in different national 
communities and different social groups, there is now indeed a 
common culture based on the search for material well-being, the 
consumption of goods, images and information, and the pursuits of 
both self-interest and national interest. The values of efficiency and 
competition are also prominent in this way of thinking, which is often 
perceived as a "model", in the normative sense, and which dominates 
contemporary societies. 57 
These pursuits of personal comfort, ease of life, accumulation of possessions, 
instant gratification, and free choice have become the foundation for the "atomistic" 
individualism of Western culture. The seminar suggested that one ofthe harmful 
results of individualism which can and does arise in this cultural situation is "Social 
Darwinism" which is a survival ofthe fittest type of mentality working against a 
spirit of love for those less fortunate. 
The seminar took pains to clarify how "individualism" could be used for good or 
bad. 
It would be more productive to show that the only way to reconcile 
personal interest and the common good is to give to the former a 
content and orientation that would transform it into a contribution to 
the latter. It is selfishness, egotism and egocentrism, rather than 
individualism, that are destructive. It is not the quest for more power 
or greater profits that is bad for the individual and society, but the 
motives for that quest, if they are dominated by vanity, the hunger for 
power or the desire to profit at the expense of others. It is not the 
desire to develop, improve and expand one's being, talents and 
abilities that can be seen as anti-social. On the contrary, and in 
contrast to narcissism, true individual progress is indivisibly 
connected to relationships with the other- the family, the community 
and all humanity- and with nature, the universe and the spiritual or 
divine whole. Individualism is an empty vessel that can be filled by 
good or evil. 58 
57 United Nations Publication, Ethical and Spiritual Dimensions of Social 
Progress (New York: Litho in United Nations, 1995), p. 26. 
58 Ibid., p. 35. 
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The positive aspect of individualism, elsewhere termed "enlightened self-interest" 
by the seminar, is a necessary corrective to the criticisms here brought against 
common Western notions of individualism. What is truly at issue in this thesis is that 
form of individual identity that leads into self and away from the Communio 
Sanctorum. While the United Nations seminar identified the possibility of 
enlightened self-interest, it did little to prove its existence as a living, functioning 
force in postmodem culture. On the contrary enlightened self-interest that leads to 
the other is the ideal for which the seminar hoped as it wrestled with the reality of 
selfish individualism. The same could be said of the Church. Christ-like selfless 
love is the sanctified ideal that the Church proclaims as she wrestles with the reality 
of selfishness and sin. 
5.2b Consumerism as an Ecclesiological Problem 
The cultural situation today provides a number of expressions for the dangerous kind 
of individualism. "Consumerism" is a descriptive term used for an underlying 
attitude of self-seeking prevalent in an individualised culture. "Consumerism" here 
is used to describe people's desire to have what they want the way they want it to 
suite themselves. Where this involves the purchase of material goods consumerism 
is fairly harmless. When it involves the Church it can be disastrous. The term 
"church shopping" has even become standard fare in the popular vocabulary. Instead 
of seeking truth or looking for a body of faith into which they could grow, many shop 
for a church that matches their own private tastes for things that may or may not 
relate to the faith (the pastor's personality, the feel of friendliness, ease of parking, 
dress expectations, length of service, congregational size, support groups, roles of 
women and men, church architecture). Communities of faith fragment as splinter 
groups leave one community of faith and begin another that better suites their tastes. 
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This observation is documented in a study on middle class American morals 
conducted by Alan Wolfe and reported in his book One Nation After All. Wolfe 
writes: 
A situation in which every individual finds their own way to God is 
one that a large number of Americans find more comfortable than one 
in which highly organized institutions fight with each other both for 
members and for truth. Americans, it has been said, like marriage so 
much that they constantly get divorced so that they can do it again. 
Much the same applies to their attitudes toward churches: they 
appreciate them to the point of constantly quitting one and joining 
another. "In today's society," Adam Grant of Sand Springs told us, 
"you know, you can go shopping; you can fmd anything you want out 
there. You can find anything that fits your beliefs and how you've 
come to interpret certain things. "59 
This sort of ecclesiological consumerism leaves little room for notions of self-
giving or spiritual growth. What is desired is conformity of the Church and her 
doctrine to the judgements of the individual and not conformity of the self to the 
proclamation of the Church.6° Consumerism is a particularly dangerous form of 
individualism because of its seeming innocence. People fail to make distinctions 
between buying items in a store window and picking and choosing beliefs from the 
window of Christian faith. Thus consumerism leads to crass doctrinal subjectivism 
when practised in the Church. 
5.2c Moral Centrism and Non-judgmentalism in the Social Fabric 
Wolfe turns repeatedly to the observation that postmodem Americans, even of a 
conservative stripe, are characterised by a liberal spirit that seeks the middle ground 
59 Alan Wolfe, One Nation After All (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), pp. 83-
84. 
60 Wolfe observes, "Rather than starting with an ideal of community into which 
individual needs should be fitted, they (middle-class Americans) begin with 
individual need and shape their community involvements accordingly." One Nation 
After All , p. 262. 
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ofmorality.61 For Wolfe, this attitude can be traced to the fundamental right of 
choice that is necessary for any democratic state. People are so committed to 
freedom of choice that they are willing to allow contrary choices from others to stand 
unchallenged under a sort of mutual agreement of co-existence. People are non-
judgmental morally not because they are committed to an ideology of tolerance, but 
because they demand the right to maintain their own views unchallenged. 
The American political critic William Bennett is more blunt than Wolfe in his 
assessment of American (Western) non-judgmentalism; 
Why have we been drawn toward a culture of permissiveness? My 
former philosophy professor John Silber was correct when he spoke 
of an "invitation to mutual corruption." We are hesitant to impose 
upon ourselves a common moral code because we want our own 
exemptions .... What arguments can be made after we have strip-
mined all the arguments of their force, their power, their ability to 
inspire public outrage? We all know that there are times when we 
will have to judge others, when it is both right and necessary to judge 
others. If we do not confront the soft relativism that is now disguised 
as a virtue, we will fmd ourselves morally and intellectually 
disarmed. 62 
Non-judgementalism and moral centrism as practised by the masses becomes 
another expression of selfish individualism. As Bennett points out its danger lies in 
slowly robbing culture of its ability to recognise injustice and corruption. Within the 
Church the threat is not merely one of creeping social permissiveness but the growth 
61 Ibid., pp. 263-268. Wolfe speaks of "morality writ small" which is his 
characterization of American morality that is not committed to objective rules, such 
as the Ten Commandments, but to a general sense of right and wrong which may be 
adjusted to protect individual freedoms. 
62 William J. Bennett, The Death of Outrage: Bill Clinton and the assault on 
American ideals (New York: The Free Press, 1998), pp. 120-121. 
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of a deep-seated spiritual blindness which is unable to stand for any truth or insist on 
any standards for the exercise of Christian love. 63 
5.ld Loss of the Metanarrative 
What the combination of these individualistic influences have done to the social 
conscience and individual mind is to create a profoundly myopic focus. People are 
simply encouraged to think about themselves and the moment in which they live. 
David Brown in Tradition and Imagination, explains this impact of Postmodernism 
as a loss of an "overarching metanarrative." As he explains, the Enlightenment with 
its promotion of scientific ways of knowing was ultimately wrapped up in a search 
for an overarching metanarrative- a cohesive truth by which all history and knowing 
could be better understood.64 Such a goal bespeaks an underlying desire for 
community. Postmodernism has seen not only the loss of desire to fmd such a 
metanarrative but the loss of unified criteria for judging the validity of proposed 
metanarratives. 65 There is simply no cultural imperative to understand life through 
the shared experience of the human community. 
63 Further support for this is found in other postmodern scholars like Gene Edward 
Veith who states, "Postmodernism, not only in the arcane world of academia but 
more importantly in popular culture, affirms and celebrates moral relativism. If there 
are no moral absolutes valid for everyone, if morality is either a privately chosen 
code or the imposition of power over someone else, then 'moral issues' dissolve. All 
actions, including Holocausts, become morally neutral- one person's private opinion 
against another." Gene Edward Veith, Modern Fascism (St. Louis, MO: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1993), pp. 134-135. 
64 David Brown, Tradition and Imagination: Revelation and Change (Oxford: 
University Press, 1999), p. 14. 
65 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
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There are those who see this loss of grand narratives as a positive step for human 
thinking, among them Jean Francois Lyotard stands out.66 In his estimation freedom 
from rationalism as a means for understanding all of reality leads to a release of 
inventive heterogeneity. 67 Yet as other authors have noted, the extreme reaction 
against grand narratives and the "valorization of difference" carries with it an explicit 
undermining of social unity. 68 Morality and law are themselves the products of a 
metanarrative and are therefore suspect; social unity gives way to social anarchy. If 
the negative aspects of postrnodem individualism are to find relief then, part of our 
goal must be restoration of social unity and with it, recovery of the metanarrative. 
This task is made more difficult when one considers that the very tools necessary 
for restoring a metanarrative of the community seem lost to Postrnodernism. In our 
conclusion we will suggest the use of certain tools like ritual and semiology for the 
restoration of an overarching metanarrative. Not surprisingly these same tools are 
central in our approach to finding the christological community as well. One cannot 
be restored without reclaiming the other. If the Church is going to present the Gospel 
effectively in such a culture built on principles of atomisation then it must not simply 
try to "wash the walls" of individualism, but must rework the foundations upon 
which such individualism is built. 
66 As an example: Jean Francois Lyotard, The Postrnodem Condition: a Report on 
Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massurni (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984 ). 
67 Gary K. Browning, Lyotard and the End of Grand Narratives (Cardiff: 
University ofWales Press, 2000), pp. 1-4. 
68 Ibid., p. 4. 
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5.3 Thielicke 's Approach in Light of Today's Individualism 
Examining Thielicke's approach in light of current postmodem conditions is not 
necessarily unfair to him or his system. For one thing his individualised approach to 
christology continues to exert force in Lutheran preaching. 69 It is therefore a present 
problem in need of attention. Another reason is the fact that Thielicke did himself 
have a taste of the dangers individualism presented in society and therefore should 
have provided a clearer defence against it. Some of the darkest moments of his life 
came as a result of a student uprising beginning in 1967. At the heart of the uprising 
was what Thielicke called "an almost perverse and paralyzing form of 
'democratization. "'70 Thielicke describes loud protests, slanderous articles appearing 
in the student papers, and disruption of classes at the university. By January of 1968 
these protests carried into St. Michael's when Thielicke preached. These protests in 
Germany coincided in time with protests throughout the United States. Like their 
American counterparts the German protests were essentially antiestablishment 
movements rife with a general spirit of political and social rebellion. But more than 
simply politically motivated, they were largely motivated by the prevalent spirit of 
individualism as expressed under the watchword of"freedom"- freedom 
sociologically (from moral norms, and socially acceptable behaviour), sexually, 
politically, academically - freedom of choice in general. The mark of Western 
individualism was stamped all over these protests. 
69 In a phone conversation with the Rev'd Dr. H. George Anderson, president of 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and translator of several Thielicke 
volumes, Dr. Anderson spoke of comments made to him from Lutheran pastors who 
still use Thielicke's sermons to help them in their sermons. Dr. Anderson stated that 
Thielicke's greatest and most lasting legacy to the Church was in the area of 
homiletics. 
70 Notes from a Wayfarer, p. 377. 
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Of particular interest is Thielicke's statement that it was during these tumultuous 
years when he wrote the first 2 volumes ofThe Evangelical Faith.71 Volume three 
followed in publication in 1978, five years after the fust volume. Nowhere in these 
volumes is the individualism of the student rebellion addressed at any length. Instead 
Thielicke develops his individualistic/spiritualistic christological application in even 
more detail. His concern is self-appropriation. His encounter with Christ is at the 
level of the spiritual self and consequently his ecclesiology is noticeably weak. In an 
age when the whole of W estem culture is built on the self and the Church is 
searching for solutions to social and ecclesiological breakdown, an approach to 
christology which is built predominantly on the self is one that will continue to miss 
the metanarrative of historic Christianity and will fail to provide postmodem culture 
with the needed corrective to individualism. 
Once more we are confronted by the question of why Thielicke continues to press 
the individual element of christology. It is especially perplexing here in light of his 
own experience with negative individualism. 
Beside those social and philosophical influences we have already noted, 
Thielicke's historical setting was undoubtedly a major contributing factor to his 
approach. Most ofhis sermons come out the years in and around World War Two. 
Thielicke saw huge crowds gathered and chanting Fascist slogans with religious 
zealotry. People followed the charisma of Hitler like sheep. This was no accidental 
by-product of Nazi doctrine but part of an intentional movement toward 
communalism. 
71 Ibid., p. 399. 
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"The aim of a German foreign policy of today," writes Hitler, "must 
be the preparation for the reconquest of freedom for tomorrow." 
Hitler is referring to a collective will, in addition to the isolated will of 
the individual, and to national freedom, rather than freedom of 
individuals. Fascists believed in communalism, in which the 
individual's will and freedom fmds fulfilment in the will and freedom 
of the group. The goal was not mindless conformity, but masses of 
individuals all actively willing the same thing. 72 
In Mein KampfHitler himself writes about the importance ofNazi rallies for 
creating the communal spirit. 
The mass meeting is also necessary for the reason that in it the 
individual, who at first, while becoming a supporter of a young 
movement, feels lonely and easily succumbs to the fear of being 
alone, for the first time gets the picture of a larger community, which 
in most people has a strengthening, encouraging effect. ... When 
from his little workshop or big factory, in which he feels very small, 
he steps for the first time into a mass meeting and has thousands and 
thousands of people of the same opinion around him, when, as the 
mighty effect of suggestive intoxication and enthusiasm ... 73 
From Thielicke's perspective (and ours) the spirit fostered within these rallies was 
more than merely a community spirit, the individual was lost and a collective will 
emerged. Veith observes "Crowd psychologists have studied how individual 
inhibitions are easily lost when a person becomes a part of a mob."74 As we have 
previously noted, there is no question Thielicke witnessed the mob mentality at work 
and lamented the effects it had on his beloved countrymen. The rampant 
individualism Thielicke witnessed during the student rebellion paled in comparison 
to the problems that grew out of the zealous communalism he witnessed in the Nazis. 
72 Gene Edward Veith, Jr., Modem Fascism: Liquidating the Judeo-Christian 
Worldview (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1993), p. 90. 
73 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, tr. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Miftlin, 
1943), p. 479, as quoted in Modem Fascism, p. 149. 
74 Modem Fascism, p.152. 
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It is understandable then at least on this level that he avoided theological 
communalism. 
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Chapter 6 
The Theology of Presence: Correctives for Individualism 
If Thielicke' s method lacks the balance of a clearer corporate element, it becomes 
important to find a way to bridge the gap in Thielicke's system and supply that which 
is lacking. This chapter is devoted to exploring avenues of theological reflection that 
are more fully directed toward the corporate. The solution that we offer here will be 
called a Theology of Presence. A key concept in classic Lutheran theology that is 
often overlooked is the role of christological presence in the faith and life of the 
people. A view toward christological presence holds important implications for the 
individual as a corporate being. It provides a root from which a new metanarrative 
can spring and directs the individual beyond the self to find meaning and a broader 
understanding of being. 
6.1 The Attempt of Trinitarian Ecclesiology 
Before I tackle the Theology of Presence as a possible avenue to a corporate 
metanarrative, I would like to examine another attempt to introduce a corporate 
element in contemporary theology. It is helpful to examine this attempt in that it 
provides certain directions for a Theology of Presence as well as weaknesses I wish 
to avoid. 
In recent years a number of books have emerged which use the model of the 
Trinity as a corrective to the imbalance created by individualism on both the self 
and the Church. Jilrgen Moltmann is often credited by these authors for his 
influence on their line of thought. What is particularly helpful in the Trinitarian 
models is that they do not seek redefinition of God, and thereby toy with heresy, 
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but they seek a renewed corporate sense through redefinition of the self away from 
notions of independent autonomy. 
Though there are different ways of defining personhood within the Trinitarian 
model, 1 the self in Trinitarian thought is usually defined in terms of a double 
transcendence of relation. The first part of this transcendence is bound up in the 
mystery of the Trinity wherein the human self carries an immediate relational 
character because it bears within it the remnants of the image of God who is Triune. 
God's making us for himself means that we have been created in the 
triune image, that God's indelible stamp has been placed on us ... 
God, therefore, did make us without ourselves, but he so molded us 
after his triune nature that everyone bears the Trinity within.2 
Thus mankind was not made to be autonomous and self-defining, but was made 
in the image of a "relational" God (Trinity). From this notion, John D. Zizioulas 
understands the Fall as a turning from relational personhood back to existence as 
individuals.3 Creation gave the relational character of the Trinity, while the Fall 
turned humanity in toward itself. Regardless of other differences between 
Trinitarian models, the common ground between them is that since God is 
1 Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity ( 
Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1998). Volf compares and contrasts the 
definitions of personhood given by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (especially pp. 37, 39) 
and John D Zizioulas (especially pp. 81-83, 89). Though there are different 
approaches to personhood by both men the common ground seems to be in defining 
self (personhood) as relation. The saying of Thomas Aquinas "persona est relatio" 
appears to be accepted as a given by both men. 
2 Roderick T. Leupp, Knowing the Name of God: A Trinitarian Tapestry of 
Grace, Faith and Community (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996), p. 
107. 
3 After our Likeness, p. 81. 
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relational in his essence, and since he created mankind in his image, there was 
placed into humanity a relational character. One of the immediate goals of grace is 
to restore, reawaken, or recreate individuals into the relational nature of their 
personhood. 
The second part of the double transcendence of selfhood is found in the Church. 
Miroslav Volf citing the work of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger explains it thus: 
The believing self is the self of the anima ecclesiastica, that is, "The 
'I' of the human being in whom the entire community of the Church 
expresses itself, with which he lives, which lives in him, and from 
which he lives" (Ratzinger, Church, p. 127). Accordingly, the self 
of the creed, according to studies of Henri de Lubac, whom 
Ratzinger follows, is a collective rather than an individual self, the 
self of the believing Mater Ecclesiae "to which the individual self 
belongs insofar as it believes" (Ratzinger, "Prinzipienlehre," 23: cf. 
idem, Dogmatische Formeln, p. 36).4 
The Christian self carries more than the broken remnants of the Trinitarian 
image within because it is founded on the soteriological relationship with the 
Trinity flowing from the Church. Thus selfhood without the Church is an 
incomplete selfhood in the Trinitarian model. 
By defining "self' in terms of its relation with the Church wherein the Trinity is 
named also connects the self directly to a sacramental theology/ to a community 
model built around the worshipping community, and to a christology in agreement 
4 1bid., p. 37. 
5 Ibid., p. 42. Volf speaks of Ratzinger's theology when he says, "Through 
baptism, human beings step out of isolation and into the Trinitarian communion, and 
thus also into the communion of the church, thereby becoming ecclesial beings. As 
ecclesial beings, however, they live from the Eucharist. The church itself, which 
participates sacramentally in making individuals into Christians, realizes its own 
being as church in the Eucharist." (cf. Ratzinger, Das neue Volk, p. 82.) 
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with historic creedal formulations. Ecclesiology becomes necessary to 
understanding selfhood. This bears a tremendous advantage over Thielicke's 
individualised encounter with a "spiritual" Christ. In an encounter with Christ that 
is primarily spiritual in nature the individual can do without the trappings of 
Church, sacraments, and worship. Ultimately such an encounter will create the 
need for right psychology over ecclesiology. Trinitarian ecclesiology counters that 
by showing incompleteness within the self as it exists apart from the full experience 
with the Trinity in his Church. 
While many of the elements of the Trinitarian approach to self and personhood 
find agreement with the proposals of this thesis, there are certain points of which we 
must be critical. One criticism must be noted in regard to the validity of comparing 
the Trinitarian relationship with human beings. Ideas of plurality in the Godhead are 
not immediately applicable to human communities. The biblical witness of the 
Godhead bespeaks a perfect unity.6 Christ's references to his Father's will show 
complete harmony between Father and Son. 7 Possible objections to perfect unity 
might be raised at Jesus' prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane, wherein Jesus was 
reluctant to endure the suffering that lay before him, 8 and in the cry of dereliction 
from the cross ("My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"); however, these 
6 cf. Deut. 6:4 "Hear, 0 Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one." 1 Cor. 8:4 
"There is no God but one." 
7 Cf. John 10:30 "I and my Father are one." Also John 5:19-47 in which Christ 
speaks to oneness of the Father and Son stating: "The Son can do nothing of Himself, 
but what He sees the Father do .... I do not seek my own will but the will of the 
Father who sent me .... I have come in my Father's name." John 17:11 In Christ's 
High Priestly Prayer as he addresses the Father," ... that they may be one as we are." 
(also vs. 21) 
8 Though even here Christ prays ''Not my will but Yours be done." Luke 22:42 
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instances do not prove disharmony of two opposing wills. Rather they are 
demonstrations of the inner conflicts within Christ that define the depth of his 
vicarious suffering. 
Human beings are simply not directly applicable to the divine Trinitarian 
condition. God as Trinity is complete with himself via his divine unity between 
Persons. Human beings in relation do not, indeed cannot, exist in complete 
harmony with others in this life. In fact the very lack of unity between human 
persons becomes a tool for the Divine to begin growth within the individual. The 
process of reaction, interaction, and even conflict are used by God for spiritual 
growth and maturity. Human beings search out self-identity through some mark of 
"differentness." Self-identity is not foreign to human nature nor an expression of 
sin, but part and parcel of what it means to be created human. 
The Trinity as declared in the biblical witness and as carefully described in such 
historic confessions as the Athanasian Creed finds no human correlation. A 
multiplicity of human beings can never be said to be one in essence as can the 
Persons ofthe Trinity; nor can God be described simply as a community of 
Persons, which would be Tritheism. Regardless of the close unity which may exist 
between people sharing ideology or faith they remain separate individuals. 
Arguing a new state of human ontology as a direct correlate from divine ontology 
results either in anthropomorphizing the divine, or in deifying the human. 
Another difficulty with the Trinitarian model is that the christology put forth is 
often based so exclusively on ontological notions of Christ's corporate essence that 
his soteriological work loses its emphasis. Ideas of justification and redemption 
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which dominate the christology of classic Lutheranism give way to ideas of being. 
The result is a christology which does point away from the autonomous individual 
but which does not fully address the divine solution to the problem of sin. 
Of particular value for this thesis is the sacramental ecclesiology of the 
Trinitarian model. The Trinitarian model recognises that a spiritual/psychological 
encounter with the Triune God is not enough of a corrective for negative 
individualism. A major part of the metanarrative encouraged by Trinitarian models 
is the need for the "I" to find an encounter with God that is not solitary but shared, 
and more than simply shared, an encounter which carries the salvific promise of the 
Triune God. Sacramental/ecclesiological theology provides this to the 
metanarrative. 
Classic Lutheranism in particular sought to maintain the sacramental rites within 
the context of the ecclesiological community. One manifestation of this is the way 
it took issue with private masses. Classic Lutheranism championed the 
understanding that the mass belongs properly to the Church and was to be offered 
to all who desired it and were found to be fit communicants.9 Within the 
sacraments one did not encounter God alone but as part of a flock who together 
shared the problem of sin, the promise of redemption, and the salvific gift of 
9 Triglotm, Augsburg Confession Art. XXIV, [Of the Mass] ''Now, forasmuch as 
the Mass is such a giving of the Sacrament, we hold one communion every holy-day, 
and, if any desire the Sacrament, also on other days, when it is given to such as ask 
for it. And this custom is not new in the Church; for the Fathers before Gregory 
make no mention of any private Mass, but of the common Mass [the Communion] 
they speak very much." p. 67. Cf. the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. 
XXIV, p. 385 "The fact that we hold only Public or Common Mass [at which the 
people also commune, not Private Mass] is no offense against the Church catholic. 
For in the Greek churches even today private Masses are not held, but there is only a 
public Mass and that on the Lord's Day and festivals." 
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Christ's presence. The believer is directed away from himself or herself in several 
ways: he or she partakes of the sacraments as part of the immediate group of 
fellow believers, is united to the Saviour present in the sacrament, and joined to the 
stream of faith as it passes throughout all ages. Such forces acting upon the 
individual directing him or her away from notions of an autonomous or selfish 
relationship with God are important correctives for the postmodem worldview. 
In our presentation of the Theology of Presence we wish to use the desire of the 
Trinitarian model to stay within the confines of historical Christendom. We further 
wish to draw on both sacramental and ecclesiological elements in furthering 
corporate identity. Avoiding the impossible corollaries between human selfhood 
and Trinitarian Being we wish to redirect the postmodem metanarrative away from 
destructive individualism and toward a fuller concept of Christian corporate being. 
A Theology of Presence does not seek community as a goal, but it does arrive at 
community as a result. More than simple community, the concept of"communion" 
highlighted by the Trinitarian theologians is particularly helpful. "Communion" 
conveys both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions to othemess needed in our 
solution. By not focusing on community as a goal, a Theology of Presence seeks to 
avoid anthropocentrism. By focusing on communion as a soteriological and 
ecclesiological reality, it seeks to be christocentric. What we hope to show is that not 
only the issue of christological presence but also the whole concept of communion is 
essential for Christianity to remain true to its biblical foundation and relevant in a 
postmodem world. 
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6..2 Dangers to a 11oeology of hese1111ce OJS Exemplifoed by Ositomler 
and the Finnish Sclaool 
The systematic application of christological presence is not new. One finds obvious 
examples of this in the theology ofLuther and subsequent classic Lutheran 
theologians that we will explore below. While Luther scholars have pointed to this 
tendency in Luther, Lutheranism in general has struggled to find a workable place for 
the idea of Christ's presence in the postmodem Church. 
In a paper entitled "The New Finnish School and Melanchthon" prepared for the 
North American Forum for Luther Research at Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, Ken 
Schurb discusses the attempt of Finnish scholars, led by Tuomo Mannermaa, to use 
Luther' s idea of presence to refocus traditional Lutheran understandings of 
justification. Schurb points to Mannermaa's tendency to rewrite the forensic sense of 
justification so important to Luther's thought and replace it with a particular form of 
theosis. 
The Finnish school downplays the work of Christ as the basis of 
justification. It looks instead to justification, at least in part, via a 
transfer of qualities from the person of the Christ who is present in 
faith to the believer with whom he is present. 10 
It has been shown by others that theosis certainly has a valid form of expression in 
Luther' s theology, 11 but Schurb' s contention with the Finnish school is that their 
views go too far. Instead of theosis complementing the forensic sense of justification 
the Finnish version leaves open the possibility for justification as a process. That is, 
1
° Ken Schurb, "The New Finnish School and Melanchthon" (Delivered at 
Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, Aug. 9, 2001), p. 3. 
11 Cf. Kurt E. Marquart, "Luther and Theosis," Concordia Theological Quarterly, 
July 2000, pp. 182-205. 
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it is not so much the work of Christ imputed to sinners that saves but the transfer of 
righteous qualities to people with whom he is present. This transfer is realised 
through the righteous life of individuals. This idea has been advanced by Simo 
Peura to the point where Christian renewal through Christ's presence becomes a 
condition for grace. 12 The shift in understanding Luther is subtle but the 
consequences are profound. The Christian's own life could be seen as the assurance 
of salvation instead of Christ's unique life. 
In many ways the Finnish school reflects problems seen during the Reformation 
with the christology of Andreas Osiander (1498-1552). Osiander likewise brought 
the issue of Christ's presence into the article on justification in such a way as to deny 
the forensic sense of justification confessed by classic Lutheranism. 13 For Osiander 
justification became a matter of the infusion of Christ's righteousness into a 
believer's life brought about by the indwelling of Christ's divine nature. Where 
classic Lutheranism taught instantaneous and complete justification through Christ 
and his salvific work according to both natures, Osiander's views led to progressive 
justification through the presence of Christ' divine nature. 
Osiander's misapplication of Christ's presence was noticed also by Thielicke. In 
his Theological Ethics Thielicke engages Osiander' s views. Curiously the issue of an 
"ontic" presence, that we noted as a central point of disagreement in Thielicke's 
sacramental christology, becomes a problem for Thielicke here as well. 
12 Cited by Ken Schurb on p. 4 from Simo Peura, "Christ as Pavor and Gift: The 
Challenge ofLuther's Understanding of Justification, Union with Chri§t p. 57. 
13 F. Bente, "Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church," in Concordia Triglotta (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1921), pp. 152-159. 
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" ... there is a real indwelling of the righteousness of Christ in us, an on tic 
appropriation into our very being, and it takes place through faith." 14 Thielicke's 
complaint about this ontic presence in Osiander's theology is tied to his concerns 
over the method of justification: 
Justification in this sense is a being made righteous fjustum effici] in 
virtue of that real indwelling of Christ. The term efficere [to make] 
thus involves the sharpest possible antithesis to Melanchthon's 
imputare [to impute] and Osiander believes that his view is true to 
LutherY 
Thielicke's criticisms ofOsiander are twofold. The first criticism is that 
"Osiander does not make it fmally clear that this process of renewal has its roots in 
the divine work ofremission."16 That flaw for Thielicke leads to the false notion of 
perfectionism. The indwelling of Christ as Osiander saw it denies the idea of simul 
justus et peccator. Christ is present to the extent that the sinner is disposed of and 
only Christ remains seated in the human heart. Christ becomes the "state or 
condition [habitus]," 17 of the Christian and the need for a constant granting of 
remission of sins is no longer necessary. So for Thielicke the "indwelling of 
Christ" as presented by Osiander ultimately denies the need for an ongoing 
relationship of repentance and grace. 
Thielicke' s second criticism of Osiander is the negative impact his views have 
on sanctification. The Christian life is no longer a matter of the death of the self 
14 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1966), p. 79. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 80. 
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via personal sacrifice for the other, but is known only "in the sense of a statement 
of location: God's righteousness has entered into us and been made our own 
inwardly."18 Thielicke sees here a form of individualism that ultimately denies 
Christ, wherein faith no longer has to be engaged and active but can be content to 
have within itself some sense of Christ's presence. In his assessment of Osiander 
Thielicke allows the idea of Christian righteousness to be grounded in "an 
immanent substantiality," yet his warning must be heeded that this christological 
presence not be thought of as a mere habitus driving the self inward. 
When, on the other hand, the indicative of justification is isolated, as 
in Osiander, the result is an autarchical form of the ego, to which a 
habitus is imparted and which is thus referred, not primarily to the 
historically present Christ, but to itself as the mystical tabernacle of 
Christ's presence. Faith is thus driven to seek constant reassurance 
from perfectionistic experiences. 19 
In both cases (the theosis of the Finnish school and the divine indwelling of 
Osiander) the problem is not simply a belief in the presence of Christ as necessary to 
justification; the problem is more the use of this christological presence to deny the 
forensic sense of justification and turn the individual toward himself or herself as the 
fmallocation ofhope. What is proposed as a solution here to individualism is a 
return to an understanding of christological presence that does not divide the natures 
of Christ, as Osiander did, and does not deny the forensic aspect of justification. Yet 
this presence exceeds the spiritual presence championed by Thielicke and points 
rather to the very ontic character that Thielicke sought to avoid. 
18 1bid., p. 81. 
19 Ibid., p. 82. 
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6.3 The Use of Transcendence and Immanence Againsd Individualism 
The ontic character of this christological presence is important. Not a small part of 
this importance lies in forcing the individual to confront something beyond the 
subjective grasp. Additionally it avoids a spiritualising of the faith and concretises 
the activity of God within the physical life experience of the people. As we develop 
this below and show the value of such a view in combating negative individualism, it 
will become apparent that issues of immanence and transcendence are foundational 
for the creation of a new less individual-centred metanarrative. 
Transcendence simply means God is willing to go beyond normal "ontological" or 
"natural" boundaries to accomplish his will; immanence bespeaks God's nearness20 
and presence. The incarnation becomes the strongest expression of both immanence 
and transcendence. Human flesh was transcended by the divine nature, yet God's 
nearness was so complete as to ensure the existence of a human nature within Christ. 
The Theology of Presence proceeds with the belief that in as much as God revealed 
both these characteristics in the flesh of Christ he established a course for dealing 
with fallen mankind through history.21 Divine Transcendence in itself offers no hope 
for fallen creation. Pure transcendence leads only the deus absconditus and therefore 
2° Cf. Matthew 1:23, 28:20 "I am with you always," Heb. 13:5 "I will never 
leave you ... " Psalm 139:7 "Where can I flee from Your presence?", Romans 
15:33 ''Now the God of peace be with you all. Amen.", (also in the form of a 
blessing- 2 Corinthians 13:11, 14; Phil4:9, 2 Thessalonians 3:16). 
21 Luther: Witness of Jesus Chrim, pp. 112-113. Here Leinhard quotes Althaus 
who applies this principle to ethics. "The plan by which he (Christ) has become 
human crosses all his life with an incessant actualization. On can say: the incarnation 
is a continuous event, an act of Christ constantly renewed ... the kenosis is realized 
anew without ceasing in the actuality of the gift to sinful human beings, in that 
Christ, wishing to be similar to persons, placed himself under the misery which 
weighted on humanity and assumed it, he who was free from all that in forma dei. 
The incarnation is accomplished in the cross of Christ." Cf. p. 382. 
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to further separation and isolation from God. But when God combines transcendence 
with immanence as a soteriological movement then there is hope. 22 
The descent of God out of pure unknowable transcendence (deus absonditus) to 
physical reality (deus incarnatus) represents a capitulation on the part of God to the 
limited capacities ofhumanity.23 Immanence becomes God's vehicle for 
overcoming human limitations.24 The Theology of Presence draws on this divine 
debasement as the chosen means of God to break the grip of negative individualism. 
The sacramental christology of classic Lutheranism provides the means for 
Christ's ontological presence. 25 Through physical sacramental realities transcended 
by the presence of Christ the individual is brought into fellowship first with the One 
Present and secondly with the Communio Sanctorum. 26 In order to maintain the 
salviftc relationship with the One Present, the "I" must go to those places where 
Christ has bound his presence. Speaking of Christ's "bound" presence does not in 
any way deny the doctrine of omnipresence. Luther stated that God is everywhere 
22 Cf. WA 45:520,2ff. WA 33:562,10 and WA 45:481,17-26. Here Luther speaks 
of grasping God only through the incarnation of Christ. 
23 Cf. Siggins, p. 84, W A 391:217. 
24 LW 1:11, 13. 
25 LW 37:71 f. ''The glory of our God is precisely that for our sakes he comes 
down to the very depths, into human flesh, into the bread, into our mouth, our heart, 
our body; moreover for our sakes he allows himself to be treated ingloriously both on 
the cross and on the altar." Cf. Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. By 
Robert C. Schultz, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 398. 
26 The Theology of Luther p. 3 77. Althaus quoting Reinhold Seeberg, 
Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Deichert, 1917) N, 323ff. 
"Luther's concept of the church as the community of saints was developed on the 
basis of this understanding of the sacrament." 
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present, but we cannot grasp him everywhere?7 The doctrine of omnipresence does 
not carry the promise of grace in Lutheran theology. Rather the "binding" of Christ 
to certain places is for the specific purpose of distributing grace. When the 
individual discovers that Christ has bound his presence to specific means one also 
discovers that those means are tied to a community of faith whose members share the 
benefits ofthe salvific presence of Christ. 
The necessity of personal union with the Communio Sanctorum is a principle well 
known to classic Lutheranism. Luther stated: 
The Christian church, on the contrary, keeps all the words of God in 
her heart and ponders them, compares one with the other and with 
Holy Scripture. Therefore he who wants to fmd Christ, must first find 
the church. How would one know Christ and faith in him if one did 
not know where they are who believe in him? He who would know 
something concerning Christ, must neither trust in himself nor build 
his bridge into heaven by means of his own reason, but he should go 
to the church; he should attend it and ask his questions there?8• 29 
27 LW 37:140. 
28 LW 52:39-40. Cf. LW 41:150 "for God's word cannot be without God's 
people and conversely, God's people cannot be without God's word. Otherwise, 
who would preach or hear it preached if there were no people of God?" LW 3 5:50-51 
"Hence it is that Christ and all saints are one spiritual body, just as the inhabitants of 
a city are one community and body, each citizen being a member of the other and of 
the entire city. All the saints, therefore, are members of Christ and of the church, 
which is a spiritual and eternal city of God. And whoever is taken into this city is 
said to be received into the community of saints and to be incorporated into Christ's 
spiritual body and made a member of him." Similarly Luther 's Large Catechism, 
Triglotta, p. 694 " ... dazu er (The Holy Spirit) verordnet eine Gemeinde aufErden, 
dadurch er alles redet und tut. .. Darum glauben wir an den, der uns tii.glich herzuholt 
durch das Wort und den Glauben gibt, mehrt un stii.rkt durch dasselbe Wort und 
Vergebung der Siinden." [Translation" ... to that end (of carrying out his work) he 
(the Holy Spirit) establishes a community on earth through which he speaks and does 
everything ... Therefore we believe in him who daily brings us (into this community) 
through the Word and who gives, increases, and strengthens faith through the same 
Word and the forgiveness of sins."] 
29 The mode of christological presence encountered within the Communio 
Sanctorum necessarily leads to a discussion of the communication of attributes. 
However since the communication of attributes is such a crucial point of departure 
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The transcendence and immanence of Christ leads ultimately to a kind of 
expression of these same ideas in the individual. Christ embodied in Church and 
sacrament means the individual who "encounters" this presence salvificly is 
transcended in his or her individuality and discovers a "nearness" to others. The 
individual still exists and still maintains a personal "1"11bou relationship with God 
and the distinctive characteristics of his or her own person. However, once joined to 
the Church the individual transcends self and becomes more than just an individual. 
The very attribute of transcendence that Christ uses with earthly means is placed into 
work within the individual. The "I" becomes part of the whole community of faith 
that is itself tied up in the mystery of Christ's presence. 
The combination of transcendence and immanence also means that we can speak 
of Christ being present according to his person without a re-enactment ofhis first 
incarnation. Christ according to his person is able to transcend normal modes of 
being and draw near through other vehicles. 30 Thus when the presence of Christ is 
mentioned, it is not merely presence in a nebulous spiritual way, but something more 
concrete albeit mysterious. Faith itself becomes a matter of union with the present 
person ofChrist.31 
for Thielicke from classic Lutheranism a separate section has been devoted to that 
topic. 
30 Of special mention is the statement in the Formula of Concord:" ... according 
to His assumed human nature and with the same, He can be, and also is, present 
where He will, and especially that in His Church and congregation on earth He is 
present as Mediator, Head, King, and High Priest, not in part, or one-half of Him 
only, but the entire person of Christ is present, to which both natures belong, the 
divine and the human." Triglo!m, p. 1044, Formula of Concord, Art. VIII, para 78 
31 Cf. to Marc Lienhard's comments .. p. 48 " ... the concept which is fundamental 
to Luther must be made quite clear, that of the fides Christi. Innumerable passages in 
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Such a christology holds benefits in dealing with individualism. Christology as an 
encounter with a personal Christ removes the Christ encounter from the realm of 
subjective spiritual experience, wherein one searches for confirmation for the Christ 
encounter through psychological verification, to the realm of an objective encounter 
between persons. Thus one who encounters another person on the street does not 
establish the fact of the meeting on the basis of his or her psychological reaction to 
the meeting, but on his or her actual proximity to the other person. In a Theology of 
Presence one's meeting with Christ is tied to the simple objective fact of Christ's 
presence bound to specific places and one's contact with those places. This does not 
make the psychologicaVspiritual element of this encounter irrelevant. How one 
reacts to the ontic presence of Christ belongs to the realm of consequence (either for 
salvation or damnation) instead of to the realm of establishing the fact of the Christ 
encounter itself. 
By beginning with the fact of the objective Christ encounter classic Lutheranism 
would seek to provide a measure of reassurance to troubled souls. Subjective 
verification of the Christ encounter is liable to create doubt because the subject, 
human nature, is corrupt in Lutheran theology. Corruption in turn throws into 
question the validity of subjective feelings, emotions, and judgements. If one 
establishes the reality of Christ's presence based on the evaluations of such a heart 
the Commentary on the Psalms and in his later works put this forward. It is at one 
and the same time faith in Christ and the Christ present in faith. One may remark in 
passing that Luther gave preference to the personalist aspect of faith. Faith is not 
primarily acceptance of supernatural truths, but union with a person, union with the 
present Christ." Ian Siggins also notes that when Luther put forth his sola fide 
principle he did so with the understanding that sola fide was the same as saying sola 
Christo (p. 104-1 05). 
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one is always prone to question the correctness of the judgement. A more objective 
encounter with Christ removes that doubt and moves the discussion immediately to 
the effect of Christ who was actually present upon that same heart. 
Thielicke also identified God's absence as sign of judgement. He stated that a 
God who doesn't care is a God who withdraws Himself from a subject and leaves 
that individual to his or her own judgements. The reverse ofThielicke's thought is 
that a God who is present, who has not withdrawn, is a God who cares. The implicit 
message of an objective Christ encounter is that there is a Saviour who by his very 
act of presence proves he also loves. 
6.4 Individualism in Light of Christ in Word, Church, and Office 
Within Luther and classic Lutheranism the objective character of the Christ 
encounter is tied largely to the outward means of the Word. The "Word" in Lutheran 
theology is both the living Word of the kerygma, the written Word of Holy Scripture, 
or the visible Word of the Sacrament.32 The Word (Gospel) is the supreme location 
for Christ's presence and salvific work.33 Luther states: 
32 Without becoming entangled in the controversy as to whether Scripture is 
God's Word (doctrine of verbal inspiration) or contains God's Word, it should be 
noted that Luther did hold a very high view of the Bible. Though Luther is often 
cited as being against the doctrine of verbal inspiration (so Thielicke, Notes from a 
Wayfarer, p. 366), one cannot avoid the conclusion that Luther did in fact equate the 
"Word" with the Bible. In his Theology ofMartin Luther, Althaus essentially blames 
Luther's understanding of Scripture as God's Word on the rise of Lutheran 
orthodoxy later in the 17th century (p. 32). Luther's understanding of the Word as 
Scripture did not prevent him from raising questions about the canon, but even here 
part of his solution to canonical difficulties is to let Scripture interpret Scripture 
(Althaus, p. 76). 
33 Cf. LW 3 5: 121. Also Luther' s well known definition of worship is given in a 
sermon at the dedication of the Castle Church in Torgau Oct. 5, 1544, " ... the 
purpose of this new house may be such that nothing else may ever happen in it 
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How, then, do we have Christ? After all, he is sitting at the right hand 
of the Father; he will not come down to us in our house. No, this he 
will not do. But how do I gain and have him? Ah, you cannot have 
him except in the gospel. . . . And since Christ comes into our hearts 
through the gospel, he must also be accepted by the heart. As I now 
believe that he is in the gospel, so I receive him and have him 
already.34 
One thing else is necessary. What then? The Word, the Word, the 
Word, listen, lying spirit do you hear? The Word acts. For even if 
Christ gave himself for us a thousand times and were a thousand 
times crucified for us, all would be in vain if the Word of God did not 
come to distribute it and to offer it to me, saying: It is for you, take it, 
receive it. ... If then I want my sins forgiven, I must not run to the 
cross, for there I do not find the forgiveness of sins attributed. 
Neither must I simply cling to the remembrance and knowledge of the 
suffering of Christ ... but to the sacrament or the gospel; it is there 
that I fmd the Word which attributes it to me, offers it to me, presents 
it to me and gives me that pardon acquired on the cross.35 
The danger with such a high view of the Word is of course a sort of 
fundamentalist bibliolatry wherein the Word is seen in isolation from the Church and 
the holy ministry. As Luther spoke of the importance of the Word his intent was 
never to separate the Word from the Communio Sanctorum. On the contrary Luther 
saw the Church and the Word as an unbreakable unity. Luther speaks of the written 
except that our dear Lord himself may speak to us through his holy Word and we 
respond to him through prayer and praise." LW 51 :333. 
34 LW 51:114. Cf. Althaus comments "He (Christ) is present for us through the 
word about him. We have him in no other way, for he is now in heaven with the 
Father. He does not come down to us in person but only in the gospel. ... We have 
him only in faith in his presence in the gospel. ... This is so indispensable for the 
knowledge of Christ that Luther can say, God wishes the spoken word to be revered 
more than Christ's humanity." (The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 193) Also 
Walther von Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, trans. Herbert J.A. 
Bouman, (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976), p. 33. "God confronts us 
first of all in his word .... In it he has offered himself to us .... God wraps himself in 
his word He becomes the 'clothed' God." 
35 Quoted by Marc Lienhard, p. 200; taken from WA 18: 203, 27-39. 
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Word as existing for the sake of oral proclamation within the Church,36 and again he 
sees the written word as a guard for the Church against heretics.37 While the Word 
was vital to the lives of the common people and to be read and studied by them 
personally the proper location for administration of the Word as Law and Gospel and 
for public proclamation was the Church. 
In addition, it was also understood that the Word was properly administered 
through the mediating vehicle of the public ministry in which Christ is again 
present?8 The Augsburg Confossion defines the need for the mediating element of 
the pastoral office in two distinct articles. Article five reads, 
Vom Predigtamt: Solchen Glauben zu erlangen, hat Gott das 
Predigtamt eingesetzt, Evangelium und Sakramente gegeben, dadurch 
er, als durch Mittel, den heiligen Geist gibt, welcher den Glauben, wo 
und wann er will, in denen, so das Evangelium horen, wirkt, welches 
da lehrt, daB wir durch Christus' Verdienst, nicht durch unser 
Verdienst, einen gnadigen Gott haben, so wir solches glauben. 39 
36 Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, p. 72. Also on p. 73 Althaus cites WA 
12, 259 "It [the gospel] is properly not something written down with letters in a book 
but more an oral proclamation and a living word: a voice which sounds forth into the 
whole world and is proclaimed publicly so that we may hear it everywhere." fu. 3. 
37 Ibid., p. 73, fu. 2. Althaus quoting Luther: "The fact that it became necessary to 
write books reveals that great damage and injury had already been done to the Spirit. 
Books were thus written out of necessity and not because this is the nature of the 
New Testament. Instead of godly preachers heretics, false teachers, and all sorts of 
errorists arose who fed poison to the sheep of Christ. This made it necessary to 
attempt everything possible so that some sheep might be rescued from the wolves. 
And then they [the apostles] began to write and thus - insofar as this was possible -
to lead the sheep of Christ into the Scriptures so that the sheep would be able to feed 
themselves and preserve themselves against the wolves when their shepherds did not 
feed them or became wolves." 
38 On a divine presence in the office of ministry - Triglotta, p. 311 Apology, Art. 
XIII, para 12-13. Also p. 903 Formula ofConcord, Thorough Declaration, Art. 11, 
para 55. 
39 Triglotta, p. 44. 
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[My translation: Of fthe Pasftoran Office: In order to attain such faith, 
God has instituted the pastoral office for the giving of the Gospel and 
Sacraments. By those means he gives the Holy Spirit as through an 
instrument who [in turn] works faith where and when he wills in those 
who hear the Gospel- which teaches that we have a gracious God 
through Christ's merit and not through our merit, if we so believe.] 
Here "the Gospel" [ Evangelium] is the proclaimed word of grace or the 
"kerygma" and belongs with the sacraments to the ordinary mediation of the pastoral 
office. Through this Gospel the Holy Spirit is present (not of course to the exclusion 
of Christ himself). The pastoral office and the congregation served by that office 
exist as a result of the action of Christ through the Word, so that the Word creates 
and sustains both. By the necessary mediation of the pastoral office a fundamentalist 
individualism is avoided; the Word is prevented from becoming a static thing merely 
written on pages of the book and addressed to isolated individuals in their 
subjectivity. Instead the Word is grounded in an office and able to be applied from 
person to person based on the pastor's knowledge of a broader application 
throughout the Church catholic. 
Augsburg Confession article 14 reads: 
Vom Kirchenregiment: Vom Kirchenregiment wird gelehrt, daB 
niemand in der Kirche offentlich lehren oder predi8en order 
Sakramente reichen soli ohne ordentlichen Beruf. 4 
[My translation: Of Ecclesiastical Order: Of Ecclesiastical order it is 
taught that no one should publicly teach, preach or administer the 
Sacraments in the Church without a proper call." 
The insistence on the mediation of the regularly called Predigtamt in the Lutheran 
Confessions includes a strong desire to promote unity of doctrine and prevent the 
atomisation that would result from private interpretations of the Word. The very 
40 Ibid., p. 48. 
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process of issuing the call to pastors in the 16th century testifies to the deep concern 
for catholicity.41 Insistence on the Predigtamt as the regular voice of the Word 
insures that the Word will not become the private possession of individuals but will 
continue to necessitate one's participation in the Communio Sanctorum. The calling 
process in turn insures that the Predigtamt will not deteriorate into the individual 
interpretations of the pastor but will accord with the doctrine and practice of the 
historic catholic Church. 
These concerns do not reflect a desire for mere sociological cohesion but for 
christological communion. The concern for catholicity is grounded in the notion of 
christological union with the Word. One can see in classic Lutheranism the premise 
that as long as the present proclamation is in agreement with the apostolic Word and 
intent then the Church can be assured that the Word proclaimed in her midst is 
Christ's Word and that Christ is indeed present therein. 
On the other side of the "salvific event" is the act of reception. The Word in 
Lutheranism is not merely grasped by an act of the individual will but by Christ's 
living presence within the believer (faith). Christ is thus on both sides of the 
kerygma as the one proclaimed in the Word (and doing the proclamation through the 
41 Robert David Preus, The Doctrine of the Call in the Confessions and Lutheran 
Orthodoxy (Ft. Wayne, IN: Luther Academy, 1991), pp. 33-40. Preus describes the 
calling process during 16th through the 18th centuries as involving rigorous 
examination by the "consistory" (p. 38) and confirmation by the magistrates (p. 37). 
This process of examination prior to the issue of a "call" was to establish theological 
catholicity. 
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Predigtamt) and as the One receiving the proclamation who is present in the faith of 
the believer.42 
6.5 Recapturing Ecclesiological Language 
In seeking foundational elements for a new metanarrative that will move away from 
the atomising individualism ofPostmodernism, the Church must recognise the 
importance of language in the formation of that metanarrative. Both the language the 
Church uses for itself and the language it uses within its body are important. In 
referring to itself the Church has readily available imagery that conveys ideas of 
christological immanence and intimate communion. 
Biblical images of the Church as mother and as Christ's bride43 bespeak an 
intimate and direct relationship with the male counterpart of Christ. There can be no 
bride without a Bridegroom, nor can motherhood exist apart from a Father. Both 
images make clear that the Church derives its existence from Christ (Thus the 
expression in the early Church, "ubi Christus, ibi ecclesia" ["Where Christ is, there is 
the Church"]). Both images present the Church as single being and not as a 
conglomeration of individuals. There is also human warmth and love implied in each 
image, not institutional coldness. Perhaps the political correctness and sexual 
tension of the postmodem era have caused theologians to shy away from these terms 
but they can be recovered and put into popular use for positive ends. Through such 
terms individuals can be taught to see themselves as joined to new sense of corporate 
yet personal being and intimate closeness to Christ. 
42 LW 26:129, 130, 168, 283f. Cf. Von Loewenich, Luther's Theology ofthe 
Cross, pp. 103-105. 
43 Ephesians 5:25-27. 
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The language the Church uses within her fellowship in conversation with her 
bridegroom is also important in contravening an individualistic mindset. Liturgy 
carries a supracultural character that can prove disruptive of individualism. The 
liturgy is a blend of spoken language and ritual. It actively promotes community by 
engaging all present in a common confession of faith. Even with secular 
communities it has been shown that ritual preserves the stability of the community44 
and maintains group solidarity.45 In its infancy the Christian liturgy provided Jewish 
converts a sense of belonging by drawing on the style of worship common in the 
Jewish synagogue.46 And yet the genius of the early Christian liturgy was also its 
power to unite people of different cultures together. As Christianity spread among 
the non-Jewish nations the basic form of liturgical worship and ritual also proved 
effective in cementing people of different cultures together. It gave a common 
language to a people separated by race and language. 
The liturgy unites the community of faith not only by providing a trans-cultural 
form of expression but also a trans-temporal connection.47 The words and modes of 
44 Brian Wicker, "Ritual and Culture: Some Dimensions of the Problem Today," 
in The Roots of Ritual, ed. James D Shaughnessy (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1973), p. 15. 
45 Heidi D. Mueller, "Ritual Behavior and Celebration in the Liturgy," Logi~ 
Epiphany 2000, p. 23. She here sites Mark Searle, "Ritual," in The Study of Liturgy, 
2nd ed. Ed. Cheslyn Jones, Geoffrey Wainright, Edward Yarnold, S.J., and Paul 
Bradshaw (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.53. 
46 Frank C. Senn, Christian Worship and its Cultural Setting, (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1983), p. 21. 
47 Dean Wenthe, "God's Character and the Calling of God's People: Contextual 
Relations," in Church and Ministry: The Collected Papers of the 150th Anniversary 
Theological Convocation of the Lutheran Church- Missouri Synod, ed. Jerald C. 
Joerz and Paul T. McCain (Office of the President- LCMS, 1998), p. 28 "The 
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expression connect a believer to all those before who gave expression to the same 
faith in similar (if not identical) ways and all those who follow. The liturgy becomes 
the language ofthe eschatological community.48 
The role of the liturgy is not anthropocentric, merely providing a common 
language and ritual to unite people socially, but should also be understood as 
christocentric pointing to Christ's work of binding his people to himself. Within 
Lutheran circles the German term "Gottesdiensf' has been used to describe a view of 
liturgy that sees worship primarily as a divine service of God to mankind and not 
simply of mankind to God. Under such a view "Gottes" has been understood as a 
subjective genitive.49 He is the actor; mankind is the recipient. Liturgy then is a 
shared work or word of the people only in a secondary sense. In the primary sense 
liturgy unites people through "Gottesdienst," as God serves the community of faith 
through his Word in the liturgy. 5° 
Priesthood of All Believers is not simply an assembly of autonomous individuals 
who have come to the same place by virtue of their sovereign and private decisions. 
Rather, by God's grace and election, they have been grafted into a common history 
and participate in a unified reality that goes back to creation itself and forward to 
eternity." 
48 As an example the Sanctus which expresses the eschatological vision in Isaiah 
6:3 and Revelation 4:8. 
49 Cf. Friedrich Kalb, Theology of Worship in Seventeenth Century Lutheranism, 
trans. Henry P.A. Hamann, (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, N.D.), p. 24-25. 
5° For a discussion about the Lutheran understanding of"Gottesdiensf' see 
Norman Nagel, "Whose Liturgy Is It?" Logia: A Journal of Lutheran Theology 
(Eastertide/Aprill993), pp. 4-8. "It is the Lord who is there for us where his name 
is, and with his words he delivers what his gifts say. We are there only as those who 
are being given to. Ours is simply the way of faith, and faith has nothing to say 
except what it is given to say: 'Amen."' p. 5. 
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One also must recognise that liturgy is not static within the community. Liturgy 
does not mandate a repristinated view of faith, but as a living language is taken up 
into the community and shaped by the unique circumstances that community faces. 
So while the basic form of the liturgy was largely established by the fourth century, 51 
the community in response to both heresies and changing worldviews made 
alterations to its common language. The geographical spread of Christianity also led 
to a "process of indigenisation" of the liturgy. One could argue that Luther' s reform 
of the Mass and use of the vernacular reflect such a process. Yet despite the 
influences on the liturgy from Greek, Latin, African, German and even English 
speaking cultures the catholic community of faith has maintained the basic structure 
of the liturgy as its unique "language." Indigenisation runs the risk of atomisation, 
yet the history of the liturgy shows a strong resistance to liturgical fragmentation. 52 
Despite time and human culture, a higher culture has arisen which maintains a 
common language with God, thereby cementing people together. 
The Lutheran confessions note the twin realities of peculiar liturgical 
interpretations necessary in different cultural situations and the need for liturgical 
catholicity. In recognising liturgical variety the Augsburg Confession notes: 
And to the true unity of the Church it is enough to agree concerning 
the doctrine of the Gospel and the administration of the Sacraments. 
Nor is it necessary that human traditions, that is, rites or ceremonies 
instituted by men, should be everywhere alike. 53 
51 Senn, p. 26. Also note the basic liturgical form present already in Acts 2:42. 
52 This recognises of course that various sects have departed so far from the 
historic liturgy that its structure and content are barely recognizable. Yet among 
those churches with a strong sense of catholicity, there has been a great concern to 
keep traditional liturgical rubrics. 
53 Triglotm, p. 47, Augsburg Confession, Art. VTI, para. 2-4. 
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Yet as liturgical variety is recognised the tendency for atomisation and 
individualisation of the liturgy is kept in check by a strong concern for the state of the 
community and the effect innovation might have on the whole . 
. . . very many traditions are kept on our part, which are conducive to 
good order in the Church, as the Order of Lessons in the Mass and the 
chief holy-days. But, at the same time, men are warned that such 
observances do not justify before God, and that in such things it 
should not be made sin if they be omitted without offense. 54 
Likewise in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession: 
We retain the Latin language on account of those who are learning 
and understand Latin, and we mingle with it German hymns, in order 
that the people also may have something to learn, and by which faith 
and fear may be called forth. This custom has always existed in the 
churches. 55 
It should be noted that the rites and rituals of the liturgy, while being open to 
reform, were never consigned to the realm of purely optional forms of expression in 
classic Lutheranism. The form of the liturgy was itself a confession of the catholic 
faith, which in times of persecution or confession was not to be yielded in the 
slightest lest the Church as a whole become guilty of giving an unsure confession of 
its faith. 56 
The balance of language is a tremendous challenge. The Church must seek 
relevance and "contemporaneity" with the present cultural situation, but its language 
must also be distinctive and connected to the stream of historical expression. It must 
be in time but not time-bound, and must be appreciated in its power to shape the way 
54 Ibid., p. 75, Augsburg Confession, Art. XXVI, para. 40-42. 
55 Ibid., p. 385. Apology to the Augsburg Confossion, Art. XXIV, para 3. 
56 Cf. The Formula of Concord, Art. X, "Of Church Rites which are (Commonly] 
called Adiaphora or Matters of Indifference." Triglotm, p. 829ff. 
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individuals think about themselves as individuals. Merely repeating cultural phrases 
and the language of the street, even the context of a church gathering, might simply 
reinforce the individualism inherent in such speech. While using language carefully 
can help individuals see the unique character of Church in connecting them to 
something beyond the self. 
6.6 Understanding the Relational Character of the Sacraments 
Much space has already been devoted to the topic of the sacraments. The negative 
impact an individualised christology has on sacramental theology has been shown. 
Here our concern is to point out further how the christological presence in the 
sacraments builds the Communio Sanctorum. In its plainest sense "sacrament" is 
understood in terms of the dominical sacraments; of those the most profound 
christological presence is that of the Lord's Supper. Lutheran theology places special 
emphasis on the unique mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist describing this as 
the "real presence."57 Within the Lutheran concept Christ's presence in the Lord's 
Supper is a presence involving both divine and human natures. In Reformed 
theology because of the principle of finitum non est capax infiniti, the human nature 
57 The exact nature of the "real presence" is more difficult to define. Luther spoke 
of Christ's presence in the sacrament according to his physical flesh and blood. 
Leinhard explains that Luther believed when one denied the necessity for the flesh of 
Christ in the Eucharist, one would also deny the incarnation of Christ himself. p. 
220. Luther's passion for the real presence is revealed in his oft-quoted statement 
that he would rather drink blood with the pope than wine with the Reformed. [W A 
6:462, 1-5). Later Lutherans in answer to Reformed and Anabaptist interpretation, 
sought a more systematic I scholastic definition of the real presence. Chemnitz in 
particular defines the Real Presence from the negative by presenting a seven point list 
of what the real presence is not. Cf. Martin Chemnitz, The Two Natures in Christ, 
trans. J.A.O. Preus (St. Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing House, 1971), p. 433-
434. 
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of Christ cannot be present in the sacramental elements in the same sense.58 
Lutheran theology does not limit the christological presence to the Lord's Supper but 
does confess a unique mode for Christ's presence there. 
Curiously the language used by Philip Melanchthon when discussing the 
sacraments in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession is not as strong in its 
incarnational flavour as Luther's language when he speaks of sacraments. 
Melanchthon's intent seems to favour the emphasis on the soteriological effect of the 
sacrament rather than the christological presence in it. The Apology of the Augsburg 
Corifession states: "A sacrament is a ceremony or act in which God offers us the 
content of the promise joined to the ceremony,"59 and, "There are two parts to a 
58 Calvin's language concerning the Lord's Supper does carry a sense of 
christological presence. Calvin states: "Christ is the matter, or, if you rather choose 
it, the substance of all the sacraments, since in him they have their whole solidity, 
and out of him promise nothing." John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 
8th printing, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1979), vol. 2, p. 502. Yet it is clear that what Calvin means by 
Christ being the "matter" or "substance" of the Sacrament is not the same as classic 
Lutheranism. He qualifies the above statement with these words: "In so far, 
therefore, as we are assisted by their instrumentality in cherishing, confirming, and 
increasing the true knowledge of Christ, so as both to possess him more fully, and 
enjoy him in all his richness, so far are they effectual in regard to us." [p. 502] "We 
must not suppose that there is some latent virtue inherent in the sacraments by which 
they, in themselves, confer the gifts of the Holy Spirit upon us ... " [p. 503]. Also, 
"Meanwhile, we get rid of that fiction by which the cause of justification and the 
power of the Holy Spirit are included in elements as vessels and vehicles ... " [p. 
504]. It is also clear from Calvin's initial definition of a sacrament that the idea of a 
christological presence is not necessary to his thought, while the idea of a 
christological witness is. " ... a simple and appropriate definition (of a sacrament) to 
say, that it is an external sign, by which the Lord seals on our consciences his 
promises of good-will toward us, in order to sustain the weakness of our faith, and 
we in our turn testify our piety towards him, both before himself, and before angels 
as well as men. We may also define more briefly by calling it a testimony of the 
divine favour toward us, confirmed by an external sign, with a corresponding 
attestation of our faith towards Him." [p. 491-492]. To compare the classic Lutheran 
response to the finitum non est capax infiniti see the Triglotm, Formula of Concord, 
Epitome VII para 13-15. 
59 Tappert, p. 252. Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. XXIV, para. 16. 
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sacrament, the sign and the Word .... Therefore the Word offers forgiveness of sins, 
while the ceremony is a sort of picture or 'seal,' as Paul calls it (Rom. 4:11), showing 
forth the promise."60 
Luther is much clearer in his emphasis that the Lord's Supper is incarnational in 
substance and relational in function. One did not simply receive Christ as an element 
in the sacrament but was united to Christ and became one with him in the Sacrament. 
... we become one bread, one cake, with Christ, our Lord, so that we 
enter into the fellowship of his treasures and he into the fellowship of 
our misfortune.61 
Drawing on Luther' s insight the Theology of Presence would build on the 
relational character of the Eucharist. Part and parcel of the mystery of the sacrament 
itself is the multifaceted character of the christological union found within the 
sacrament. This union includes the union of Christ's person- divine and human-
with the sacramental elements and Christ's person with the believer who receives the 
elements. 
Beyond the ontic reality of Christ in the Eucharist there is a communal value in 
understanding how the Lord's Supper can also be seen as a sign. Luther explains: 
We all become one bread, one cake, and eat one another. You know 
when we make bread all the grains of wheat are crushed and ground, 
so that each grain becomes the flour of the others, they are then mixed 
together so that we see in a sack of flour all the grains joined together, 
and that each has become the flour of the other, and no grain of wheat 
60 Tappert, p. 262. Apology of the Augsburg Confession, Art. XXIV, para. 69. 
Note that according to Lutheran definitions there are properly three dominical 
sacraments: the Lord's Supper, Baptism and Confession I Absolution. Cf. Triglott~ 
p. 309, Apology, Art. XIII, para. 5. 
61 Martin Luther, Sermons of Martin Luther, trans. and ed. John Nicholas Lenker,. 
vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1988), p. 232. 
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retains its own form, but each gives the other its flour, and each loses 
it body, in order that the body of the many grains may become the 
body of the one bread. The same way is it when we make wine, each 
grape mixes its juice with the juice of the other rapes, and each loses 
its form, so that there comes from it one drink. 6 
For Luther the sacrament was both sign and reality of the deep fellowship 
between Christians. The description of a grain of wheat or a grape losing its form 
for the sake of the other bespeaks the individual losing his or her selfish autonomy 
for the sake of others. He or she is no longer a person unto himself or herself but 
surrenders self for other and for the whole. These thoughts are tied by Luther to the 
biblical witness of 1 Cor. 10: 16-17.63 Sacramental theology then encourages the 
individual to think of himself or herself in terms of sacrificial or self-giving 
relationships. 
The very action of the sacraments in classic Lutheran theology points to relational 
existence. One receives them from the hand of another within the context of the 
whole community of faith (taking communion to infirm individuals and the self-
communion of pastors notwithstanding). In our final chapter we will explore more 
fully the unique bonding possibilities for the community of faith as they share in the 
sacramental mysteries. We will discuss how the very fact that Christ is present in the 
Eucharist, forces the worshippers to confront a mystery together in a shared 
experience, which they cannot collectively resolve through the force of raw 
intelligence, and how such a confrontation draws people into closer unity. For now 
we note only that such a relational character is carried within the sacraments. 
62 Ibid., p. 233-234. 
63 1 Corinthians 10:16-17 (New King James Version) ~~The cup ofblessing which 
we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, 
is it not the communion of the body of Christ? For we, though many, are one bread 
and one body; for we all partake of that one bread." 
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Drawing on the inherent strength of the sacraments to create and sustain the 
christological communion (both horizontally and vertically) is an important element 
in the Theology of Presence and an important counterfoil for postmodem 
individualism. 
6. 7 Drawing on Biblical lmtJJgery to Reinforce CommuUilion 
Another important element in a new metanarrative for Postmodernism is the recovery 
of a deeper appreciation for christological communion as a thoroughly biblical 
doctrine. Both Thielicke and classic Lutheranism saw Holy Scripture as a vehicle for 
christological presence. Both acknowledged the inherent power in the sacred text 
and saw it as a source of enlightenment through which the Holy Spirit worked. We 
believe that both are correct in this regard. Keeping the postmodem Church 
grounded in Scripture goes far beyond a simple concern with maintaining a socially 
cohesive bond with the past through tradition. Scripture is valuable in that it is God's 
truth and as such accomplishes that for which God sends it. Hanz Schwarz touches 
on this as he explains the role of Scripture in the Church: 
There must be a fidelity to the biblical documents, not just because 
they happened to be received in the canon, but because the church 
decided that qualitatively there was more to be gained from them than 
from extracanonicalliterature. Fidelity to the New Testament also 
implies an acceptance of its truthfulness. 64 
A corporate model for christology is simply the structure of truth under which 
God has chosen to reveal himself. As this is unfolded in the New Testament it is 
clear that this corporate structure is inextricably linked to Christ's presence.65 If 
64 Hans Schwarz, Christology (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1998), pp. 334-335. 
65 Cf. James Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids & 
Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 1998), pp. 400, 401,404, 408, & 411. Dunn 
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Christianity is going to remain relevant in the postmodem context then it must be 
able to clearly demonstrate that the Christ it presents is not a caricature of the one 
revealed in the sacred text but is in fact true to the overall biblical witness. 
We offer the following examples with the recognition that our task is greater 
than the space available to us. A thorough exegesis of the many corporate 
christological images would necessitate a book in itself. What we will attempt 
therefore, is to offer a brief overview of several of the more common biblical 
images of christological communion. Our purpose is to show the foundational 
thoughts that must be part of the Christian metanarrative if negative individualism 
is going to be countered. 
6. la The "Corporate" Body of Christ 
The image of the Communio Sanctorum as the "body of Christ" 
(crrof.!a'toc; 'tOU Xptcr'tou) belongs primarily to the Pauline corpus66 (with the 
possible exception of Hebrews 13:1). The main presentations of this image are 
found in Romans 12:4-8; 1 Corinthians 12:12- 27; and Ephesians 4:11-16. Other 
references to the crffi!la of Christ include Romans 7:4; 1 Corinthians 10:16; 
Ephesians 1:22-23, 3:6,4:4, 5:23 & 30; Colossians 1:18,24,2:19, 3:14, and 
states that there was an "evident sense of Christ's presence as more or less a constant 
factor" in Paul's writings (p. 400). This is said in the context of dealing with images 
that bespeak the corporate experience of Christ. Christological presence and unity 
among his people are linked concepts. As Dunn states "particiption in Christ is 
irreducibly corporate" (p. 411). Cf. C.D.F. Moule, The Origin ofChristology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 96 where Moule admits a kind of 
"more than individual" understanding of Christ pervades many ofthe New 
Testament writers. 
66 Dunn calls this the "dominant theological image in Pauline ecclesiology." The 
Theology of Paul the Apostle, p. 548. 
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Hebrews 13:1. crroJ.!a carries various shades of meaning. While our concern here 
is primarily with the corporate use of crro!J.a we do not wish in the process to deny 
other uses of crro!J.a which may be more individualistic in nature.67 Of the passages 
above the most detailed description of the Communio Sanctorum as crro!J.a is that 
found in 1 Corinthians 12:12f. 
It is not our intent here to enter a detailed examination of how crroJ.!a is 
understood in each ofthese various locations. 68 What we hope to accomplish is a 
simple discussion about the role of this image for purposes of redirecting 
postmodem individualism. What is striking about the 1 Corinthians 12 section is 
the way both corporate and individual elements are combined with christology. 
One's experience of Christ is so closely tied to others that an organic unity is 
formed between Christ, individual, and other. Individuality in the postmodem 
sense is not possible in such a christology.69 To illustrate this deep unity of the 
67 Cf. Robert H. Gundry, SOMA in Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline 
Anthropology, (Cambridge: University Printing House, 1976), p. 222. "Just as soma 
is both substantival and functional, it is also both individualistic and social. Its 
sociality does not detract from its individuality. And its individuality is not 
introvertive. 'The lesser totality exists, then, in dynamic relation to the greater 
without losing its distinctive individuality' (Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body, p. 
62). In its substantiality soma prevents the privatism of flight from the material 
world of men and events. In its individuation it also prevents capitulation to the 
facelessness of collectivization in the modem as well as ancient world.' 
68 Discussions of the various shades of meaning of crro!J.a in the different contexts 
can be found in: Moule's, The Origin ofChristology, pp. 69-89 and Gundry's, 
SOMA in Biblical Theology. 
69 The Theology of Paul, p. 406. 
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corporate body formed in Christ Paul sets up the absurd situation where each 
member possesses self-awareness. 
If the foot should say, 'Because I am not a hand, I am not of the 
body,' is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear should say, 
'Because I am not an eye, I am not of the body,' is it therefore not of 
the body. 70 
More than simply being self-aware each member takes the persona of a selfish 
individual. The intent of his absurdity is to contrast human selfishness apart from 
Christ with the natural unity one experiences with others in Christ. Paul's message 
is that selfish individualism dissolves when one is part of the cr&J.la XptcrTo0 . 
. . . there should be no schism in the body but that the members 
should have the same care for one another. And if one member 
suffers, all the members suffer with it; or if one member is honored, 
all the members rejoice with it.71 
In Christ each individual is bound to the others existentially. When these 
thoughts are held in comparison to the many references to a Christian's being "in 
Christ" it becomes more obvious that the christological bond is more than merely 
spiritual or metaphorical.72 In some way, whether directly or indirectly, the 
corporate cr&J.la image involves genuine union with the physical life of the other 
and with Christ's presence.73 The pain of one member is felt by all; the honour of 
70 I Corinthians 12:15-16 (New King James Version). 
71 I Corinthians 12:25-26, (New King James Version). 
72 This is said despite Moule's statement that "usually, it (cr&J..ta) is a metaphor 
simply for the community in certain of its aspects." p. 70. 
73 Gundry refers to Robinson and the "physicality" of soma. He believes the idea 
of psycho-physicality enters into the meaning of soma, but is careful not force the 
term too much into this single aspect. Soma in Biblical Theology, pp. 243-244. 
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one is enjoyed by all. If one has needs the others are to supply what is lacking. 74 
Neither autarchy nor autonomy is the governing principle of the members in the 
body. Rather the image of the body bespeaks interdependence and organic unity in 
Christ. 
Paul's use of cr&j..ta may be conditioned in part by his Jewish background. It 
has been pointed out by Martin Buber that the Hebrew mind began with the 
concept of the whole and saw the individual secondarily. 75 The section in 1 
Corinthians 12 proceeds with this approach of seeing the Communio Sanctorum in 
terms of the whole primarily and only secondarily moving toward the individual. 
This becomes all the more significant when one notes the particular Gentile 
ministry of Paul. 76 He was emphasising a Hebrew perspective to those heavily 
influenced by Greek concepts of body. The Greek concept was not unfamiliar with 
the idea of body as a unity or wholeness, 77 however there was implicit within much 
of Greek thought a certain platonic distrust of the physical. Paul's use of cr&j..ta put 
74 C£ 2 Corinthians 8:9-15. 
75 Buber as quoted by Eduard Schweizer, The Church as the Body of Christ 
(Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1964), p.21. "Thus, the Hebrew is used to 
seeing first the nation, the people, mankind, and only afterward the individual 
member of that nation, people, or mankind. It was Martin Buber who once observed 
that the Hebrew first sees the woods and only then single trees; whereas we in the 
Western world would see first the single tree, and only after a process of reflection do 
we call a thousand trees a wood." One must also recognize of course that the Jewish 
mind did not deny the individual as has been pointed out previously. However, there 
is a unique and clear tension between individual and corporate existence in Jewish 
thought. Cf. J.W. Rogerson, "The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A 
Re-Examination," Journal ofTheological Studies, Vol. XXI, Pt. 1, April1970, pp. 1-
16. 
76 Cf. Acts 9:15. 
77 Eduard Schweizer, p. 20, 77. 
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faith on the level of the physical. Being Christ's was not a personal spiritualistic 
endeavour, but carried real consequences for the flesh. Luther picks up on this 
"fleshy" reality of the body image when he draws on these texts in support of his 
teaching on sanctification (explored below). 
crroJ..La. is a significant term for "relational" christology in that it fmds use both in 
reference to the Church and to the sacrament. In his "Adoration of the Sacrament" 
Luther shows how these dual meanings can cause confusion in Lutheran theology if 
not properly differentiated. He addresses 1 Cor. 10:16 and the institution narratives 
in particular. 1 Cor. 10:1678 was being interpreted in such a way that Kotvrov'ta. 
was being understood as "the fellowship of the Church." crro J..LU was then being 
understood as a universal reference to the fellowship of the Church and not as a 
reference to the physical body of Christ. This had the effect of rewriting the 
institution narratives making "This is my body" the same as "This is my Church." 
The result for Luther was a denial of the real presence and a replacing of Christ's 
physical presence with a nebulous spiritual presence. He warns that the two 
concepts (ecclesiological body and sacramental body) should not be mixed and 
then explains the different uses of crroJ..La. in the following terms: 
... the Scriptures ascribe to Christ two kinds of body: one a natural 
body, which was born physically of Mary, just as all other men have 
bodies; the other a spiritual body, which is the whole Christian 
church, of which Christ is the head ... And who can tolerate it with 
good conscience when Christ's statement: 'This is my body, which 
is given for you' is interpreted to mean: 'This is the participation-in-
my-body, which is given for you'? For this interpretation has no 
78 1 Corinthians 10:16 reads, "The cup ofblessing which we bless, is it not the 
communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the 
communion of the body of Christ?" 
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basis in Scripture. 'My body' is a very different ex~ression, a very 
different thing, from 'the participation in my body.' 9. 
The distinction Luther draws is helpful for establishing the relational character 
of christology. Through the incarnate crroJ.la (especially that found in the real 
presence of the sacrament) one is preserved as part of the spiritual crroJ.la. The 
spiritual body is both metaphor and reality. It is metaphor in that "spiritual" and 
"body" stand in ontological contradiction. It is reality, however, in that one must 
say the Communio Sanctorum is not merely like the body of Christ but is the body 
of Christ in some sense. The stark "is" of the Lutheran real presence in the 
sacrament is mirrored by an equally emphatic "is" with regard to the presence of 
Christ in the Church. 
In Lutheran theology the issue of the christological crroJ.la has a distinctly 
practical application for the daily piety of common people. The idea of the 
christological crroJ.la is often joined to concepts of vocation and then necessarily to 
sanctification, both of which deal directly with the common relational life of the 
laity. 
Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us, 
let us use them: if prophecy, let us prophesy in proportion to our 
faith; or ministry, let us use it in our ministering; he who teaches, in 
teaching; he who exhorts in exhortation ... 80 
Vocation here is understood as one's God given charismata which is given for 
the benefit of others so that the whole may profit. The metaphor of the body is not 
79 LW 36:282-283. 
80 Romans 12:6-8 (New King James Version). 
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possible apart from sanctified relations with others. Thus the individual is not 
merely directed to a new existence within the ecclesiological community, but to a 
genuine life of self-sacrifice for others outside the Church as well. It is worth 
noting that as Luther refers to the Romans 12 and 1 Corinthians 12 passages his 
discussions about ecclesiology almost always centre on sanctification. 
Through the figure of the members of the body Paul teaches in Rom. 
12 [:4-5] and 1 Cor. 12 [:12-27] how the strong, honorable, healthy 
members do not glory over those that are weak, less honorable, and 
sick as if they were their masters and gods; but on the contrary they 
serve them the more, forgetting their own honor, health, and power. 
For thus no member of the body serves itself; nor does it seek its 
own welfare but that of the other. And the weaker, the sicker, the 
less honorable a members is, the more the other members serve it 
'that there may be no discord in the body, but that the members may 
have the same care for one another; to use Paul's words [I Cor. 
12:25]. For this it is now evident how one must conduct himself 
with his neighbor in each situation.81 
The biblical image of cr&)la is an important point of emphasis for the laity 
because it encompasses elements of community, christological presence, 
sanctification, and justification. It extends into Paul's sacramental theology and 
bespeaks an ontology that will not allow the individual to stand in isolation. By 
drawing on the fullness of these Pauline images the Church can direct her members 
into a broader understanding of themselves and their existence as corporate beings 
in Christ. Postmodem individualism is thus countered by the inclusiveness of the 
body. 
81 LW 31: 302-303. Cf. LW 34:73,21:98,45:97-98, 12:294-295,44:129-130, 
46:166, 13:112,35:509-510. 
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6. 7b The Temple of Christ 
Scripture also describes the Communio Sanctorum with the image of a holy 
building.82 The biblical images of"o'iKoc; 7tVEUJ.lanK~c;,"83 and 
"va~c; 8eo0,"84 necessitate a christological "aKpoyrovtaioc;" or by implication a 
"foundation. "85 
As with the image of the body, the temple image conveys both interdependence 
(among the stones comprising the building) and christological dependence. The 
clearest explication ofthe holy building image is found in Ephesians 2:19-20 where 
the description of the temple is given organic overtones: "in whom the whole 
building, being joined together, grows into a holy temple in the Lord."86 "Being 
joined together" ("cruvapJ.loAoyero ") is the same term used in Eph. 4: 16 with 
reference to the body. What might normally be considered a static metaphor for a 
conglomeration of individuals becomes something more as the va~c; image shows 
organic qualities in that the self grows ("aul;ro") into others and is alive with them 
in dynamic relationship. 87 
82 Though again the image is used elsewhere outside of collective applications. 
Cf. 1 Cor. 6:19. 
83 I Peter 2:5. 
84 I Corinthains 3:16, also 2 Corinthains 6:16, Ephesians 2:19-22. 
85 Cf. Moule, p. 89. 
86 Ephesians 2:21 (New King James Version). 
87 Also 1 Peter 2:4-5 and the idea of"Xl8m l;;rov'tec;" 
263 
One must also note the obvious Hebraic character of the va~c; image. Within 
the Jewish cultus the temple served as a dynamic and multifaceted symbol. It was 
understood to be the seat for the presence of God among his people, as the centre of 
all worship, and as integral to the identity of the Jewish people themselves. 88 In the 
vision of Ezekiel the very structure and measure of the temple served as an example 
for the purity of life given to Israel as a nation. 89 All these elements were set in the 
"deep structure" of what it meant to be Jewish. Although the past glory of the 
temple complex now lies in ruins and much of the ancient cultus involving the 
temple is no longer practised one can still see the vital importance of even the 
temple ruins in Israeli self-identification. In using this powerful image, which was 
already set in the minds of the Jewish converts as part of their self-definition, the 
New Testament authors were drawing the people into a new christological 
understanding of community that was a further unfolding of past (more static) 
understandings of community. 
88 Several observations here present themselves: 1) The Temple became the 
symbol for Jewish identity during both the Babylonian captivity and the later razing 
of the Temple in 70 A.D. In Daniel5 one sees Belshazzar reveling in his domination 
over the Jewish people by desecrating the sacred objects of the temple that he had 
captured. In Ezra one also sees the clear connection between the restoration of Israel 
as a nation and the rebuilding of the temple. 2) Modem pilgrimages to the "Wailing 
Wall" show the continued connection of the Jewish people to the ancient temple, if 
even a single remaining wall. 3) One may also note the exclusive access of Jews to 
certain parts of the temple and the barring ofnon-Jews [c£ Ez. 44:7-9 and Solomon 
Zeitlin, Studies in the Early History of Judaism, vol. 1 (New York: Ktav Publishing 
House, Inc., 1973), p. 144.] The Temple complex and restrictions on access set the 
Jews apart from all others. 
89 Cf. Ezekiel41-43:17, esp. 43:10! 
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The use of the temple image in the Christian epistles might additionally suggest 
its original metaphorical use by Jesus. The temple metaphor is strengthened by the 
narrative of Christ driving the money changers out from the temple which was an 
event important enough to warrant inclusion in all four Gospels. More important 
than the event itself is Christ's own metaphorical interpretation of the event as 
I ' )~ ' 
recorded in John, where John 2:21 concludes, "EKE'ivoc; OE EAE)'EV 7tEpt '!OU 
vaou 1ou crroJ.la'toc; atnou." Both Matthew and Mark record Jesus' statement 
about destroying the temple and raising it in three days as a central issue in his 
eventual crucifixion. What Jesus meant metaphorically was understood as an 
actual threat against the temple. 
E.P. Sanders argues against the more traditional understanding of the temple 
incident as a "cleansing" of the temple.90 Rather Sanders proposes understanding 
the "cleansing narrative" as a symbolic demonstration.91 In this understanding 
Christ's cleansing was a symbolic act of destruction which Jesus performed in 
order to point ahead to the eschatological restoration of a new temple (and new 
Israel).92 This argument which is based largely on historic Jewish expectations has 
much to offer. But added to the historical Jewish expectations of an eschatological 
restoration of Israel were post-Easter Christian expectations that understood the 
fulfilment of the new temple promise as manifest in the Communio Sanctorum 
90 E.P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 61-67. 
91 Ibid., p. 69. 
92 Ibid., p. 75, 77, 90. 
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itself, which in New Testament understanding embodies both present and 
eschatological expectations. 93 
Further complicating Sanders' conclusion is John's mention of Jesus' body as 
Christ's point of reference. The symbolic act of destruction in the temple is linked 
to the actual destruction of Jesus' body on the cross. Paul saw a direct connection 
between the death of Christ's crro )la and the death of sin. 94 Thus in the destruction 
of Christ's "temple" the soteriological act of vicarious destruction was carried out 
and the new temple made of living stones was erected. The temple, Christ himself, 
and the post-Easter Communio Sanctorum are thus all linked as part of a greater 
unity. The individual who is among those living stones of the new temple is caught 
up in this "mystical" union with the person of Christ and his people.95 
6. 7c The Flock and the New Israel 
Other unavoidable biblical social images are worthy of mention. They are 
important not so much in terms of offering an original perspective on community or 
interdependence, but to establish the consistency of the biblical emphasis. The first 
93 Cf .. Hebrews 9:11; 1 Cor. 6:19; 2 Corinthians 5:1. 
94 
esp. Romans 6:6. 
95 Here the contribution ofN.T. Wright is helpful. In: N.T. Wright, Jesus and the 
Victory of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), pp. 414,417,426,639,642, 
644,647-649,651-653, Wright argues that the incident in the Temple pointed to 
Jesus own claim to be the Messiah and this in turn suggested that he would 
reconstitute Israel in himself. Christ was, in Wright's words "embodying YHWH'S 
return" through the Temple cleansing. He further "believed himself to be the 
Messiah who would draw Israel's destiny to its climax by embodying the new 
exodus in himself' [p. 649]. 
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of these images is the "flock" (nmj.tvtov).96 It too necessitates a christological 
figure - the Shepherd. Unlike the previous two images, the flock is not so much 
concerned with the new existence of the "I" in relationship to others, as it is with 
the "I" in relationship to the Shepherd, who in distinction from other shepherds lays 
down his life for the sheep. 
The image of the 1totj.tVtov is strongly Hebraic.97 Its use by Christ seems more 
a means to proclaim himself as the messianic Shepherd than to introduce any new 
ecclesiological ideas. John 10 shows the use ofthis image to establish the 
christological nature of communal unity. "But a hireling, he who is not the 
shepherd, one who does not own the sheep, sees the wolf coming and leaves the 
sheep and flees; and the wolf catches the sheep and scatters them."98 
Unique within the social image of the flock is the dual role of Christ. Similar to 
the previous two images Christ is figured as separate and above the Communio 
Sanctorum as the One without whom the Communio Sanctorum would not exist. 
Different from the previous images Christ is also one with the flock as npopa-rov. 
He is the lamb of God;99 "He was led as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep 
96 Cf. Matthew 26:31; Luke 12:32; John 10; Acts 20:28, 1 Peter 5:2; Hebrews 
13 :20; 1 Peter 2:25 
97 Psalm 77:20; 78:52; 80:1; Song of Solomon 2:16; 6:2-3; Isaiah 40:11; 63:11; 
Jeremiahl3:17,20;23:2-3; 25:34-36; 31:10,12; 49:20; 50:45; Ezekiel34; 36:37-
38; Micah 2:12; 4:8; 5:4; 7:14; Zechariah 9:16; 10:3; 11:4-17. 
98 John 10:12 (New King James Version). 
99 John 1:29, 36. Cf. 1 Peter 1:19. 
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before its shearers is silent, so he opened not His mouth."10° Christ as lamb 
bespeaks an ontological oneness with the sheep. Yet he remains unique as an 
&J.tvoc; without spot or blemish. 101 
The Pauline use of "Israel" is also worth noting as a beneficial image for 
teaching the deeper nature of Christian Community. For Paul it is a term broader 
than a nationalistic reference. In Romans 9:6-8 one finds reference to Israel as 
those who are children of Abraham by virtue of the Messianic promise. In 
Galatians 6:16 Paul speaks of"t~vicrpa~A. -cou Swu" as consisting of those who 
walk according to the rule of faith. When the term "Israel" is used in Paul's 
"expanded" sense, that is in reference also to Christians of any nation, it becomes a 
term denoting great intimacy with both God and others. James Dunn demonstrates 
convincingly that "Israel" is a sort of"insider" term used to express a "self-
understanding, a covenant understanding."102 He shows that it is a decidedly 
different term from "Jews" or "Judaism" which convey more ethnic/racial ideas. 
"Israel" bespeaks one's relationship to God and one's participation in his covenant. 
Using this term in reference to Christians is an attempt to avoid portraying 
Christianity as something different or new and show rather the connection of Christ 
and his people with the ancient faith and the Messianic schema of salvation. 103 
"Israel" then denotes the idea of "communion" in both vertical and horizontal 
directions. 
100 Isaiah 53:7. 
101 1 Peter 1:19. 
102 The Theology ofPaul, pp. 505-506. 
103 Ibid., pp. 507-508. 
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6. 7d The Church and the Son of Man 
The most obvious of communal images in the New Testament and (especially in 
Paul104) is that of EKKAT]crta which occurs over one hundred times. There is some 
debate regarding the Christian origins of the term; Kittel concludes that the term 
fr I k . , , I 1os comes om secu ar Gree which used EKKATJ<na to denote a popular assemb y. 
Dunn suggests Paul borrowed the term from Israel's own self-identity because of 
its common use in the Septuagint. 106 Within the New Testament the word is used 
in a variety of contexts to denote both the small house church (Rom.16:5) and the 
whole Communio Sanctorum (Matt. 16:18). Kittel points out that one should not 
draw too sharp a distinction between singular and plural uses of ~KKAT]crta. 
It is not that the tKKATJ<na divides up into ~KKAT]crtat. Nor does 
the sum of the ~KKAT]ma~ produce the EKKAT]<Jta. The one 
EKKAT]ma is present in the places mentioned, nor is this affected by 
the mention of EKKAT]crtat alongside one another. We must always 
understand and translate either 'congregation' and 'congregations' 
or 'Church' and 'churches.' ... The plural implies assembly in the 
sense of assembling. The decisive point is not that someone or 
something assembles; it is who or what assembles. 107 
104 The Theology ofPaul, p. 537. Dunn states that '"church' is the term with 
which Paul most regularly conceptualizes the corporate identity of those converted in 
the Gentile mission." 
105 Gerhard Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, trans. Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley, vol. 3, 9th printing: (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1989), p. 513. 
106 The Theology of Paul, pp. 537-538. 
107 Kittel, p. 505. 
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The rather indiscriminate use of EKKAYJma to refer to both small and large 
Christian "assemblings" and even to the general Communio Sanctorum, 108 suggests 
ideas of unity and dignity. As to dignity the use of EKKAY]ma knows no qualitative 
difference between Christian communities. The larger communities are on an equal 
basis with the smaller communities. Older and predominantly Jewish 
congregations such as the one found in Jerusalem are on the same level as newer 
and predominantly Gentile congregations like Corinth. >EKKAYJma captures the 
Pauline insistence that the redeemed share the same value and importance before 
God (Galatians 3 :28). As to unity, Kittel points out, " ... the sum of individual 
congregations does not produce the total community or the Church. Each 
community, however small, represents the total community, the Church."109 The 
inexact use of sKKAYJma itself suggests a oneness in that each part embodies the 
whole. 
Postmodem Christians have shown some difficulty in applying this basic 
concept. The natural individualistic bent of postmodernism tends to use the 
concept of "whole church embodied in individual congregations" as an excuse for 
individual congregations to shun the whole church. There is a tendency for 
congregations to see themselves as autonomous entities complete in themselves 
because they are EKKAYJma. 110 This is a persistent danger in Thielicke's entire 
108 A usage which Dunn calls a later development in Paul's epistles. The 
Theology of Paul, p. 541. 
109 Ibid., p. 506. 
110 Tins is reflected in particular clarity in American Lutheran congregations 
which nearly all have constitutions specifying that the congregation is "autonomous." 
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christological approach. As individualism and a personal subjective Christ 
encounter is held up over a more objective shared Christ encounter within the 
EKKA:11ma an atomistic congregationalism will be encouraged. It is important in 
postmodern ecclesiology to stress the need for catholicity over and against the 
separatistic tendencies inherent in Western culture. 
Paul also develops the doctrine of EKKA:11ma christologically through the image 
ofthe cr&J.La as examined above. In Colossians (1:18 and 24) the two terms are 
linked directly and in Ephesians 5 Paul links the idea of marriage between husband 
and wife to the idea of marriage between Christ and Church, which in turn is 
likened to the relationship between head and body. Paul concludes this section by 
stating: "This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the Church. " 111 
Again, Kittel's observations about Paul's treatment of EKKA:11ma in reference to 
crci)J.La are valuable: 
This does not imply a flight to the sphere of the numinous. Rather, 
that which is always a mystery to human eyes is a revelation from 
God. What concerns Christ and the EKKAllcrta is conceived, created 
and sustained by God. 112 
If, as we have suggested, EKKAllma is one ofthe most commonly recognised 
communal images in the New Testament then perhaps 0 U~O<; 'tOU av8pro7tOU is 
one of the least. C.F.D. Moule thinks this expression is important enough that he 
111 Ephesians 5:32, cf. Ephesians 1:22 & 3:1-6. 
112 Kittel, p. 509-510. 
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devotes the opening section of his The Origin ofChristology to it. 113 Moule's basic 
argument is that the expression the Son of Man, with the definite article, is a clear 
reference back to Daniel 7 and the vision of the Son of Man (or "like a Son of 
Man" -no definite article). There the Son of Man image is directly joined to the 
eschatological community as their Sovereign. Moule believes that the phrase is 
Jesus' self-chosen designation of vocation and that it is not used primarily as a 
title. 114 Oscar Cullmann agrees that the designation "Son of Man" refers to the 
task of Christ but he, unlike Moule, continues to speak of it as a title. 115 Either way 
both agree that "the Son of Man" carries a definite corporate character and makes 
Christ representative of the people of Israel and, indeed, all of mankind. 116 
Seen in this light, within Jesus' own self-designation is a purposeful reference to 
his union with God's people. "The Son of Man" becomes a statement denoting his 
solidarity and self-emptying love for others. This heightens the importance of all 
biblical corporate images discussed thus far. Christ's very existence and the nature 
of His earthly ministry are inseparable from the community of faith he creates. He 
is not merely thought of in this way by those writing about him, but he understands 
his own existence in these terms. 
113 The Origin of Christology, pp. 11-22. 
114 Ibid., p. 14. 
115 Oscar Cullmann, The Christology of the New Testament. tran. Shirley C. 
Guthrie and Charles A.M. Hall (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), p. 155. 
116 Ibid., p.156. 
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6. 7e Conclusion 
The richness of New Testament imagery holding up christological communion in 
both vertical and horizontal directions is staggering. 117 It is simply impossible to 
present a biblical christology and maintain an individualistic Christ encounter in 
light of these images. Christology and ecclesiology become eo-mingled. For 
postmodem Christianity to remain biblically relevant, it must reckon with the unity 
between christology and ecclesiology. This is precisely why Thielicke's 
christological proclamation proves difficult. The difficulty ofThielicke's approach 
goes to the very heart of Christian self-definition and biblical models of 
117 Mention must be made of other scattered communal images such as those 
found in Hebrews. Hebrews 12:22-23 reads as follows: 
' ,,.. 
But you have come to Mount Zion (L:wN opEt) and to the city 
(7tOA~>t) of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem 
(, l~>poucraA. ~f.! EnoupavtO? ), to an innumerable company of angels, 
to the general assembly (navT]yDpt~> 117) and church (~KKATJmq,) of 
the firstbom who are registered in heaven, to God the Judge of all, to 
the spirits of just men made perfect. 
Hebrews 2:11-13 provides a further unfolding of the idea of Church. 
For both He who sanctifies and those who are being sanctified are 
all of one, for which reason He is not ashamed to call them brethren 
( a8~>A-<j>o~c; au1:o~<; 117), saying: "I will declare Your name to My 
brethren; In the midst of the assembly (EKKAT]cr~ac;117) I will sing 
praise to You." And again: "I will put My trust in Him." And again: 
"Here am I and the children (nmsta) whom God has given Me." 
The combination of images is important. They range from images of Jewish sacred 
places (Mount Zion and Jerusalem), to familial images (brethren and children), to 
secular communal images (city), to terms which conjure pictures of a worshipping 
community (nav~yupt~>), to images where temporal and eternal are joined (an 
innumerable company of angels), to even depictions of the mystery of the believer's 
union with the Divine ("For both He who sanctifies and those who are being 
sanctified are all one"). The juxtaposition of these images in such close proximity 
communicates in a powerful way the great depth of meaning held in the concept of 
"Church." As the individual considers himself or herself in relation to the Church, he 
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soteriology. In creating a saved people Christ created them in a community and 
relates to them through that community. Biblically, apart from that community, the 
individual is a limb cut off from the body or a sheep separated from the flock. The 
implication in both images is that death is the result of separation from this divine 
community. As one examines Thielicke's ecclesiology, one must be critical of his 
treatment ofthe individual's place within the Communio Sanctorum. 
We also note in conclusion that the ecclesiological connection to christology is 
not one of superficial contact but of personal union with Christ. The images of 
building to cornerstone, sheep to Shepherd, and body to head all imply more than 
mere cognitive apprehension of Christ but bespeak a close bond to One who is 
present. Even within the image of Church the union with Christ's presence is 
manifest. 118 The solution to individualism must then combine a number of vital 
elements. Biblical imagery must be combined with christological presence, 
transcendence with immanence, subjective experience with ontological being. In 
short the Theology of Presence must strive to redefine the foundational elements 
for self-examination. Who one is cannot be established through "internal" 
evaluation but only by that manifestation of Christ that is outside the self, and that 
binds many selves together by making them members of his body. 
or she must also consider this new depth of being which directs one away from self 
toward both the Divine Other and the human other. 
118 Matthew 18:20 "Where two or three are gathered together in my name I am 
there in the midst of them." 
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Chapter 7 · 
Individual and Social Concerns United in Christ 
7.1 New Directions for a Changed Perspective 
Through our proposal of the Theology of Presence we have sought to lay the 
groundwork for a clearer understanding of corporate being. What remains now is 
to bring our thoughts into a more direct confrontation with Thielicke. We hope in 
the concluding pages to solidify our conclusions that postmodern christology must 
rest on a view of corporate being and not primarily on the individual as in 
Thielicke's method. Our goal ultimately is to draw on Thielicke's example for help 
in clarifying paths toward an effective christological approach in the postmodern 
world. 
Toward that end it is important to note that the underlying view of the individual 
as such has changed from the basic understandings prevalent in Thielicke's day. 
Simply put individualism has taken on a more radical tone in the postmodernism 
context. During the years in and around World War Two when most ofThielicke's 
sermons were written, individualism was not as marked by the selfishness and 
autarchy of the present time. 1 Now (and largely since the 1960s) individualism 
includes more tendencies toward a permissiveness that while trying to preclude 
harm to others still shows no real interest in anything except self-fulfilment. One 
could argue that human nature is the same now as in Thielicke's day, but 
1 Admittedly this is a difficult point to establish with scientific certainty. The 
statement comes instead from conversations with people who lived and worked 
during those years and their observations of cultural tolerance and sympathy during 
such difficult times. 
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nonetheless it does seem that the years that were so important in shaping his 
thoughts were characterised by more sensitivity toward others2• 
The "Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt" offers an example of concern over personal 
and collective responsibility for others at this time. This declaration represents the 
EKD (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland) wrestling with its role in the war. 
Matthew Hockenos in his doctoral dissertation Coming to Terms with the Past: The 
Protestant Church in Germany, 1933-1948 has effectively demonstrated the 
complexity of debates within the German Church over the form and nature of its 
confession of sin for the war. The result of this debate was the highly controversial 
"Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt" issued in October of 1945 to representatives of the 
WCC from an EKD twelve man council. In it they stated "we know ourselves to be 
with our people in a great company of suffering, but also in a great solidarity of 
guilt."3 Collective guilt is here singled out, yet individual responsibility toward 
others was a major element of the debate that ensued from it.4 
2 This statement is made recognizing political intrigue and betrayal that was 
common in Germany under Hitler. The thought here is that during these years the 
population of Germany was forced to wrestle with issues of personal responsibility 
toward others. Beside the example of the "Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt" which 
follows, one could also cite the very public example of Dietrich Bonhoeffer as one 
who further confronted Germans with their responsibility toward others. In Notes 
from a Wayfarer Thielicke makes mention of many deeds of kindness and care that 
people offered to one another during the difficult war years ( eg. p. 126-128) and 
even his many stories of encounters with gruff individuals carry a tone of humour 
and selflessness. Of course following the war problems like the destruction of the 
German infrastructure, caring for causalities, and food shortages would have left 
people dependant on each other for many years. 
3 
"The Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt" translated by the World Council of 
Churches, Ecumenical Press Service 39 (October 1945), p. 193. 
4 Matthew Hockenos, Coming to Terms with the Past: The Protestant Church in 
Germany, 1933-1948, a dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
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Again what this demonstrates is that it was a pronounced part of the worldview 
in Germany at that time to allow concern for the other to temper and determine 
one's actions. Each was individually responsible and all were collectively 
responsible for how actions impacted the lives of others. This German Zeitgeist 
then is what shaped Thielicke's understanding of the individual. 
Thielicke' s treatment of community is also coloured by the communitarian 
models of modernity. In his book Modernity and Postmodernity, Gerard Delanty 
makes the observation that modernity carried with it a "utopian impulse. 5" That 
impulse to which Thielicke reacted is dated and therefore the need to take on 
utopianism as a formative issue for society has changed. If the newly forming 
European Union is any indication of postmodern political communitarianism, it 
seems that concerns today are less driven by political ideology and more by 
economic opportunism. 
This shift in thinking about both the individual and the community from 
Thielicke's day exposes inherent difficulties in the direct application ofThielicke's 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, (New York University, Sept. 
1998) the author shows convincingly how the debate over guilt involved sorting 
through difficult questions about both individual and corporate responsibility ( esp. 
pp. 155-171). He goes so far as to claim, ''Nothing divided churchmen in 1945 
more than the manner in which they interpreted the church's guilt of its conduct 
during the Third Reich" (p. 165). What this demonstrates is a worldview that takes 
seriously its relationship to others. This does not contradict previous claims of 
individualism in the world view of that time but shows how the nature of that 
individualism was not insensitive toward others. 
5 Gerard Delanty, Modernity and Postmodernity (London: Sage Publications, 
2000), 
pp. 58-59. 
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christology in today's world. To continue the individualising bent of his 
christology in an age when the individual has moved toward hedonism and autarchy 
is problematic. To continue a critical avoidance of community in an age when 
many utopian governments are toppling is likewise no longer necessary. It seems 
clear that these changes in circumstance require a re-evaluation ofThielicke's 
christological presentation. 
7.1 a Adjusting Solutions to Depersonalisation 
We begin our re-evaluation ofThielicke by noting how christological 
individualisation is intertwined with basic issues of human personhood and 
ontology. As Frank Stanaland Christian Jr. was quoted earlier as observing, "the 
concrete existence of the individual is the 'anthropological starting point' of his 
methodical procedure." This "concrete existence" involves more than a person's 
life setting; it also involves issues of being and personhood that are influenced by 
that setting. 
The shifts from Thielicke's period to today have not completely eliminated all 
the concrete issues that influenced questions of being and personhood. Nihilistic 
depersonalisation still exists. Deification of the individual and ofthe collective 
likewise persist; further, they persist not just in the totalitarian systems of which 
Thielicke was so critical but also within progressive democracies. Thielicke 
predicted this very thing already in the early 1950s. In his second Ethics volume 
Thielicke notes that even in democracies the tendency toward the welfare state 
carries with it a movement toward depersonalisation where individuals trust the 
state will provide for the "other." Familial person to person care of the elderly, the 
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handicapped, and poor become state responsibilities not individual ones. 6 The 
observations offered here are in no way intended to suggest that all socialised 
systems of care for the elderly and infirm are wrong. What is of concern is that 
Thielicke saw within the tendency toward more collectivistic notions of human care 
a growing depersonalisation of those who are offered the care. Such concerns 
about depersonalisation are not unwarranted, and the postmodern Church can profit 
from Thielicke's observations. 
Thielicke addresses the problem of depersonalisation by pursing a kind of 
Christian anthropology that isolates the "I" before God. 7 He bases this on some 
very daring preconceived notions, namely that God deals only with the individual 
not the community8 and that it is desirable from the perspective of Christian 
anthropology to isolate the "I." 
Part ofThielicke's need to isolate the "I" may stem from his reaction against the 
anthropological assumptions of socialism. In an analysis of the Marxist scholar 
Kolakovski, Thielicke summarises his thought in this way: 
... the feeling of meaninglessness is the individual's sense of 
alienation from external or social existence. By not paying heed to 
their continuity with society individuals are forced to seek the 
meaning of life in their constricted individual existence and to 
regard themselves, we might add, as self-enclosed monads or 
entelechies.9 
6 Cf. Theological Ethics, vol. 2, p. 313. 
7 Theological Ethics, vol. 2. p. 393. "personhood depends not on one's standing 
before men but on one's standing before God, on an 'alien dignity'." 
8 Quoted earlier from Theological Ethics, vol. 1, p. 514. 
9 Living with Death, p. 94. 
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Thielicke then observes: 
... Kolakovski erases the picture of individuality and falls back into 
a Marxist anthropology in which individuals have meaning in life 
and death only as they are integrated into an ideologically conceived 
nexus of history and society and actively cooperate in the 
humanizing ofthis nexus. 10 
While Marxists may indeed push the social element to the point of denying the 
individual element of humanity, Thielicke seems to counter by going too far in the 
opposite direction. He presses the individual element to the exclusion of social 
considerations. What were basically sociologically correct statements made by 
Kolakovski and not overtly Marxist are understood as crassly Marxist by Thielicke. 
Thielicke will not agree here with Kolakovski that human beings are endowed with 
essential social qualities - qualities which if ignored can cause great harm to 
people. Yet non-socialist psychologists and sociologists know well the damaging 
effects of isolating individuals into a forced solitude. 11 Admitting that humanity 
10 Ibid. 
11 It is recognized, of course, that actual physical isolation is radically different 
from the theological isolation ofthe "I" in Thielicke. Yet the issue of isolation and 
its effects on the individual are relevant for assessing the validity of a broad based 
system of individualisation. If mankind suffers in the process of physicaVsocial 
isolation, then it follows that a vital part of the individual's existence is tied to 
relationships with others. How honest to the very nature of mankind can a system 
be that does not take into account the fact that an isolated person lacks true 
personhood? Cf. Michael Jackson, Prisoners oflsolation: Solitary Confinement in 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) pp. 66-68. These pages 
record testimony from prisoners who were given solitary confinement. Their 
testimony is that such isolation drove them to more and more hatred for others, 
hallucinations, and a sense of despair. Prisoners spoke of solitary confinement as a 
worse punishment than execution and worse than physical torture (p. 77). Dr. 
Stephen Fox, an expert in the area of incarceration, defines the purpose of isolation 
as the attempt "to reduce the individual to that condition where there is no 
conceivable human resistance, where they represent essentially nothing" (p. 72). 
He further reported that the minds of those who have faced prolonged solitary 
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was simply not designed by the Creator to be isolated does not make one a Marxist. 
However Thielicke cannot seem to avoid seeing statements about the social needs 
of humanity in the light of his preconceived negative notions of communist 
. 1" 12 SOCla lSm. 
Thielicke's over-reaction to the social element in anthropology is unfortunate 
and even dishonest to the human condition. A communal element is simply 
inherent in the very makeup of mankind; it is essential for human development and 
essential for spiritual development. Thielicke even admits that human beings have 
close deep-seated bonds with other human beings13 and through grace can have an 
even closer bond with the Saviour. 14 Yet he does not allow these bonds to shape 
significantly his ideas of Christian personhood. 
confinement are irreversibly affected. They are unable to trust or love others in the 
same way as before (p. 76). 
12 Thielicke here might simply be influenced by the overall German feeling 
toward Russian Communism. One could point to the obvious political conflicts 
between the two nations as evidenced by the German invasion of Russia on June 
22, 1941. [William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 1960), cf. pp. 793-852 esp. p.849.] Yet as Shirer also records 
the tensions between the two involved ideological disagreements. He records 
several instances of Hitler giving voice to these deep ideological conflicts. (pp. 830, 
846). 
13 The place where Thielicke gives the most detailed treatment of the close 
personal bonds individuals have with others is in his volume The Ethics of Sex, 
trans. John W. Doberstein (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964) pp. 56, 
58, 63, 64, 68, 96, 98. 
14 In the same volume as above Thielicke repeats often the need to base 
personhood on the alien dignity ascribed it by God and the personal union of the 
individual with the Creator. Cf. pp. 5, 12, 21, 31, 32*, 33, 61, 63, 64, 80, 97. 
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7.1b Finding the Soci(JJ/ Element in Personhood 
This of course is not to say that Thielicke' s concept of personhood is totally devoid 
of social elements. He speaks often about "alien dignity" as essential for 
understanding the nature of mankind (both self and other). 15 If God loves the other 
and places his alien dignity within that other, 16 then to be a person before God17 is 
to be placed in the agape relationship with God's "alien dignity" wherever it may 
be found. One cannot then look at the other and see him or her according to his or 
her bare humanity. There is an affinity with otherness by virtue of the shared "alien 
dignity" found in grace. 18 Yet behind Thielicke's "christological social bond" 
there remains an implicit separation. In Thielicke's doctrine of sanctification the 
other is the one to whom one acts in kindness and love. In the Church the others 
are those who pray vicariously for the "I". One sees Christ in the other and thus 
serves Christ as one serves the other, but in all of these examples the other is 
always a detached other - the other apart from the self, a separated individual 
caught up in his or her own personal isolation before God and his or her own 
personal spiritual Christ encounter. 
15 Theological Ethics, vol. 1 p. 21. (For examples of how Thielicke's sermons 
reflect the use of Christ's alien dignity for grounding personhood compare Faith the 
Great Adventure pp. 21-22 and Life Can Begin Again, pp. 70, 78-79.) 
16 The Ethics of Sex, p. 80. "Therefore the real image of man emerges only in 
love of God, the magnitude which encompasses all 1-Thou relationships." 
17 Ibid., p. 64. "The ground, goal, and meaning ofhis (man's) existence, which 
contain this authentic being of man consist in his relation to God. This is what man 
'is,' and this can only be believed or denied." 
18 Theological Ethics, vol. 1, p 242. Depersonalisation begins "the moment 
grace is ontically separated from God." 
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Throughout Thielicke's writings he embraces the language of Martin Buber in 
speaking of the relationship between the believer and God as an "I-Thou" 
relationship. Thielicke was familiar with Buber's writings19 and understood the "I-
Thou" relationship as defining personhood.20 Yet when it comes to using Buber's 
ideas in his formation of personhood Thielicke does not consider Buber at 
sufficient depth. Within Buber's work there are broader social implications for the 
"1-Thou" relationship that Thielicke seems to miss. 
As an Hasidic Jew Buber speaks almost mystically of the "I Thou" relationship. 
His treatise I and Thou reads almost like poetry at times?' Yet within the mystical 
poetic language of I and Thou one sees an understanding of human ontology that 
does not view the other as something alien but as something in unity with the "I" -
even as touching a unity found at the core of human being. Consider the following 
statements by Buber: 
The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being.22 
The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be 
accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I 
require a You to become; becoming I, I say You. All actual life is 
encounter?3 
19 As an example Buber is referenced in Modem Faith and Thought, pp. 37, 
417. The Evangelical Faith vol. 2, pp. 17 (fu 10), 106, 449, and The Evangelical 
Faith vol. 3, pp. 150, 261, 303. 
20 The Evangelical Faith vol. 2, p.1 06. Speaking of Buber Thielicke states 
"Through the word God and man are related as I and Thou, i.e. as persons. Human 
personality finds its basis here." 
21 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Waiter Kaufmann (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1970), p. 1. Buber's translator, Waiter Kaufmann, complains in 
the acknowledgments to his book that Buber's I and Thou is untranslatable. 
22 Ibid., pp. 54, 62. 
23 Ibid., p. 62. 
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In the beginning is the relation?4 
Whoever stands in relation, participates in an actuality; that is, in a 
being that is neither merely a part of him nor merely outside him .... 
The pers~m becomes conscious of himself as participating in being, 
as being-with, and thus as a being.25 
Of course many ofBuber's statements regarding this intimacy are in reference to 
the "I" with the divine "Thou," but Buber also saw this intimacy as reaching into 
human relations: 
There is so much that can never break through the crust of 
thinghood! ... But when something does emerge from among 
things, something living, and becomes a being for me, and comes to 
me, near and eloquent, how unavoidably briefly it is for me nothing 
but You!26 
In Buber's view the deep intimacy ofthe "I" with the divine "Thou" establishes 
the less consistent intimacy of the "I" with the "other" of all relationships. This 
view ofpersonhood necessitates the "I" as a "being-with." In this relationship the 
very speaking of the word "I" also necessarily means "Y ou.',n "Othemess" is 
therefore not a matter of the other possessing an "alien dignity" derived from his or 
24 Ibid., p. 69. 
25 Ibid., p. 113. 
26 Ibid., pp. 146-14 7. cf. the broader discussion of this on p. 148 when Buber 
says, "every individual You must disappear into the chrysalis of the It in order to 
grow wings again." 
27 Surprisingly Buber sees this kind of relationship in the person of Jesus. He 
states in I and Thou," ... how powerful, even overpowering, is Jesus' !-saying, and 
how legitimate to the point of being a matter of course! For it is the I of the 
unconditional relation in which man calls his You 'Father' in such a way that he 
himself becomes nothing but a son. Whenever he says I, he can only mean the I of 
the holy basic word that has become unconditional for him. If detachment ever 
touches him, it is surpassed by association, and it is from this that he speaks to 
others." 
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her own private isolation before God as in Thielicke, but the other is a being with 
the "I" in intimate closeness to the "Thou." As Thielicke draws on Buber he does 
not stand against Buber's notions of corporate being, rather he seems to ignore the 
deeper applications ofBuber's thought to communitarian schema. 
As this applies to Christian ontology Buber shows a lesser need of distinctions 
between the "I" and other and a greater emphasis on the "we" before God as those 
who bear together the "alien dignity" of grace. In isolating the "I" before God as 
the mark of personhood, Thielicke wanted to highlight the value of each person 
before God?8 We agree in principle with his goal and feel that individual worth 
and importance must be maintained in our solution to individualism. Yet value in 
personhood need not be found exclusively in isolation from others but can just as 
well be found in union with them. From the perspectives of theology and from 
anthropology, there seems little reason to continue Thielicke's isolation of the "I" 
as a necessary component of Christian personhood. 
7.1 c Directing Modern Secular Acknowledgements of Community Toward 
Christian Ends 
Was this isolation of the "I" adopted in order to give validity to the anthropological 
discussion from a secular perspective? Thielicke observed that the secular view 
was hopelessly tied to a narrow individualized anthropocentric ontology. He did 
little searching for support for more communal views of personhood in secular 
28 The component of individual uniqueness is brought out with special clarity in 
Living with Death, p. 140 "For only in relation to him [the Lord] do I become a 
person, that is, unique, incapable of being represented, responsible for myself (as I 
have undoubtedly been loaned this selfby him)." Cf. pp. 150-152 in these pages 
Thielicke ties personhood and uniqueness to the alien dignity of Christ that he gives 
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thought. Yet there are examples in secular thinking that do not see mankind in 
exclusively individualistic terms, and it is in these examples that the Church of 
today can engage the secular world around her. This is in keeping with Thielicke's 
own method. He sought to engage philosophy and anthropology over their 
treatments of the ontological "I." In so doing he hoped to reconcile the Christian 
message with credible secular thought and engage those outside the Church with 
the Christian message in terms they would more readily receive. The same 
approach can be taken as we explore the place of the "we" in human ontology and 
show its connection with Christian communal being. 
As one example, Wittgenstein's discussion of"private language" gives an 
obvious beginning point for a more communal sensitivity in anthropology. 
Wittgenstein's discussion leads to the conclusion that the existence oflanguage 
bespeaks community because language exists to link action and interaction with 
others: 
Without language we cannot influence other people in such-and-
such ways; cannot build roads and machines, etc. And also: without 
the use of speech and writing people could not communicate.29 
Wittgenstein extends this thought by arguing against the possibility of "private 
language." There simply cannot be such a thing as a truly private language because 
the individual. " ... personal uniqueness is connected with the summons of God 
and the history with him." p. 152. 
29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G .E.M. Anscombe, 
3rd. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 116e. 
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"to exist it must presuppose a common language. "30 Even if one were able to 
invent a language known only to one's selfthe meaning of the elements in this 
language would be attached to pre-existing language. Wittgenstein leads us to this 
conclusion as he describes the impossibility of inventing a truly private word for 
pain known as "S": 
What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation? For 
"sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one 
intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a 
justification which everybody understands.31 
His discussion, which suggests that language is rooted in an already existing 
sense of community, presents several opportunities for further discussions between 
christology and secular anthropology.32 For example: what do Wittgenstein's 
observations on the communal nature of language say in regards to the Person of 
Christ as the incarnate logos? Does not Christ's very identification with the Word 
bespeak a corporate dimension to his being both as touching his godhead and as 
touching his relation to human beings? Cannot the Church then claim that a proper 
view to the Word of God must always ground its use in the corporate experience. 
30 This is the observation on Wittgenstein offered by Gerd Brand ed., The 
Central Texts ofLudwig Wittgenstein, trans. Robert E. Innis (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1979), p. 60. 
31 Wittgenstein, p.79e. cf. with comments made on p. 75e, "If language is to be 
a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also 
(queer as this may sound) in judgments." 
32 Interestingly Habermas, who will be discussed immediately following, also 
noted that language necessitates community. As Helmut Peukert noted when 
discussing Habermas' language-philosophy [Science. Action. and Fundamental 
Theology: Toward a Theology of Communicative Action, trans. By James Bohman 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984 ), p. 13 8.] "In every linguistic utterance aimed at 
communicating something to someone, the ideal of an all inclusive communication 
community is necessarily implied and raised to the status of transcendental validity 
and, at the same time, posited practically as a goal to be achieved." 
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We do not wish to probe answers at this point, instead we wish only to show that 
secular anthropology offers opportunity for the Church to build on the importance 
of the corporate dimension for understanding the human condition in relation to 
cm:ist. 
One fmds that even a scholar like Jiirgen Habermas, known for espousing a 
more individualistic enlightenment philosophy, offers a view of mankind that takes 
community into account. In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Habermas 
says: 
... the lifeworld is divided in accord with the "given" components 
of speech acts (that is, their propositional, illocutionary, and 
intentional components) into culture, society, and person. I call 
culture the store of knowledge from which those engaged in 
communicative action draw interpretations susceptible of consensus 
... I call society (in the narrower sense of a component of the 
lifeworld) the legitimate orders from which those engaged in 
communicative action gather a solidarity, based on belonging to 
groups, as they enter into interpersonal relationships with one 
another. Personality serves as a term of art for acquired 
competences that render a subject capable of speech and action ~d 
hence able to participate in processes of mutual understanding in a 
given context and to maintain his own identity in the shifting 
contexts of interaction. 33 
Habermas sees the total "lifeworld" of mankind as including "person," 
"society," and "culture." Accordingly human beings live and move simultaneously 
within the three realms. Even more they gather their being as they exist within this 
threefold ontology. Habermas' division of the "we" into culture and society offers 
the Church tremendous opportunities. Habermas opens the door for discourse 
between the Church and credible secular anthropology over the issue of 
33 Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick 
G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 343. 
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personhood.34 Surprisingly Habermas drew little attention from Thielicke. His 
name is mentioned only once in vol. 3 of The Evangelical Faith (German edition, 
1978) and only once in passing in Modern Faith and Thought (German edition, 
1983). Some ofHabermas's more significant works like the Theory of 
Communicative Action (2 vol. 1981 ), were published too late for Thielicke to 
consider. Still one would expect that even the initial influence Habermas held in 
intellectual circles with earlier publications35 would have merited more of 
Thielicke's consideration but it does not. 
Be that as it may, for our purposes here Habermas, even though he may 
represent a more modernist perspective, still holds influence and importance for 
postmodern secular anthropology.36 His multi-layered view of human being allows 
34 We recognize at this point that our engagement with Habermas' thought is 
extremely limited. Elsewhere it seems clear that Habermas challenges the sort of 
"historic-conservative" view of objective Christian truth, claiming that '"self-
reflection as limited to the sphere of the history of the species' has taken the place 
of the fmal grounding of metaphysics." (Peukert, p. 162). Such a view would move 
theology toward a kind of universalism that would discard the possibility of 
objective or dogmatic truth and would encourage greater individuality and even 
atomisation of religious truth. The point of our thesis is demonstrate that such 
atomisation is ultimately harmful both to the Church and to her people. 
35 Eg. Theory and Practice (Theorie und Praxis, 1963), Towards a Rational 
Society (The first three essays were published in Protestbewegung und 
Hochschulreform (1969); the last 3 essays were published in Technik und 
Wissenschaft als "Ideologie" (1968), Knowledge and Human Interests (Erkenntnis 
und Interesse, 1968), Legitimation Crisis (Legitimationsprobleme im 
Spatkapitalismus, 1973). 
36 Peukert notes that the life-world concept of Habermas remains controversial 
and will require further examination and debate in the future to help determine to 
what extent such a concept is "retrievable and redeemable" for present culture (p. 
137). That this matter remains controversial demonstrates Habermas' lasting 
influence and importance for postmodern discussions. Cf. comments in the 
"translator's Introduction" to Peukert's book which states "Habermas has begun to 
exercise a perceptible influence on the conceptions of the tasks and methods of a 
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the Church an opportunity to show how its ontology provides for this exact 
layering. For Habermas culture exceeds society because it serves as a storehouse 
and foundation upon which society can draw. Culture is society in sum and total. 
The "we" transcends present time and individual circumstance as it draws from the 
culture that preceded and includes it. The individual without a society, as well as 
the society without a culture, is incomplete. Even from this secular point of view, 
the Church can present a valid case to a world atomised by individualism that true 
personhood and meaning are not located in the isolated self because self is 
incomplete without a society and a culture.37 
The Church in her understanding of personhood must, of course, go beyond a 
simple emphasis on the social dimension. Stressing one's individual place in the 
overall culture of the Communio Sanctorum or in the society of the localized 
EKKAEcrta is insufficient. This is in agreement with Thielicke's conclusions as 
well. The christological element is the core non-negotiable element in any valid 
presentation of personhood and that core will forever remain outside of the grasp of 
secular society. 
number of disciplines. From the analysis of cognitive interests to the theory of 
communicative action, he has both appropriated and transformed diverse fields of 
empirical and theoretical research" (p. vii). 
37 Haberrnas frames the difficulties that a successful practice of socialization 
faces in today's world into very practical terms, "The growing number of hospital 
beds occupied by psychiatric patients, the epidemic proportions of behavioural 
disturbances, alcoholism, the phenomena of addiction per se, the rising suicide and 
juvenile delinquency rates are all signs of unsuccessful processes of integration and 
failed socialization." Jiirgen Habermas, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of 
the Age," trans. By Andrew Buchwalter (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984), p. 17. 
It is because of society's failing ability to "incorporate future generations into its 
institutionalised value orientations" (p. 17) that the Church is presented a golden 
opportunity to engage society with its view of christological communion - a view 
which ultimately addressed people at a deeper more spiritual level. 
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What the Church can do and what Thielicke' s approach encourages is to 
establish the solution to the secular problem within its ranks in an engaging and 
inviting way, to draw on those elements of the secular view that support it, and to 
redirect those elements to a christological telos. Thus from Habermas the Church 
can formulate the discussion of personhood to consider how ontological over-
individualisation can be balanced. A view toward the "society" of the Church at 
present, the historic culture of the Communio Sanctorum, and the individual with 
his or her own uniqueness can all be borrowed from Habermas and shown to be 
intertwined around the core of christology. The individual stands in the society of 
the Church, in turn the Church stands in the culture of the Communio Santorum, 
and finally all elements separately and together stand in the Person of Christ (as 
One who touches both personal and corporate dimensions). 
Thielicke may not have explored the social dimension of secular anthropology 
with enough passion but what he does do well with secular anthropology is use its 
conclusions as a means of explaining Christian development. Thielicke's embrace 
of the individual seeks to rob anthropology of some of its "secular power" and 
establishes a means of looking at this development as a gift of God. 
At the heart ofThielicke's approach to secular thought is a willingness to treat 
seriously the changing worldview (including the maturation of individualism) and 
see it more as a matter of coming to adulthood than just a matter of rebellion 
against God. Thielicke writes: 
Das Christentum verhalt sich zur technischen Revolution sozusagen 
wie ein Vater zu seinem Sohne, der unterdessen erwachsen ist. Der 
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so mUndig gewordene Sohn kann nun zweierlei tun: Er kann 
entweder also Erwachsener das Haus des Vaters verwalten - oder er 
kann in die Fremde gehen, sich vom Vater lossagen und sich 
"emanzipieren. "38 
[My translation: Christianity acts toward the technical revolution like 
a father to his son who has grown-up so to speak. As a mature son he 
can now do two things: he can either manage the house of his father as 
an adult - or he can go into a foreign land, dissociating and 
"emancipating" himself from his father.] 
This adulthood into which humanity has come challenges what has come before 
it. An honest view of humanity in accord with prevailing thought is not content 
with mere dogmatism or retreats into the opinion of earlier fathers, but insists that 
current rules of reason and logic be followed because these now define the way 
humanity understands the world. This too Thielicke embraces and holds up as a 
positive thing for the Christian Church. Thielicke calls it "secularisation" 
("Sakularisation") and sees no reason why it cannot be subsumed under the 
category of Christian freedom. Thielicke does note, however, that this maturity is a 
two-edged sword; the same freedom that can give new perspectives on the world 
can and has been misused to bring about the fall into sin.39 Nonetheless, 
regardless ofthe risks, it is essential for Thielicke that christology itself recognise 
the new adult understanding of reality and become one with it. Thielicke states: 
... secularisation might be viewed as the attainment of adulthood, of 
an independent and autonomous relation to the world, which faith 
itself initiates. The historical process of emancipation [from a 
theonomous world view], then is simply another form of 
Christianity. 40 
38 Helmut Thielicke, Mensch sein Mensch werden: Entwurf einer christlichen 
Anthropologie (Munchen: R. Piper and Co. Verlag, 1976) p. 167. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The Evangelical Faith vol. 1, p. 3'14. 
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Important here is Thielicke's view that faith not only accepts the current 
individualistic Weltanschauung but "initiates" it. Faith recognises that 
advancements in ways of knowing and thinking are also gifts of God. Traditional 
hermeneutics are immediately challenged by this coming to adulthood. Thielicke 
explains: 
A veritable maze of new problems is thus posed by the Cartesian 
approach. The feature common to all of them is that they center on 
the situation of the adult self who is summoned to appropriate the 
message. The question of understanding thus becomes more and 
more central until fmally hermeneutics becomes a theological 
discipline of its own. I can appropriate only what I can understand 
and penetrate.41 
Such challenges to understanding posed by the adult individualistic 
Weltanschauung can again threaten faith. Thielicke admits this in his sermons 
when he holds up the Prodigal Son as a stereotypical individualist whose coming to 
adulthood drove him to abandon his father. 42 Regardless of inherent dangers 
Thielicke pushes the Church to establish its christology with respect to this new 
maturity and demonstrate the applicability of Christ.43 
In practical terms for Thielicke this means one's search for Christ is influenced 
"inductively" so to speak; as one examines advancements in knowledge, science, 
41 Ibid., p. 39. Cf. statements made about this newfound adulthood on pp. 49ff. 
42 The Waiting Father, pp. 21, 27. 
43 In a section titled "Dawn of the New Age: Emancipation of Adult Man", p. 
90 of The Evangelical Faith, vol. I, Thielicke writes:" ... in adulthood man has 
not achieved control in his own power; he has been empowered. Adulthood is not a 
domestic coup d' et at by which the father is expropriated. It is the institution to the 
right of sonship at the time appointed by the father." cf. also p. I 08 "The 
anthropological dimension (of Theology A) is that man's adulthood and dignity 
require that his self-understanding be respected." 
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and even biblical interpretation and then draws these into one's "I-Thou" 
relationship. Thielicke laments the reluctance of classic or orthodox theology to 
approach the world in such a way.44 At times he sharply criticizes "orthodoxy" for 
its reluctance to embrace critical understandings of textual development and its use 
of what he considers an archaic view of verbal inspiration.45 Such criticisms reflect 
his desire for theology to be current and "adult" in its approach to matters of faith 
and anthropology.46 
Thielicke of course was right in his observation that christology must be able to 
function in a changed worldview. In the pages that follow we hope to provide 
practical examples of how the Church can shape its christological presentation in 
such way as to provide answers and fill the needs of the postmodem person. The 
way sermons are presented, for example, must be re-examined in light of 
postmodem cognitive capabilities. The importance of the individual can be 
supported through corporate acts of charity and compassion. The postmodem 
desire for belonging can be recognized and efforts made to show how the Church 
can fill that longing in a meaningful and lasting way - how the Church can even 
44 Consider Thielicke treatment of "borderline situations" like birth control, 
homosexuality, and more modem views of sexuality in The Ethics of Sex. Several 
times in this volume Thielicke chastises modem theology for not treating seriously 
advancements in science or secular sociology, pp. 269-271, 295. 
45 Cf. Modem Faith and Thought, pp. 105-107. 
46 A particularly clear example of this approach can be seen in: Helm ut 
Thielicke, The Faith Letters, trans. Douglas Crow (Waco, Texas: Word Books 
Publisher, 1978). In this work students are Thielicke's principal audience. This 
work is the product of the "Faith Information Project Group" and claims to be a 
compilation of letters by various students addressing current questions of spiritual 
importance. The letters all seem be bear Thielicke's unique linguistic stamp, 
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draw on inherent ritualistic tendencies that the postmodem community uses to 
reinforce a sense of togetherness. 
Thielicke was also right in pointing out that many aspects of individualism are 
gifts of God and part of a necessary movement toward spiritual maturity. The 
matters of individual worth and uniqueness that he emphasised were valuable and 
continue to be necessary elements in christology. The Church does not merely 
throw postmodem culture a bone by reluctantly admitting these facts. It rightfully 
claims them as part of God's unique revelation that should be prominent in its 
teaching. 
However, what seems clear in the postmodem climate is that these observations 
about the mature individual cannot stand alone. As shown above both 
anthropology and christology remain incomplete without a proper balance of 
social/communal elements. The Church must then take up this issue of community 
while preserving the anthropological recognition of the individual. 
Thielicke drew attention to an emerging spiritual adulthood. But such 
maturation need not be seen as complete in individualism. This can be illustrated 
through the analogy of human maturing: As a young child one depends on the 
structure and certainty of the parent's decisions. In the teen years the young adult 
seeks to express his or her individuality and asserts his or her independence of 
thought. This may lead to varying levels of rebellion against the parental structure. 
however, which suggests he was heavily involved in editing them. "Playing" to the 
notion of intellectual adulthood comes up several times in these letters (cf. pp. 11, 
20, 36). 
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In later years there is a regaining of appreciation for the wisdom of the parent and 
recognition that one's independence must be tempered by one's interdependence. 
In normal development the period of what might be termed more crass individual 
expression is only a mediating phase of development. Eventually the individual 
discovers that isolated individuality is no longer satisfying. What Thielicke 
proposed as the adulthood of humanity seems more approximate to young 
adulthood. 
The Church need not simply stand at odds with secular anthropology over the 
role of the individual because secular anthropology does not demand individualism; 
just the opposite. There are communal elements within anthropology that invite 
further exploration and engagement by the Church. The more the communal nature 
of mankind is self-evident to the secular world, the more opportunity the Church 
has for showing how its corporate christology supplies inherent needs. The danger 
for the Church is to allow these observations from secular anthropology to shape its 
presentation in purely social terms. The corporate nature of the Church may indeed 
answer the social need of human beings, but the Church does not exist for that 
purpose. Her purpose must always be rooted in the salvific action of Christ. Such a 
rooting deepens the nature of the social bond rather than supplants it. Secular 
anthropology opens a door for the Church to bring this more profound sort of social 
bond, so necessary to human existence, to an audience that may be suspicious of the 
Church as an institution or of Christianity as a body of dogma. 
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7.2 Understanding Christ from a Social Perspective 
As discussed earlier there was a unique flavour to the individualism and the 
community models ofThielicke's day but so too was christology coloured by the 
unique foci of that era. Broad generalities are always dangerous but in this case 
somewhat necessary. N.T. Wright has noted certain epochs in the approach to 
christology. There was the initial "Quest for the Historical Jesus" beginning with 
Reimarus in the 18th century, extending throughout the 19th century, and ending 
essentially with Schweitzer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus.47 This first stage, 
according to Wright, was interested in rediscovering the personality of Jesus. 
Then in the 20th century during the height ofThielicke's career the christological 
discussions were greatly concerned with critically examining the narratives about 
Jesus. There was a proliferation of various critical approaches in evaluating the 
texts themselves and the faith of the early Christian communities to which those 
texts testified.48 Recently, as Wright explains, the push is more toward a synthesis 
of Jesus' sayings and deeds with reference to the first century Jewish context in 
which Jesus lived.49 This approach offers a more complete historical understanding 
of Jesus and invites a greater theological evaluation of his actual aims. However 
Wright hints that questions about the ecclesial nature of Christ's person remain 
largely unanswered. 50 
47 Who Was Jesus? pp. 2-6. 
48 Ibid., pp. 7-9. 
49 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
50 Ibid.,pp.17-18. 
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The christological concerns in Thielicke's day had advanced beyond 
rediscovering the personality of Jesus, but Jesus as an individual still remained the 
focus. His uniqueness was explored using the new tools of textual criticism but his 
existence as a social being was not given much thought. Indeed, as will be 
discussed more in the following pages, this flaw remains apparent in present-day 
christology. 51 
What will be proposed here is that to be honest with the incarnation itself, the 
individualising bent ofThielicke's christology (and that ofhis era) must be re-
evaluated with an eye on the innate social character of Jesus the human being. Not 
that there is anything wrong with exploring the uniqueness of Jesus as an 
individual. But when his individuality is explored to the exclusion of his life within 
community then the fuller picture of Christ suffers. As was stated previously, 
human beings were made to be social creatures. They suffer harm when they are 
isolated. A closer examination of Christ will discover an obvious and 
51 This is not to say that present day christologies completely ignore corporate 
dimensions in the person of Christ. For instance N.T. Wright offers several 
observations in regard to the corporate nature of Christ. He points out that Christ 
and the Temple were one in the sense that "he (Jesus) was the place where Israel 
was to meet her God." (Who Was Jesus?, pp. 50-51); and again that the title "Son 
of God" was in the first century a title both for Israel and for the Messiah (Who 
Was Jesus? p. 79), which further advances the social/ecclesial connection between 
Christ and his people. Yet while these observations are made the amount of space 
devoted to exploring the deeper meaning of Christ's corporate nature remains fairly 
small. E.P. Sanders in The Historical Figure of Jesus (London: Penguin Books, 
1993) notes similar corporate hints in Jesus life but passes by them quickly to 
explore broader concerns involving the individual uniqueness of Christ and his 
circumstances. Again John Dominic Crossan in The Historical Jesus: The Life of a 
Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991) devotes 
great space to exploring the cultural circumstances surrounding Jesus in the first 
century and tries then to explain Jesus' life accordingly but leaves questions of 
Christ's corporate nature unexplored. 
298 
multidimensional side to his existence as a social being and will force the case 
further for the need of a Theology of Presence. 
One author has explained the human life as residing in what amounts to "nesting 
boxes" of human social settings. Human beings live in multi-layered societies from 
families to communities to cultures. There are different close-knit communities at 
the work place, worship place, and neighbourhood. There are loose-knit 
communities that arise around sporting events and shared group functions. To be a 
functioning human being is to find one's place within these many social contexts. 
Despite the growing individualism of which we have spoken, there still remains a 
desire in postmodern people to find a place within this multiplicity of social 
contexts. People who claim their individualism do not in the end want to be 
isolated in it. By showing Christ as a social being, postmodern individuals can see 
him as one involved with the same "nesting box" structure in which they struggle to 
fit. Understanding Christ as a social being goes directly to Thielicke's desire of 
making the Christian message graspable at the level of concern where people 
actually live. 
To begin our evaluation of Christ the social being we note that Matthew 
precedes the birth narrative with the genealogy of Jesus. Luke places a genealogy 
of Christ at what is usually thought of as the beginning point in Christ's public 
ministry - his baptism. These genealogies are often understood as establishing 
Christ's Davidic descent. This they do but, more than that, they also connect Christ 
to a line of humanity. He is not an alien born in isolation from the human 
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community but is one with humanity even to the point of having an identifiable 
human ancestry. 
Secondly Christ was placed within the context of family. Much ink has been 
devoted to speculation about Christ's awakening self-consciousness and self-
identification. 52 When one approaches this issue from a more critical perspective, 
questioning the reliability of the sacred texts' witness to Christ's divinity, then the 
role of social influence on Jesus' self-identification becomes even more crucial. If 
Jesus was an ordinary human child then his Messianic self-understanding was 
wholly dependant on social, familial, and religious pressures. When Christ's 
awakening self-consciousness is seen from a more conservative perspective, 
without doubt as to his divinity or the biblical witness of his life, even then the 
place of social interaction is important. For example, conservative scholars could 
point to the role ofMary and Joseph in the formation of Jesus' self-understanding. 
Luke 2: 19 records that "Mary pondered all these things in her heart. "53 It seems 
likely that in the close social/familial bonds of parent to child such remarkable 
information would have been shared with the boy Jesus at some point (admittedly 
this is highly speculative). 
The point is that regardless of one's theological camp there is every reason to 
consider Christ's development in terms of a social being who drew in some way on 
52 Thielicke discusses this topic in The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, pp. 353-357. 
Thielicke states "If we take the humanity of Jesus seriously, the question ofhis self-
consciousness necessarily arises." (p. 355) 
53 A similar statement is made of Mary following Jesus in the temple as a boy. 
Luke 2:51. 
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family and society54 and not as one who defmed himself through an isolated self-
awakening. The New Testament records the various social interactions with the 
Jewish community that Jesus enjoyed as a child. 55 There is also the matter of Jesus 
growing up in the context of a town. Despite later apocryphal attempts to 
characterise Jesus' youth as remarkable, even supernatural, 56 the New Testament 
seems to imply that Jesus' younger years were so "human" within the town of his 
youth that the town's people could not accept his remarkable character later when 
he returned as an adult. 57 What precious little the Gospels do say about Jesus' 
youth would support the view that his childhood was understood by the Gospel 
54 One could also cite Jesus in the temple (Luke 2) learning from the teachers of 
the law as an example of social influence on his understanding. Yet conservative 
scholars would point out that even by this time the Christ child seems to understand 
himself as God's unique son: "I must be about My Father's business." 
55 His circumcision (Luke 2:21 ff) is a social and religious bond. His yearly 
participation in Passover at Jerusalem (Luke 2:41) was also an opportunity for 
instruction and reflection in a social context. 
56 Cf. The Infancy Gospel of James (3rd or 4th century) where Christ's birth is 
more a matter of His miraculous appearing at Mary's breast after a bright light 
appears in the cave where Mary was (19:15-16). Salome's hand is devoured by 
flames after giving Mary a pelvic exam only to be healed by the infant Jesus (20: 1-
10). In the Infancy Gospel ofThomas (2"d or 3rd century) Jesus at age five purifies 
water in a stream and turns clay shaped into birds into living sparrows (Chapter 2), 
in a fit of rage causes a young boy to wither up (3:3), causes another boy to die for 
bumping into him (4:1-2), heals a group of people (8), raises a dead boy back to life 
(9:4-5), and heals an axe wound (10). At age six Jesus carries water in his cloak 
(11). At age 8 Jesus is said to have multiplied a measure of grain into a hundred 
measures (12:1-2) and stretched a board out that was cut too short (13:3). Other 
miracles attributed to the boy Jesus are also listed but not necessary to recite 
further. Cited from: Ronald F. Hock, The Infancy Gospels of James and Thomas 
(California: Polebridge Press, 1995), pp, 33-77 and 104-143. Cf. also stories in the 
Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew which records all the animals constantly bowing to the 
Christ child and adoring him, the boy Jesus causing a palm tree to bend down over 
Mary and give up its fruit and pick up its roots to unplug a spring of water for them 
to drink. The Arabic Infancy Gospel is another source of supernatural stories of the 
boy Christ. These are found in J.K. Elliott, The Apocryphal Jesus (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) pp. 23-30. 
57 CfMatthew 13:55ff., Mark 6:3ff., and Luke 4:22ff. 
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writers as relatively normal. He was subject to his parents in the context of the 
family and under their tutelage grew "in wisdom and stature. "58 
Some scholars have found it irresistible to use later apocryphal writings to press 
the social nature of Christ even further. Authors like Barbara Thiering and Bishop 
John Spong have pressed the social side of the incarnation to the point of claiming 
Jesus was married, but as N.T. Wright has shown the apocryphal evidence for such 
a claim is simply not plausible. 59 
The New Testament image of Christ is not one of a man with antisocial 
tendencies. The Gospel accounts show Christ gathering disciples around him and 
being surrounded by crowds of desperate and needy people on a continual basis;60 
whereas prior to the beginning of his ministry, Jesus was subsumed within society 
to the point of being virtually "unknown." After the start of his ministry an 
identifiable community formed around him.61 It is undeniable that a major part of 
58 Luke 2:52. 
59 Who Was Jesus? pp. 29-32. Thiering basis this claim on a citation in the third 
century Gnostic Gospel of Philip which speaks of Christ kissing Mary Magdalene 
on the mouth. Even if such a thing happened it was a normal social greeting and 
not a sign of sexual attraction. Cf. pp. 70, 90-91. 
60 Debate exists over the exact size of these crowds that surrounded Jesus. The 
Gospels speak of crowds that became exceedingly large, in excess of five thousand 
at times, yet others have argued that the crowds surrounding Jesus were fairly 
small. E.P. Saunders posits the view that a logical reason for Jesus' execution from 
the perspective ofPilate and Caiaphas was that it was clear he could raise a 
substantial mob at will. E.P. Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus (London: 
Penguin Books, 1993), p. 268. 
61 The size of this following has been debated as E.P Sanders notes in Jesus and 
Judaism. The evidence in the Gospels points to crowds varying in size but 
exceeding several thousand at times. 
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Jesus' life and ministry as recorded in the Gospels was spent firmly encased in this 
"nesting box" of social contexts. To seek Jesus then only in terms of his 
uniqueness and individuality and to focus on one's "personal encounter" with Jesus 
to the exclusion of recognising Christ as found in corporate contexts, seems 
arguably to be dishonest to the very nature of the incarnation. 
To apply this information to Thielicke's christology may in a way be unfair to 
him. Thielicke's fixation on individuality in christology was after all not wholly 
his fault. Questions of knowing Christ according to his union with community 
were simply not asked in the popular christologies of the day. Yet in the present 
postmodem context it seems that such issues are pushed to the forefront. 62 It is 
necessary in our day to ask, "What does it mean for Christianity to know Christ as a 
communal being?" Zizioulas and the Trinitarian theologians have asked what it 
means to know Christ according to his corporate nature within the Trinity, but they 
too seem to miss the issue of Christ within the "nesting boxes" of human social 
62 David Brown in Tradition and Imagination speaks of "triggers" in the culture 
and thought of each era that causes the sacred texts to be revealed or interpreted in 
new ways. Such a "trigger" for recognizing the importance of community in the 
incarnation may be present in the plurality of postmodernism today. In Modernity 
and Postmodemity: Knowledge, Power and the Self, p. 120 Gerard Delanty argues, 
"The revival of community in sociological theory and political philosophy cannot 
be divorced from the return of community in global political culture. Indeed, it may 
be that community is becoming the universal ideology of our time and is usurping 
the idea of the social. The idea of community, after all, is more central to the social 
movements of the early twenty-first century than is society. The appeal to 
community was central to Bill Clinton's election campaign of 1992, and Tony 
Blair's election campaign of 1997 was very much articulated in terms of a neo-
republican idea of community. The rhetoric ofNew Labour favours terms such as 
'community' and 'nation' more than 'society.' If liberal individualism was the 
ideology ofthe 1980's, community was the ideology ofthe 1990's." Of course as 
other authors have warned, the danger of some of this political rhetoric of 
'community' is that what is often encouraged is not dissimilar to mild strains of 
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community. The Social Gospel was an attempt to explore Christ as a social being, 
but it fell short by reducing Christ to the role of a social reconstructionist and the 
Gospel to a message of worldly reform. Issues of redemption, justification, and 
ecclesiology were left underdeveloped by the Social Gospel movement. 
Thielicke's more common use of Christ's union with community is largely 
limited to a principle of sanctification. One loves the other because Christ is in that 
other. One loves the world and the human community because Christ died for the 
world and her people. But more than using Christ's universal love as a motivation 
for sanctification, there needs to be an effort to place Christ's being in community 
as a necessary part of the incarnation and as a necessary part of the very definition 
of community. Why was Christ joined to the human community? Why did he not 
simply live as a hermit sage and answer questions from passing truth seekers? Yet 
perhaps before an adequate answer can be given to those questions, a more 
fundamental question presents itself: "How do we as Christians understand 
community?" 
The Christian perspective on the nature of community and society is markedly 
different from a secular understanding. It is more than a gathering of people with 
certain bonds of interest or ancestry. It is larger than geographical proximity. An 
interesting observation on the nature of community is offered by Rowan Williams 
in his article "Sacraments of the New Society" where he states: 
... what constitutes our belonging together, morally and spiritually, 
is our corporate relation to God. That is to say that what unites us 
with other human beings is not common culture or negotiated terms 
neo-fascism. Cf. Craig A. Loscalzo, Apologetic Preaching: Proclaiming Christ to a 
Postmodem Word (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000) pp. 18-19. 
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of co-operation or common aims, but something external to human 
community itself, the regard of God upon us. In the Book of 
Common Prayer's terms ... we are either bound together by being 
'seen' by God as distant, as strangers, or bound together in a 
common assurance that we are received, affirmed, adopted. 63 
Williams provides us with a logical extension ofThielicke's isolation of the 
individual before God. The element of"before God (or Christ)" remains constant, 
but the matter of self-definition moves from the "I" before God to the "we" before 
God. This corollary to Thielicke's method draws strength from the very nature of 
the incarnation where Christ manifested himself to "peoples" or "communities" and 
not primarily to singular individuals. Christ's joining to the nesting box structures 
of human society goes far beyond reasons for sanctification with others; it becomes 
a way to defme community and a way of understanding the self. 
In the incarnation there was either the community around Jesus that drew new 
life from him as its Saviour, or there was the community standing apart from Jesus 
rejecting him as Saviour. In our existence as social beings we too are either joined 
to a community wherein Christ's salvific presence is manifest64 or we are joined to 
a community standing against him. The incarnation then does not simply define 
who we think Christ was but ultimately defines who we are as a people. Certainly 
Thielicke's more individualistic views ofpersonhood can find a place in this 
evaluation. Those who are joined to a community for or against Christ are then 
63 Rowan Williams, "Sacraments of the New Society," in Christ: The 
Sacramental Word, ed. David Brown and Ann Loades (London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1996), p. 93. 
64 In mind here is Matthew 18:20 "For where two or three are gathered together 
in My name, I am there in the midst of them." (NKN) This promise is set within 
the context of the giving of the office of the keys and the binding and loosing of 
sins. Thus there are strong sacramental overtones in this christological presence. 
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individually standing for or against Christ. Definition in relation to Christ's 
presence is not either community or individual but both. However, what is being 
proposed here is that one's personal definition in relation to Christ flows from one's 
relationship to the community surrounding him; not as Thielicke suggests, flowing 
first from one's individual encounter with Christ and only secondarily from one's 
relationship with the community of faith. 
7.3 Joining a Social Perspective to an Individualised World 
Thus far we have suggested changes in focus toward more corporate ideas of being. 
We have shown weaknesses in Thielicke's individualisation and positive directives 
from Thielicke's approach to help in our postmodern context. What remains is to 
apply these shifts of idea to practical circumstances. We would point out that this 
too is very much in keeping with Thielicke's wishes for the Church. His distaste 
for purely dogmatic forms of theology that failed to offer practical help have been 
well documented in our thesis so far. 
In seeking practical applications for corporate christological being we take heed 
to a warning given by Martin Heidegger: 
Only ages that really no longer believe in the true greatness of the 
task of theology arrive at the pernicious opinion that, through a 
supposed refurbishment with the help of philosophy, a theology can 
be gained or even replaced, and can be made more palatable to the 
need of the age.65 
As Heidegger points out there is a fme line between addressing current needs in 
philosophy with theology and altering theology to fit prevailing philosophies. 
65 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 8. 
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While one could argue that Thielicke's individualisation is the result of 
philosophical influences on his theology, and perhaps even an attempt to make 
current theology more palatable to prevailing philosophy, one cannot deny that the 
christological principle upon which his human ontology is based prevents his 
approach from being swallowed by philosophy. 
Thielicke sought always to make this christological principle a matter of real life 
application for the people. Even as he wrestled with difficult philosophical 
debates, he did so in such a way as to involve people at the grassroots level and not 
just in the halls of academia. One finds Thielicke bringing numerous philosophical 
concerns into his sermons and addressing them in the hearing of the common 
Volk. 66 It was his desire that common people would learn how the christological 
principle actually overcame pure philosophy as the ground for human being, and 
that they would themselves be spared from being swallowed by secular philosophy. 
The central place of this christological principle in Thielicke's mind as he 
addressed his thoughts to the common people are worthy of re-emphasis: 
66 As an example from his sermons one finds Thielicke confronting numerous 
philosophers: In Christ and the Meaning of Life, Kant is discussed on pp. 111, 112, 
117, Sarte on page 148, Kierkegaard on p. 92, Lessing on p. 11; In Life Can Begin 
Again, Sarte is discussed on p. 168, Kant on pp. xii, xiii, 89; In How to Believe 
Again, Kierkegaard is referenced on pp. 134, 147, 164, Pascal on pp. 11, 12, 13, 17, 
Kant on pp. 32, 134, 142, Sarte is found on p. 196; In I Believe the Christian Creed, 
Marx is addressed on pp. 122, 224, 244, 248, Kirkegaard on pp. 144, 183, Lessing 
on pp. 50, 58, 152, 153, 168; In Faith the Great Adventure, one fmds reference to 
the ideas ofKant on pp. 56, 136 and Lessing on p. 112. Not all these references 
reflect a conscious wrestling with issues of individualisation but they do 
demonstrate a wrestling with the ultimate questions of philosophy itself. A number 
of these references do show how philosophical matters pertinent to the "I" were of 
great concern for Thielicke ( esp. Christ and the Meaning of Life, pp. 11, 111, 112; 
How to Believe Again, pp. 17, 130, 134, 147, 196; Faith the Great Adventure, p. 
136). 
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Indeed, the very image of man - we can even say the very concept of 
humanity - is not plain to me outside of Christ. If I seek it apart 
from him, what I come up with is simply the ideal of man in conflict 
with himself, or the ideal of the beautiful soul, or a labor factor, or a 
vital potency, or one of the many other variants. What these all have 
in common is that they construct their image not from what man was 
at creation and what he is intended to be but from what he presently 
is; they take fallen man as their model and idealized him. The image 
which God has of us men has taken form in the humanity of Jesus 
Christ ... What man is, I know only in the face of the humanity of 
Jesus Christ. To become a man is to share in this humanity of Jesus 
Christ. It is to grow into the union with the Father which Jesus 
Christ 'is" in virtue of his being the God-man. To grow into 
humanity is to grow into Jesus Christ.67 
Thielicke's statement about "growing into Christ" is not tightly defined, but 
within his statement there is a distinct need of Christ as the defining element for 
understanding human being, and indeed, for understanding daily life. The 
challenge for the Church is to present a christological and corporate concept of 
being in such a way that it accomplishes what Thielicke sought to accomplish in 
reaching the common people at the grassroots level, and that it does so in such a 
way as to avoid being overcome by the world's philosophies. 
7.3a The ttSocial" Ministry of the Church 
It goes without saying that Christ's social existence meant involvement and care 
with real needs of people. From healing sicknesses to feeding thousands, Jesus 
directly connected relief for the physical burdens of the people with oral 
proclamation. This simple combination of physical charity with spiritual care 
gives shape to the ongoing christological presence in the world. 
67 Theological Ethics, vol. 2, pp. 613-614. 
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The fact that this combined focus of physical healing and oral teaching is 
mentioned in Luke 9 (vs. 1ft) as part of the authority Christ gave the twelve, and 
was further confirmed by the Church in the establishment of a deaconal office in 
Acts 6, shows the early Church recognised this combination as essential to ongoing 
christological proclamation. This also sets the exercise of Christian charity and 
love in a communal and practical context. Charity was not merely the ethical act of 
the individual in his or her unique sphere of influence but the duty of the Church in 
the midst of the world. 
The marriage between the proclaimed Gospel and social ethics has not always 
been an easy one. Overemphasis on the Church's expression of charity in society 
has led to various shades of "Social Gospel" which effectively turn Christ into a 
social reformer or liberator and not a Saviour from sin and wrath. Conversely, 
overemphasis on the isolated proclamation of the Gospel within the confines of the 
Church proper has led to a kind of dogmatism that seems unconcerned with the 
people in the world around it. Matthew Harrison offers the following observations 
about the need for a proper balance: 
I'm convinced, on the basis of the New Testament, that there is a 
threefold reality in the life of the church as church. All three hang 
inseparably together. The church must be on about proclamation of 
the gospel of Christ (martyria). In fact, to the extent that any 
mission of the church ceases this proclamation of the vicarious 
atonement of Christ and salvation by grace through faith, or alters 
this definition of the gospel, it ceases to be Christian. Second, the 
church must be on about worship (leitourgia). Proclamation 
produces faith in Christ, and draws the faithful into the full 
sacramental life of the church. Wherever the church would have a 
'mission' or endeavor which is not clearly flowing from, to, and 
connected with altar, font and pulpit, that mission is sectarian at 
best, and non-Christian at its worst. Third, wherever the church 
breathes in the blessed gospel and sacraments, she cannot but exhale 
mercy and love toward the neighbor (diakonia) Diakonia is as 
much a part of the church's life as good works are a part of the life 
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of faith. This applies to Christians both individually and 
collectively. Wherever these three realities of the church's life are 
not functioning in balance, there is a truncation of the church's life, 
and a diminution of its mission. 68 
In an article Harrison wrote after he penned these comments he clarifies the 
shape of this christological charity by emphasising the unconditional nature of the 
gift.69 His point is that charity, to be Christian, should not engage in a dishonest 
"bait and switch," portraying itself as the giver of unconditional help but in reality 
using charity as an evangelism tool. One sees this with certain soup kitchens that 
give help but demand those in need sit and listen to a sermon first, or promise to 
come to Church, or confess a certain belief in Christ. Harrison writes: 
The church doesn't reach out to those in need because it's a 
guaranteed way to fill pews. Proclaiming Jesus and loving our 
neighbor has to do with who and what the church is as the body of 
Christ.70 
Any christology which takes seriously Christ as a social being must in turn take 
seriously this work of"deaconal" care for and in society. This has been important 
for Lutheranism historically. Luther spoke of the importance of care for the 
community71 and drew up plans for the ongoing care of the poor and needy in 
68 Matthew Harrison, "The Church's Role of Mercy in the Community," Lecture 
given at Concordia Theological Seminary, Ft. Wayne, IN, 2000. p. 2. 
69 Matthew Harrison, "The Church Is a Mercy Place!" The Lutheran Witness, 
November 2002, p. 7. 
70 Ibid. 
71 LW 52:223, "Both nature and God's ordinances teach that since people have 
to live together as a community, they must pool their interests and carry common 
burdens on a common back, undertake common work with common hands; in this 
way they are bound together by the common needs of a common life. Contrary to 
this, the pope and canon law uphold privilegia, libertates, immunitates, indulta, 
gratias, and obvious exemptions, and he and his servants avail themselves ofthe 
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Leisnig.72 In these plans known as "The Ordinance of a Common Chest," Luther 
defmes the impetus for communal charity in christological terms. Love for the 
other flows not from law but from Christ and His love for us. 73 The manifestation 
of that love must include care of widows, orphans, the poor, church workers, and 
the elderly. 74 Luther saw this social interaction as including even the maintenance 
of bridges, schools, and hospitals. 75 More important than his recognition of charity 
as a communal act of the Church is his understanding of this charity flowing from 
the liturgical/sacramental life of the Church. Carter Lindberg explains Luther's 
view that "communal service to the neighbor is the continuation of worship in the 
world, that social ethics is the liturgy after the liturgy."76 As evidence of this one 
fmds Luther pointing to the apostolic practice of gathering gifts for the needy at the 
time of the mass, 77 and statements that the collects before and after the mass were 
prayers spoken over the gifts for the poor as they were being gathered. 78 
advantages of the goods but let others undertake the common work and shoulder 
the common burdens .... They want to be socially uncommitted and to have special 
privileges, and so St. Paul calls them aspondos, those who refuse social 
commitment, those who are antisocial ... " 
72 LW 45:169-194. 
73 Ibid., p. 169. 
74 Ibid., pp. 186-191. 
75 Ibid., p. 191. 
76 Carter Lindberg, "Luther's Concept of Offering," Dialogue, Fall1996, vol. 35, 
no. 4, p. 251. 
77 LW 35:94. 
78 Ibid., p. 95. 
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Later during the age of Lutheran orthodoxy, which is often considered as a time 
of preoccupation with cold dogmatism, Johann Gerhard79 went so far as to make 
social charity an essential mark of the office of the public ministry. 80 
Even today charity remains vital to Lutheran christology. Harrison quotes "The 
Not-for-Profit Times" as reporting that Lutheran Services in America are the largest 
not-for-profit umbrella in America with a combined budget of nearly 7 billion 
dollars.81 So even though dogmatics texts do not often highlight charity as an arm 
of christology, Lutheran practice has made deaconal service paramount. In practice 
charity is the natural consequence and the worldly expression of Christ's incarnate 
presence within the Word and sacraments of the Church. 
The ingrained individualistic philosophy of those who are part of the 
postmodem Church presents difficulties in establishing an understanding of 
communal ethics as a natural part of christology. Social observers have noted that 
79 Johann Gerhard (1582-1637) a recognized scholar, writer, and church father 
of early Lutheranism. 
80 Iohannis Gerhardi, Theologi Quondam Jenesis Celeberrimi Locorum 
Theologicorum, Tomus Decimus Tertius. Denuo Edidit, Variisque Observationibus 
adavxit lo. Fridericus Cotta, Theologus Tubingensis. Tubingae, Sumtibus Jo. 
Georgii Cottae. MDCCLXXV, para. CCLXXXIX, p. 114. [the following 
unpublished translation is given by Matthew Harrison] "The seventh officium of 
ministers is care for the needy (pauperum cura) and visitation of the elderly. That 
which pertains to the care for the needy must not be considered alien to himself by 
the minister of the church: 1) since Christ in his ministry maintained the most 
sincere concern for the needy: John XIII.29: 2) Paul gave directions (ordinations) 
concerning the collections for use by the saints, in the churches of Galatia and 
Corinth: 1 Cor. 16:1; Gal. ll.9, ... 3) Since in the ancient church the agapai or 
public meals for the use of the needy were instituted by the ministers from the 
collections ... " 
81 Matthew C. Harrison, "The Church's Role of Mercy in the Community," p. 3. 
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even when postmodern individuals seek community what they are seeking is not a 
sacrificial community willing to give freely to the other, but a conglomeration of 
individuals who are not especially committed to the other. 
Bellah et al. (1985) discovered that as they interviewed people 
throughout the United States there was a strong longing for 
community, but the language used to discuss the notion of 
community was often individualistic and psychological. They found 
community individualized in an attempt to escape the demands of 
"the other. "82 
What the individualism of postmodern culture does understand and appreciate 
(albeit to extremes) is individual worth. Active social charity answers the 
postmodern yearning for individual importance without yielding to individualism. 
Each person, even those of unusually depressed social status, become vitally 
important to Christ and to the community of the Church, so much so that those of 
higher social status are willing to make personal sacrifices for them. A visible role 
in social charity seizes upon an essential positive element in the postmodern 
consciousness. In so doing it invites postmodern people to examine its 
christological motivation at more depth. 
As social charity is examined in terms of its christology, the inherent message of 
the act shows more than a desire to imitate Christ outwardly; it expresses a core 
element of the incarnation as an event that defines individuals in relation and love 
to others. Communion with Christ then has as its counterpart communion with 
82 Josina M. Makau and Ronald C. Arnett, Communication Ethics in an Age of 
Diversity (Chicago: University oflllinois Press, 1997), p. 29. 
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others in a self-sacrificing way. One cannot rightly know Christ in isolated 
individualism. 83 
Though we have made much ofThielicke's individualising christology, his 
passion for the concrete situation of humanity readily supports active charity and 
sacrifice for others. He wants Christianity to touch the real daily lives of ordinary 
people to help deliver them from the hardships of their "all too human" flesh. This 
compassionate heart of the theologian is especially apparent is his travel diary, 
Voyage to the Far East. In this volume Thielicke relates the events of a cruise that 
took him to ports at Penang, Singapore, Hong Kong and Y okohama, to name a few. 
Thielicke's eye is constantly on the people around him. He buys drinks for young 
sailors as a way of getting to know them more personally and of understanding their 
lives. He notes the sins with which they struggle in port and ponders practical 
alternatives to help them avoid such sins. He shows concern for his fellow 
passengers and for those he visits on shore.84 It is obvious that his theology flows 
from a genuine love for other people. He not only sees their spiritual predicament 
he searches for ways to alleviate their troubles. 85 This heart of genuine compassion 
83 1 John 3:17. 
84 Helmut Thielicke, Voyage to the Far East, trans. By John W Doberstein 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1962), pp. 16,48-49, 81, 112-113, 116, 119, 129, 
174, and 177. 
85 One particular pastor's approach in Hong Kong caught Thielicke's eye. He 
would invite young sailors from the streets into well kept rooms where they could 
read or talk. Young people from the city were there to talk with them. He had 
some Bible reading but not in a forced atmosphere. In the evening young women 
were invited to come for dancing and conversation, but then asked to return home a 
half hour before the men left, so as to avoid adulterous situations. To Thielicke's 
surprise the young sailors responded well to this and gladly sought out the pastor at 
later visits (Voyage to the Far East, pp. 112-113). Thielicke noted a genuine love 
and concern in the heart of the pastor for the lives of these young men- a concern 
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for the real needs of others is a timeless element in christology and as such must 
remain prominent in the Churches' interaction with postmodern people. 
7.3b Solutions in Liturgical Structure 
In chapter two we noted Thielicke's concern that the liturgy not be abused either by 
repristination or by innovation. We noted how he did in fact see the liturgy as 
important in building community. Thielicke however did not develop these 
thoughts into any kind of strategy for furthering his christological goals. Here we 
intend to take Thielicke's observations further by exploring the liturgy as an answer 
to Thielicke's double concern of reaching those outside the Church and connecting 
to people at the root of their needs. We will also show how the liturgy helps focus 
the postmodern participant away from an individualistic mindset. 
How the Church treats the individual and furthers the notion of ecclesial 
community is not a trivial matter but goes to the very heart of what the Church is; 
and nowhere does the Church express these matters more clearly than in her 
liturgical conversation with God. It is there in the liturgical action that the Church 
implicitly and explicitly defmes the relationship of her members to the present 
cultural conditions. Though the following quotation from Miroslav Volf does not 
directly speak to the liturgy, his words do voice concern that the Church often fails 
to recognize her function of challenging the currents and views of the day in 
conflict with the faith. 
Our coziness with the surrounding culture has made us so blind to 
many of its evils that, instead of calling them into question, we offer 
our own versions of them - in God's name and with a good 
that expressed itself in a unique and genuine approach to charity which freely gave 
and witnessed to Christ but did not make its given conditional. 
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conscience. Those who refuse to be party to our mimicry we brand 
sectarians ... Cultural identity insinuates itself with religious force; 
Christian and cultural commitments merge. Such sacralization of 
cultural identity is invaluable for the parties in conflict because it 
can transmute what is in fact a murder into an act ofpiety.86 
When the liturgy is seen as a vehicle for bringing a different worldview to the 
people, the form and character of her public liturgical voice becomes important. 
Thielicke recognizes the importance of liturgy and sees the combination of liturgy 
and preaching as essential for one's understanding of Church, Christ, 87 and self. 88 
It is disappointing then that Thielicke does not develop his ideas in any detail and 
does not draw his thoughts about the liturgy into the christology of his sermons. 
The liturgy is also important from the perspective of missionary zeal. We 
identified Thielicke's passion for reaching lost and hurting souls in our previous 
section. Discussion of the liturgy must take into account how well suited the 
Church's liturgical expressions are for bringing Christ to those unfamiliar with the 
Church. Does the historic liturgy invite or repulse those outside the Church? Is it 
an historic curiosity or a source of spiritual help and nurture? 
Debates over the liturgy demonstrate wide differences of opinion about the 
function and nature of the liturgy in its relationship to community. There are those 
86 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of 
Identity, Othemess, and Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), pp. 36-
37. 
87 In The Trouble with the Church, (p. 99) Thielicke likens the marriage between 
the liturgy and the sermon to that of the divine and human natures in Christ; the 
liturgy with all its splendour and beauty portrays the divinity of Christ while the 
sermon with all its gritty earthiness is like unto Christ's humanity. 
88 Ibid., pp. 97-101. 
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who argue that the historic liturgy is a mere technique for communicating the 
Gospel and that the ritualistic "performance" of it discourages community.89 Their 
point is that such ritual encourages only the promulgation of tradition while more 
non-liturgical styles promote vibrant community building and encourage personal 
relationships. As evidence of this they point to the rapid growth of community 
churches in America that offer very little of the traditional liturgical ritual.90 
Among American Lutherans there has been a fairly heated debate about whether or 
not historic forms should be maintained or discarded in favour of more 
"contemporary forms." Within my own Church body (The Lutheran Church -
Missouri Synod) there are those who have begun using terms like "missionaries" 
and "guardians" to describe the different liturgical camps. "Missionaries," it is 
suggested, care about the lost and are willing to adapt to forms more suited to those 
outside the Church; "guardians" care only about preserving the past and will not 
change ritualistic form for the sake of souls - suggesting of course than anyone 
wishing to maintain the historic liturgy cares nothing for souls! 
Recently a book was published by a source often cited as supportive of more 
free-form contemporary expressions of worship; in it ThornS. Rainer, Dean of the 
89 Timothy D. May, "The Liturgy: A Place for Relationships," Logia: A Journal 
of Lutheran Theology vol. XI, No. 1 (Epiphany 2002), pp. 56-58. 
90 Even within American Lutheranism there are strong currents moving the 
stylistic emphasis away from ideas of "reverence" and "devotion" toward ideas of 
"praise" and "enjoyment." Organs are giving way to contemporary bands. The 
Theology of the Cross is giving way to a constant focus on glory. Creeds are 
dismissed because they smack of traditionalism. The Lord's Prayer is not used 
because it suggests vain repetition. Liturgical elements such as the Te Deum are 
cast aside in favour of tunes and lyrics that are snappier and more "praise" oriented. 
Even American Church architecture reflects design that revolves around a "stage 
area" where entertainers perform instead of around an altar where Christ is present. 
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Billy Graham School of Missions, Evangelism, and Church Growth, interviewed 
over 300 people who were previously unchurched and had joined a Christian 
congregation within the past several years. He enquired about their reasons for 
joining a Christian Church. What he found was that only 11% of those interviewed 
were influenced by the particular style of liturgical worship.91 Which liturgical 
style attracted them was not revealed. What was revealed was that the form of 
liturgical expression mattered less than the sense of orderliness and purpose it 
conveyed. 92 The claims then that the historic liturgy conveys a sense of musty 
formalism that repulses postmodem people is simply unfounded. The unavoidable 
conclusion ofRainer's study is that in order for the liturgy to be effective in 
reaching beyond the boarders of the Church one does not have to "contemporise" it, 
but simply make it clear in its purpose and order. 
Our other concern when addressing the liturgy goes to the matter of its 
effectiveness in overcoming negative individualism and conveying a more 
communal understanding of christology. Sociologist Kieran Flanagan has taken up 
this question in his book Sociology and Liturgy: Re-presentations of the Holy. 
There Flanagan argues that the historic liturgical praxis, so full of ritual and 
structure, is more beneficial for building community than non-ritualistic liturgical 
forms. The reforms of Vatican 11 were mild in comparison with many postmodem 
liturgical "re-workings," yet even in this mild form Flanagan argues that the 
approach to reform was based on faulty sociology: 
91 ThornS. Rainer, Surprising Insights from the Unchurched (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 2001 ), p. 21. 
92 Ibid. p. 102. 
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The changes in liturgical renewal endorsed in the Vatican II 
documents were based on a narrowly conceived and inadequate 
sociology where functional relational aspects of ritual were 
endorsed. As Luis Maldonado noted, there was an obsessive 
concern in the key document on Sacred Liturgy of Vatican II, that 
rites should be simple, brief, facile and clear. The Council 
sanctioned a deficient set of sociological assumptions and launched 
these in a society, whose cultural assumptions, in the late 1960s, 
underwent a revolution that denied what they had endorsed. Efforts 
to make rites relevant made them curiously irrelevant.93 
The faulty set of assumptions, as Flanagan goes on to describe, are rooted in the 
belief that the value of rite lies in its being better understood.94 The reforms of 
Vatican II were based on the belief that culture seeks that which is intellectually 
oriented, and that which is identifiable, provable, quantifiable, and explainable. 
These traits are often seen as more modem than postmodem, yet many postmodem 
liturgical re-constructionists continue to champion these as the necessary guiding 
principles for liturgical reform. There is perhaps a tension within postmodernism 
where people seek to live in two worlds, so to speak, yearning for a sense of the 
metaphysical and non-quantifiable, yet demanding intellectual appropriation of all 
truths. The demand for intellectual appropriation when applied to the liturgy often 
leads to a diminishing of liturgical practice to the most basic elements and a 
forsaking of numerous historic forms. 
Flanagan's contention is that this approach (focusing on the intellectual 
"understandability" of the liturgy) leads to judging the sacred by the methods and 
assumptions of the secular. Volfs warning about the "sacralization" of cultural 
93 Kieran Flanagan, Sociology and Liturgy: Re-presentations of the Holy 
(London: Mac m ill an Academic and Professional L TD, 1991 ), p. 3 8. 
94 Not surprisingly an idea that Thielicke shares. Cf. The Trouble with the 
Church, pp. 102-103. 
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identity is particularly poignant in this debate. The need for provability and 
intellectual appropriation arises out of a culture more concerned with the individual 
than with the community. Intellectual "graspability" is foundational for the 
individual but not as much so for the community. Flanagan goes on to say: 
... Franklin comments on Gueranger's 'rediscovery of the liturgy as 
an instrument for the destruction of individualism. For the first time 
in centuries there was a definition of prayer as a social act'. Most 
importantly, the quest for community was tied into mystery rather 
than rationality. It involved the community in an act of reaching 
beyond the purely material and human to an order that transcended 
these elements.95 
Individualism has pressed the liturgical presentation toward an anthropological 
view that seeks greater meaning through rational means. Yet as Flanagan argues 
sociology bears out that community is not built from intellectualisation but by 
sharing an experience beyond itself which may not be explainable. Flanagan quotes 
Ratzinger who said: 
Many people have felt and said the liturgy must be 'made' by the 
whole community if it is really to belong to them. Such an attitude 
has led to the 'success' of the liturgy being measured by its effects at 
the level of spectacle and entertainment. It is to lose sight of what is 
distinctive to the liturgy, which does not come from what we do but 
from the fact that something is taking place here that all of us 
together cannot 'make'. 96 
Certainly questions about the meaning of the liturgy must be asked. To claim as 
Flanagan does, that the power of community inherent in the liturgy is not based on 
one's ability to understand it intellectually does not mean that the deeper meaning 
of the liturgy should remain hidden. Instead what it means is that the historic 
ritualistic forms of the liturgy must be carefully governed, weighing the importance 
95 Ibid., p. 48. 
96 Ibid., p. 54. 
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of the power of the rite as mystery and the ability of each individual to understand 
every element of that rite. That the liturgy should be so reduced to a simplistic 
level where everyone can understand its elements is an approach that simply does 
not foster community but rather individualism. 
The historic liturgy does provide unique and important avenues for building the 
christological community and shaping the mind around the mystery of the present 
Christ. Thielicke speaks of the liturgy as providing a "stationary element nourished 
by tradition" to the Church.97 But the liturgy is more than an anchor to the ancient 
Church. It is also an expression of the present Christ. The very nature of the 
historic liturgy bespeaks an awe before a God who is present among his people. 
The liturgical building toward the Eucharistic encounter with the flesh and blood of 
Christ is difficult if not impossible to quantify, yet on a level above the intellectual 
mind this movement is perceptible and shared by all. The very mysterious nature of 
this movement and the shared inability to put it in exact words binds the 
community together in a common experience. 
Early on in this thesis it was noted that one of the most prominent christological 
methods in Thielicke's sermons is his use of"open metaphor" (which will become 
important in our concluding section). This method applied so well by Thielicke to 
the spoken word is just as important in conveying the deep spiritual truths 
contained in the liturgy. The liturgy is itself in a way an open metaphor inviting 
wonder and contemplation. It is not a metaphor in the sense of only being a sign 
pointing beyond itself but rather in the sense of also pointing beyond itself. 
97 The Trouble with the Church, p. 97. 
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Timelessness and holiness are two liturgical characteristics that bespeak something 
of the nature of God. The corporate exercise of the liturgy testifies to the corporate 
nature of Christ as an ecclesial and social being. Liturgy is not a metaphor for the 
subjective individual mind and intellect alone, but for the very heart and soul of the 
community that experiences a taste of the mystery of the present Christ enfolded 
within the liturgy. 
Vatican II has much to commend it in striving to draw people into the notion of 
ecclesiological community. It sought to do this by reworking the liturgical forms 
while maintaining the basic liturgical structure.98 In "The Constitution On the 
Sacred Liturgy" (Sacrosanctum Concilium) of 1963, the reforms of the Mass reveal 
the issue of intellectual "understandability" on the one hand and the desire to build 
community on the other. Certainly as Vatican II points out there is a sense where 
"understandibility" can prove helpful toward building the christological 
community.99 But this is not to say that in achieving this ''understandability," one 
must sacrifice the power of metaphor and mystery and give up the historic liturgy. 
98 Cf. Annibale Bugnini, The Reform of the Liturgy 1948-1975, trans. Matthew 
J. O'Connell (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1990), p. 5. 
99 Cf. Chapter I, under ill. "The Reform of the Sacred Liturgy," para. 21 "In 
this restoration, both texts and rites should be drawn up so that they express more 
clearly the things which they signify; the Christian people, so far as possible, should 
be enabled to understand with ease and to take part in them fully, actively, and as 
befits a community." Para. 27 "It is to be stressed that whenever rites, according to 
their specific nature, make provision for communal celebration involving the 
presence and active participation of the faithful, this way of celebrating them is to 
be preferred, so far as possible, to a celebration that is individual and quasi-
private." Para. 30 "To promote active participation, the people should be 
encouraged to take part by means of acclamations, responses, psalmody, antiphons, 
and songs, as well as by actions, gestures, and bodily attitudes. And at the proper 
times all should observe a reverent silence." Chapter II para. 48, "The Church, 
therefore, earnestly desires that Christ's faithful, when present at this mystery of 
faith, should not be there as strangers or silent spectators; on the contrary, through a 
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The desire on the part of Vatican ll that individuals should better understand 
themselves as the body of Christ is a worthwhile hope in the postmodern context. 
The debate over Vatican ll seems to involve more the matter of how this 
understanding is achieved. Flanagan obviously thinks the forms themselves need 
not be radically changed to convey the idea of the christological community. While 
acknowledging the need for liturgical enculturation, and further acknowledging the 
need for the words of the liturgy to be understood by the laity, this thesis agrees in 
principle with Flanagan. The dignity and awe of the liturgical conversation 
inherent in the historic forms best acknowledges the mystery of the presence of 
Christ, and through the power of that mystery and presence the liturgy builds up the 
community of faith in a shared un-quantifiable experience. 
Before we leave the discussion of the liturgy, it is worth noting that the 
"ritualistic" nature of the liturgy provides us with a tool for fulfilling a major 
concern ofThielicke's, namely of reaching people "where they are." If one looks at 
Thielicke's method in general terms, one fmds him seeking points of contact with 
people that are built on their already existing inclinations. Thielicke's criticisms of 
missionary efforts in Japan stand as an example; he believes Christendom would 
fare better among the Japanese if missionaries stressed less of the Western 
good understanding of the rites and prayers they should take part in the sacred 
action conscious of what they are doing, with devotion and full collaboration. They 
should be instructed by God's word and be nourished at the table of the Lord's body; 
they should give thanks to God; by offering the Immaculate Victim, not only 
through the hands of the priest, but also with him, they should learn also to offer 
themselves; through Christ the Mediator, they should be drawn day by day into ever 
more perfect union with God and with each other, so that finally God may be all in 
all." 
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incarnational!sacramental theology, which he sees as alien to Japanese thought, and 
gave greater attention to allowing the Japanese to "arrive at their own elemental 
encounter with Christ." 100 Regardless of one's agreement or disagreement with his 
conclusions, his strategy is clear: expose that which is already present in the 
internal make-up of the hearers and build on it. 
Liturgy as ritual is one such point of contact with something inherent within 
human beings. Ritual is found throughout the world in every known culture. It is 
in itself a form of communication or "communicative action" that touches human 
beings at a level deeper than simple cognitive apprehension. 
Ritual facilitates several forms of communication at the same time. 
These differ from ordinary, discursive forms of communication in 
being both richer and less direct. They are both multilayered, in 
other words, and compact. Typically, their function is not so much 
to transmit information but to communicate self-recognition, intense 
and ambivalent feelings, moral principles and invocations. 101 
Ritual reaches into nearly every aspect of cultural life. As an example one could 
point to fan activity during organised sport as evidence of ritual; fans "doing the 
wave" and singing team songs at football matches are ritual. In America the ''tail-
gate" party prior to American football games has become ingrained in the culture of 
American football. In college sport especially ritual is seen as a necessary part of 
the total game experience. 102 Ritual is not foreign to humanity but part of 
100 Voyage to the Far East, p. 175. (Cf. pp. 174-179). 
101 Frederick Bird, "Ritual as Communicative Action," in Ritual and Ethnic 
Identity: A Comparative Study of the Social Meaning of Liturgical Ritual in 
Synagogues, ed. Jack N. Lightstone and Frederick B. Bird (Ontario, Canada: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1995), p. 39. 
102 The pageantry of pre-game and post-game festivities at University ofNotre 
Dame football games is described in detail by Leonel L. Mitchell and used as an 
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mankind's natural expression of community. Mary Jo Deegan, in The American 
Ritual Tapestry writes that: 
Rituals create a community stage for cultural experience, symbols, 
and values. They can generate, change, destroy, and maintain 
meaning, and in the U.S.A. they can engage in these processes 
simultaneously and rapidly. 103 
As Deegan suggests, the role of ritual is a complex one. It can create meaning 
and reflect already existing meaning simultaneously. It can engage the mind but 
touch the soul at a level that cannot be understood. In order for ritual to be truly 
effective within a community a certain amount of shared experience and meaning is 
necessary. In reaching those outside the Church the extent of that shared 
experience may be minimal but it still remains. Though the deeper meaning of rites 
and liturgies may not be understood, the non-church goer may well grasp the 
reverent attitude, solemnity, and awe of the ritual. Thoughts such as othemess, 
holiness, respect, transcendence, importance and sincerity can be communicated 
through liturgical ritual even to those who may not yet understand basic Christian 
doctrine. 
Mircea Eliade takes this one step further by suggesting that ritual, even when it 
takes place in non-religious people, betrays a suppressed memory of religious ritual: 
Modem nonreligious man assumes a new existential situation; he 
regards himself solely as the subject and agent of history, and he 
refuses all appeal to transcendence ... But the modem man who 
feels and claims that he is nonreligious still retains a large stock of 
camouflaged myths and degenerated rituals. As we remarked 
earlier, the festivities that go with the New Year or with taking up 
example of popular yet "extremely formal" ritual in college sports. Leone! L. 
Mitchell, The Meaning of Ritual (New York: Paulist Press, 1977), p. 118-120. 
103 Mary Jo Deegan, The American Ritual Tapestry (Westport Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 3. 
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residence in a new house, although laicised, still exhibit the structure 
of a ritual of renewal. The same phenomenon is observable in the 
merrymaking that accompanies a marriage or the birth of a child or 
obtaining a new position or a social advancement, and so on. 104 
His thoughts are obviously debatable, but even if he is correct to a degree then 
ritual becomes a strong point of contact for further outreach to the secular world. 
While ritual itself is inherent in human nature, appreciation for any given ritual 
grows as one establishes his or her place within that community. Shared 
understanding across a broad range of values and doctrines makes the purpose and 
richness of a particular ritual clearer. As Bird writes: 
When people enact a ritual ... they do so not only because they 
think of it in terms of drama, something desirable or entertaining, 
but also because they think of it in terms of morality, something that 
ought to be done. 105 
Thielicke recognized the importance of building that common understanding in 
society by offering adult catechetical sessions to the general public. 106 His intent 
was education for a better understanding of one's personal Christ encounter, but 
104 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. By 
Willard R Trask (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1959), pp. 203-205. 
105 Ritual and Ethnic Identity, p. 27. In the following article, Katherine Platt, 
"Ritual and the Symbolic Geography of Community," in On Community, ed. Leroy 
S. Rouner (Notre Dame, Indiana: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1991), pp.106-
107, the author relates her own Muslim ritualistic heritage and observes: "One's 
identity as a man, a woman, and a Muslim of good reputation and right practice is 
established and renewed through a series of life cycle rituals and annual Islamic 
holidays .... the rituals must take place in a context of shared meanings, shared 
information, and shared standards of evaluation. The place of origin reliably 
provides such a context for those both in and of the place of origin. As such the 
place, itself, becomes a powerful symbol of orthopraxy, especially for those who 
live away. 
106 Notes from a Wayfarer, pp. 149-153. 
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what he did inadvertently was build the common understanding necessary for 
ritualistic appreciation. Had his focus included a stronger directive toward the 
Church and her worship~ his catechetical efforts may have had a more profound 
effect on strengthening the Christian community. 
This discussion of ritual as an important form of communication and as a 
continuation ofThielicke's desire to reach those outside the Church will gain 
importance in the concluding section of this chapter which deals with the role of 
semiotics in combating individualism. Ritual is the semiotic expression of the 
community, and when applied to ecclesiological expressions one may even suggest 
that ritual becomes a semiotic form of divine communication. As the voice of the 
community ritual provides a powerful tool against individualism and subjective 
atomisation. As the voice of God ritual communicates the soteriological action of 
Christ. 
In America the aversion to ritual may have its origin in the puritanical and 
iconoclastic roots of American Protestantism. Yet as others have pointed out, those 
who complain about the formal rituals of the Church show no aversion to 
participating in the rituals of the secular world around them. Formal ritual in the 
Church is not a problem when engaging the secular world; just the opposite, it may 
hold a critical role in the solution. 
7.3c Emphasising the Communal .Aspects of Common Rites 
Ritual gains depth and breadth as it gains history. The more recent the innovation 
of any particular ritual the less mass appeal it will have. As we search for ways to 
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overcome the effects of negative individualism with a clearer view ofthe 
christological "we," I suggest not inventing new rituals that better stress 
communion but recognizing the existing opportunities within more traditional 
liturgical rituals. 
As an example, earlier it was noted that Thielicke complained of a magical view 
of baptism. People would bring their child to be baptised and then would not set 
foot in the Church again until it was time for that child to be married. The 
fulfilment of the rite became an excuse for a self-defined life apart from the 
Church. Thielicke's solution, as we discussed previously, was to dispense with the 
historic practice of infant baptism. Instead of such a radical solution, the problem 
(which still exists) can be addressed in other ways that do not do violence to the rite 
(and the doctrine of infant baptism surrounding it). One way would be to insist on 
a brief period of catechesis for the parents prior to the act of baptism. Such issues as 
the union of the baptised to the body of Christ and the mystical indwelling of the 
person of Christ could be discussed. The parents' own separation from that body 
and from Christ who is present within his Church could thus be explored and better 
direction given. 
The importance of directly addressing this matter with people is made more 
urgent in consideration of the phenomenon of"implicit religion" (a term now being 
used to describe the religious life of those who do not attend corporate worship but 
who are involved in regular prayer, listening to religious broadcasting, and reading 
religious materials). This phenomenon elicits both hope and trepidation. 
Trepidation because unless all those bringing children to be baptised are instructed 
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in the meaning of faith as corporate existence, it is only matter of time until people 
start baptising their own children and celebrating their own private forms of the 
Eucharist. Yet there is hope, because as they are still clinging to the importance of 
private devotion, they have not totally abandon religion. It may be easier for the 
Church to redirect their misunderstandings than to recreate what is no longer 
present. 
This should further instruct the Church to address the wisdom of private 
baptisms. If part of the message of one's baptism is union with the people of God 
in Christ, then the location and "audience" for the event of this union itself is 
important. 107 Private baptisms send a mixed signal that makes appreciation for the 
true union ofthe baptised with the Saviour and his people more difficult. 108 Further 
it separates the sacrament from the overall context of the liturgy of the worshipping 
community, which as both Flanagan and our discussion on ritual point out is a 
powerful tool in building community. 
Similarly the rites for marriages and funerals are often separated from the 
regular liturgy of the Church, made matters for immediate friends and family, and 
not necessarily seen as including the Church as the body of Christ. Efforts could be 
made to bring these gradually within the context of the regular worshipping 
107 Cf. fn. 104 where Katherine Platt speaks of the importance oflocation for the 
overall orientation of ritual. 
108 John Zizioulas notes similar thoughts about the necessary corporate nature of 
the Eucharist. He states, "The Eucharist ... is unthinkable without the gathering of 
the whole Church in one place, that is, without an event of communion." Being 
and Communion (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimer's Seminary Press, 1985), p. 
22. 
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community (especially in smaller parishes where there are fewer marriages and 
funerals). What better way to emphasise the idea of two being made one flesh in 
marriage than to set that marriage within the gathering of faith wherein the many 
members become one body (i.e. the regular Sunday morning worshipping 
community)? What better way to build the foundation for union between husband 
and wife than surrounded by the historic liturgy which itself builds union through 
the shared experience of the christological mystery? When possible funerals too 
could be brought into the regular worship of the Church so that the community of 
faith in which the person lived could together celebrate the joining of one of its own 
with the unseen community of heavenly saints. If joining these "extra" services to a 
typical Sunday morning worship proves too difficult (especially in larger parishes), 
then perhaps attention could be given for the liturgical rites of these services to be 
included in some meaningful way as a time of remembrance during the regular 
worship so the whole worshipping community could participate after the fact. 
The liturgy itself need not undergo significant changes to accomplish the task of 
better conveying the christological community. The Church need only recognize 
the historic liturgy as a powerful tool in its own right for building up the sense of 
mystical communion with the person of Christ and with others sharing that 
experience. 
7.3d Rethinking the Role of the Sermon 
Thielicke' s vehicle of choice for furthering his christological method is clearly the 
sermon. It is not without grounds that one can see the many other non-sermonic 
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texts he wrote as serving his public proclamation. 109 Many ofthe recurring themes 
in his sermons have separate volumes devoted to them. So the sermon as a well-
developed, polished, and winsome medium carried much greater weight for 
establishing his christological method than any other medium. It was in the 
sermon where Thielicke could most quickly and clearly relate to the concrete 
situation of mankind and make christology relevant to the individual. 110 
It was through the sermon that Thielicke reached out to the world at large. In 
volume two of his Ethics Thielicke writes: 
... the church acts, if you will, Socratically, or indirectly. It does 
not debate things; it aims at the conversion of persons. Those who 
"seek first the kingdom of God" will fmd not only that certain new 
things will "be added" [Matt. 6:33] but also that certain old things 
will drop away. Direct political action is not for the church. Indirect 
influence by way of infiltration and subversion is more appropriate. 
In this connection it is perhaps not without significance that the 
church is constantly referred to symbolically as a wife .... By nature 
the woman influences the world indirectly, through her husband. 111 
Words such as "infiltration" and "subversion" are not words with which the 
Church is normally comfortable. Yet it is an apt description of the Lutheran 
doctrine of the two kingdoms. Notwithstanding our previous discussion of the 
109 In The Trouble with the Church, p. 78 Thielicke states that his writing of his 
Ethics volumes was done "in order to do the theological background work for 
preaching." 
11° Cf. Ibid., pp. 66-67, 71-73. Also Helmut Thielicke, How the World Began, 
trans. John Doberstein (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961) p.306. "The hearer must 
be able to say after he has listened to the sermon: ';I was in it'; perhaps also, 'I was 
in it in a way that doesn't suit me at all, because I wanted to think of myself in a 
different way, and so I feel challenged to oppose. Nevertheless, I was in it."' 
111 Theological Ethics, vol. 2, p. 646. The concluding remark in this quotation is 
of course somewhat surprising ofThielicke who speaks here with an 
uncharacteristic insensitivity toward the modem status of women. 
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Church's social presence as a charitable institution, classic Lutheranism does avoid 
direct sociaVpolitical involvement by the Church as a means of changing the world. 
Instead it tries to influence the world at large through the justified and therefore 
sanctified acts and minds of her members. For Thielicke the proclaimed word is 
the main vehicle for christological presence112 and therefore the sermon is the main 
ecclesiological avenue for indirectly changing the world. 
Yet in today's cultural climate it must be asked whether the sermon can or 
should still bear the load Thielicke placed on it? Can the sermon still function in 
today's world as virtually the sole point of christological contact with the individual 
or as the main vehicle through which christology infiltrates the world? It is not our 
intention here to question the ability of the sermon to bear the christological 
presence (a necessary point in both classic Lutheranism and Thielicke113), nor do 
we wish to cast doubt on the work of the Holy Spirit through the proclaimed word 
(as Luther and Thielicke both emphasise114). What we wish to explore is the ability 
of the sermon to function as the main communicative vehicle for reaching the 
112 Consider from Glauben als Abenteuer, p. 48. "Sondem ich bin es nur, weil 
ich auf etwas vertraue: darauf, daB Gott mein ktimmerliches Wort in seinen Dienst 
stellen, daB er selber darin anwesend sein will. 'Das Wort der Predigt ist der die 
menschliche Natur annehmende und tragende Christus selbst' (Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer)." [Translation: "However I am it (a letter from Christ) only because I 
trust in something. I trust that God puts my pitiful word in his service and that he 
wants to be present himself in that word. 'The Word of the sermon is that which 
human nature apprehends and which bears Christ himself (Dietrich Bonhoeffer)]" 
Scheidt's translation in Faith the Great Adventure, p. 22 was not used due to lack of 
accuracy. 
113 Cf. LW 36:340, " ... the one Christ enters into so many hearts through the 
voice, and that each person who hears the sermon and accepts it takes the whole 
Christ into his heart." 
114 See fn. 120. 
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postmodern world in light of emerging cultural dynamics. As previously, pursuing 
this question lies at the heart ofThielicke's desire to be most effective in reaching 
those outside the Church. 
We propose below to examine the sermon from the standpoint of 
communication theory. 115 What communication theory suggests initially is that the 
very nature of the sermon as Christian proclamation presents particular difficulties 
for postmodern expectations. Secular communication theorists suggest that the 
more "communicators follow professional or personally chosen - rather than 
market-dictated- goals, the more potential for tension with the audience."116 The 
goals of the Church should never be "market-driven," if they were then the sermon 
itself must further the individualism and hedonism which the market wants. Instead 
the sermon must remain polemic in its relationship to social desire. Thielicke 
offers effective sermonic models for such a critical positioning toward societal and 
ecclesiological error. As this applies to our goal of furthering the christological 
"we," the implication is that this message will be a difficult message for the world 
to hear because it goes against market desires. To be effective in communicating 
this message, sermons will require constant reinforcement and reiteration. 
115 Thielicke speaks of evaluating the sermon on the basis of"accommodation in 
speech" [communication theory] and "accommodation in substance" [theology]. 
How the World Began, p. 306. Our evaluation from communication theory is then 
in keeping with Thielicke's own method of evaluation. 
116 Denis McQuail, Audience Analysis (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
1997), p. 111. 
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Communication theory also requires us to examine the audience. When we do 
so, we discover that the task of preaching is complicated by the apparent 
degradation of the postmodern ability to think and reason at the level of profound 
truth that theology often demands. As previous discussions on Postmodernism 
have shown, the typical postmodern mind has been so influenced by a culture of 
entertainment that the ability of the average Western mind to engage deep thoughts 
has been affected. 117 So the act of sitting and listening to someone give a well-
reasoned speech, with a logical progression of thought, and about what might prove 
to be a difficult subject, has become a more difficult exercise for the postmodern 
mind. 118 
The response suggested by communication theory is to simplify and shorten the 
length of sermons. Where Luther and other reformers may have preached for well 
over an hour (several hours at times) and Thielicke's typical sermon ran near to 45 
117 George Comstock and Erica Scharrer, Television: What's On. Who's 
Watching, and What It Means (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), pp 245-252. 
The authors show through studies done with hundreds of thousands of American 
school children (4th- 12th grades) that there is a direct correlation between the 
amount of television watched and academic achievement. The more television 
students watched the poorer their scholastic performance. The studies also showed 
a direct correlation to socio-economic status and the amount of television watched. 
Those of a higher socio-economic status watched less television and therefore also 
exhibited less direct negative impact from television watching. 
118 Apologetic Preaching. p. 118. Loscalzo argues that the Postmodern mind 
finds it difficult to grasp logical linear arguments and is more accustomed to 
thinking "mosaically," which is to say that Postmodern thinkers "draw conclusion 
by seeing a whole in the parts, no matter how or in what order the parts are 
presented." 
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minutes, 119 many churches now expect sermon length to be an absolute maximum 
of20 minutes and more commonly between 12 and 15 minutes. The sermons of 
previous generations could be more in-depth and could explore a broader range of 
tangents than postmodem sermons can. Previously sermons could also build on a 
more cohesive body of truth and values among the people. Now, assumptions 
about common values and truth claims cannot be taken for granted. 
From a purely communicative standpoint this combination of circumstances 
challenges the role of the sermon as Thielicke used it. Certainly the sermon still 
holds power to convince and move people's hearts. 120 But in the postmodem world 
its strength may depend more on its overall ecclesiological context and less on its 
ability to stand alone as oral persuasion. 
7.4 Merging Christological Elements into a Semiotic Solution 
The solution for the changing role of the sermon is tied directly to our solution for 
an individualised christology. Thus far we have offered a number of critical 
comments about Thielicke's individualised approach, and we have listed a number 
of elements that can help build a new metanarrative of communion with others and 
with Christ. What has not yet been offered is a cohesive principle binding all these 
various elements together into a workable solution for postmodem individualism. 
119 On a personal note, once when I went on vacation I invited a retired pastor in 
his 80's to preach for me. He preached for 45 minutes and reported that several 
families walked out after the half hour mark. There were even suggestions from 
some of my younger members upon my return that T -shirts be made up saying, "I 
survived a 45 minute sermon!" 
12
° From the standpoint of classic Lutheranism this is all the more true in light of 
the work and action ofthe Holy Spirit in the proclaimed word. Cf. LW 13:272, 
15:261,24:357. 
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We have offered the view of a Theology of Presence as a means toward building a 
new metanarrative, but this too needs to be understood as something more than a 
subjective application of separate principles. 
Beneath all the different elements defining a Theology of Presence is an 
understanding that ontology, meaning, and corporate being are bound together in a 
semiotic relationship. That is, each element discussed separately above as a part of 
our solution for postmodern individualism is bound to all the other elements as 
"sign" relating to an overall "meta-sign." "Sign" here is not understood as merely 
"symbol" but that which may have meaning in itself yet simultaneously points to 
meaning beyond itself. 
We justify our use of such a principle by citing Thielicke's use of metaphor as a 
chosen method of christological communication. We have discussed several times 
above how he used open metaphor as a means of subjective christological 
appropriation. The power of metaphor in Thielicke's use of it was its subjective 
nature; it forced individuals to make corollaries to their personal experience and 
defied attempts to objectify meaning. 121 Metaphor furthered his individualistic 
christological approach by emphasising the subject element of encountering Christ. 
Such a use of metaphor is an implicit adoption of a semiotic approach. Metaphors 
are signs pointing beyond themselves. He may have consciously promoted logical 
and cognitive forms of apprehension, but by the persistent use of metaphor he 
121 Cf. Gundry's observations about Pauline metaphors "Perhaps part of the very 
point of the Pauline metaphors - spatial, horticultural, structural, familial, and 
somatic - is that they stand for a reality understandable but incomprehensible. If 
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unconsciously adopts a method of communication that exceeds the logical. What 
we now propose is to use the "semiotic principle" that Thielicke unconsciously 
adopted and redirect it away from subjective individualistic points of view. Even 
more we will attempt to show how the adoption of a semiotic approach touches the 
totality of theology, ecclesiology, and christology and ultimately ties together an 
unspoken metanarrative of corporate existence and christological communion. 
As a secular discipline "Semiotics" is the study of signs and their relationships 
as a means of communication. It is not merely concerned with establishing things 
as signs but it asks questions about the action and interaction of signs. 122 Semiotics 
is concerned with signs as narrow as a single thing or as broad as a culture123 or a 
cosmology. Spoken language is often considered to have a privilege or primacy in 
the discipline of semiotics. 124 But what semiotics has to say about how human 
beings form their understanding of the word or world around them is based on 
interaction of other signs surrounding those in question. The spoken word never 
occurs in isolation but is interpreted through other surrounding signs. Thus how 
one speaks adds to what is being spoken. Hand movements, facial gestures, and 
so, the attempt to exhaust its meaning is doomed from the start." Soma in Biblical 
Theology, p. 241. 
122 John Deely, Basics of Semiotics (B1oomington: Indiana University Press, 
1990), p. 105. 
123 Sydney M. Lamb, "Semiotics of Language and Culture: a Relational 
Approach" in The Semiotics of Culture and Language, vol. 2 (Dover, New 
Hampshire: Prances Pinted, 1984), p. 96. Here Lamb states that "a culture as a 
whole may be characterizable as a vast integrated semiotic in which can be 
recognized a number of subsemiotics." 
124 Pierre Guiraud, Semiology, trans. George Gross (Boston: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975), p. 1. 
337 
intonations are all additional signs reinforcing the words themselves. 125 Thus 
Guiraud writes: 
The receiver of a message must decode it, must reconstruct its 
meaning on the basis of signs each of which carry elements of that 
meaning, i.e. indication concerning the relation of each sign with 
others. 126 
This impacts the sermon by taking it out of the realm of the isolated event and 
placing it within the highly complex context of liturgical signs and rites all of which 
work together to convey meaning. If people are to gain the faith and understanding 
they need to infiltrate the world with a more selfless christology, then they will 
have to be influenced by the total combination of signs supporting and extending 
the meaning of the spoken Word. This is so especially now when the force of the 
spoken word is constrained by limitations of time and cognitive ability. 
Communication theorists point out a strong relationship between meaning and 
action for the postmodem mind. The rejection of objective truth and the 
fragmentation of meaning has shifted the burden of meaning away from objective 
truth claims to that which can be subjectively and existentially verified. Verifiable 
action then becomes an important character for the sorts of signs that can establish 
meaning for a new metanarrative. 127 
125 Ibid., p. 87. 
126 Ibid., p. 13. 
127 James A. Anderson, Communication Theory: Epistemological Foundations 
(New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), p.57. Anderson writes: "What something 
means, therefore, is answerable only in the present, only at the site of considerable 
efforts that provide for its construction and must be answered anew at the next 
asking .... One must also understand action, for it is in action that meaning may 
become." 
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Through semiotics liturgical action and social charity (as discussed above) lend 
strength to the spoken word. Eucharistic fellowship, shared doctrinal subscription, 
and sacramental rites in the context of regular communal worship all work together 
as a mosaic to build a powerful message of communion with God and with others. 
These signs may impact some individuals differently, and thus preserve the 
importance of the individual; while other signs may convey more common 
meanings. When it comes to matters of Christian faith, the implicit message of all 
signs is directed to a common christology under the operation of the Holy Spirit. 
Signs have been variously categorized as to type and function. Signal signs 
trigger a reaction in the receiver; Icons are signs that seek to represent in some way 
another object; Index signs point to something else; and symbols denote meaning 
through a "conventional link" between signifier and its denotata. 128 The point is 
that meaning is established through a variety of ways and in signs differing in 
character, yet all these work together to convey common meaning in some sense. 
So maintaining the objective presence of Christ in sacramental signs provides one 
unique way of receiving him mysteriously that defies attempts at logical/cognitive 
explanation. Maintaining the different presence of Christ in faith, community, or 
society, provides ways of perceiving Christ and his work that impact a different 
level of the consciousness. Christ in the spoken word works more on the cognitive 
mind. Christ and matters of faith portrayed in art speak to yet a different part of the 
128 Thomas A. Sebeok, Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
University ofToronto Press, 2001), pp. 39-63. Within these pages the species of 
signs are discussed. 
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mind. Yet together all the unique signs form a complete underlying message about 
Christ's salvific work and the consequent communion of his people together in him. 
The application of semiotics to the Church yields a vast complex web of sign 
forms from architecture to art, from music to the spoken word, and from social 
action to sacramental experience; all of which bespeak Christ's saving presence, 
and all of which carry both communal and subjective/individual elements. They 
cannot be fully appreciated in isolated solitude as the individual interprets them in 
his or her own understanding, but they find interrelatedness and fullness in meaning 
only when viewed from within the body of Christ. 
In the end the way signs are able to communicate a kind of "subliminal" or non-
quantifiable form of meaning may prove to be more effective in shaping the 
metanarrative of postmodem individual than any logical argument could. Logical 
instruction and argument certainly have their place, but a view toward the whole 
experience of ecclesiology as a unified sign strengthens the force of the meaning 
underneath. In his discussion on faith, person, and Church Miroslav Volf rightly 
states: 
What George Lindbeck says of proclamation is true of every form of 
the confession of faith: "[it] gains power and meaning insofar as it is 
embodied in the total gestalt of community life and action. 129 
Volfs comments are embedded in his discussion on personhood as it relates to 
one's ecclesial being. The identity of a person is bound to the total life of the 
ecclesial community and to the very life of Christ. Ontology and christology 
129 After Our Likeness, p. 163. 
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become one with ecclesiology. When such "ecclesial being" is ingrained within 
Christians, then as they infiltrate the world they will take with them a deep-seated 
understanding of themselves as "beings-with." Such an appreciation for 
"corporateness" need not stand against the individual. Ecclesial being in no way 
denies the individual as such. As Zizioulas presents it from a more eastern 
perspective, there may be a tendency to pit ecclesial being against the individual; 130 
however one need not do so. Instead the total presentation of the Gospel through 
all the many and various forms available to the Church can communicate both 
individual importance and corporate being simultaneously. When the Church is 
aware of the force of its interlocking signs and directs her people toward the 
inherent message of corporate existence and christological communion in them, she 
will begin to form the basis of a new and comprehensive understanding of self, 
other, and God. 
This goes directly to the matter of the sermon as well. This thesis began with 
concern over the christological direction of Thielicke's sermons. In retrospect the 
problem with Thielicke and with present-day individualised preaching is a failure to 
connect the sermon with the obvious communal semiotic structure around it. Some 
authors have noted that preaching has historically struggled to find a connection 
130 Zizioulas' strong language regarding the individual and personhood seems to 
reveal the tactic of pitting the individual against ecclesial being. The proposal here 
is that both aspects of human personhood should be acknowledged as important in 
their own right. Zizioulas writes, "Being a person is fundamentally different from 
being an individual or a 'personality,' for a person cannot be imagined in himself 
but only within his relationships. Taking our categories from our fallen state of 
existence, we usually identify a person with the 'self (individual) and with all it 
possesses in its qualities and experiences (the personality). But modem 
philosophers recall with good reason that this is not what being a person means." 
Being and Communion, pp. 105-106. 
341 
with its liturgical and sacramental context. 131 Thielicke can be seen as suffering 
from just such a disconnection; liturgy and sacraments are seldom bound to his 
sermonic thoughts. Likewise the rich communal overtones of the myriad of signs 
throughout the Church go unnoticed by him. If the sermon could be structured in 
such a way as to direct the hearers to the dual realities of individual worth and 
corporate existence by using the many surrounding ecclesiological signs as 
examples of both in harmony, then postmodem hearers could be brought further 
into this new realisation. 
Thielicke is valuable as an example of how an underlying principle needs to be 
carried through one's overall theology in order to effective. Not only his sermons 
but, as has been shown, his entire theological system is tipped in the direction of the 
individual. This consistency of theme is very important for the effective 
communication of an underlying We/tanschauung. One cannot merely redress 
individualism by talking more about community. One must rather see all the 
elements of theology and christology as a united whole with a common theme. 
That common theme must be christocentric and relevant to the concrete situation of 
people in the present day, and it must value the individual while promoting 
communion. 
131 Richard Lischer, Theories of Preaching (Durham, NC: The Labyrinth Press, 
1987), p.354-355. In an article by Geoffrey Wainwright entitled "Preaching as 
Worship," Wainwright points out "that the sermon has sometimes been shifted 
from its proper place within the liturgy and may even, in certain degenerate periods 
and places, have disappeared altogether from use, while in Protestantism the service 
of the word has often been robbed of its sacramental counterpart and context." The 
marriage then between sermon and liturgy and sermon and sacramental referent has 
not always been (nor is it now) understood as necessary. 
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Thielicke's contribution to christology is indispensable to our present discussion 
in other ways as well. He shows the singleness of mind that must direct future 
christology. His concern in preaching for a freshness of style and need for 
understanding one's audience should characterise all postmodem sermons. Issues 
important to him like reaching the concrete situation of people and challenging both 
social and ecclesiological error must likewise endure. Only by taking up the 
gauntlet Thielicke has thrown down and exploring ways to foster a new 
metanarrative can the postmodem Church be true to the saving heart of Christ that 
beats within her. 
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